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Peter C. Erbland, ISB #2456 
Paine, Hamblen, Coffin, Brooke & Miller, LLP 
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101 
Post Office Box E 
Coeurd'Aiene, Idaho 83816-0328 
Phone (208) 664-8115 
FAX (208) 664-6338 
Scott W. Reed, ISB#818 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box A 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
Phone (208) 664-2161 
FAX (208) 765-5117 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JIM BRANNON, 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
v~ > 
) 
SUSAN K. WEATHERS, in her capacity ) 
as the City of Coeur d'Alene City Clerk; ) 
MIKE KENNEDY, in his capacity as the ) 
incumbent candidate for the City of ) 
Coeur d'Alene Council Seat #2; ) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
Case No. cv:.o9-1 0010 
MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANT 
KENNEDY IN RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REFUSE 
THE APPLICATION OF DEFENDANT 
KENNEDY FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO IRCP Rule 
56 (f) 
From at least the voluntary dismissal by plaintiff of Kootenai County as 
defendant, this case has been carried on in disregard of the law in the election statutes 
and appellant opinions and upon erroneous assumptions not founded upon fact and, in 
most instances, immaterial. The plaintiffs Motion to Refuse is just one more waste of 
the time of Court and counsel. 
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Rule 56 (f), I.R.Civ.P. reads as follows: 
Rule 56 (f). When affidavits are unavailable in summary judgment 
proceedings. 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion 
that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts 
essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit 
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to 
be had or may make such other order as is just. 
The motion purports to be supported by affidavit of plaintiff's attorney Starr Kelso 
expressing opinions and making assumptions totally without factual foundation. 
As set forth in the rebuttal affidavit of undersigned counsel, there was only one 
conversation with potential witness Monica Paquin. Undersigned counsel's only legal 
opinion was the obvious shared by plaintiff's attorney that an Idaho court cannot compel 
a person in Canada to come to Coeur d'Alene to trial. The refusal to pass on her 
telephone number which plaintiff's investigator already had or her home address which 
defendants' counsel did not have resulted in an e-mail to plaintiff's counsel on February 
ath as follows: 
Feb. 8, 2010 04:23:55 P.M. scottwreed@verizon.net wrote: 
Starr: In the Sunday Spokesman of January 31st I read in Dave Oliveria's 
column that Monica Pacquin lived in Canada, that she had been contacted 
by one of your investigators and asked about her vote and that she thought 
such an inquiry about a vote in a city election rather than U.S. Senator or 
President was ridiculous. I sensed from her comment that she did not want 
to be bothered any more. I respect her wish for privacy. Pacquin is a legal 
vote, that is all I have to say. 
See Affidavit of Starr Kelso, page A-6. 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO MOTION 
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The only other contact with plaintiffs target list of witnesses was a call on 
Tuesday, August 1ih, the day after plaintiff filed his pleading from Tammy Currie 
Farkes who was frightened by receipt of a "Notice of Testimony" from attorney Kelso. 
There has been no other contact by undersigned counsel or anyone else 
representing defendant Kennedy with any of plaintiffs listed witnesses. 
There are no facts in the record to support anything in plaintiffs motion. It is 
hardly surprising that out-of-state residents after initially replying to questions from a 
private investigator, decided that they did want to become involved in a city council 
election of no importance to them nor in a trial that might require them to travel 
hundreds or thousands of miles at their own expense. 
So much for paragraphs 1, 2, 6 and 7 of the Motion to Refuse. Paragraph 3 
explains how the deposition of Susan Harris and Ronald Prior failed to elicit under oath 
an indication as for whom either voted. 
In paragraph 4, plaintiffs attorney identifies two persons whom he believes to be 
ineligible voters in the city election whom he intended to depose, but did not. The 
record at the time of summary judgment motion does not provide any admissible 
evidence as to how either Nancy White or Dustin Ainsworth voted. By not deposing 
either, plaintiff forfeited the opportunity to establish either a vote for Kennedy or that 
such voter was not eligible. 
The tape recordings as summarized on pages 3 to 5 are all inadmissible 
hearsay to be stricken. So much for allegations that go nowhere. 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO MOTION 
TO REFUSE THE APPLICATION 3 
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The amended complaint was filed December 10, 2010. As will be noted 
hereinafter, attorney Kelso in an affidavit filed February 28, 2010 averred that affidavits 
or depositions of all witnesses would be completed within two to three months. 
On page 6 of the Motion to Refuse ten persons are named as " ... identified as 
probable material witnesses" probably to be called at trial. As to each, the pleading 
only states that each may testify for whom he or she voted with no indication that any of 
them was an ineligible voter. 
This scant identification is made 249 days after the filing of the Amended 
Complaint, 15 days before hearing on defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
a month before trial. 
In the last paragraph of the Motion to Refuse, plaintiff argues that summary 
judgment is not allowable in an election contest. Idaho Code §34-2013, selectively 
cited in plaintiffs motion, commences: 
34-2013. Procedure in general. - The proceedings shall be held according 
to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure so far as practicable ... 
Further reference to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is made in Idaho Code 
Sections 34-2010, 34-2014, 34-2030 and 34-2033. The unchallenged Scheduling 
Order, Notice of Trial Setting and Initial Pre-Trial Order makes specific provision for 
motions for summary judgment. 
So much more time and space continues to be devoted to rebutting 
unsupportable arguments by plaintiff. 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO MOTION 
TO REFUSE THE APPLICATION 4 
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Plaintiff is not following proper procedure in Rule 56 (f) I.R.Civ.P. Of even more 
importance and further indication that this suit has been brought and pursued 
frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation is to be found in plaintiffs own 
pleadings. 
When the case was before Judge Simpson on a track on the city's motion to 
dismiss set for hearing on March 2"d, counsel for plaintiff filed on Sunday (!) February 
28th his own affidavit captioned: "Affidavit in Support of Motion for Extended Time for 
Discovery and Depositions and To Vacate and Reschedule Trial." 
A duplicate of that affidavit is filed with this response. Under oath, counsel 
represented as follows: 
§7, 8 and 9: Subpoenas would be obtained through Canadian counsel to 
depose Paquin, Farkes and Friend. 
§1 0 Three other non-residents who voted absentee would provide affidavits 
establishing ineligibility and that they voted for Kennedy. 
§12. Plaintiff is to take affidavits and depositions of those ineligible voters 
within two or three months. 
§18. Plaintiff would depose Deputy Secretary of State Tim Hurst, other out-of-
state voters and Mike Kennedy. 
The affidavit concludes in paragraphs 19 and 20. 
19. . . With the schedules of the attorneys for the parties hereto, and the 
schedules of the witnesses, it is my opinion that this process will take two 
or three months beyond the date of the scheduled trial in this matter. 
20. In my opinion, based upon my investigation so far, it is necessary 
that this discovery be completed prior to the trial in this matter so that the 
facts regarding the election can be properly presented by the Court for a 
fair and complete evaluation. 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO MOTION 
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Plaintiff has not deposed anybody. The only affidavit he has obtained and not 
filed is of Gregory A. Proft, a soldier in the army in Iraq alleged by plaintiff to be 
ineligible who voted absentee for Brannon. 
As with many other pleadings of plaintiff in this case, this motion and supporting 
affidavit do not follow the proper procedure for invoking the rules, this time Rule 56 (f) 
I.R.Civ.P. The proper Rule 56 (f) motion is to assert in a timely fashion discoverable 
facts essential to the party's opposition and seek a continuance for depositions or other 
discovery. 
By agreement of all parties and at the express request of attorney Starr in court 
conference in June the trial date of September 13th was set overriding the request of 
defendant Kennedy for a much earlier trial date. 
Plaintiffs motion and affidavit do not assert any effort to obtain affidavits or 
depositions between August 16th and trial. For good and sufficient reason, plaintiff dare 
not seek a continuance. 
Instead, plaintiff asserts that Monica Paquin, Denise Dobslaff, Alan Friend, 
Tammy Currie Farkes and Kimberly Gagnon will appear at commencement of trial on 
September 13th and testify that each has an ineligible voter and that each voted for 
Kennedy. 
And how does plaintiff believe these five persons will be compelled to appear? 
Not subpoena served in Idaho nor by subpoenas in Canada and California under the 
Uniform Intestate Depositions and Discovery Act (Rule 45 (1), I.R.Civ.P.). 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO MOTION 
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Counsel for plaintiff would have this Court believe that these five persons living in 
three provinces in Canada and in Petaluma, California will appear after this Court 
grants plaintiffs Motion to Compel Witness to attend trial with what plaintiff proposes as 
the Court's order: 
Compelling the following persons who cast ballots in the 2009 City of 
Coeur d'Alene General Election to attend the trial in this matter and testify: 
1. Monica Paquin - Boucherville, Quebec, Canada 
2. Denise Dobslaff- Vernon, British Columbia, Canada 
3. Tammy Farkes - Edmondton, Alberta, Canada 
4. Alan Friend - Nelson, British Columbia, Canada 
5. Kimberly Gagnon - Petaluma, California 
Motion to Compel Witnesses to Attend Trial, p .. 1. 
And what representations does plaintiff make that these five persons will, upon 
receipt by mail of the Court's order, voluntarily appear on September 13th in the 
courthouse in Coeur d'Alene? Plaintiffs affidavit in support of his Motion to Compel 
Witnesses to Attend Trial represents just as did plaintiffs February 28th affidavit total 
lack of interest and/or cooperation by any out-of-state potential witnesses. 
Finally, plaintiff has not identified any witness nor set forth any law that is 
contrary to this conclusion of Chief Deputy Secretary of State Timothy A. Hurst in his 
letter to Dan English dated December 18, 2009 attested to in his affidavit of January 14, 
2010 filed herein: 
I am in receipt of your letter dated December 16, 2009, regarding the 
eligibility of a certain overseas citizen and military personnel to vote in the 
City of Coeur d'Alene election. 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO MOTION 
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It appears from the information that was entered into the statewide voter 
registration system that Tammy Farkes, Monica Pacquin, Gregory Proft and 
Alan Friend registered to vote in accordance with state law. 
More than likely the same ruling would also apply to Kimberly Gagnon whose 
name did not appear in the Amended Complaint. 
It is tempting to say three strikes and plaintiff is out but as a matter of law, 
plaintiff did not come to bat as to the five witnesses as supporting his case. 
While plaintiff has not made a proper pleading to invoke Rule 56 (f), the record 
establishes abundance of reasons why any reliance upon any Rule 56 {f), motion must 
be rejected. In 73 American Jurisprudence 2"d "Summary Judgment" the following 
applicable comment is made. 
For example, a party is entitled to a receive a continuance for additional 
discovery if he or she makes the request before the court's ruling on the 
summary judgment, places the court on notice that further discovery 
pertaining to summary judgment motion is being sought, and 
demonstrates to the court with reasonable specificity who the requested 
discovery pertains to the pending motion. However, Rule 56 (f) cannot be 
relied on if the result of the continuance to obtain further information 
would be wholly speculative. 
72 Am. Jur. 2d. 928, p. 673. 
The result of continuance would be to let plaintiff unsuccessfully try to obtain 
information that is wholly speculative. 
Five and one half months (270 days) have passed since counsel for plaintiff 
under oath stated that all discovery would be completed in two to three months. Lack 
of diligence is the most frequent reason given by courts in denying a Rule 56 (f) motion. 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO MOTION 
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If a party opposing a motion for summary judgment has not been diligent to 
obtain affidavits or take depositions or have discovery, and seeks more 
time to obtain materials in opposition, or asserts or appeal that he or she 
should have been granted more time to do so, his or her claim of 
insufficient opportunity is not reason enough to require the application of 
Rule 56 (f). 
73 Am.Jur. 2"d, §30, p. 673. 
The few reported appellate cases in Idaho in which opinions cite Rule 56 (f) are 
not relevant. The Federal Rule 56 f) is identical so the following opinions are 
instructive. 
Beattie v. Madison County School District, 1254 F.3d 595 (5th Cir. 2001) was a 
suit brought by a school secretary alleging that her termination was a First Amendment 
violation under 42 USC §1983. 
Defendants moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed a Rule 56 (f) motion 
three days after the summary judgment motion was filed. 
Beattie had only several months after she sued to depose board members, but 
the Court of Appeals upheld the District Court ruling that she had not been diligent: 
Rule 56 (f) motions are generally favored and should be liberally granted. 
Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 535 (5th Cir. 1999). 
Beattie "may not simply rely on vague assertions that additional discovery 
will produce· needed, but unspecified facts." Krim, 989 F.2d at 1442 
(Internal Citations omitted.) She must show (1) why she needs additional 
discovery and (2) how that discovery will create a genuine issue of material 
fact. Stearns, 170 F.3d at 535 (citing Krim, 989 F.2d at 1442). If Beattie 
has not diligently pursued discovery, however, she is not entitled to relief 
under rule 56 (f). See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence 
& Coordination Unit, 28 F.3d 1388, 1397 (5th Cir. 1994). We need not 
address whether Beattie has shown why she needs additional discovery to 
create a genuine issue of material fact, because she was not diligent. /d. At 
1397. 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO MOTION 
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254 F .3d at 606. 
Springs Window Fashions v. Novo Industries, L.P., 323 F.3d 989 (Fed. Cir. Ct. 
Appeals, (2003) was a patent case. 
Defendant had notice in September that Motion for Summary Judgment had to 
be pled by February 1st meaning its response must be filed by FebiUary 21st even 
though discovery was open until March 15th. Defendant scheduled the deposition of 
plaintiffs for March 1st and moved for a Rule 56 (f) delay which the District Court denied. 
The Federal Circuit Court affirmed: 
Furthermore, "[a] party who has been dilatory in discovery may not use 
Rule 56 (f) to gain a continuance where he has only made vague assertions 
that further discovery would develop genuine issues of material fact." 
United States v. Bob Stofer Oldsmobile-Cadillac, Inc., 766 F .2d 1147, 1153 
(7th Cir. 1985). See also Farmer v. Brennan, 81 F.3d 1444, 1449 (7th Cir. 
1996) ("this Court has noted that the party seeking further time to respond 
to a summary judgment motion must give an adequate explanation to the 
court of the reasons why the extension is necessary.") 
323 F.3d at 998. 
SUMMARY 
For each and all of the above reasons, plaintiffs Motion to Refuse the 
Application of Defendant Kennedy for Summary Judgment pursuant to IRCP Rule 56 
(f) must be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, this 23rd day of 
August, 2010. 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO MOTION 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true copy of the above and foregoing was served by first class mail, 
postage prepaid, this 23rd day of August, 2010 to: 
STARR KELSO 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P. 0. BOX 1312 
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83816 
FAJ<(208)664-6261 
MICHAEL L. HAMAN 
HAMAN LAW OFFICE 
P. 0. BOX 2155 
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83816 
FAX (208) 675-1683 
ARTHUR B. MACOMBER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
408 E. SHE-RMAN AVENUE- SUITE 215 
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83814 
FAX (208) 664-9933 
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Peter C. Erbland, ISB #2456 
Paine, Hamblen, Coffin, Brooke & Miller, LLP 
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101 
Post Office Box E 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0328 
Phone (208) 664-8115 
FAX (208} 664-6338 
Scott W. Reed, ISB#818 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box A 
Coeur d'Alene, 10 83816 
Phone (208) 664-2161 
FAX (208) 765-5117 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL. DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JIM BRANNON, 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
SUSAN K. WEATHERS, in her capacity 
as the City of Coeur d'Alene City Clerk; 
MIKE KENNEDY, in his capacity as the 
Incumbent candidate for the City of 
Coeur d'Alene Council Seat #2; 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-09-10010 
) DEFENDANT KENNEDY'S PROPOSED 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
) J..AW 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Pursuant to this Court's Pre-trial Order dated June 15, 2010, defendant Mike 
Kennedy proposes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On August 18, 2009 the city co.uncil of the City of Coeur d'Alene approved 
an agreement with Kootenai County through the District County Clerk, ex 
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officer auditor and rescinder whereby Kootenai County would conduct the 
city election to be held November 3, 2009. 
2. Said Kootenai County/City of Coeur d'Alene Agreement provides in part 
as follows: 
4. The parties agree that the County is the independent contractor of 
the City and in no way an agent of the City, and that no joint venture 
shall be created by virtue of this Agreement. The City shall have no 
control over the performance of this Agreement by the Court or Its 
employees, except to specify the time and place of performance, and 
the results to be achieved. The City shall have no responsibility for 
security or protection of the County's supplies or equipment. for 
security or protection of the County's supplies or equipment 
3. The City of Coeur d'Alene has for regular elections in past years entered 
into similar agreements with Kootenai County to conduct its elections. 
4. Many other larger cities in. Idaho have similarly agreed to have their 
respective counties conduct regular city elections. 
5. The Idaho Secretary of State has approved of the actions of cities to have 
their respective regular elections conducted by counties. 
6. The city election held on November 3, 2009 was for the mayor and for city 
council seats Nos. 2, 4 and 6. 
7. On ~ovember 3, 2009 there was also a separate ballot for a vote ''yes" or 
uno" countywide upon a county bond election for the expansion of the jail 
and related county facilities. 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
2 
£ 'd 0999 'ON 
2
'l
''
II
SC 38417-2011 Page 2013 of 2676
8. The Kootenai County Elections Report to the city council signed by 
Deedie Beard on November 9, included the following information: 
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE 
ELECTION 
NOVEMBER 3, 2009 
Total number of registered voters 
Number of absentee ballots 
Total number of ballots cast 
CITY COUNCIL 
Seat#2 
Jim Brannon 
Mike Kennedy 
Votes Received 
(*Denotes Winner) 
21,480 
2,051 
6,370 
3,160 
3,165* 
9. The number of absentee ballots reported by Kootenai County to the city 
council was accurate. 
10. Plaintiff Brannon did not name in his Amended Complaint Kootenai County 
nor the county election officials who conducted the election. 
11. Neither defendant City of Coeur d'Alene nor defendant Mike Kennedy 
participated in any manner in the conduct of the city election on November 
3, 2009 nor in the counting of ballots nor any subsequent process related to 
the election. 
12. It is not possible to determine how anyone voted absentee in the November 
3, 2009 city election except by te:stimony of such voter in open court. 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
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13. There was no factual error of the city board of canvassers in counting the 
vote or in declaring the result of the election for Council Position No. 2. 
14. There was not any evidence coming before the Court in the trial that illegal 
votes had been received or legal votes rejected at the polls sufficient to 
change the result of the election for Council Position No.2. 
15. There is no evidence that any person aeting on behalf of defendant Kennedy 
interfered in any manner with regard to any witness or potential witness for 
plaintiff. 
16. Attorney Starr Kelso, by affidavits filed with this Court on February 28, 2010 
made extensive commitments to depose witnesses in this state and in 
Canada. There is no evidence that any depositions of anyone were ever 
taken on behalf of plaintiff after February 28, 2010. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Neither of the defendants named in the Amended Complaint. City of 
Coeur d'Alene and Mike_ Kennedy, committed any error or took any action 
with regard to the city election or1 November 3, 2009 in violation of Title 
56, Chapter 4 or Title 34, Idaho Code. 
2. The Amended Complaint did not state any cause of action on behalf of 
plaintiff Jim Brannon. 
3. The Amended Complaint did not name Kootenai County which conducted 
the election on November 3, 2009. 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
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4. The agreement made between the City of Coeur d'Alene and Kootenai 
County on August 18, 2009 for cc1nduct of the city election on November 
3, 2009 was lawful and allowed under all applicable provisions of the 
Idaho Code. 
5. Defendant Mike Kennedy was lawfully elected to City Council Position No. 
2 on November 3, 2009. 
6. There was in the conduct of the election and at all times thereafter no 
violation of any of the provisions of Idaho Code §34-21 01. 
7. The Amended Complaint filed December 20, 2009 and the actions taken 
on behalf of plaintiff Jim Brannon from that date forward were brought and 
pursued frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation. 
Dated this 2nd day of September, 2010. 
,. 
.,. ,. ., CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true copy of the above and foregoing was served by fil'lt aleee 188il 
postage prepaid, .this 2nd day of September, 2010 to: 
Starr Kelso 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box 1312 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
FAX (208) 664-6261 
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Michael L. Haman 
Haman Law Office 
P. 0. Box 2155 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
FAX (208) 676-1683 
Art Macomber 
Attorney at Law 
408 E. Sherman Avenue- Suite 216 
Coeur d'A 83814 
FAX 
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Sep. 3. 2010 5:09PM Mar"mber Law PLLC 
Arthur B. Macomber, State Bar No. 7370 
Jonathan A. Burky, State Bar No. 8043 
Macomber Law, PLLC 
408 E. Shennan Avenue, Suite 215 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone: 208·664-4700 
Facsimile: 208-664-9933 
Attorney for William L. McCrory 
No. 0343 P. 2/9 
STATe o~ IDAr~o · , 
fOUNTY OF KOOTENAJ } SS 
riLED: L\ l\ ~ 
2010 SEP -7 AH 8: OB 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
llMBRANNON; ) Case No: CV-09-10010 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. 
SUSAN K. WEATHERS, in her capacity 
as the City of Coeur d'Alene City Clerk; 
MIKE KENNEDY, in his capacity as the 
incumbent candidate for the City of 
Coeur d'Alene Council Seat #2; 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT 
KENNEDY'S OPPOSITION TO 
MCCRORY'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS 
DATE: 
TIME: 
JUDGE: 
September 7, 2010 
1:30 p.m. 
Charles W. Hosack 
COMES NOW WILLIAM L. MCCRORY, a non-party in this action, by and 
through his undersigned attorney, and hereby replies to Defendant Kennedy's Opposition 
to McCrory's Motion to Dismiss Contempt Proceedings. Trial in this action is scheduled 
for the time and location stated above. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Kennedy's Hazel Complaint does not meet I.R.C.P. 7S(c)(3) requirements. 
In this contempt proceeding, the affidavit of Crystal Hazel "constitutes [defendant 
Kennedy's] complaint," and must ''apprise (McCrory,] the alleged condemnor [,] of the 
particular facts of which he is accused, so that he may need such accusations at the 
hearing." Steiner v. Gilbert, 144 Idaho 240, 244, 159 P.3d 877, 881 (2007). 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure (l.R.C.P.) 75(c)(3) states: 
The written charge of contempt or affidavit must allege the specific 
facts constituting the alleged contempt. Each instance of alleged 
contempt, ifthere is more than one, must be set forth separately. If the 
alleged contempt is the violation of a court order, the written charge or 
affidavit must allege that either the respondent or the respondent's 
attorney was served with a copy of the order or had actual knowledge 
of it. The written charge or affidavit need not allege facts showing that 
the respondent's failure to comply with the court order was willful. 
Crystal Hazel's affidavit fails that standard, because it does not allege specific 
facts constituting the alleged contempt. Ms. Hazel does not cite any order of the court 
that McCrory violated. Ms. Hazel does not cite the existence of or what constitutes any 
specific breach of the purported Confidentiality Agreement contract which Kennedy's 
motion alleges McCrory violated. Ms. Ha2el does not make a statement related to why 
any fact she cites would put McCrory in contempt of this court. She does not set forth 
each count of contempt separately. The alleged contempt is not in violation of a court 
order, but is aJleged outside the affidavit to be a breach of a contract between non-party 
McCrory and Kootenai County, neither order nor contract being cited in Ms. Hazel's 
affidavit. Further, Ms. Hazel is not a party to this case, and her affidavit cites no damages 
accruing to her for which she should be afforded relief. (I.R.C.P. Rule S(a)(l). 
Since Claimant Ha2el cannot and did not state she has suffered any damages, and 
the affidavit is in almost every way insufficient, this Court ''does not have jurisdiction to 
proceed," and the contempt charges must be dismissed. Steiner, 144 Idaho at 244. 
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Alternatively, since Kennedy brought the motion in re: contempt, where is his 
affidavit of complaint? There is nothing in Kennedy's motion nor has an affidavit been 
filed with this Court alleging Kennedy has suffered damages due to McCrory's postings 
on www.opencda.com. Further, there is no affidavit from Kootenai County, the 
purported opposing party in the vague contract, stating that it has suffered damages based 
on any act of McCrory. Finally, no affidavit exists that this court ordered McCrory to 
refrain from any act at any time. Notably, the Hazel affidavit does not allege any damage 
to this Court's orders, process, reputation, public judgments, or any other attribute of 
either Judge Hosack individually or this Court harmed by any act of McCrory at any 
time. 
II. Kennedy's Hazel Complaint has not met the new U.S. Supreme Court's 
standard for pleadings, because his allegations are conclusory, and his pled 
"factual allegations (do not) plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." 
While the complaint fails I.R.C.P. 75(c)(3), it also fails the pleading standards 
recently set by the United States Supreme Court related to motions to dismiss. 
The Idaho State Supreme Court has "expressed (its] preference for inte1preting 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure in confonnance with the interpretation placed upon 
the same language in the federal rules. That preference is obviously limited to situations 
in which our rules and the federal rules contain identical language." Obendorfv. Terra 
Hug Spray Co., Inc., 145 Idaho 892, 897188 P.3d 834, 839 (2008); citing Wail v. Leavell 
Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho 792, 796, 41 P.3d 220,224 {2001). 
I.R.C.P. Rule 8(a)(2) and (3) state: 
A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original 
claim, counterclaim, cross·claim, or third-party claim, shall 
contain ... (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing 
that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment 
for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. 
F.R.C.P. 8(a)(2) and (3) state: 
A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: ... (2) a 
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
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entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may 
include relief in the alternative or different types of relief. 
The two rules at (2) are identical, and almost identical at (3). Thus, as to (2), 
Idaho will follow interpretation according to the federal rule. As to (3) they differ, but to 
McCrory's g~in. 
"To survive the motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."' Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 07~1015 at 14 (556 U.S.__); citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544 (2007). "Where the well-pleaded facts do not pennit the court to infer more than the 
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged·· but it has not 'show(n]- 'that 
the pleader is entitled to relief.'" ld at 15; citing F.R.C.P. 8(a)(2). 
In this case, the Hazel affidavit does not even infer "the mere possibility of 
misconduct,'' unless she alleges McCrory lacks First Amendment rights./d. Certainly 
there is not even a mere possibiJity of misconduct, because Hazel does not even say 
McCrory did anything wrong, much less cite damages :from any wrongdoing, or any 
breach that might indicate wrongdoing ever happened. 
A court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by [1] 
identifying pleadings that, because they are n~ more than 
conclusions are not entitled to the presumption of truth. While 
legal conclusions can provide the framework of the complaint, they 
must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well 
pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity 
and then [2] determine whether they plausibly give rise to an 
entitlement to relief. 
Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 15 (emphasis added.) Even if every fact cited in Ms. Hazel's 
affidavit is entitled to a presumption of truth, her affidavit cites nothing that would 
indicate she is plausibly entitled to any relief based on the facts she cites. Certainly, if 
Ms. Hazel, the complainant here, cannot make a statement as to why she has been 
damaged and has a right to relief satisfied by findjng McCrory in contempt, Kennedy, a 
defendant who did not even bring an affidavit or complaint should not be entitled to 
proceed against McCrory, because he did not believe there were even grounds to bring a 
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contempt complaint through proper affidavit either under Idaho Civil Rule 8 or Idaho 
Civil Rule 75. 
Therefore, under the new Supreme Cowt's Iq~al standard, there is no plausible 
compiaint on fiie with this Court that can give rise to an entitiement to relief to defendant 
Kennedy or Ms. Hazel. Whether one follows I.R.C.P. Rule 8(a)(2) under the old standard, 
or under F.R.C.P. Rule 8(a)(2) using the new Iqbal standard, Ms. Hazel's 
complaint/affidavit is insufficient, she fails to state a claim, and this Court should dismiss 
both contempt charges. 
III. Kennedy's citation of the County's motion for protective order is irrelevant, 
because that protective order did not result in judicial order restraining McCrory. 
Accompanying Kennedy's Counsel's letter to this Court dated August 30 
was Kootenai County's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Protective 
Order filed in this Court, February 19,2010. Enclosed with that letter was also a 
transcript of this Court's March 2, 2010 hearing on that motion for protective 
order. Neither is of assistance to defendant Kennedy's frivolous action here. 
Kootenai County's Memorandum in Support of a Motion for Protective 
Order most explicitly waxes eloquent regarding the secrecy of ballots, and states 
nothlng about absentee ballot envelopes, which is the subject of McCrory's 
affidavit and, presumably, the gravamen of these contempt complaint charges. 
On March 2, 2010, the honorable judge Simpson found an "insufficient 
showing [of facts justifying plaintiff] to reach the [regularly cast] ballots." Tr. p. 
7,1.15.1 
As to absentee ballot envelopes, the court granted plaintiffs motion to you 
''the return [absentee ballot] envelopes, copies will be provided under affidavit 
and oath, under 50-446 .... " Tr. p. 10, 11. 16-17. There was no explanation of this 
at the hearing. Idaho Code section 50-446 states, "the elector shall then execute an 
affidavit on the back of the return envelope in the fonn prescribed, provided 
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however, that such affidavit need not be notarized." Perhaps this is the affidavit 
and oath that the Court was referring to on line 17 of page 10 of the transcript. 
However, the Court's Order, filed on March 8, 2010, ordered Kooten.ai 
County to provide to plaintiff''(!) return envelopes for the absentee ballots; (2) 
return envelope date stamps; (three) a Jist of absentee ballots received in cases 
where the clerk keeps ballots in a central location until tabulations; and, (four) the 
records of appJications for absentee ballots." Ord. ~ 4. At no location in that Order 
does the Court require any sort of contract, confidentiality agreement, or other 
order or mandate that can now be held against McCrory. 
IV. Kennedy's pleading and Kootenai Countv's Certification regarding 
the purported Confidentiality Agreements show they are contracts. 
Defendant Kennedy admits the purported Confidentiality Agreements are 
contracts, because his pleading avers, and such is supported by the County's 
Certification, that negotiations took place between Kootenai County and 
plaintiffs counsel - and not McCrory - to create those purported agreements. 
KelUledy Br. pp. 5-6 (8/31/1 0); see McHugh Certification Upon Confidentiality 
Agreements dated 8/30/10. 
As cited in McCrory's earlier responses, contempt of court cannot be a 
remedy for breach of contract. Kennedy merely asserts these purported 
Confidentiality Agreements were not contracts, but facts before the court belie 
that assertion. Both contempt complaints should be dismissed. 
V. Kennedy makes no showing that this Court's process or reputation 
has been damaged by McCroty. 
The header stands on its own. There is no fact alleged that McCrory has 
held this Court in contempt by any of McCrory's acts. There is no showing that 
this Court's process for this election's case has been damaged or delayed in any 
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way. There is no showing that McCrory has damaged. this Court's reputation in 
any forum. Kennedy's motion is frivolous and should be dismissed, with 
attorney's fees and costs to McCrory. 
CONCLUSION 
Neither Defendant Kennedy not his proxy Hazel present an affidavit sufficient to 
initiate contempt proceedings. The court has, therefore, no jurisdiction to hear the 
contempt proceedings. Dismissal of the contempt proceedings is appropriate and justice 
demands that the contempt proceedings against McCrory be dismissed. Further, 
Kennedy's pleadings and affidavits in support of these contempt proceedings are 
frivolous, because adequate research would have shown both procedural and substantive 
deficiencies in the pleadings prior to their filing with this Court. 
McCrory respectfully requests the court grant his motion. Oral argument is 
requested. ~ 
·""? f1"-
Dated this ~ day o~~st 2010. 
~1~+.-
MACOMBER LAW, PLLC 
Cf;t'~/ 
Arthur B. Macomber 
Attorney for William L. McCrory 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
'?v--.t 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ;:::, day of September 2010, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing: 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT KENNEDY'S OPPOSITION TO MCCRORY'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS 
Peter Erbland ( ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Paine, Hamblen, Coffin, Brooke & Miller, LLP [ ] Hand Delivered 
701 Front Ave., Ste. 101 [ ] Overnight Mail 
P.O.BoxE [XX] Facsimile: 664-6338 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 816-0328 
Main Phone: 664-8115 
FAX: 664-6338 
Attorney for Defendant Mike Kennedy 
Michael Haman [ ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
P.O. Box 2155 [ ] Hand Delivered 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 [ ] Ovemlght Mail 
FAX: 676-1683 (XX] Facsimile: 676-1683 
Scott Reed [ ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
P.O. Box A [ ] Hand Delivered 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 ( ] Overnight Mail 
Main Phone: 664~2161 (XX] Facsimile: 765-5117 
FAX: 765~5117 
Attorney for Defendant Mike Kennedy 
Starr Kelso ( ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
P.O. Box 1312 [ J Hand Delivered 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 816 ( ] Overnight Mail 
FAX: 664-6261 [XX] Facsimile: 664-6261 
ATtorney for Plaintiff Jim Brannon 
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Court Minutes: 
Session: HOSACK090710P 
Session Date: 09/07/2010 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Reporter: V eare, Keri 
Clerk(s): Rohrbach, Shari 
State Attorney(s): 
Public Defender(s): 
Prob. Officer(s): 
Court interpreter(s): 
Case ID: 0001 
09/07/2010 
13:31:46 
13:31:46 
Case number: CV2009-1 0010 
Plaintiff: 
Plaintiff Attorney: 
Defendant: Of, City 
Pers. Attorney: 
Co-Defendant(s): 
State Attorney: 
Public Defender: 
Recording Started: 
Case called 
13:34:16 Stop recording 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK090710P 
Division: MAG 
Session Time: 13:22 
Courtroom: Courtroom! 
,L&-~~ 
Page 1, ... 
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Court Minutes: 
Session: HOSACK090710P 
Session Date: 09/07/2010 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Reporter: V eare, Keri 
Division: MAG 
Session Time: 13:22 
Clerk(s): Rohrbach, Shari 
State Attorney(s): 
Public Defender(s): 
Prob. Officer(s): 
Court interpreter(s): 
Case ID: 0002 
09/07/2010 
13:34:19 
13:34:19 
Case number: CV2009-1 001 0 
Plaintiff: 
Plaintiff Attorney: Reed, Scott 
Defendant: Of, City 
Pers. Attorney: Macomber, Arthur 
Co-Defendant( s): 
State Attorney: 
Public Defender: 
Recording Started: 
Case called 
13:34:59 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Calls, Hearing on Contempt. Did counsel receive 
Notice ofTrial? 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK09071 OP 
Courtroom: Courtroom! 
Page 2, ... 
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13:35:34 Pers. Attorney: Macomber, Arthur 
I received a Notice. 
13:36:19 Plaintiff Attorney: Reed, Scott 
There's been a blizzard of paperwork. 
13:37:07 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Court hearing on Motion to Dismiss, remains set 
for trial on Sept. 
13:37:50 I have Mr Reed's Order from the prior hearing, 
although other counsel. is not 
13:38:12 here, there being no objection the Court will 
enter the Orders. 
13:38:48 Plaintiff Attorney: Reed, Scott 
I've submitted another Order - explains. 
13:40:35 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I'll enter the Order, substance is the same. 
Moving to what we're here on, 
13:40:53 Motion to Dismiss Contempt Proceedings. I have 
the Briefs and have reviewed 
13:41:12 them. Is is Mr McCrory Motion. 
13:41 :28 Plaintiff Attorney: Reed, Scott 
13:41:32 Pers. Attorney: Macomber, Arthur 
Most of our pleadings are on the Affd, and 
12(b)6, and lack of jurisdiction. 
13:41:55 Lack of jurisdiction on the subject matter and 
of the person. Under 7-603, 
13:42:52 the Affd constitutes the Complaint. Stiner case. 
Rule 75(c)2, talks about 
13:44:07 contempt not initiated by a judge. Counsel Reed 
on behalf of Kennedy filed 
13:44:20 the Affd. Charge must allege specific facts, 
that was not done. I am not 
13:44:53 aware of any order issued by the court re: 
McCrory's behavior. Hazel Affd 
13:45:13 filed Aug 5, says she has looked at various 
websites. She doesn't allege that 
13:45:43 Mr McCrory is subject to any court order. It 
doesn't show any damages to 
13:46:31 anyone. Under the Stiner case, quoting a Jones 
case. Attorney Kelso did not 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK09071 OP Page 3, ... 
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13:48:07 suffer a contempt charge for filing McCrory 
affd. My client did not file, or 
13:48:34 cause the Affd to be filed. Capturing 
information in the Affd is not outside 
13:49:33 the boundary of anything. Next issue is 
insufficieny of service of process. 
13:50:40 Rule 75d2 and Rule 4d2 service upon individuals. 
The actual Motion filed with 
13:51:44 the Court, the Notice to McCroyr to Appear, says 
my client was served at his 
13:52:19 house. I should withdraw this portion, it 
appears he was personally served. 
13:52:56 But he would have no idea of the Hazel Affd. or 
what it meant. He had no 
13:53:47 knowledge that this contempt proceeding would 
pursue. The affd provided is 
13:54:55 completly insufficient. Request the Motion be 
dismissed and renew request for 
13:56:06 atty fees. 
13:56:29 Plaintiff Attorney: Reed, Scott 
The new charge made by Mr Macomber starts will 
Rule 75c2 says a contemp must 
13:57:34 be initiated with a Motion. We followed the 
rules and filed a Motion and 
13:57:54 Affd. The order was from Judge Simpson. A subp 
was issued, Kootenai opposed 
13:58:34 that. Ballots are confidential under Idaho 
constitution, and Judge Simpson 
13:59:21 quashed the supb. He appointed Judge Marano to 
look over the ballots. An 
13:59:44 agreement was reached on how this would be done, 
they approved the form of 
13:59:58 the confidential agreement. There was an order, 
you don't need another order. 
14:00:38 Kennedy was injured by the publication of 
information. Stevens v Gilbert case 
14:01:14 says you're not confined to Rule 7. Courts have 
powers to enforce their 
14:02:08 orders and that's what we're seeking. We think 
Motion to Dismiss should be 
14:03:07 denied. 137 Idaho, goes into great detail on 
what contempt is. We brought 
14:03:50 this as a civil contempt, subject to a fine or 
reprimand, not seeking a 
14:04:07 criminal contempt. I do not believe this should 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK09071 OP Page 4, ... 
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14:05:07 
14:05:42 
14:06:23 
14:06:34 
14:06:59 
14:07:50 
14:08:45 
14:09:22 
14:10:19 
14:10:54 
14:11:53 
14:12:13 
14:13:32 
14:14:57 
14:15:33 
14:16:45 
14:17:09 
14:17:17 
14:17:24 
14:18:19 
14:18:36 
be a case in which Mr McCrory 
should be subject to a criminal contempt. We had 
reasonable cause for 
believing the same. There is no way Mr McCroy 
can undo what has been done. 
The lesser punishment is not available. 
Pers. Attorney: Macomber, Arthur 
Kennedy provides no legal support that the Affd 
and Motion need to be 
considered together. The only Order I'm aware of 
is from March 8. Nothing in 
the order indicates Judge Simpson required a 
confidentiality agreement. 
The method of inspection was at the election 
office. Judge Marano was to view 
the ballots, Mr McCrory observed Judge Marano 
counting ballots. In McCrory 
Affd there is no mention of Kennedy. When the 
ballot is removed from the 
envelope it's mixed with other ballots. There is 
no information presented how 
Kennedy was injured. My client did not inspect 
the ballots, we're not seeing 
any injury. There have been no pleading from 
Kootenai County. 
McCrory did not view ballots, he viewed 
envelopes. Envelopes have no 
informatin related to this case. I'm surprised 
at Kootenai and counsel for PL 
and DF trying to hijack this court's remedies. 
My understanding is that the stip dismissal is 
that each counsel cover 
fees/costs. 
Plaintiff Attorney: Reed, Scott 
Correct. 
Pers. Attorney: Macomber, Arthur 
I need a moment to talk to my client. 
My client has decided to reject the offered 
stipulation. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Question to counsel re: discovery of 
confidential information, would the 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK090710P Page 5, ... 
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14:19:38 court have the power to step in ifthat was 
published on the internet? 
14:20:15 Pers. Attorney: Macomber, Arthur 
I think the court can act sua sponte. 
14:22:17 Comments, it turns into a criminal contempt. 
14:22:40 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
We don't have a stip agreement to dismiss the 
contempt proceedings. Atty fees 
14:23:00 are a decision by the Court. There are some 
meritorious arguments raised on 
14:23:41 this contempt proceedings. The Court has a 
concern in this litigation about 
14:24:07 the rights ofthe citizen voters. This type of 
litigation has a ramification 
14:24:29 ofthe average voter. Comments have been made 
about hauling citizens back 
14:25: 15 into court for trial because they voted. That is 
disturbing to the Court. To 
14:26:12 publish names, contact them about votes, so the 
privacy of the voter is 
14:26:40 ofparamont concern to the Court. Judge 
Simpson's order was clear. To assure 
14:27:17 the voter to be free from interference or 
litigation. The Court is not going 
14:27:48 to pursue a criminal proceedings. The only thing 
left is criminal 
14:28:04 proceedings. The concern here is, we have a 
spirit of confidentiality, that 
14:29:10 as far as this court can see, was utterly, 
blantely violated. The Court needs 
14:29:34 to consider this. It remains set for trial. The 
Court may decide to dismiss 
14:30:56 the contempt on its own motion, at his point 
we'll take the matter under 
14:31 : 14 advisement. 
14:31:26 Plaintiff Attorney: Reed, Scott 
Just to make it formal of record, for the reason 
I've stated, I'd move to 
14:31:40 dismss the proceeding with the understanding 
costs/fees would not be 
14:31:57 involved. 
14:32:04 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK090710P Page 6, ... 
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You agreed with Mr Reed's position, correct? 
14:32:32 Pers. Attorney: Macomber, Arthur 
I agree on that point. I need to notify the 
court that I have no idea about 
14:33:01 crminallaw, if the Court sees fit to not 
dismiss, then I need to notify the 
14:33:16 court I have no idea about Idaho criminal 
defense. 
14:33:31 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I'll take it under advisement. The Court would 
advise you, if needed. 
14:35:04 Stop recording 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK090710P Page 7, Final page 
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FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF IDAHO 
IIi f AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTK l 
324 W. GARDEN AVENUE 
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83816-9000 
JIM BRANNON 
vs. 
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, ETAL. 
) 
FILED 917/2010 AT 03:20PM 
STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF KOOTENAI SS 
CLERK OF THE DISTRI~T K_URT 
BY ~@.A.A. .-1 DEPUTY 
, =:::::::::: 
) Case No: CV-2009-0010010 
) 
) 
) 
) NOTICE OF TRIAL 
) 
) 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is set for: 
Court Trial Scheduled Friday, September 17,2010 at 09:00AM 
contempt 
Judge: Charles W. Hosack 
Additional Presiding Judges: Charles W. Hosack; John P. Luster; John T. Mitchell; Lansing L. Haynes; Fred 
M. Gibler; Steven Verby; George Reinhardt, III; George D. Carey. 
I certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on Tuesday, September 07, 2010. 
ARTHUR B MACOMBER'-.)~ [ ] Mailed [ ] Hand Delivered [X] Faxed 
FAX: (208) 664-9933 / 
SCOTT W. REED 3>~ 
FAX: (208) 765-5117 <¥ 
[ ] Mailed [ ] Hand Delivered I)<] Faxed 
PETER C. ERBLAND ~ 
FAX: (208) 664-6338 db 
[ ] Mailed [ ] Hand Delivered [f,J Faxed 
MICHAEL L. HAMAN 
FAX: (208) 676-1683 -YO) 
[ ] Mailed [ ] Hand Delivered [jJ Faxed 
STARR KELSO 
FAX: (208) 664-6261 ~7 
[ ] Mailed [ ] Hand Delivered [ )(.i Faxed 
Dated: Tuesday, September 07,2010 
Daniel J. English 
Clerk Of The District Court 
By: Shari Rohrbach, Deputy Clerk 
Notice ofTrial 
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Peter C. Erbland, ISB #2456 
Paine, Hamblen, Coffin. Brooke & Miller, LLP 
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101 
Post Office Box E 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0328 
Phone (208) 664-8115 
FAX (208) 664-6338 
Scott W. Reed, ISB#818 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box A 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
Phone (208) 664-2161 
FAX (208) 765-5117 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JIM BRANNON, 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
Vs. ) 
) 
SUSAN K. WEATHERS, in her capacity ) 
as the City of Coeur d'Alene City Clerk; ) 
MIKE KENNEDY, In his capacity as the ) 
incumbent candidate for the City of ) 
Coeur d'Alene Council Seat #2; ) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
Case No. CV..09-10010 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION IN LIMINE 
On March 22, 2010 defendant Kennedy filed a Motion in Limine with supporting brief 
to exclude all evidence related to Tammy Farkes, Monica Paquin and Alan Friend all of 
whom cast votes from Canada and all of whom were named in the Amended Complaint. 
Plaintiff has since added to the list of challenged absentee voters Kimberly Gagnon 
and Denise Dobslaff who voted absentee from California. Each of the five is a registered 
voter within the City of Coeur d'Alene. 
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The plaintiffs Preliminary Witness list identifies the five as witnesses but none will 
appear. (Nos. 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23.) Plaintiff's Preliminary Witness List Names other 
witnesses (Nos. 17 •. 18, 24, 25, 26 ,27, 28, 49 and 50) to testify as to residence and/or 
conversations with one or more of these five voters. 
As set forth in the initial brief in support, each of these persons mailed an absentee 
ballot which was received, properly checked against registration and counted along with 
all other absentee ballots .. Idaho Code Section 34-107 (3) allows for absentee votes from 
qualified electors. The Uniform and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, cited and 
attached to the opening brief, allows out of state and out of country absentee voting. 
None of these five persons reside in Coeur d'Alene. All of the five had the right 
under federal and state laws to vote in the Coeur d'Alene City Election on November 3, 
2009. 
The actions of the county election officials was purely ministerial. Deedie Beard as 
the Election Manager and her staff had a "clear legal duty" to accept the absentee ballots 
as received without any discretion to investigate or to reject the same. Utah Power & Light 
Companyv. Campbell, 1081daho 950, 953, 703 P.2d 714, (1985), Dalton v./daho 
Dairy Products, 107 Idaho 6, 9, 684 P.2d 983, (1984). 
The federal and state law is clear and explicit. Plaintiff in the five months since this 
motion in limine was filed has presented no contrary legal authority and for good and 
sufficient reason. There is none. 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 2 
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The proposed testimony of witnesses Nos. 17, 18, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28,49 and 50 is 
irrelevant and should be excluded along with any and all testimony or evidence offered 
relating to any of these five voters. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true copy of the above and foregoing was served by fax, this 9th 
day of September, 2010 to: 
Starr Kelso 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box 1312 
Coeurd'Aiene, Idaho 83816 
FAX (208) 664-6261 
Michael L. Haman 
Haman Law Office 
P. 0. Box 2155 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
FAA (208) 676-1683 
Arthur 8. Macomber 
Attorney at Law 
408 E. Sherman Avenue- Suite 215 
Coeur ' 814 
FAX (~t!lfiilf99 
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STi\KR KELSO 
1\rtot:ney Ht .L:.t-.v #~44) 
p' 0' BIJX 1312 
'1\:1· 20"!· 7ti5-12Mi 
Fa.'l(: 20~·664-c',:;o I 
A rtl"'lrney for "P\::1 i 111 iff Kr«tlll•)JI 
KELSO LAW OFFICE 
lN Tl·tJ:: LHSTKlCT COURT FOR Tl iE f71RST .f1 11'>1CI.i\l, DISlgH .. ! CH· 
THE S'!A 1·1~ Of IDAHO. IN /\Nf) FORTH[ COUNTY UF i{UOT'EN:\l 
JU'v1 ORANNON. 
Pl::tinti tf. 
ig)007/011 
?DIO SEP I 0 AM 8: 00 
v·· 
"'' 
NOTlCF. OF Tf.-'TJMONY 
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE. 
:l municipal CIH1)(>ntlion, ~t..ul 
Defendants. 
YL'U arc h~reby rc:qut!sted to appear ut the place. dnte and tirnc sp(.;t~iticd l~(:low tw l~::~t.i(y in the 
above ens~. 
'PLACF..~: KOOTENAI COlJN1'Y COUR'l'JiOU~.t: 
JL'L>GE 1-J.OSAC:.K..'S COU R I'KOOM 
(\.'~:.:ur u' Akw:. tu~thu 
OAT~: S.!:!J>TEM~r~R 1.3. 2010 
L$J~UI . ..:.t:;.~.!.s_o;· .... ~.U~V.l.~_d 
Starr Kd:::o. l.SH # 2445 
Iii .............. . 
Alll>ITIONAL lNT•'()R.\1:\.TlON 
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This inf'i)mlation is being provided ro you lo h..:lp ~;:;,;pl;.Lin Lh~ r•t:::lStHl for this .~:t~n.:icc. rr ;.'(.'U h·~v..: 
quc~tion.s nrter rending rluough rhis gl:nc;;ntl inJorrmltion plc:::w~ (j() nc1t he~iwt~; to Jdcph~:_,n~ Starr 
Kclzo, Attomey nt Law. 20!$ .. 765-3261J. Hop..:l'ully this infom1tlTion will assisr you in d:u-i(ying 
the rcaStlll foe th~~ ;;crvk:~. Plt:a~~ k.et:p in mind U.'i y01J r..:ad thi:; i.nfon11<1.tiun rh:.\1 this i.'i nnl lt:o1!1ll 
arlv!r~ bci.ng giv,.;n !.() ynu. It i~ only a gencrul ~;<plnnfltion ofwh3t i:s occurring su thai. yuu ~an 
dc:r.crrrt1ne how to re:;pnnd, if nt nll. If you nc..:d h:g:tJ :.uJYice rt!g,:.m..Jing th,is vo11 sht.mlrl COilt:lcf 
un '-'t'tOI'DCY 2fyr.mr choosing. 
REASONS FOH THJS NOTICE 
l. TiLlt: 50 C!JapLer ':1 ofth~ 'fdul111 Code nt (I. C. 50-40:~') ~t'ts !'urth ld.:UvJ luw rr.!gardir~G 1c, 
Flc:ct:ion.•.; :md voting :md it provide5, in pa.rt, the f~.l!)()winlf,! 
(c) A ·•qualified ch:ctor"' m~:ru)~; tUl)' pt;r::;on wlro i~ t~i~htccn (I~) y~:1r~' nf rrgc., is a UnilcJ 
State::; Citizen and who hi:i$ .re,-:ided i.u the City at le!.l~t thirty (30) d~1y:i ncx1 pr~:(~.~:~:din:::. the 
ckclion at. whi..:h he du~irc:s to vl.JI~;: Wld who is registered with.in th~·. tim~:: pcl'i,JJ pr·ovideJ 
by l~w. 
(d) Residen~e. 
( 1) ••Ra;;sidencc'' f(u Vl)ling pur"JXI:;~.::>. ~;hall he the principa I or f!ri mtlr"y home or pbc(: of 
abode of o pCf$On. Yrincipal ur primary hurne ur plucc of ub•)dl~ is th:U home or rJiace io 
whil!b hi:. bab.t<ttion i.~ J'ixed and to which '' pei'Sftn, whenever hl: i.'!l ~thscul.1 b.-~ tbc r•re:u~.nt· 
iott!ntiou of returning 11fttr u dcJiartur\: or ub.C~encc tht!t·drom, rc:g;trulc~s of the durution 11f 
tlbseocc. In determining whnt is !) tn'iocipnl or primary pl.ac.: uf ~lmc.le of' :1 person the 
followin~ circuml:lt.~oces rdur:ing to tJuch penon u:my be token intu JU~cnnnt~ l)u~im~sN 
punuits, c1np!o~·ru~nr, 
iocuwe :~c.mrce:s, r~idt!nct: for i.ncomt or other tux pursuitst rc~idencc of l>:tr~:.ol~, ·~!lOuse, 
uod childrco1 i.C uny, leu~dtolds, situ!i nr pcrsona~l and real Jli'Op()~·ry, :lod molor vehicle 
r~gistration. 
(3) A 1.p.~::11ified elecror who hm; h~ft his h,)lnt' M~ f\(>ne to ~UlvllJ<.:r' ar\.:a nut.~ide tl11.; ~o:ity, l'hr 
at.emporor:y purpo~c ou.Jy shnll not b~ ~:on:;kkn;J w h~rv~: lu~t h.i!) r•::siJ~.n~.;;.:. 
REASON YOV ARE BEING GlVEN NOTtCte 
You have b~en given notice! ht:cause the rl!cords for r.he '2009 Ciry of Coeur d'1\knc 
CeneruJ .Election reJ:lcct Lhul you voted ·in l.hal Gt:trc:w.l Flection by nbs~.:nlc..: b>lllol cl:'limiol,? U.H1t 
your residence is located in ''Kootenai Cl'llnty.'' Because the rccNds that 1 luwc ;Jvai I'Lblc to rnr.; 
scern to i.ndicnte that ill tact your I'Cs.idcncr.: i~~ loc:-rt~~d ~~.Jmewh..:t·~ olht>r th~u1 th~ City of c...~oeur 
d' Alct1c, or e"Ven K.t,,)tenai Couuty, h is ll~c;;c~::;;.'l.t')' 10 tal,~· your tc:>litn•)ny (~> t!:-;~bli:>h whctlv.::r) n:; 
a matter of luv .. ·. your residence: is in the Cir.y of \.nl!ur· d.' Alc:nc 1)J' snrnewltc;;n;; ~;:Is~:.. IJ ;,'oHrr· 
residence was nnt in the: City llt' Cneur J~.i.\k:nc: duriug the rim~ no;:..:a.:~{S::lry 1,;, "'·''"~ in lh~.:. :-;aid 
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C~:ncral Elc~l.ion \'llu will bt: askc:tl ro l(::;;lifv wh~thcr vou vored tor Jim Bnuut•J:l ~Jr !VIik~ 
. , . 
Kenn~dv ii.1r S··~;)t 2 on the Cit'"' l'ounci I. . . 
By s~;rving tltis nol]c~;; w:iill~::r n1y cl1ent. Mr. firo.nno:,n. nor I~~~\.: i11 :.Ul)' w~ty admitling thut 
your re!jiclenc~~. ~s ddin\:d by sLaLc lilw. is, nr is no1. kh.:ntcd in llw Cir,v ..-,r C~t:ur J- -\len.e. w~~ 
an.~ on.ly servi.r11; :V'-'U noti~e;; you bec.::mse rh'~ c lct.::ti(Hl n:.:~:ord>; rdl~:ct that you Vi.Hed in the 
NtJvcmb~r 3, 2009 Cit:v nt'C'nc_:tJr d'AJcne General E.k.;tio!!-
IF YOU OETERMINF. THAT YOlJI{ RESil>J:.:.~CF:] AS pEffNJi~D BY STAl"E I..A \V, 
WAS NOT 1!'1 TI:-IE CI.TY 01'" COEUR D'ALENE: 
If you do nul c.:laim thut y·our rcsid~nc~~, <1S dcfin..::d by Sli.1.t~ law. \ .... a:; in t.hc: City (,f (\,~\If 
J'Alt:Ot r.-,r the time period J't.quircd by btw to \'Ott: in tlw. 21UI'I n,:y of Coenr ti.Akuc 
Ccucrul F.:lcction, r llSk yuu l(l do t.h~ fttlluwin.~: 
I. Fill (l\lt. :sign, cmd rctum tl1c be::low Al1itbvit (must J,e si~~cd bdorc (I !'·h.)tary Publll.:) 
in rhc self ;:~dd.rc.sscd and ~tampt::d tmvchlpt: that wac:; r.ll~~; ~¢rv~~d ou yaJu. 
'2. If 1 receive. yotu· tilled ouL .U1idavlt. (:riL,rnccJ b~.;fort: a Nor11ry Publi~,;) by SeJHt!mhcr 
10~ 2010 !'>t~-tling that your resid~:nce as defined by state l<1w w;,1~ r!lll in Ca:.,eur 
d".-\.lcne, f()r the rime period requi.red by li:~.w to vote in the N·~·vemb~r 3, 200~ City of 
Coeur d' Al.etlC Gcn~.:ml Elcer.ion. r will pre~;~nt: your nffidtWil iJl li~u 0 r ynur 
app~ar:mce at trial on St:l)temher 1.1, 20 I 0. Ow..::c rh:-11 o<.~~,;ur:; lwpd~Jlly the attorney."· 
H)r tht> Ddi:rHjants will ~~ripulnrc ro 11drni.1 yot.ll' sr;;,t..:m~o:nl in )'~lur a.ftidilvir i1Hn 
~Vit1enc~;; lbr tht." purpOSt!~ of th1.s Elcctlt:ln C\:"lntcst, th:·H ~'1)\.J wt-rt:: rrut a n:sider1t of th(: 
Cily I) f.' C1.1~.;ur d' r\len~. that you were not il qualit1ed elector lu -vnLc: in Lhc November 
J. 2UO~ Ci-ry of Coeur d"r\lene. l:dahn (i.;:neral b:kcr.i~~''- ;.\I'H.l :h;ll your vpte ~hou!d not 
he: I.; I, HI 1111::-d. 
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1, '"""""Q. .. ~ ~~·-•....5_c.. { ·· .O .. cL1.:L··C.J.· ( j)l'itll ,Y'JliJ' name). h~;:in~;; li~st duty ~;w~)rn upou 
ooth dn hereby ~mJtc <Hld t(:::;r.ify a,:, follo\vs; 
1. Th(.lt I UJ.ll (>V~f th..::: ag~ or 1 g yr;;ar:-;, c.;urnpt:tent t(l te~tH)', and lD.O.kl~ this ::;t~ltcm..:nt (_)f my 
liWn Jre~ will, withllul ~.:ocrcion, based upon my personlll K110wledgc, <.u1d i wQuld ::;o L~~tily if 
prcs~nt in t:ou1'T.~ 
:2. That.! voted in the 2009 Cit:· of Coeur d'A lcnc G~nt:ral El~ction hy ~•bsc:ntee ballot; 
3. TJ)IJ.I. I voted in the :mid dcction und~r a mi::;taken undcrs~ding and gMd tbith belief 
that the locmioJl of my residence met the lcgnl requirements f'or hcing :1 City of c()tHir d 'A len~ 
resident. under hb.h.:' St:JW Law, to pc.rrn.il m~:; to vott: in the :!009 City nf c:neur d' /\len(' Ckncrul 
Election; 
4. Th:JL roy rcsicJtmce, as dc:fin~:d in Idaho Cnd~ ~ecrion 50-402, (8t~~~ iofurmatiun .'l.-t 
l"urth io I tiuht) Cmle s~ctinn 50·402) unhc: t:im~: I sigr\cd and rc.turncd my <ib:>c:nlc!! nalloL, wa.o.; 
located at: 
.... ~.P.t~Ct. PI e. ~l-:.. ·~~:LI&-1L:!It./~-............ , .. " .. _ .. ,.. ,_. __ 
_ .J.lr.;..~.~/J.!!!::r1 .. 1 .. ./33.-· c .:::::J.-· ... u, e. -:1j ..?.. ~· . .. (:>ll'l..~~;: ::u.hJrd£ of rt:::>icJcnc~;) 
5. 'l'h;;Lt l~.:a:H mv -..·ole in rlu~ 2001) Citv ofCucur d'Alene: Gcn(~ral l~k~tiou ft..ll' 
.:£ .... :f.'h,.l.1.k ........ ./.~Ldl.~ .. gj_d.tle.)...:;....l?.tiJ:..~.~j: ... ~.~Lrf(inscrl ciU1er Mike f<,·:rlncdy 01~ .Jin1 
Rrnnnon here) in the City ~,~1"(\JC:II.f' d'A.kn~: City C(tl.l.ncil.l::k'-'lktn fill' S·.:~H 2. 
DATED rh.is . . t· doy of ~f...(L-.1!:-;?:¢'f'r.·' .. ::W l u. 
·- ...... /}/ t)<~f.~Lt.·_-;;_c. ..... L:. ...... [;.;:1.,_, ,..,_/,'"""'.:mr~-'-L-____ _ 
(print Y'.lllt' munt: here) 
Phyllis I. Simon 
YOO t.\RF. NOTTFIEU TR.AT YOUR APPEAR.'\NCf~ AT TRJAL DOI~S N(>J~ . J~~~>VI.i: 
THAT Y<)'U WERE A •Rt~Slo.fi:NT' OF THE CITY 01,. COEUn 'ALENTo:, fOAHO 
ENTITLED TO VOTE lN TH.lt NOV'li:MlJl~R J, ~J}O~J2!,~.~fJ.~.~.!N.~ 
RF.TURN ALL 4 PAf:f::s ANU AFFJl)AVIT TO: 
Stan K~~bu,_Artorru:rv at' Law 
P.O. 6ox 131.2 
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STi\RR KE.LSO 20!0 SEP I 0 M-'1 8: 00 
A ttomcy at I ,nw 1/2445 
P.O. Box 1312 
Coeur d' Ah.:n<..·. l.daiw 83816 
Td: 208-765-3260 
Fax: 20S-t'i64~626l 
Atwrncy fi>r Plaintiff Brunnon 
IN THE DISTRICT COlJRT FOR TUE FIRST JIJDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STA!V OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR Tl IE COUNTY OF KOOTENAr 
JIM BRANNON. Case No. CV -09-1 001 0 
Plaintill 
V$, 
PLAJNTJFF'S WJTNF,SS 
LIST PURSUANT T'O IN I'I'IAL PRE-TRIAl. 
ORDER; a.nd I ,IST 01: 
CITY OF COEUR !YALENE. IDAHO. 
n municipal wrporat·ion. et.n.L 
Dd.i:ndanls. 
ILLEGAL VOTES AND BY WHOM GJVl:~N 
PURSUANT TC> J.C. 34-20l7 
COMES NO\V PlainliiTJim 1.3mnnon hy and lhrough hi.s atl:orncy Starr Kdso and submits 
this preliminary wiwc:-;s list pursuant to [he Court's lnjlial Pretrial Order. Thv Plainlifrs right, 
pursuant to ldnho Cod~ scc1ion 34-2017, to provide opposing parties a written !i~r of the number 
of ilkgnl voles and hy whom given which h': inlcnds to prove at trial comm~~ncing on Scplcmber 
13. 1010 is reserved '1nJ not waived hy submittal oflhis list pursuanr 10 the Cnwt's initi~ll pr<..~­
trial ord~-:r. 
WITNESSES: 
I. Jim Brunnon ;Is lO his vott!r stntu;;; and candidacy and :.1ggr·icvcd status as set f(>rth in the 
Amended Complaint: c/o his counsel; 
2. Sus~111 Wl:athL:rs as to IH~~r trtilurc to comply with l.daho Code Title 50 Ch~·lptcr 4 :.rnd 'l'illc 
50 Chapter 9: ()Vtrall lack ofknowlcdg'~ of ckction Jaw :md proccdur(:~; and m:ts in 
conducling p:Jrt of the City election; c/o her cc.umsd: 
l City orc~.)~llr d'Alene rcpr·cscnWiivc IO ll:stiJy as to the cnnvus:-; hdd (11.1 Nowmhcr 9, 
2009. and i 1::: counting. 205 I nbscnlt:t.• hallots instead of 204 I legal vol.es ::1ctually recci ved: 
c/n it·s <~~Hrnsci: 
I'LAlNTJFF'S P~ELIMINARY WlTNESS LIST AND SUPPLEMENT't\L LIST OF 
ILLECiAL VOTES AND BY WHOM GIVt::N Plii{SUANT TO LC. J4,20l7 
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4. Mik..: Gridk~y as w rh~ Dc(:emb~r I. 2009 mt!ding held \Vith Kcnn~<..ly ::1Horneys and John 
;\. Cal'l~rty ~md joint defense ~l'rategy to avoid contest: do City's counsel~ 
5. Wm-rt:n Wilson as to the Decem her 1 ~ 200l) meeting held with Kc.rmedy ;,lttonwys nnd 
.John A. C~1Jferty and joint dd~~nsc .strategy to avoid contt~st: c/o City's counsel: 
(l. Peter Erhland as to the l)cc\~ll10cl' I. 2009 mcdi.ng hdd with City attorney~ rmd John A. 
CaiTcrty and joint effort tn nvoi.d C(llltcst; do hi~ law office:. 
7. Scoll Reed us to t.hc Dcccmher 1. 2009 m~~ting held with City utt.ornc:-ys ~mel John;\, 
Cafl~rty~ direction~ pt·(wid~xl w Caf'li:rty and Eng.Ji:sh including hut. not limited to his I· I 2· 
10 J.~tx to Cartt:rty: obstruction ofwirncs::;c::; Pa\:~ttdn and Farkt:s~ c/n his law ofticc: 
S. John A. Caflcrly as tn the December I, 2009 mc~ting held with City tl1torncys and 
Kennedy attorney:;; ongoing discussion:-;. correspondence. ;Jnd planning re.garding th~~ 
dd·ense of thi.~ election contest; obstruction of Plain1iff's efforts to ohr.ain (lnd review 
election documents~ planning and communications with Dnn l.~nglish n.:g:arding the 
<kJcns~.~ l'.lf thi~ election contest: c/o Knotcm:~i County: the. destruction of Dccdie Heard's 
~.:ompuler"s datnbase: 
9. Barry Mel Jug:h as to his C·mail corr·cspondtmce with Lawrence Spencer r~~garding the 
dirlcrence h(:rwccn absc.rlle\:.~ hallnt. rccc.ivcu records and absentee hullols counted and len 
extra illc!l.allv t:ount.cd absentee ballots: c/o Kootenai Countv: 
·-· •' • .I 
I 0. Dan English ~~s to his ov-::rnll actions in. <:onducting part of the City ckction and h.is 
J~1ilure.s to (:(H1lply v.-·ith Idaho SttllC law l'cgarding. huL not limikd to Ti!k 34 and Thl~ 50 
of the Idaho Code: identify election documents: the (:on tents elf his vnrious affidavits lilcd 
in this mauer; the failure to keep an ~\bscnt Votc1· record require.d by stare Jaw. in~ahility to 
~slablish 205! legal ab~cnh.x: hallots wc.rc n.:.ccive.d wh(:ll nvailabft..~ r~~cords <:mly rdkct 
2041 Clnmwbk. legal. ah~cmcc hullnt~ \Wr~o~ rec~ived and thnttcn or t~i1:J.ht if!cg~il absentee 
ballots w<:rc Gotmt~d. and the vote wuntintt machines rclkct "Dup" bailots that were 
illegally cotH'1Wd: c/o Kool.cnai County Prosecuting Attnr111::y's 011ict:: 
11. Dc.~(:di~.~ Beard as to her ovt.•rall ad ions in conducting part of lh~ City ck~~lion and her 
l11ilurc to 1.:omply \vith Idaho Swt~ law rc.garding, but not.limit.:d to litk 34 ~md Title 50 
or lh~ Idaho C.' ode: idcnti fy election dO(~Ulll<.mls~ the C(lllt(:nts or her var!ou;:; aff1davits filed 
in this mallcr and f~ihJt'(~ to properly keep ahscnt voter records and rt.~ct:.~ipt and count·ing of 
2 PLAIN'T'IFF"S PREUMJNARY Wl'l'NESS LIST AND SUPPLFMFNT.i\L LIST Of 
fi.LEGAL VO'rr·:S ANDRY WHOM UIVEN PUKSU.'\NT TO I.C. 34~2017 
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illcg:1l voh.:s: 1.:/o Koolt:n<.~i Count.y~ rhc destruction oflwr computl~r's dataha.st!; c/o 
Kootenai <. 'ounry Pro~l:cuting Attorney"s Ofti~.~e; 
12. S..:ni<lr Magistrate .ludt!c Eugene Marano regnrding his rnultipk~ vi~:il~ [Cl the d~clions 
dcpnrnncnl to ~..~ounl. ballots and cnvclop~.s and his torn Is th~n;of; his al'fidavit: c/o 
Kontenni County Courthou::>t.~~ 
I 3. Suson Smith as to her involvemcm in the City election and her preparation of reports 
based upon :he S~::crctary of Sr.nt.c' s d~llabas~ rc0c:ct1ng either ten or cig.hl extra i llcgnl 
ahs~nl.cc ball.ots wer~ counted: 
14. Carrie Phill!rs as to her involvement in the City ckL:tion and her preparation ofrepm1s 
h~1scd upon the Secretary oC St:Hc' s datah3se and the I 0 or eight. extra illegal absentee 
ballnls l:hut \:vc.rc countlxl; 
141003/011 
15. Timothv A. I !urst as to his contact. with Defendant. Kcnn~:dv's allomevs; initirll rcfusnl w 
pi 01 ,. 
sign :.tflidav.it (s) pr~par~d hy Plaintiff's attorney r~:~garding Idaho law despite doing so for 
J.)d~ndant K('nnedy · s allomey: his vnrious anidavits tikd in this mat1t:r: c/o Secretary l)f' 
State's Of'licl~: 
16. Bctsie Kimlwnugh as to ht:r <..~onttlct with City election n.;pr~scntaliv(:~$ regarding Secrt~l'ary 
of Stmc' .s dafahnsc: 
17. Erin .lcnkin~ 11s to his tdcphonc and in person recordings of discussion!' v.·ith Po~~quin, 
Dobsbfl (lag non. Harris. Prior: Ainsworth: and Whitl': 
IS. Colleen .luhnslon as to her returns of non~s~:rvicc of subpoenas f(ll· Pacquin. Dobslafl: 
(lagnon. Farh:s. uml Friend 
I 9. Monic:J Pacquin as to J~u.:ts regarding her illcg~ll voter status and disc.us.si()n:-; with Scolt. 
Reed and Erin Jenkins; 
20. Tammy Fnrh::--: as to f~tcts regarding her illegal volt!r status and h~r vote nnd discussions 
~'ilh ScoH Reed 
21. Alan Fl'icnd as to facts regMding his illeg.n1 vott~r status and vole. 
2::!. Dcnist:.~ Dobsl;:llfas Lo 6cts regarding her ilkgal \'ntel' .-:;t;Jtu.s :wd vote and disc:~ussion.s with 
Erin Jenkins 
23. Kimberly Gagnon as to Jltcts reg:1rding her illegal voter status :md vow and discussions 
with 1-':l'in .knl.;i.ns 
,1 PLAlNTIFF'S PRPUMINJ\RY WlTNESS LIST AND SlJPPt.r::MENTi\L I.IST 01: 
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24. Rif.:k (Eim!.::rl Currk as to knowledge. or lack tlll.::rt.;ol: ni:'Tmnmy (Currk) Furkt.~s and her 
prin1;;~ry hnrnt;.~ nr plac~ or ahode and Farkcs ilkgal vote ; 
15. Mr.s. Elmer (Ri ... ~k) Currie a.s to knowledge;, <~1· lack thcr~::o( of primary home t.:1r pl~t~:.c of 
abode ofTammy (Currie) Fark~s ~md he1· illt.:[:\::.tl Vl.H~: 
26. Rcpr.:scntulive of Lake City Billing. located nt 1423 N. Government ·way ns to knowledge. 
or lack thereof'~ of primary home or place of abodt: or Altul Friend and his ilkg~•l vott.!; 
27. Will'~{~ll G::tgnnn ns lo knowbJgc of the primary home or plac~ of a hod~~ of Kimberly 
Oagnon: c/o address claimed by Ongnon and Gagnon's illegal vole. 
28. Beatrice Joha.nn~s::;.:n a.s to knowledge uf lht~ prirn~ary home or place o!.' abode of Monil~n 
P.:1cquin: c/() nddn.:ss claimed by Pncquin and h~r illegal vote: 
:29. Nancy White as l'o her illcgHI voter stat.11s arld vole~ c/o WindeJ'tllCI\~ R~..~alty Coeur 
d'Alene. ldnho 
:HJ. Dustin 1\in::;,.vorl.h m; lo his illegal voter· Sli.IIUS ami voL~~ (:/o Kooremai Tirh:: Co. Cn~ur 
d'Alene. luahc.1 
J I. Susan Harri~ as to her illegal vnt(:r ::;latus and voh;;; c/cl h11sincs:-; <H..ldr~~ss daimcd as 
residcnc(· 
32. Ronald Pr·ior ''s to his illegal voter stal.us and votl;!: c/o bm;inc~s addrcs~ dnimt:d as 
a·c.sidcncc 
33. R~hn1w Zl:IJ:.Jrs <'ls1'o her illegal votCJ' status and \<Otc: c/o Tnnerccpr. lm: ... her ... ~mpltly,~r 
.H. Pntril~iu l·h1rrl:) ;1:; 1.0 her c~1st:ing two ab~cnll:.'e ballots one of which W<.'ls i I legally counted 
and votL~: c/o lwr residence in Exhibit 5 
35. Knlcb Trinkle :.1s to his service ofsubpocmt on I farris. Prior. While. Zc.:~llars. c/o 
Conlidt:ntial investig:.stion~ 
36. S1cphanic Oossard as to her scrvic(~ of' subpoena em Harris. Prior. Whitl~, /dlan;; c/o 
Kelso I .aw Onlcc 
37. Man Kelso as lo hi~ t.elephonc call from Rahana Zellars: c/o Kdso La\v Ol'fic~ 
3~. Donna Mdt:nde;~, as to nol signing her ahs~nl.ee ballot and signing und sending in Mlol.her· 
person's ~1hs~nree hnllnt and illegal vote: Telt~r)hone unknown. check vmc1' J'Cgi~tration 
.19. Paul Thomas ~~s to not signing his ab.scntr;;e hniiM and signing anJ s~::nJing in another 
p~.~J'S()n's ~·bsenl~~c hallot and ilkgal vote: Telephone unkno\-\11, check vok~r rcgistralion 
4 PLAINTIFF'S !'I~I:J..JMJNARY Wf"I"NESS UST AND SUPPLEMb:NTAL. LIST OF 
l'l,LEGAL VOTES J\ND BY WHOM GIVEN PURSUJ\Nl' TO l.C. 34-2017 
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40. n~ulah Thomas as to l}(ll signing ht:.r abSl:tllCC lxJII()t and signing and ~(:nding in another 
person's ah:-;cnrc,~ ballot and illcg~1l vote; Telephone unkllown. check voter regisl.raLion 
41. Chri$h1ph ... ~r I ,l)d;~~ a.s to not signing his uhs~nt.c'~ ballot and signing ::tnd sending in (lnoth"~r 
person's uhs~:ntce ballot and ill~.gJI vote: Tck:piH.Hl~~ unk.nown. check V(llCt' registration 
42. Debra I .-ock': as to not signing her ahsen1'cc ballot and signing ~nd sending in another 
person's abs,:nwc h;;tllot rmd illegal vote; Telephone unknowr1, check vnl·cr registration 
43. Nick Clamrisco as lo nuL signing :md sending in his illegal ~~b~enh:~c hutlot: Tdcphouc 
unknown, t:h~~ck voter registration: 
44. Kothryn Gunt~ico as to signing and ~end in~; in another person's i llcgn! ahscnt.cc baJJot and 
her· illegal voll~: T~kphone unknown. c.hcck vol~:r registration 
45. Karen Thom:1s :.ts to not signing her nhsentcc ballot unci signing nnd st::nding in ~mothcl' 
p(:rson's absentee hallot and illcgnl vot.c; Tdcphon~ unknown, check voter· registration 
-H>. Robert Thornu~ as to nnt signing hi.s ahs~:nt~~~: ballot and signing and s~.:.~nding in another 
p~~r:ilon's ahs(~ntcc ballot and illegal vote; Tckphonc unknown. chL~ck vut.c;;r r~gistration 
47. l.awn::ncl~ Sp(~nc:er as m his anidavil and his obt~aining Ahsentcc Ballo! Rccord(s)-
Koorcnai: (:orn:.sponding with Knntcnui County Pros~~cming All.orney Barry McHut:th wit.h 
regard to the di.scr·epancy between t.hc Absentee llallot Record-Kootenai and Lhc numher 
or abs~:rllce txdlots counted hy vote counting ma~.:hines in the City dt~dion: (~/o Kelso Law 
Ol'lil:~,~: 
4X . .Iulie Chaddt~rdon as to receiving the wrong baJI.ot ar rh~ poll and having to onlain a 
corr'l:l~t ballot Telephone number unknown hclicvcd well knm"'' In lkl(:ndant Kennedy: 
49. Nan~.;y Powers commcrci<~l property landlord of building claimed by /\inn Friend Lobe his 
r.:sid~.~ncc as to any knt1wledge regarding Alan f-riend nnd his ilkgal Vl.lll:. Tckphom: 
numb~r LUl.known will he provided wh~~n obrained. 
50. P<lrf\(:r Gibsnn as to his c.oJwers3tion nnd rcc:l)l'diJJg of with Mrs. Flrnl:r (Rick) Currie 
regarding Tammy Farl\es and her illegal voLe. c/o C'onJidcnti:Jl lnvtstig<.:Liom;. 
51. Vakric R. /\ insworth/Wclhorn as to h~r knowledge or the i lkgal VOlt.: o( Dustin 
Ainsworth: 
52. Judi C. Laur·enherg ns to lwr knowk:dgc of' the illegnl vote of' Dustin 1\in:-;worth: 
5 PLAINTfFF"S PRELtrvl'JNARY WITNESS LIST AND SlJPPLEMENT."\L .LJST or 
ILLE(JAL VOTES ANI.> HY WHOM GIVEN PURSUANT 'l'O I. C. :14-:20 !7 
III 
H uot s(:tltec IXJllo j
!'cl1le \C l : ll J tr
\() l , l oth,,
rson'::;: ll l , ll(.H , r
c " c ( 10 ntee h
( o , I l fllle! t. n j'
(/Imris l) L  o i g. lll i  l l ele ne
(,:h~~ t.
t.rnl.~i (1 ll inl II l Ol
CI' ph() , e
IS i e h a l': ll lI1othcJ
l l, e o Ol e c '
, (Jtl1u o :-; " l 1 tlfl t~ndin
" J';i:o e Ol C l l j l (
aWI'I::llel ~nc ll ()bl~ljllin ee e
OOTenai ll l ~~cU1 1I.or dlut: t
10 s l'e h e 1 l l l e
l lOlS l achin .h l di()
/ il:~
. J d(~rd() h noI' l'
C(l r'l: llot: ow I .. l
aJl\, Y Oll)mcrciL I rl Ala lo 
"t l e lll) leci ori I) e ont:
Ul11 ~1.' lIll.kno
(lrl, e, lwcl's31. li I' l,mJ
cl' c l · cn1.ii I I tstig,, li
le e i s rt / cJ tl c l" vote
f' l' a I C l Ousti. I\i :o
V' t n .: , I
B  '1'0 1.<.'. · 1  
SC 38417-2011 Page 2047 of 2676
08/08/2010 16:03 FAX 2086646261 KELSO LAW OFFICE lg)006/011 
:D. Mart~ (]li:Lil'H1<.~!i$26SO Man:cillc Dr. Coeur d'Aknc as Lo her rcsidcnc~:~ and wiK~rc sht: 
( 
i I legally n1st h'~r vote. 
NO'J'E: All illet1.al voter~ will b.:. a::;kcd to tesr.ifv us to whom thcv voted for r~:.~f.!arding Scat2. 
;;:~'" ..... .... 4- - . ,. -DA'I"ED.l~··dny or ~1, 20 I 0 . 
................ ~ .. :421(~~~~.. ' ...... , .... _, __ ....... ,.,~ 
Starr Kciso. Allurn~y for Pia inti tT Hrammn 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: I\ copy was hand uclivcred to Lkfendanls City and 
Wc1.1thers altorncv Mjchad Haman, and Dcl1mdant Kt.·.nnedv's attomcv.s Scull Reed and Peter 
Erhln.nd on l~<ll~i) .. of~ _201 0. " • 
c'' l. { (~-· ~~1-p f- .... 
,,,, __ ........ ,-='-······Ct. ········-·-
Starr Kds~., 
(, PLAI"NTIFF'S P!U::LIMINARY WITNESS LJST AND SUPI>Lf:MENTAL US'f OF 
ILl YGAL VOTES AND BY WHOM OJVEN PURSUANT TO LC. 34-20 I 7 
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Coeur d'Alene 
Reporting 
Conrt muf <Depositiot~ t[(§portm 
September 10, 2010 
Mr. Arthur B. Macomber 
Macomber Law Firm 
408 E. Sherman Avenue, Suite 215 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Re: Brannon vs. City of Coeur d'Alene- Case No. 10010 
9n /2010 McCrory contempt hearing 
Dear Mr. Macomber: 
No. 0477 P. 1 
NOTICE OF PREPARATION OF ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPT 
Notice is hereby given that a transcript totaling 37 pages, entitled Contempt 
Hearing dated 9/7/2010, has been delivered to the following recipients: 
The original and a copy has been delivered to: 
Arthur B. Macomber 
Macomber Law Firm 
408 E Sherman Ave., Suite 215 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
A copy has been delivered to: 
Scott W. Reed 
401 Front Street 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
If additional copies of the transcript are requested, please call Keri Veare at 
Coeur d'Alene Reporting at 208-765-3666. 
cc: Original transcript 
Court Clerk 
All Counsel 
Personable ... Dependable ... Flexible 
Depositions- Court,.. Conforence Room ... E-Transcript ... Video ---Realtime Hookup 
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Michael L. Haman 
HAMAN LAW OFFICE 
923 N. 3.n1 Street 
P.O. Box 2155 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-2155 
Telephone: (208) 667-6287 
D,.An!-!1-• /',1\0\ ~'1~ 1 L"Q"') 
.l"CI.\,;:)ll1U.ll:io \..!.VOJ UIU-J.UO.:J 
ISB #4784 
Attorneys for Defendant City of Coeur d'Alene/Clerk 
No. 1674 P. 115 
,....P \ 0 V\ t~: 59 ?.0\GS•-_,- · ·' 
lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THB FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 1N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JIM BRANNON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, et al, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2009-10010 
DEFENDANT CITY OF COEUR D' 
ALENE'S MOTION IN LIMINE 
COMES NOW the above-entitled Defendants City of Coeur d'Alene and its Clerk, by and 
through their counsel of record, and hereby moves this Court for an Order in Limine prohibiting the 
Plaintiff :from making any mention or interrogation, directly or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever 
concerning the following matters: 
1. Introduction of any witnesses, records or exhibits not previously disclosed per the 
Court's Pre--Trial Order. 
2. That the Comt prohibit cumulative witness testimony. ''The admission of cumulative 
evidence is within the trial court's sound discretion." State v. Rosencranrz, 110 Idaho 124, 131, 714 
P.2d 93, 100 (Idaho App. 1986). See also Rule 403, Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
DEFENDANTCITYOFCOEURD' ALENE'SMOTIONINLIMINE -1 
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3. That the Court prohibit the introduction of evidence of audio recordings or other 
renditions of an out of court statement under Rules 802 and 804, IRE. As the Court knows, Rules 
802 and 804 prohibit hearsay if the declarant is unavailable. And, moreover, the exceptions are 
liaJ.-row and limited. 
Backing up, it is well known that this case comes down to whether the Plaintiff can clearly 
show that the County accepted illegal votes, and hence that said votes were illegal; and, if so whether 
said illegal voter cast a vote for the Plaintiff or the Defendant Kennedy. Thus, even if the Plaintiff 
can establish that one voted i11egally, which is doubtful, he must then present admissible evidence 
Ol' testimony of whom the vote was cast. In this case, if the Plaintiff can overcome the first hurdle, 
he will attempt to overcome the second hurdle by way of audio recordings. This is improper under 
the Rules of Evidence. 
Indeed, based on the submissions, it is anticipated that the Plaintiff will contend that he 
should be aJlowed to present audio recordings or other renditions because the declarants are now 
unavailable to testify. However, Rule 804( a)(S), mE, cleady provides that the proponent must first 
establish that the declarant is unavailable. See Stale v. Button, 134 Idaho 864, 868, 11 P .3d 483, 487 
(Ct. App. 2000) CUUnavailability of a witness's testimony is a preliminacy fact, which must be 
established by the proponent to the satisfaction of the trjaJ court.) See also Nelson v. Fibreboard 
Corp., 912 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Driscoll v. Schmitt, 649 F.2d 631, 632 (8th Cir.l981); 
Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 165 F.2d 456, 463 (5th Cir.1985); Baylor, 733 F.2d at 1534.") In the 
Nelson matter, the Court noted that the proponent must show that the declarant was "entirely 
unavailable for even a deposition. H !d. The Nelson Court also discussed the fact that the proponent 
could have sought a continuance to obtain the declarant. !d. In Button, the expression of doubt as 
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to whether the declarant would appear was insufficient, and there was no showing that the declarant 
was unwilling to show for trial. Button, 134 Idaho at 868, 11 P.3d at 487. 
Here, as noted, the Plaintiff has identified audio recordings of witnesses for the purpose of 
J:::r. • 1 • 1 .£.> 1 1 ..1 1 yy f - ....... • • .,.... .. 4 .. • 
oue:nng the same :m. p1ace 0.1 tne actllal oecJarant. nowever, the ..t"Jamtlfi nas maae no snowmg 
whatsoever th~t the declarant(s) is unavailable. Simply because the declarant does not reside here 
is not sufficient. There must be a showing of unavailability, even for a deposition. It is noted that 
in March, 2010, the Plajntiff sought a continuance of trial for the purpose of obtaining the 
depositions of the declarants. But, there is nothing in the flle to show or even suggest that the 
Plaintiff made any efforts to take a deposition, telephone or otherwise. In fact, there is nothing in 
the record that would show that the Plaintiff made much of an effort, if at all, to get the declarant to 
trail. As such, the Plaintiff carmot take advantage of the exception if he made no efforts to even 
determine if the declarant would be available or not. 
Even if the declarant is unavailable, the next step is that the Plaintiff must show that he made 
reasonable efforts to obtain the declarant's testimony. In Stale v. Button, 134 Idaho 864, 11 P .3d 483 
(Ct. App. 2000), the Idaho Court of Appeals also commented on the diligence of the proponent in 
obtaining the declarant for trial. In other words, to satisfy the "reasonable means" requirement of 
Rule 804(a)(5), the proponent must make diligent and reasonable efforts. ld. Indeed, in U.S. v. 
Williams, 930 F .2d 921 (9th Cir. 1991 ), for example, the Ninth Circuit found an absence of diligence 
when the proponent simply prepared subpoenas but never actually served the same. US. v. Williams, 
supra, at 922. Clearly, simply preparing subpoenas and making a half· hearted effort to present those 
locally when the Plaintiff knew of the declarant's whereabouts is insufficient. 
DEFENDANT CITY OF COEUR D, ALENE'S MOTION IN LIMINE -3 
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On the other hand, in U.S. v. Shayesteh,132 F.3d41 (91b Cir. 1997), the Court found that the 
proponent did undertake diligent efforts by attempting to procure the attendance of a Canadian 
citizen by procuring the assistance of Canadian authorities in locating the declarant. It also is noted 
t~at.even if an '"absent witness is beyond the court's jUlisdictio:n, 'the [proponent) must show 
diligent effort on its part to secure the (witness') voluntary return to testify."' U.S. v. Yida, 498 F.3d 
945, 952 (91b Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Mann, 590 F.2d 361, 367 (lst Cir.l978). Here, 
there is no evidence whatsoever that the Plaintiff made any effort to procure the availability of the 
declatants, let alone seek the assistance of foreign authorities. 
Clearly, the evidence ofPlaintiffs diligence is lacking. Indeed, as noted there is no evidence 
that the Plaintiff served a subpoena, attempted to take a deposition, attempted to arrange a telephonic 
deposition, or even sought the assistance of authorities from other jurisdictions. Rather, the Plaintiff 
simply has thrown his hands up and said that the declarants are too far away and therefore are 
unavailable. Once again, however, it should not be forgotten that the Plaintiff represented to the 
Court in March, 2010, that he was going to track down the witnesses and take their depositions. 
In sum, the Plaintiffhas failed to show that any declarant is unavailable, due to unwillingness 
or otherwise; and, he has failed to show reasonable means or diligence to procure the testimony. 
Therefore, notwithstanding the authenticity issues underlying the audio recordings, they contain 
hearsay and are inadmissible. 
4. Exhibits referencing statutes are inadmissible. Surely the Plaintiff knows that a 
statute is not an exhibit. Little more needs to be said. 
5. Exhibits containing newspaper mticles or blogs, or internet conununications are 
hearsay and unaccepted by any Rule. 
DEFENDANT CITY OF COEURD' ALENE'S MOTION IN LIMINE -4 
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DATED this_p_ day ofSeptember, 2010. 
HAMAN LAW OFFICE 
By: , 
Michael'!: Haman, counsel for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVING 
!HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~ day of September, 2010, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing DEFENDANT CITY OF COEUR D' ALENE'S MOTION lN LIMINE by the 
method described below to: 
Stan· Kelso 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1312 
1621 N. Third Street. Ste. 600 
Coew· d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Fax: 208 664-6261 
Scott Reed 
P.O.BoxA 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Fax (208) 765-5117 
U.S. First class mail 
--
.,.-- Fax 
__ Hand Delivery 
__ U.S. First class mail 
/Fax 
__ Hand Delivery 
DEFENDANT CITY OF COEUR D, ALENE'S MOTION IN LIMINE ~ s 
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STARR KELSO 
Attorney at Law #2445 
P.O. Box 1312 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Tel: 208-765-3260 
Fax: 208-664-6261 
Attorney for Plaintiff Brannon 
ORIGINAL 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JIM BRANNON, 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. CV-09-10010 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DISQUALIFY 
vs. JUDGE HOSACK PURSUANT 
TO IRCP RULE 40 (d) (2) (A) (1) and (4) 
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO, 
a municipal corporation, et.al. 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff Jim Brannon, by and through his attorney Starr Kelso, and 
pursuant to Idaho Rules of Procedure Rule 40 (d) (2) (A) (1) and (4) submits this Memorandum 
of Law in support ofhis affidavit supported Motion to disqualify Judge Hosack. 
FACTS 
1. At the hearing held on numerous motions in this matter on August 31, 2010, Judge 
Hosack denied Defendant Kennedy's Motion for Summary Judgment; 
-2. At the time of the hearing on August 31, 2010, to the knowledge of either Plaintiff or 
his attorney did Judge Hosack express or intimate anything other than judicial interest 
in the proceeding; 
3. At no time before nor at the time of the hearing on August 31, 2010, was it known to 
either Plaintiff or his attorney that Judge Hosack harbored and possessed unrevealed 
personal opinions that election contests of the nature of this case have "ramifications 
upon the average voter" that are "not a salutary connotation." 
1 MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISQUALIFY 
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4. At no time before nor at the time of the hearing on August 31, 2010, was it known to 
either Plaintiff or his attorney that Judge Hosack harbored and possessed unrevealed 
personal opinions that Idaho's election contest statutory procedures set forth in Title 34 
Chapter 20 of the Idaho Code which specifically require (1) identifying voters by 
name, (2) voters to appear and testify in court as to facts from which it can be 
determined if they are, respectively, legal voters, and (3) voters, if it be determined 
based upon facts introduced at trial that they were not legal voters, to be "grilled by a 
judge" to testify for whom they cast their ballot, "is an anathema to everything about 
our democratic process." 
5. At no time before nor at the time of the hearing on August 31, 201 0, was it known to 
either Plaintiff or his attorney that Judge Hosack harbored and possessed unrevealed 
personal opinions that ( 1) the privacy of even illegal voters is of paramount concern to 
him and (2) the most important duty of the Court is to assure that voters, even illegal 
voters, of their right to vote and do so freely and free of interference and certainly free 
of threat of litigation. 
6. That despite repeated efforts Plaintiff Brannon's attorney was not able to obtain and 
review a copy of the transcript of a hearing (that was held on September 7, 2010 at 
which Plaintiff's attorney was not present) before Judge Hosack on a contempt of court 
charge claimed by Defendant Kennedy and his attorney Scott W. Reed against Bill 
McCrory until the late afternoon on Saturday September 11, 2010; 
7. That the transcript of the September 7, 2010 hearing revealed for the first time Judge 
Hosack's harbored and possessed unrevealed personal opinions that: 
a. Idaho's election contest statutory procedures set forth in Title 34 Chapter 20 of 
the Idaho Code which specifically require (1) identifying voters by name, (2) 
voters to appear and testify in court as to facts from which it can be determined 
if they are, respectively, legal voters, and (3) voters, if it be determined based 
upon facts introduced at trial that they were not legal voters, to be "grilled by a 
judge" to testify for whom they cast their ballot "is an anathema to everything 
about our democratic process." 
2 MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISQUALIFY 
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b. (1) the privacy of illegal voters is of paramount concern to him and (2) the most 
important duty of the Court is to assure voters, even illegal voters, of their right 
to vote and do so freely and free of interference and certainly free of threat of 
litigation. 
c. Judge Hosack harbored and possessed unrevealed personal opinions that 
election contests of the nature of this case have "ramifications upon the average 
voter" that are "not a salutary connotation." 
8. That as reflected by the definition attached hereto as Exhibit 1, "an anathema to 
everything about our democratic process" means that an election contest process as 
established by the Idaho Legislature is detestable, not agreeable with, a curse upon, an 
execration, and an evil to our democratic process. 
9. That as reflected by the definition attached hereto as Exhibit 2, for a person to state 
that an election contest process established by the Idaho Legislature "has ramifications 
upon the average voter that in the view of this court is not a salutary connotation" 
means that this court, Judge Hosack, believes that an election contest is not 
wholesome, healthy, or promoting or conducive to all of the City of Coeur d'Alene's 
legal voters who cast their legal votes in the November 3, 2009 City of Coeur d'Alene 
General Election. 
ARGUMENT 
The right to due process under the Idaho and U.S. Constitutions requires and impartial 
judge. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 US. 510, 47 S. Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927); State v. Lanliford, 116 
Idaho 860, 781197 (1989). 
The prejudice of a judge contemplated by the constitution (Art. 1, sec. 18) is a prejudice 
that is directed against the party litigant, and is of such nature and character as would render it 
improbable that the presiding judge could or would give the litigant a fair and impartial trial in 
the particular case pending. Bell v. Bell, 18 Idaho 636, 111 Pac. 1074 (1910). 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 40 (d) (2) (A) (1) Disqualification for Cause. 
provides: 
"1. That the judge or magistrate is a party, or is interested, in the action or proceeding;" 
3 MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISQUALIFY 
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Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 40 (d) (2) (A) (1) Disqualification for Cause. 
provides: 
"4. That the judge or magistrate is biased or prejudiced for or against any party or the case 
in the action." (emphasis added) 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 40 (d) (2) (B) Motion for Disqualification. requires: 
"The presiding judge or magistrate sought to be disqualified shall grant or deny the 
motion for disqualification upon notice and hearing in the manner prescribed by these rules for 
motions." 
Idaho case law provides that, 
"The alleged bias and prejudice to be disqualifying must stem from an extrajudicial source 
and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned 
from his participation in the case." Desfosses v. Desfosses, 813 P. 2d 366, 120 Idaho 27 
(1991). 
The Desfosses Court held that "disqualifying prejudice cannot be deduced from adverse 
rulings by a judge," and "suspicion, surmise, speculation, rationalization, conjecture, innuendo, 
and statements of mere conclusions may not be substituted for a statement of facts." 
The Desfosses Court relied upon and specifically directs attention to the United States 
Supreme Court case of United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 US. 563, 86 S. Ct. 1698, 16 L. Ed 
778 (1966) citing Berger v. United States, 255 US. 22, 31, 41 S. Ct. 230, 232, 65 L. Ed 481 
(1922) 
In Berger, the United States Court addressed statements attributed to Judge Landis in an 
affidavit based solely upon "information and belief' that Judge Landis stated regarding German 
Americans: 
"If anybody has said anything worse about the Germans than I have I would like to 
know it so I can use it." "One must have a very judicial mind, indeed, not to be 
prejudiced against the German Americans in this country. Their hearts are reeking 
with disloyalty." 
The Berger Court noted that the purpose of requiring an affidavit( s) is because the reasons 
and facts for the belief of the litigant that the judge is interested, biased, and or prejudiced, must 
give fair support to the charge of a bent of mind that may prevent or impede impartiality of 
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judgment. More directly than even the affidavit filed in Berger, the Affidavit with attached 
actual transcript of the September 7, 2010 hearing filed in this matter has a clear, undisputable, 
and direct relation to the attitude of Judge Hosack towards, if not Plaintiff Brannon and his 
attorney, certainly this case ... an election contest. .. As documented in his expressed opinion in 
open court, his personal view of this election contest is that it is "an anathema to everything 
about our democratic process" and not wholesome, healthy, or promoting or conducive to ali of 
the City of Coeur d'Alene's legal voters who cast their legal votes in the November 3, 2009 City 
of Coeur d'Alene General Election. This objectionable inclination and disposition of Judge 
Hosack is definite in time and place and character. 
The Affidavit and hearing transcript show the objectionable inclination or disposition of 
Judge-Hosack, and it is his duty to "proceed no further" in the case. Berger, supra. 
As the Berger Court stated: 
" ... the tribunals of the country shall not only be impartial in the controversies submitted 
to them but shall give assurance that they are impartial, free ... from any 'bias or prejudice 
that might disturb the normal course of impartial judgment." 
Contrary to the misguided personal opinions of Judge Hosack, while the will of the legal 
electorate must be protected, so must the sanctity of the ballot and the integrity of the election. 
The integrity of the election has been, and remains, the sole thrust of this case. A thrust that all 
Defendants, following the leadership of Defendant Kennedy, has tried to lead, apparently with 
substantial success, this Court away from. Courts can not, under any circumstance, ignore 
fraudulent conduct whether it be, but not limited to, (1) counting more absentee ballots than 
exist; (2) not maintaining records specifically required by Idaho statutes to verify the date and 
time of receipt of applications for absentee ballots, issuance of absentee ballots, return of 
absentee ballots, and the failure of any absentee ballots to be returned; (3) being unable to 
document which ballot, City or County some 53 voters received and voted; (4) providing County 
voters with City ballots; (5) not investigating and prosecuting unquestionable voter fraud; (5) 
ignoring the fact that the only document establishing how many and when absentee ballots were 
returned reflects that ten (10) more absentee ballots were counted by the machines than were not 
void or duplicative. 
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Contrary to the misguided personal opinions of Judge Hosack, the sanctity of free and 
honest elections is the cornerstone of a true democracy and not "just an election regardless of 
honest." Election contests such as this case are the only manner provided by Idaho's Legislature 
to guarantee that the cornerstone of our democratic process is preserved. Election contests are the 
antithesis of the anathema label that Judge Hosack utilizes to describe this protector of the 
cornerstone of our democratic process. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court must duly schedule and notice a hearing on this motion. Short of that Judge 
Hosack should immediately and voluntarily disqualify himself from all further proceedings in 
this case. 
DATE~==er, 2010. 
Starr Kelso, Attorney for Plaintiff Brannon 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: A copy was faxed Defendant City and Weathers counsel Mike 
Haman and fendant Kennedy's counsel Scott Reed and Peter Erbland on the 13th day of 
Septe , 010. ~ v---
Starr Kelso 
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a·nath·e·ma {~!"!~t~~~~). 
n. pl. a·nath·e·mas 
1. A formal ecclesiastical ban, curse, or excommunication. 
2. A vehement denunciation; a curse: "the sound of a witch's 
anathemas in some unknown tongue" (Nathaniel Hawthorne). 
3. One that is cursed or damned. 
4. One that is greatly reviled, loathed, or shunned: 
"Essentialisrrr--a belief in natural, immutable sex differences 
-is anathema to postmodernists, for whom sexuality itself, 
along with gender, is a 'social construct'" (Wendy Kaminer). 
[Late Latin anathema, doomed offering, accursed thing, from 
Greek, from anatithenai, anathe-, to dedicate: ana-, ana-
+ ti thenai, to put; see dh.e- in Indo-European roots.] 
The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition copyright @2000 by 
Houghton Millin Company. Updated in 2009. Published by Hough!Dn Millin Company. All rights 
reserved. 
anathema [a'nceeama] 
n pi-mas 
-1. a detested person or thing he is anathema to me 
2. (Christianity I Ecclesiastical Terms) a formal ecclesiastical 
curse of excommunication or a formal denunciation of a doctrine 
3. (Christianity I Ecclesiastical Terms) the person or thing so 
cursed 
4. a strong curse; imprecation 
[via Church Latin from Greek: something accursed, dedicated (to 
evil), from anatithenai to dedicate, from ANA-+ tithenai to set] 
Collins English Dictionary- Complete and Unabridged @ HarperCoiHns Publishers 1991, 1994, 
1998,2000,2003 
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anathema - definition of anathema by the Free Online Dictionary, Thesa ... http://www .thefreedictionary.com/ anathema 
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Words IAntonyms 
Noun 1. anathema - a detested person; "he is an anathema to 
me" 
lbete noire 
I disagreeable person, unpleasant person- a person who is not pleasant or agreeable 
2. anathema- a formal ecclesiastical curse accompanied 
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Anathema Maranatha 
Anathematjzation 
anathematize 
bete noire 
curse 
disagreeable person 
Maranatha 
? 
To a people of this nature the Homeric epos would be 
inacceptable, and the post-Homeric epic, with its 
conventional atmosphere, its trite and hackneyed diction, 
and its insincere sentiment, would be anathema. 
Collection Of Hesiod, Homer and Homerica by Homer 
View in context 
Paul's perfection, that he would wish to be anathema 
from Christ, for the salvation of his brethren, it shows much 
of a divine nature, and a kind of conformity with Christ 
himself 
The Essays by Bacon, Sir Francis View in context 
To do anything THEY have never done is anathema 
maranatha. 
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salutary 
1 message 
starr.kelso@frontier.com <starr.keiso@frontier.com> 
To: kelsolawoffice@gmail.com 
sal•u•tar•y 
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-adjective 
1. 
favorable to or promoting health; healthful. 
2. 
promoting or conducive to some beneficial purpose; wholesome. 
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CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT. 
23*23 Mr. Seymour Stedman and Mr. Henry F. Cochems for Berger et al. 
The Solicitor General for the United States. 
26*26 MR. JUSTICE McKENNA delivered the opinion of the court. 
Section 21 of the Judicial Code provides as follows: 
"Whenever a party to any action or proceeding, civil or criminal, shall make and file an affidavit that the judge 
before whom the action or proceeding is to be tried or heard has a personal bias or prejudice either against 
him or in favor of any opposite party to the suit, such judge 27*27 shall proceed no further therein, but another 
judge shall be designated in the manner prescribed in the section last preceding, or chosen in the manner 
prescribed in section twenty-three, to hear such matter. Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the 
reasons for the belief that such bias or prejudice exists, ... No party shall be entitled in any case to file more 
than one such affidavit; and no such affidavit shall be filed unless accompanied by a certificate of counsel of 
record that such affidavit and application are made in good faith. The same proceedings shall be had when 
the presiding judge shall file with the clerk of the court a certificate that he deems himself unable for any 
reason to preside with absolute impartiality in the pending suit or action." 
February 2, 1918, there was returned into the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of 
Illinois, an indictment against plaintiffs in error (it will be convenient to refer to them as defendants), charging 
them with a violation of the Act of Congress of June 15, 1917, known as the Espionage Act, c. 30, 40 Stat. 
217.[1] In due time they invoked§ 21 by filing an affidavit charging Judge Landis, who was to preside at the 
trial, with personal bias and prejudice against them, and moved for the assignment of another judge to 
preside at the trial. The motion was denied and upon the trial defendants were convicted and each sentenced 
to twenty years' imprisonment. From the judgment and sentence they took 28*28 the case to the United 
States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. That court, reciting that certain questions of law under 
§ 21 have arisen upon the affidavit and motion upon which the court is in doubt and upon which it desires the 
advice and instructions of this court, certifies questions of the sufficiency of the affidavit and of the duty of the 
judge thereunder, and also certifies the affidavit and other proceedings upon such motion. 
The affidavit, omitting formal and unnecessary parts, is as follows: Petitioners (defendants) represent "that 
they jointly and severally verily believe that His Honor Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis has a personal bias 
and prejudice against certain of the defendants, to wit: Victor L. Berger, William F. Kruse and Adolph Germer, 
defendants in this cause, and impleaded with J. Louis Engdahl and Irwin St. John Tucker, defendants in this 
case. That the grounds for the petitioners' beliefs are the following facts: That said Adolph Germer was born 
in Prussia, a state or province of Germany; that Victor L. Berger was born in Rehback, Austria; that William F. 
Kruse is of immediate German extraction; that said Judge Landis is prejudiced and biased against said 
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defendants because of their nativity, and in support thereof the defendants allege, that, on information and 
belief, on or about the 1st day of November said Judge Landis said in substance: 'If anybody has said 
anything worse about the Germans than I have I would like to know it so I can use it.' And referring to a 
German who was charged with stating that 'Germany had money and plenty of men and wait and see what 
she is going to do to the United States,' Judge Landis said in substance: 'One must have a very judicial mind, 
indeed, not be to prejudiced against the German Americans in this country. Their hearts are reeking with 
disloyalty. This defendant is the kind of a man that spreads this kind of propaganda and it has been spread 
until it has affected practically all the Germans 29*29 in this country. This same kind of excuse of the 
defendant offertng to piotect the Geiman people is the same kind of excuse offered by tS,e pacifists in t.l-tis 
country, who are against the United States and have the interests of the enemy at heart by defending that 
thing they call the Kaiser and his darling people. You are the same kind of a man that comes over to this 
country from Germany to get away from the Kaiser and war. You have become a citizen of this country and 
lived here as such, and now when this country is at war with Germany you seek to undermine the country 
which gave you protection. You are of the same mind that practically all the German-Americans are in this 
country, and you call yourselves German-Americans. Your hearts are reeking with disloyalty. I know a 
safeblower, he is a friend of mine, who is making a good soldier in France. He was a bank robber for nine 
years, that was his business in peace time, and now he is a good soldier, and as between him and this 
defendant, I prefer the safeblower.' 
"These defendants further aver that they have at no time defended the Kaiser, but on the contrary they have 
been opposed to an autocracy in Germany and every other country; that Victor L. Berger, defendant herein, 
editor of the Milwaukee Leader, a Socialist daily paper; Adolph Germer, National Secretary of the Socialist 
party; William F. Kruse, editor of the Young Socialists Magazine, a Socialist publication; and J. Louis Engdahl 
disapproved the entrance of the United States into this war. 
"Your petitioners further aver that the defendants Tucker and Engdahl were born in the United States and 
were not born in enemy countries, and are not immediate descendants of persons born in enemy countries, 
but verily believe because they are impleaded with Berger, Kruse and Germer that they as well as Berger, 
Germer and Kruse can not receive a fair and impartial trial, and that the prejudice of said Judge Landis 
against said 30*30 Berger, Germer and Kruse would prejudice the defense of said defendants Tucker and 
Engdahl impleaded in this case." 
The affidavit was accompanied by the certificate of Seymour Stedman, attorney for defendants, that the 
affidavit and application were made in good faith. 
The questions certified are as follows: 
(1) Is the aforesaid affidavit of prejudice sufficient to invoke the operation of the act which provides for the 
filing of affidavit of prejudice of a judge? 
(2) Did said Judge Landis have the lawful right to pass upon the sufficiency of the said affidavit of his 
prejudice, or upon any question arising out of the filing of said affidavit? 
(3) Upon the filing of the said affidavit of prejudice of said Judge Landis, did the said Judge have lawful right 
and power to preside as judge on the trial of plaintiffs in error upon said indictment? 
The basis of the questions is§ 21, and the primary question under it is the duty and power of the judge,-
whether the filing of an affidavit of personal bias or prejudice compels his retirement from the case or whether 
he can exercise a judgment upon the facts affirmed and determine his qualification against them and the 
belief based upon them? 
These alternatives present the contentions in the case. Defendants contend for the first; the United States 
contends for the second. The assertion of defendants is that the mandate of the section is not subject to the 
discretion or judgment of the judge. The assertion of the United States is that the motion and its supporting 
affidavit, like other motions and their supporting evidence, are submitted for decision and the exercise of the 
judicial judgment upon them. In other words, the action of the affidavit is not "automatic," to quote the Solicitor 
General, but depends upon the substance and merit of its reasons and the truth of its facts, and upon both the 
judge has 31*31 jurisdiction to pass. The issue is, therefore, precise, and while not in broad compass is 
practically of first impression as now presented. 
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In Glasgow v. Moyer, 225 U.S. 420, the section was referred to but not passed upon. In Ex parte American 
Steel Barrel Co., 230 U.S. 35, the phase of the section presented here was not presented. There proceedings 
in bankruptcy had progressed to a decree of adjudication, and the judge who had conducted them was 
charged by certain creditors with bias and prejudice based on his rulings in the case. Such use of§ 21 was 
disapproved. "It was never intended," it was said, "to enable a discontented litigant to oust a judge because of 
adverse rulings made, for such rulings are reviewable otherwise, but to prevent his future action in the 
pending cause." As pertinent to the comment and to the meaning of§ 21, we may say, that Judge Chatfield, 
against whom the affidavit was directed, said that he felt that the intention of§ 21 was "to cause a transfer of 
the case, without reference to the merits of the charge of bias," and he did so immediately, in order, as he 
said, "that the application of the creditors" might "be considered as speedily as possible by such Judge as" 
might "be designated." Another judge was designated and to restrain action by the latter and vacate the 
orders that he had made, and to command Judge Chatfield to resume jurisdiction, mandamus was sought. It 
was denied. The case establishes that the bias or prejudice which can be urged against a judge must be 
based upon something other than rulings in the case. 
The cases at circuit in which§ 21 was considered have not much guidance. They, however, deserve 
attention. Ex parte N.K. Fairbank Co., 194 Fed. Rep. 978, may be considered as expressing power in the 
presiding judge to pass upon the sufficiency of the facts affirmed. In Ex parte Glasgow, 195 Fed. Rep. 780, 
the question came up 32*32 upon an application for a writ of habeas corpus and it appeared that the affidavit 
of bias was not filed until after trial of the case and when the court was about to pass upon a motion in arrest 
of judgment and new trial. It was held that§ 21 was not applicable at such stage of the proceedings. Henry v. 
Speer, 201 Fed. Rep. 869, was a petition for mandamus to require an affidavit of bias against District Judge 
Speer to be certified to the senior circuit judge that the latter might determine its sufficiency, and to restrain 
Judge Speer from exercising jurisdiction of the case. The writ was refused on the ground that the affidavit did 
not conform to§ 21 in that it omitted to charge "personal" bias, a charge of such bias, it was held, being a 
necessary condition. The court, (Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit}, by Judge Meek, said, "Upon the 
making and filing by a party of an affidavit under the provisions of section 21, of necessity there is imposed 
upon the judge the duty of examining the affidavit to determine whether or not it is the affidavit specified and 
required by the statute and to determine its legal sufficiency. If he finds it to be legally sufficient then he has 
no other or further duty to perform than that prescribed in section 20 of the Judicial Code. He is relieved from 
the delicate and trying duty of deciding upon the question of his own disqualification." This comment sustains 
defendants' view of § 21 and marks a distinction between determining the legal sufficiency of the affidavit and 
passing upon the truth of its statements, a distinction to which we shall presently advert. 
The cases (one being excepted) to the extent they go, militate against the contention of the Government and 
they have confirmation in the words of the section. Their declaration is that "whenever a party to any action or 
proceeding, civil or criminal, shall make and file an affidavit that the judge before whom the action or 
proceeding is to be tried or heard has a personal bias or prejudice 33*33 either against him or in favor of any 
opposite party to the suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be designated . 
. . to hear such matter." There is no ambiguity in the declaration and seemingly nothing upon which 
construction can be exerted - nothing to qualify or temper its words or effect. It is clear in its permission and 
direction. It permits an affidavit of personal bias or prejudice to be filed and upon its filing, if it be accompanied 
by certificate of counsel, directs an immediate cessation of action by the judge whose bias or prejudice is 
averred, and in his stead, the designation of another judge. And there is purpose in the conjunction; its 
elements are complements of each other. The exclusion of one judge is emphasized by the requirement of 
the designation of another. 
But it is said that there is modification of the absolutism of the quoted declaration in the succeeding provision 
that the "affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief' of the existence of the bias or prejudice. 
It is urged that the purpose of the requirement is to submit the reality and sufficiency of the facts to the 
judgment of the judge and their support of the averment or belief of the affiant. It is in effect urged that the 
requirement can have no other purpose, that it is idle else, giving an automatism to the affidavit which 
overrides everything. But this is a misunderstanding of the requirement It has other and less extensive use as 
pointed out by Judge Meek in Henry v. Speer, supra. It is a precaution against abuse, removes the averments 
and belief from the irresponsibility of unsupported opinion, and adds to the certificate of counsel the 
supplementary aid of the penalties attached to perjury. Nor do we think that this view gives room for frivolous 
affidavits. Of course the reasons and facts for the belief the litigant entertains are an essential part of the 
affidavit, and must give fair support to the charge of a bent of mind that may prevent or impede 34*34 
https://mail.google.com/mail/?ui=2&ik=5ad2d00175&view=pt&search=inbox&th= 12b045... 9/1112010 
 
 
 
Si Si
ich 
t 
 
)
OVisi
Oi t
ll l l 1
SC 38417-2011 Page 2066 of 2676
Gmail- case Page4 of7 
impartiality of judgment. The affidavit of defendants has that character. The facts and reasons it states are not 
frivolous or fanciful but substantial and formidable and they have relation to the attitude of Judge Landis' mind 
toward defendants. 
It is, however, said, that the assertion and the facts are stated on information and belief and that hence the 
affidavit is wholly insufficient,§ 21 requiring facts to be stated "and not merely belief." The contention is that 
"the court is expected to act on the affidavit itself' and that, therefore "the act of Congress requires facts -
not opinions, beliefs, rumors, or gossip." Ex parte American Steel Barrel Co., supra, is cited for the contention. 
'vA.Je do not know what counsel means by "opinions, beliefs, rumors, or gossip." The belief of a part-y the 
section makes of concern and if opinion be nearer to or farther from persuasion than belief, both are of 
influence and universally regarded as of influence in the affairs of men and determinative of their conduct, and 
it is not strange that§ 21 should so regard them. 
We may concede that § 21 is not fulfilled by the assertion of "rumors or gossip" but such disparagement 
cannot be applied to the affidavit in this case. Its statement has definite time and place and character, and the 
value of averments on information and belief in the procedure of the law is recognized. To refuse their 
application to§ 21 would be arbitrary and make its remedy unavailable in many, if not in most, cases. The 
section permits only the affidavit of a party, and Ex parte American Steel Barrel Co., supra, decides, that it 
must be based upon facts antedating the trial, not those occurring during the trial. In the present case the 
information was of a definite incident, and its time and place were given. Besides, it cannot be the assumption 
of§ 21 that the bias or prejudice of a judge in a particular case would be known by everybody, and 
necessarily, therefore, to deny to a party 35*35 the use of information received from others is to deny to him 
at times the benefit of the section. 
We are of opinion, therefore, that an affidavit upon information and belief satisfies the section and that upon 
its filing, if it show the objectionable inclination or disposition of the judge, which we have said is an essential 
condition, it is his duty to "proceed no further" in the case. And in this there is no serious detriment to the 
administration of justice nor inconvenience worthy of mention, for of what concern is it to a judge to preside in 
a particular case; of what concern to other parties to have him so preside? And any serious delay of trial is 
avoided by the requirement that the affidavit must be filed not less than ten days before the commencement 
of the term. 
Our interpretation of§ 21 has therefore no deterring consequences, and we cannot relieve from its imperative 
conditions upon a dread or prophecy that they may be abusively used. They can only be so used by making a 
false affidavit; and a charge of, and the penalties of, perjury restrain from that - perjury in him who makes 
the affidavit, connivance therein of counsel thereby subjecting him to disbarment. And upon what inducement 
and for what achievement? No other than trying the case by one judge rather than another, neither party nor 
counsel having voice or influence in the designation of that other; and the section in its care permits but "one 
such affidavit." 
But if we concede, out of deference to judgments that we respect, a foundation for the dread, a possibility to 
the prophecy, we must conclude Congress was aware of them and considered that there were countervailing 
benefits. At any rate we can only deal with the act as it is expressed and enforce it according to its 
expressions. Nor is it our function to approve or disapprove it; but we may say that its solicitude is that the 
tribunals of the 36*36 country shall not only be impartial in the controversies submitted to them but shall give 
assurance that they are impartial, free, to use the words of the section, from any "bias or prejudice" that might 
disturb the normal course of impartial judgment. And to accomplish this end the section withdraws from the 
presiding judge a decision upon the truth of the matters alleged. Its explicit declaration is that, upon the 
making and filing of the affidavit, the judge against whom it is directed "shall proceed no further therein, but 
another judge shall be designated in the manner prescribed in the section last preceding, or chosen in the 
manner prescribed in section twenty-three, to hear such matter." And the reason is easy to divine. To commit 
to the judge a decision upon the truth of the facts gives chance for the evil against which the section is 
directed. The remedy by appeal is inadequate. It comes after the trial and, if prejudice exist, it has worked its 
evil and a judgment of it in a reviewing tribunal is precarious. It goes there fortified by presumptions, and 
nothing can be more elusive of estimate or decision than a disposition of a mind in which there is a personal 
ingredient. 
After overruling the motion of defendants for his displacement, Judge Landis permitted to be filed a 
stenographic report of the incident and language upon which the motion was based. We, however, have not 
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discussed it because under our interpretation of§ 21 it is excluded from consideration. 
We come then to the questions certified, and to the first we answer, Yes, that is, that the affidavit of prejudice 
is sufficient to invoke the operation of the act. To the second we answer that, to the extent we have indicated, 
Judge Landis had a lawful right to pass upon the sufficiency of the affidavit. To the third we answer, No, that 
is, that Judge Landis had no lawful right or power to preside as judge on the trial of defendants upon the 
indictment. 
So ordered. 
37*37 MR. JUSTICE DAY, dissenting. 
As this case is to settle the practice for this and similar cases which may arise in the federal courts, and as 
the opinion does not consider some aspects of the record, I venture to state the reasons which impel me to 
reach a different conclusion than that announced by the majority. 
An examination shows that statutes exist in a number of States covering the subject under consideration. 
These statutes vary in character, and in the requirements for establishing the bias or prejudice of the judge 
which may require him to abstain from sitting at the trial of a particular case. In some of them an affidavit of 
belief of prejudice, or that a fair trial cannot be had before a particular judge, is sufficient to disqualify him. 
Other statutes require supporting affidavits and the certificate of counsel, and provide for a hearing on the 
matter of disqualification. In some States the matter is required to be heard before another judge. 
The federal statute, now under consideration, had its origin in an amendment to the Judicial Code, introduced 
in the House of Representatives when the adoption of the Code was under consideration. As adopted in the 
House, the affidavit was required to set forth the reasons for the belief that personal bias or prejudice existed 
against the party, or in favor of the opposite party to the suit. (See Cong. Rec., vol. 46, part 3, p. 2626, et 
seq.) 
When the bill came before the Senate the section was amended so as to require the facts, and the reasons 
for the belief that bias or prejudice existed, to be set forth, and the affidavit is required to be accompanied by 
a certificate of counsel of record that it and the application are made in good faith. (Sen. Doc., No. 848, 61st 
Cong., 3d sess.) It is thus apparent that the section in the form in which it finally became part of the Judicial 
Code intended that the bias or prejudice which should disqualify 38*38 a judge should be personal against the 
objecting party, and that it should be established by an affidavit which should set forth the reasons and facts 
upon which the charge of bias or prejudice was based. The evident purpose of this requirement was to 
require a showing of such reasons and facts as should prevent imposition upon the court, and establish the 
propriety of the affidavit of disqualification. "It is not sufficient," said the late Mr. Justice Brewer, when a 
member of the Supreme Court of Kansas, in City of Emporia v. Volmer, 12 Kansas, 627, "that a prima facie 
case only be shown, such a case as would require the sustaining of a challenge to a juror. It must be strong 
enough to overthrow the presumption in favor of the trial-judge's integrity, and of the clearness of his 
perceptions." 
I accept the opinion of the majority that the judge under the requirements of this statute may pass upon the 
sufficiency of the affidavit, subject to a review of his decision by an appellate court, and, if it be sufficient to 
show personal bias and prejudice, the judge should not try the case. But I am unable to agree that in cases of 
the character now under consideration the statement of the affidavit, however unfounded, must be accepted 
by the judge as a sufficient reason for his disqualification, leaving the vindication of the integrity and 
independence of the judge to the uncertainties and inadequacy of a prosecution for perjury if it should appear 
that the affidavit contains known misstatements. 
Notwithstanding the filing of the affidavit purporting compliance with the statute, the court has a right to use all 
reasonable means to protect itself from imposition. Davis v. Rivers, 49 Iowa, 435. The personal bias or 
prejudice of the judge against the defendants in this case is said to be established by language imputed to the 
judge as his utterances concerning the attitude of the German people during the progress of the war. 
39*39 The affidavit filed contained a statement of alleged language of the judge, concerning a German who 
was "charged" with making the statements set forth. Upon receiving the affidavit the Judge at once inquired of 
counsel whether the language ascribed to him was not in fact uttered in connection with the disposition of the 
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case of United States against one Weissensel in sentencing him after conviction by a jury of a violation of the 
Espionage Act in the same court. Counsel informed the Judge that such was the fact The Judge asked 
counsel for Berger whether he had made any effort to ascertain the accuracy of the statement alleged to have 
been made by the court. Counsel replied that he had not. It would seem incredible that any judge could have 
made such statements concerning a defendant not yet tried in his court, in advance of trial and upon a mere 
charge of an offense. Counsel in open court admitted that the offending language was used in passing 
sentence after conviction in Weissensel's case. 
tv1oieovei, upon the affidavit being filed, and aftei this admission of counsel, the District Attorney offeied in 
evidence a transcript of what took place and what was in fact said upon the sentencing of Weissensel. The 
Judge permitted this stenographic report, sworn to by an experienced stenographer, who made it, to be a true 
and correct report of the statements made and the proceedings had, to be put into the record, saying that the 
truth should be shown of record in connection with the falsity, although he was of opinion that the facts stated 
in the affidavit failed to establish bias or prejudice against the defendants which would disqualify him from 
sitting at the trial. 
This stenographic report, sent up with the certificate and made part of it, and which there is no reason to 
believe fails to state accurately what took place, is in marked contrast with statements of the affidavit which 
the defendants made when seeking the disqualification of the 40*40 Judge. It shows, as we have already 
stated, that the utterances of the Judge were after conviction of Weissensel, and were made when he was 
passing sentence. It shows that the statement of the Judge concerning German-Americans was quite different 
from that stated in the affidavit, and referred to the type of man who had been convicted and was before him 
for sentence. The Judge in speaking of the convicted defendant said that he was of the type of man who 
branded almost the whole German-American population, and that one German-American, such as the 
defendant, talking such stuff did more damage to his people than thousands of them could overcome by being 
good and loyal citizens; and that he, the defendant, was an illustration of the occasional American of German 
birth whose conduct had done so much to damn the whole ten million in America. While this language might 
have been more temperate, there does not appear to be in it anything fairly establishing that the Judge 
directed his observations at the German people in general, but rather that his remarks were aimed at one 
convicted as was the defendant, of violation of law. 
As I understand the opinion of the court, notwithstanding the admissions of counsel, and the sworn 
stenographic report of what took place, the affidavit must be accepted, and, if it discloses matters, which if 
true, would tend to establish bias and prejudice, the same must be given effect and the judge be disqualified. 
It does not seem to me that this conclusion comports with the requirements of the statute that reasons and 
facts must be set forth for the consideration of the judge. It places the federal courts at the mercy of 
defendants who are willing to make affidavits as to what took place at previous trials in the court, which the 
knowledge of the judge, and the uncontradicted testimony of an official report may show to be untrue, and in 
many districts may greatly retard the trial of criminal causes. 
41 *41 While, as I have said, in sentencing Weissensel the Judge might have been more temperate in his 
observations, I am unable to find that the statements of the affidavit, when read in connection with the 
admissions of counsel and the established facts as to what took place as gathered from the stenographic 
report, showed such evidence of personal bias or prejudice against the defendants as required the Judge 
upon the mere filing of this affidavit to permit its misleading statements to be placed of record, and to proceed 
no further with the case. 
It does not appear that the trial judge had any acquaintance with any of the defendants, only one of whom 
was of German birth, or that he had any such bias or prejudice against any of them as would prevent him 
from fairly and impartially conducting the trial. To permit an ex parte affidavit to become in effect a final 
adjudication of the disqualification of a judge when facts are shown, such as are here established, seems to 
me to be fraught with much danger to the independent discharge of duties by federal judges, and to open a 
door to the abuse of the privilege which is intended to be conferred by the statute in question. 
In my judgment the questions propounded, in the light of the disclosures of this record, should be answered 
as to the first: That the affidavit of prejudice, when read in the light of the other disclosures in the record, was 
insufficient to meet the requirements of the act. As to the second: That while the judge might have called upon 
another judge to pass upon the sufficiency of the affidavit, he had jurisdiction to pass upon it himself if he saw 
fit to do so. As to the third: That the mere filing of the affidavit did not require the judge to proceed no further 
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with the trial of the defendants upon the accusation against them. 
MR. JUSTICE PITNEY concurs in this dissent. 
42*42 MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS, dissenting. 
Page 7 of7 
I am unable to follow the reasoning of the opinion approved by the majority or to feel fairly certain of its scope 
and consequence. If an admitted anarchist charged with murder should affirm an existing prejudice against 
himself and specify that tl1e judge had made certain depreciatory remarks concerning all anarchists, what 
would be the result? Suppose official stenographic notes or other clear evidence should demonstrate the 
falsity of an affidavit, would it be necessary for the judge to retire? And what should be done if dreams or 
visions were the basis of an alleged belief? 
The conclusion announced gives effect to the statute which seems unwarranted by its terms and beyond the 
probable intent of Congress. Bias and prejudice are synonymous words and denote "an opinion or leaning 
adverse to anything without just grounds or before sufficient knowledge" -a state of mind. The statute 
relates only to adverse opinion or leaning towards an individual and has no application to the appraisement of 
a class, e.g., revolutionists, assassins, traitors. 
To claim personal bias without more is insufficient; "the facts and the reasons for the belief that such bias or 
prejudice exists" must be set out, and plainly, I think, this must be done in order that the judge or any 
reviewing tribunal may determine whether they suffice to support honest belief in the disqualifying state of 
mind. 
Defendants' affidavit discloses no adequate ground for believing that personal feeling existed against any one 
of them. The indicated prejudice was towards certain malevolents from Germany, a country then engaged in 
hunnish warfare and notoriously encouraged by many of its natives who, unhappily, had obtained citizenship 
here. The words attributed to the judge (I do not credit the affidavit's accuracy) may be fairly construed as 
showing 43*43 only deep detestation for all persons of German extraction who were at that time wickedly 
abusing privileges granted by our indulgent laws. 
Of course, no judge should preside if he entertains actual personal prejudice towards any party and to this 
obvious disqualification Congress added honestly entertained belief of such prejudice when based upon fairly 
adequate facts and circumstances. Intense dislike of a class does not render the judge incapable of 
administering complete justice to one of its members. A public officer who entertained no aversion towards 
disloyal German immigrants during the late war was simply unfit for his place. And while "An overspeaking 
judge is no well tuned cymbal" neither is an amorphous dummy unspotted by human emotions a becoming 
receptacle for judicial power. It was not the purpose of Congress to empower an unscrupulous defendant 
seeking escape from merited punishment to remove a judge solely because he had emphatically condemned 
domestic enemies in time of national danger. The personal concern of the judge in matters of this kind is 
indeed small, but the concern of the public is very great. 
In my view the trial judge committed no error when he considered the affidavit, held it insufficient, and refused 
to retire. 
[1] "Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully make or convey false reports or false statements 
with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval forces of the United States or to 
promote the success of its enemies and whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully cause or 
attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the 
United States, or shall willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States, shall be 
punished .... " 
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND. 
565*565 Daniel M. Friedman argued the cause for the United States in all cases. With him on the brief were 
Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Turner, Robert B. Hummel, Gerald Kadish and Noel E. 
Story. 
John F. Sennett argued the cause for appellant in No. 74 and for appellees in No. 73. With him on the briefs 
for Grinnell Corp. were Denis G. Mcinerney, Roger T. Clapp, Harold F. Reindel, Jerrold G. Van Cise and 
Robert F. Martin. 
Macdonald Flinn argued the cause for appellant in No. 75 and for appellees in No. 73. With him on the briefs 
for American District Telegraph Co. were Robert 0. Donnelly and Thomas B. Leary. 
John W. Drye, Jr., argued the cause for appellant in No. 76 and for appellees in No. 73. With him on the briefs 
for Holmes Electric Protective Co. were Francis S. Bensel and Bud G. Holman. 
566*566 J. Francis Hayden argued the cause for appellant in No. 77 and for appellees in No. 73. Mr. Hayden 
also filed a brief for Automatic Fire Alarm Co. of Delaware. 
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents an important question under§ 2 of the Sherman Act,[1] which makes it an offense for any 
person to "monopolize ... any part of the trade or commerce among the several States." This is a civil suit 
brought by the United States against Grinnell Corporation (Grinnell), American District Telegraph Co. (ADD, 
Holmes Electric Protective Co. (Holmes) and Automatic Fire Alarm Co. of Delaware (AFA). The District Court 
held for the Government and entered a decree. All parties appeal,[2] the United States because it deems the 
relief inadequate and the defendants both on the merits and on the relief and on the ground that the District 
Court denied them a fair trial. We noted probable jurisdiction. 381 U. S. 910. 
Grinnell manufactures plumbing supplies and fire sprinkler systems. It also owns 76% of the stock of ADT, 
89% of the stock of AFA, and 100% of the stock of Holmes.[3] ADT provides both burglary and fire protection 
services; Holmes provides burglary services alone; AFA supplies only fire protection service. Each offers a 
central station service under which hazard-detecting devices installed on the protected premises 
automatically 567*567 transmit an electric signal to a central station.[4] The central station is manned 24 
hours a day. Upon receipt of a signal, the central station, where appropriate, dispatches guards to the 
protected premises and notifies the police or fire department direct. There are other forms of protective 
services. But the record shows that subscribers to accredited central station service (i. e., that approved by 
the insurance underwriters) receive reductions in their insurance premiums that are substantially greater than 
the reduction received by the users of other kinds of protection service. In 1961 accredited companies in the 
central station service business grossed $65,000,000. ADT, Holmes, and AFA are the three largest 
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companies in the business in terms of revenue: ADT (with 121 central stations in 115 cities) has 73% of the 
business; Holmes (with 12 central stations in three large cities) has 12.5%; AFA (with three central stations in 
three large cities) has 2%. Thus the three companies that Grinnell controls have over 87% of the business. 
Over the years ADT purchased the stock or assets of 27 companies engaged in the business of providing 
burglar or fire alarm services. Holmes acquired the stock or assets of three burglar alarm companies in New 
York City using a central station. Of these 30, the officials 568*568 of seven agreed not to engage in the 
protective service business in the area for periods ranging from five years to permanently. After Grinnell 
acquired control of the other defendants, the latter continued in their attempts to acquire central station 
companies-offers being made to at least eight companies between the years 1955 and 1961, including four 
of the five largest nondefendant companies in the business. When the present suit was filed, each of those 
defendants had outstanding an offer to purchase one of the four largest nondefendant companies. 
In 1906, prior to the affiliation of ADT and Holmes, they made a written agreement whereby ADT transferred 
to Holmes its burglar alarm business in a major part of the Middle Atlantic States and agreed to refrain forever 
from engaging in that business in that area, while Holmes transferred to ADT its watch signal business and 
agreed to limit its activities to burglar alarm service and night watch service for financial institutions. While this 
agreement was modified several times and terminated in 1947, in 1961 Holmes still restricted its business to 
burglar alarm service and operated only in those areas which had been allocated to it under the 1906 
agreement. Similarly, ADT continued to refrain from supplying burglar alarm service in those areas earlier 
allocated to Holmes. 
In 1907 Grinnell entered into a series of agreements with the other defendant companies and with Automatic 
Fire Protection Co. to the following effect: 
AFA received the exclusive right to provide central station sprinkler supervisory and waterflow alarm and 
automatic fire alarm service in New York City, Boston and Philadelphia, and agreed not to provide burglar 
alarm service in those cities or central station service elsewhere in the United States. 
569*569 Automatic Fire Protection Co. obtained the exclusive right to provide central station sprinkler 
supervisory and waterflow alarm service everywhere else in the United States except for the three cities in 
which AFA received that exclusive right, and agreed not to engage in burglar alarm service. 
ADT received the exclusive right to render burglar alarm and nightwatch service throughout the United States. 
(Under ADrs 1906 agreement with Holmes, however, it could not provide burglar alarm services in the areas 
for which it had given Holmes the exclusive right to do so.) It agreed not to furnish sprinkler supervisory and 
waterflow alarm service anywhere in the country and not to furnish automatic fire alarm service in New York 
City, Boston or Philadelphia (the three cities allocated to AFA). ADT agreed to connect to its central stations 
the systems installed by AFA and Automatic. 
Grinnell agreed to furnish and install all sprinkler supervisory and waterflow alarm actuating devices used in 
systems that AFA and Automatic would install, and otherwise not to engage in the central station protection 
business. 
AFA and Automatic received 25% of the revenue produced by the sprinkler supervisory waterflow alarm 
service which they provided in their respective territories; ADT and Grinnell received 50% and 25%, 
respectively, of the revenue which resulted from such service. The agreements were to continue until 
February 1954. 
The agreements remained substantially unchanged until 1949 when ADT purchased all of Automatic Fire 
Protection Co.'s rights under it for $13,500,000. After these 1907 agreements expired in 1954, AFA continued 
to honor the prior division of territories; and ADT and AFA entered into a new contract providing for the 
continued sharing of revenues on substantially the same 570*570 basis as before.[5] In 1954 Grinnell and 
ADT renewed an agreement with a Rhode Island company which received the exclusive right to render 
central station service within Rhode Island at prices no lower than those of ADT and which agreed to use 
certain equipment supplied by Grinnell and ADT and to share its revenues with those companies. ADT had an 
informal agreement with a competing central station company in Washington, D. C., "that we would not solicit 
each other's accounts.'' 
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ADT over the years reduced its minimum basic rates to meet competition and renewed contracts at 
substantially increased rates in cities where it had a monopoly of accredited central station service. ADT 
threatened retaliation against firms that contemplated inaugurating central station service. And the record 
indicates that, in contemplating opening a new central station, ADT officials frequently stressed that such 
action would deter their competitors from opening a new station in that area. 
The District Court found that the defendant companies had committed per se violations of § 1 of the Sherman 
Act as well as § 2 and entered a decree. 236 F. Supp. 244. 
I. 
The offense of monopoly under§ 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly 
power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition 571 *571 or maintenance of that power as 
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or 
historic accident. We shall see that this second ingredient presents no major problem here, as what was done 
in building the empire was done plainly and explicitly for a single purpose. In United States v. duPont & Co., 
351 U. S. 377, 391, we defined monopoly power as "the power to control prices or exclude competition." The 
existence of such power ordinarily may be inferred from the predominant share of the market. In American 
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781, 797, we said that "over two-thirds of the entire domestic field of 
cigarettes, and ... over 80% of the field of comparable cigarettes" constituted "a substantial monopoly." In 
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416, 429, 90% of the market constituted monopoly 
power. In the present case, 87% of the accredited central station service business leaves no doubt that the 
congeries of these defendants have monopoly power-power which, as our discussion of the record 
indicates, they did not hesitate to wield-if that business is the relevant market. The only remaining question 
therefore is, what is the relevant market? 
In case of a product it may be of such a character that substitute products must also be considered, as 
customers may turn to them if there is a slight increase in the price of the main product. That is the teaching 
of the du Pont case (supra, at 395, 404), viz., that commodities reasonably interchangeable make up that 
"part" of trade or commerce which § 2 protects against monopoly power. 
The District Court treated the entire accredited central station service business as a single market and we 
think it was justified in so doing. Defendants argue that the different central station services offered are so 
diverse that they cannot under du Pont be lumped together to 572*572 make up the relevant market. For 
example, burglar alarm services are not interchangeable with fire alarm services. They further urge that du 
Pont requires that protective services other than those of the central station variety be included in the market 
definition. 
But there is here a single use, i.e., the protection of property, through a central station that receives signals. It 
is that service, accredited, that is unique and that competes with all the other forms of property protection. We 
see no barrier to combining in a single market a number of different products or services where that 
combination reflects commercial realities. To repeat, there is here a single basic service-the protection of 
property through use of a central service station-that must be compared with all other forms of property 
protection. 
In § 2 cases under the Sherman Act, as in § 7 cases under the Clayton Act (Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 
370 U. S. 294, 325) there may be submarkets that are separate economic entities. We do not pursue that 
question here. First, we deal with services, not with products; and second, we conclude that the accredited 
central station is a type of service that makes up a relevant market and that domination or control of it makes 
out a monopoly of a "part" of trade or commerce within the meaning of§ 2 of the Sherman Act. The 
defendants have not made out a case for fragmentizing the types of services into lesser units. 
Burglar alarm service is in a sense different from fire alarm service; from waterflow alarms; and so on. But it 
would be unrealistic on this record to break down the market into the various kinds of central station protective 
services that are available. Central station companies recognize that to compete effectively, they must offer 
all or nearly all types of service.(6] The different 573*573 forms of accredited central station service are 
provided from a single office and customers utilize different services in combination. We held in United States 
v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 37 4 U. S. 321, 356, that "the cluster'' of services denoted by the term "commercial 
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banking" is "a distinct line of commerce." There is, in our view, a comparable cluster of services here. That 
bank case arose under § 7 of the Clayton Act where the question was whether the effect of a merger "in any 
line of commerce" may be "substantially to lessen competition." We see no reason to differentiate between 
"line" of commerce in the context of the Clayton Act and "part'' of commerce for purposes of the Sherman Act. 
See United States v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665, 667-668. In the§ 7 national bank case just 
mentioned, services, not products in the mercantile sense, were involved. In our view the lumping together of 
various kinds of services makes for the appropriate market here as it did in the § 7 case. 
Theie aie, to be suie, substitutes foi the accredited central station service. But none of t.,em appears to 
operate on the same level as the central station service so as to meet the interchangeability test of the du 
Pont case. Nonautomatic and automatic local alarm systems appear on this record to have marked 
differences, not the low degree of differentiation required of substitute services as well as substitute articles. 
574*574 Watchman service is far more costly and less reliable. Systems that set off an audible alarm at the 
site of a fire or burglary are cheaper but often less reliable. They may be inoperable without anyone's knowing 
it. Moreover, there is a risk that the local ringing of an alarm will not attract the needed attention and help. 
Proprietary systems that a customer purchases and operates are available; but they can be used only by a 
very large business or by government and are not realistic alternatives for most concerns. There are also 
protective services connected directly to a municipal police or fire department. But most cities with an 
accredited central station do not permit direct, connected service for private businesses. These alternate 
services and devices differ, we are told, in utility, efficiency, reliability, responsiveness, and continuity, and the 
record sustains that position. And, as noted, insurance companies generally allow a greater reduction in 
premiums for accredited central station service than for other types of protection. 
Defendants earnestly urge that despite these differences, they face competition from these other modes of 
protection. They seem to us seriously to overstate the degree of competition, but we recognize that (as the 
District Court found) they "do not have unfettered power to control the price of their services ... due to the 
fringe competition of other alarm or watchmen services." 236 F. Supp., at 254. What defendants overlook is 
that the high degree of differentiation between central station protection and the other forms means that for 
many customers, only central station protection will do. Though some customers may be willing to accept 
higher insurance rates in favor of cheaper forms of protection, others will not be willing or able to risk serious 
interruption to their businesses, even though covered by insurance, and will thus be unwilling to consider 
anything but central station protection. 
575*575 The accredited, as distinguished from nonaccredited service, is a relevant part of commerce. 
Virtually the only central station companies in the status of the nonaccredited are those that have not yet been 
able to meet the standards of the rating bureau. The accredited ones are indeed those that have achieved, in 
the eyes of under-writers, superiorities that other central stations do not have. The accredited central station 
is located in a building of approved design, provided with an emergency lighting system and two alternate 
main power sources, manned constantly by at least a required minimum of operators, provided with a direct 
line to fire headquarters and, where possible, a direct line to a police station; and equipped with all the 
devices, circuits and equipment meeting the requirements of the underwriters. These standards are important 
as insurance carriers often require accredited central station service as a condition to writing insurance. There 
is indeed evidence that customers consider the unaccredited service as inferior. 
We also agree with the District Court that the geographic market for the accredited central station service is 
national. The activities of an individual station are in a sense local as it serves, ordinarily, only that area which 
is within a radius of 25 miles. But the record amply supports the conclusion that the business of providing 
such a service is operated on a national level. There is national planning. The agreements we have discussed 
covered activities in many States. The inspection, certification and rate-making is largely by national insurers. 
The appellant ADT has a national schedule of prices, rates, and terms, though the rates may be varied to 
meet local conditions. It deals with multistate businesses on the basis of nationwide contracts. The 
manufacturing business of ADT is interstate. The fact that Holmes is more nearly local than the others does 
not 576*576 save it, for it is part and parcel of the combine presided over and controlled by Grinnell. 
As the District Court found, the relevant market for determining whether the defendants have monopoly power 
is not the several local areas which the individual stations serve, but the broader national market that reflects 
the reality of the way in which they built and conduct their business. 
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We have said enough about the great hold that the defendants have on this market. The percentage is so 
high as to justify the finding of monopoly. And, as the facts already related indicate, this monopoly was 
achieved in large part by unlawful and exclusionary practices. The restrictive agreements that pre-empted for 
each company a segment of the market where it was free of competition of the others were one device. 
Pricing practices that contained competitors were another. The acquisitions by Grinnell of ADT, AFA, and 
Holmes were still another. Grinnell long faced a problem of competing with ADT. That was one reason it 
acquired AFA and Holmes. Prior to settlement of its dispute and controversy with ADT, Grinnell prepared to 
go into the central station service business. By acquiring ADT in 1953, Grinnell eliminated that alternative. Its 
control of the three other defendants eliminated any possibilit'-t of an outbreak of competition t~at might have 
occurred when the 1907 agreements terminated. By those acquisitions it perfected the monopoly power to 
exclude competitors and fix prices.[?] 
577*57711. 
The final decree enjoins the defendants in general terms from restraining trade or attempting or conspiring to 
restrain trade in this particular market, from further monopolizing, and attempting or conspiring to monopolize. 
The court ordered the alarm companies to file with the Department of Justice standard lists of prices and 
terms and every quotation to customers that deviated from those lists and enjoined the defendants from 
acquiring stock, assets, or business of any enterprise in the market. Grinnell was ordered to file, not later than 
April 1, 1966, a plan of divestiture of its stock in each of the other defendant companies. It was given the 
option either to sell the stock or distribute it to its stockholders or combine or vary those methods.[8] The court 
further enjoined any of the defendants from employing in any capacity the President and Chairman of the 
Board of Grinnell, James D. Fleming. Both the Government and the defendants challenge aspects of the 
decree. 
We start from the premise that adequate relief in a monopolization case should put an end to the combination 
and deprive the defendants of any of the benefits of the illegal conduct, and break up or render impotent the 
monopoly power found to be in violation of the Act. That is the teaching of our cases, notably Schine Theatres 
v. United States, 334 U. S.110, 128-129. 
We largely agree with the Government's views on the relief aspect of the case. We start with ADT, which 
presently does 73% of the business done by accredited central stations throughout the country. It is indeed 
the keystone of the defendants' monopoly power. The mere 578*578 dissolution of the combination through 
the divestiture by Grinnell of its interests in the other companies does not reach the root of the evil. In 92 of 
the 115 cities in which ADT operates there are no other accredited central stations. Perhaps some cities could 
not support more than one. Defendants recognized prior to trial that at least 13 cities can; the Government 
urged divestiture in 48 cities. That there should be some divestiture on the part of ADT seems clear; but the 
details of such divestiture must be determined by the District Court as the matter cannot be resolved on this 
record. 
Two of the means by which ADT acquired and maintained its large share of the market are the requirement 
that subscribers sign five-year contracts and the retention by ADT of title to the protective services equipment 
installed on a subscriber's premises. On this record it appears that these practices constitute substantial 
barriers to competition and that relief against them is appropriate. The pros and cons are argued with 
considerable vehemence here.[9] Again, we cannot resolve them on this record. The various aspects of this 
controversy must be explored by the District Court and suitable protective provisions included in the decree 
that deprive these two devices of the coercive power that they apparently have had towards restraining 
competition and creating a monopoly. 
579*579 The Government proposed that the defendants be required to sell, on nondiscriminatory terms, any 
devices manufactured by them for use in furnishing central station service. It seems clear that if the 
competitors are to be able to compete effectively for the existing customers of the defendants when the 
present service contracts expire, they must be assured of replacement parts to maintain those systems.(1 0] 
The Government urges visitation rights, that is, requiring reports, examining documents, and interviewing 
company personnel, a relief commonly granted for the purpose of determining whether a defendant has 
complied with an antitrust decree. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 95. The 
District Court gave no explanation for its refusal to grant this relief.[11] It is so important and customary a 
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provision that the District Court should reconsider it. 
Defendants urge and the Government concedes that the barring of Mr. Fleming from the employment of any 
of the defendants is unduly harsh and quite unnecessary on this record. While relief of that kind may be 
appropriate where the predatory conduct is conspicuous, we cannot see that any such case was made out on 
this record. 
The Government objects, as do the defendants, to the broad and generalized terms of the restraining order. 
They properiy point out, as we ertiphasized in Schine Theatres v. United States, supra, at 125-126, that the 
precise practices found to have violated the Act should 580*580 be specifically enjoined. On remand we 
suggest that that course be taken. 
The defendants object to the requirements that Grinnell divest itself of its holdings in the three alarm company 
defendants, but we think that provision is wholly justified. Dissolution of the combination is essential as 
indicated by many of our cases, starting with Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 78. The 
defendants object to that portion of the decree that bars them from acquiring interests in firms in the 
accredited central station business. But since acquisition was one of the methods by which the defendants 
acquired their market power and was the method by which Grinnell put the combination together, an 
injunction against the repetition of the practice seems fully warranted. The defendants further object to the 
requirement in the decree that the alarm company defendants report to the Department of Justice any 
deviation they make from their list prices. We make no comment on that because in view of the other 
extensive changes necessary in the decree, the District Court might well deem it to be unnecessary in the 
fashioning of the new decree. In other words, we leave that matter open, to rest finally in the discretion of the 
District Court. 
Ill. 
The defendants contend that Judge Wyzanski, who tried the case, was personally biased and prejudiced and 
should have been disqualified from sitting in the case, and that he denied them a fair trial. We think this point 
is without merit. 
The complaint was filed in April1961, the answers in July 1961. Shortly thereafter extensive taking of 
depositions began. The District Court in January 1963 directed that no depositions be taken after September 
1, 1963. In response to an inquiry from the court both sides suggested that the trial be set no earlier than 
January 1964. 
581*581 At a pretrial conference in December 1963, government counsel told the court that the parties had 
been trying to reach agreement on a consent decree but were far apart and asked how the court would like to 
handle the presentation of the evidence in the event a settlement was not reached. Grinnell's lawyer 
suggested that the next appropriate procedure would be a pretrial on the question of relief-a suggestion that 
the District Court construed as an invitation to the court to discuss the relief apart from the merits. The 
Government objected. The court then asked for a brief from each side setting forth its views on relief if the 
Government prevailed on the merits. In response to the court's statement that "as I understand it, you want to 
find out what kind of relief I would be likely to allow if the government's case stood virtually uncontradicted," 
Grinnell's counsel replied: "That is what I had in mind, your Honor, yes." 
Thereupon the court set a day for such a hearing. At the next pretrial conference Grinnell's counsel stated that 
"if your Honor would indicate the relief that might be appropriate in this case that would help both sides to 
come to a better understanding." 
Then the following colloquy occurred: 
"THE COURT. I don't think it would help very much. 
"MR. MciNERNEY. Well, your Honor, I think it would help both the plaintiff and the defendants to know what is 
really at stake here in this trial. 
"THE COURT. I assure you that you would not be helped by anything I would say. You would do better to get 
together with the government rather than run the risk of what I would say from what I have seen. Let me just 
assure you of that. ... " 
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The case was then set for trial on June 15, 1964. When Grinnell's counsel sought to argue further, the court 
stated: "There is no use in discussing it with me. I have 582*582 read enough to know that if I have to decide 
this case on what I have seen from the government you will not be in a position at this stage to agree to it." 
On June 3, 1964, defendants argued for a postponement of the trial, saying they needed more time. The court 
denied the motion. Then they argued that the relief issues to be tried be limited to those raised by the 
pleadings so as to eliminate what they considered to be extraneous issues raised by the Government. To that 
the court replied: 
"I can't understand frankly why you don't realize that you have forced me to look at the documents in this 
case, which I dislike doing in advance of trial. You have invited me, therefore, into what I regard as, from your 
point of view, a rather undesirable situation. I think I made that clear at the beginning. I have told you that, 
forced by you to look, my views are more extreme than those of the government; and I have also made you 
realize that if I am required to make Findings and reach Conclusions I am opening up third-party suits that will 
make, in view of the size of the industry, the percentage of people involved higher than in the electrical 
cases." 
Shortly thereafter defendants filed a motion(12] for the disqualification of Judge Wyzanski on the grounds of 
personal bias and prejudice.[13] 
583*583 The alleged bias and prejudice to be disqualifying must stem from an extrajudicial source and result 
in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case. 
Berger v. United States, 255 U. S. 22, 31. Any adverse attitudes that Judge Wyzanski evinced toward the 
defendants were based on his study of the depositions and briefs which the parties had requested him to 
make. What he said reflected no more than his view that, if the facts were as the Government alleged, 
stringent relief was called for. 
During the trial he repeatedly stated that he had not made up his mind on the merits. During the trial he ruled 
certain evidence to be irrelevant to the issues and when the lawyer persisted in offering it Judge Wyzanski 
said, "Maybe you will persuade somebody else. And if you think so, all right. I just assure you it is a great 
ceremonial act, as far as I am concerned." We do not read this statement as manifesting a closed mind on the 
merits of the case but consider it merely a terse way of repeating the previously stated ruling that this 
particular evidence was irrelevant. 
We have examined all the other claims of the defendants made against Judge Wyzanski and find that the 
claim of bias and prejudice is not made out. Our discussion of the relief which he granted shows indeed that 
he was, in several critical respects, too lenient with those who now charge him with bias and prejudice. 
The judgment below is affirmed except as to the decree. We remand for further hearings on the nature of the 
relief consistent with the views expressed herein. 
It is so ordered. 
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting. 
I cannot agree with the Court that the relevant market has been adequately proved. I do not dispute that a 
584*584 national market may be found even though immediate competition takes place only within individual 
communities, some of which are themselves natural monopolies. For a national monopoly of such local 
enterprises may still have serious long-term impact on competition and be vulnerable on its own plane to the 
antitrust laws. In the product market also the Court seems to me to make out a good enough case for lumping 
together the different kinds of central station protective service (CSPS). But I cannot agree that the facts so 
far developed warrant restricting the product market to accredited CSPS. 
Because the ultimate issue is the effective power to control price and competition, this Court has always 
recognized that the market must include products or services "reasonably interchangeable" with those of the 
1 alleged monopolist. United States v. duPont & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395. In this instance, there is no doubt that 
the accredited CSPS business does compete in some measure with many other forms of hazard protection: 
watchmen, local alarms, proprietary systems, telephone-connected services, unaccredited CSPS, direct-
connected (to police and fire stations) systems, and so forth. The critical question, then, is the extent of 
competition from these rivals. 
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The Government and the majority have stressed that differences in cost, reliability and insurance discounts 
may disqualify a competing form of protection for a particular customer. For example, it is said that proprietary 
systems are too expensive for any but large companies and local alarms may go unanswered in some 
neighborhoods. But if in general a CSPS customer has a feasible alternative to CSPS, it does not much 
matter that other ones are foreclosed to him, nor that other CSPS customers have different second choices. 
From this record, it may well be that other forms of protection are each competitive enough with segments of 
the CSPS 585*585 market so that in sum CSPS rarely has a monopoly position. 
From the defense standpoint, there is substantial evidence showing that the defendants do feel themselves 
under pressure from other forms of protection, that they do compete for customers, and that they do lower 
prices even in areas where no CSPS competition is present. This concrete evidence of market behavior 
seems to me to rank higher than the kind of inference proof heavily relied on by the Government-physical 
differences between competing forms of protection, self-advertising claims of CSPS companies that they 
represent a superior service, and varying insurance discounts. Given that the burden of proof rests upon the 
Government, the record leaves me with such misgivings as to the validity of the District Court's findings on 
this score that I am not prepared to agree that the Government has made the showing of market domination 
that the law demands before a business is sundered. 
At the same time the case must be recognized as a close one, and I am not ready to say at this stage that the 
findings and conclusions of the District Court might not be supportable. All things considered, I join with my 
Brothers FORT AS and STEWART to the extent of voting to remand the case for further proceedings so that 
new findings can be made as to the relevant product market. This course seems to me the more appropriate 
in light of the fact that because of the Expediting Act, 15 U. S. C. § 29 (1964 ed. ), we have not had the benefit 
of any intermediate appellate sifting of this record. In view of the disposition I propose, I do not consider any 
of the other questions in the case. 
MR. JUSTICE FORT AS, with whom MR. JUSTICE STEWART joins, dissenting. 
I agree that the judgment below should be remanded, but I do not agree that the remand should be limited to 
586*586 reshaping the decree. Because I believe that the definition of the relevant market here cannot be 
sustained, I would reverse and remand for a new determination of this basic issue, subject to proper 
standards. 
We have here a case under both § 1 and § 2 of the Sherman Act, which proscribe combinations in restraint of 
trade, and monopolies and attempts to monopolize. The judicial task is not difficult to state: Does the record 
show a combination in restraint of trade or a monopoly or attempt to monopolize? If so, what are its 
characteristics, scope and effect? And, finally, what is the appropriate remedy for a court of equity to decree? 
Each of these inquiries depends upon two basic referents: definition of the geographical area of trade or 
commerce restrained or monopolized, and of the products or services involved. In § 1 cases this problem 
ordinarily presents little difficulty because the combination in restraint of trade itself delineates the "markef' 
with sufficient clarity to support the usual injunctive form of relief in those cases. See, e. g., United States v. 
Griffith, 334 U. S. 100. In the present case, however, the essence of the offense is monopolization, achieved 
or attempted, and the major relief is divestiture. For these purposes, "markef' definition is of the essence, just 
as in § 7 cases[1] the kindred definition of the "line of commerce" is fundamental. We must define the area of 
commerce that is allegedly engrossed before we can determine its engrossment; and we must define it before 
a decree can be shaped to deal with the consequences of the monopoly, and to restore or produce 
competition. See United States v. duPont & Co. (the Cellophane Case), 351 U.S. 377, 587*587 389-396; 
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1945). 
In§ 2 cases, the search for "the relevant markef' must be undertaken and pursued with relentless clarity. It is, 
in essence, an economic task put to the uses of the law. Unless this task is well done, the results will be 
distorted in terms of the conclusion as to whether the law has been violated and what the decree should 
contain. 
In this case, the relevant geographical and product markets have not been defined on the basis of the 
economic facts of the industry concerned. They have been tailored precisely to fit defendants' business. The 
Government proposed and the trial court concluded that the relevant market is not the business of fire 
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protection, or burglary protection, or protection against waterflow, etc., or all of these together. It is not even 
the business of furnishing these from a central location. It is the business, viewed nationally, of supplying 
"insurance accredited central station protection services" (CSPS)- that is, fire, burglary and other kinds of 
protection furnished from a central station which is accredited by insurance companies. The business of 
defendants fits neatly into the product and geographic market so defined. In fact, it comes close to filling the 
market so defined.[2J This Court has now approved this Procrustean definition. 
The geographical market is defined as nationwide. But the need and the service are intensely local-more 
local by far, for exampie, than the market which this Court found to be local in United States v. Philadelphia 
Nat. Bank, 37 4 U. S. 321 , 357-362. [3] The premises protected 588*588 do not travel. They are fixed 
locations. They must be protected where they are. Protection must be provided on the spot. It must be 
furnished by local personnel able to bring help to the scene within minutes. Even the central stations can 
provide service only within a 25-mile radius. Where the tenants of the premises turn to central stations for this 
service, they must make their contracts locally with the central station and purchase their services from it on 
the basis of local conditions. 
But because these defendants, the trial court found, are connected by stock ownership, interlocking 
management and some degree of national corporate direction, and because there is some national 
participation in selling as well as national financing, advertising, purchasing of equipment, and the like,[4] the 
court concluded that the competitive area to be considered is national. This Court now affirms that conclusion. 
This is a non sequitur. It is not permissible to seize upon the nationwide scope of defendants' operation and to 
bootstrap a geographical definition of the market from this. The purpose of the search for the relevant 
geographical market is to find the area or areas to which a potential buyer may rationally look for the goods or 
services that he seeks. The test, as this Court said in United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, is "the 
geographic structure of supplier-customer relations," 374 U. S. 321, 357, quoting Kaysen & Turner, Antitrust 
Policy 102 (1959). And, as MR. JUSTICE CLARK put it in Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 
320, 327, the definition of the relevant market requires 589*589 "careful selection of the market area in which 
the seller operates, and to which the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies."[5] The central issue is 
where does a potential buyer look for potential suppliers of the service- what is the geographical area in 
which the buyer has, or, in the absence of monopoly, would have, a real choice as to price and alternative 
facilities? This depends upon the facts of the market place, taking into account such economic factors as the 
distance over which supplies and services may be feasibly furnished, consistently with cost and functional 
efficiency. 
The incidental aspects of defendants' business which the court uses cannot control the outcome of this 
inquiry. They do not measure the market area in which buyer and sellers meet. They have little impact upon 
the ascertainment of the geographical areas in which the economic and legal questions must be answered: 
have defendants "monopolized" or "restrained" trade; have they eliminated or can they eliminate competitors 
or prevent or obstruct new entries into the business; have they controlled or can they control price for the 
services? These are the issues; and, in defendants' business, a finding that the "relevant market" is national is 
nothing less than a studied failure to assess the effect of defendants' position and practices in the light of the 
competition which exists, or could exist, in economically defined areas-in the real world. 
Here, there can be no doubt that the correct geographic market is local. The services at issue are intensely 
local: they can be furnished only locally. The business as it is done is local-not nationwide. If, as might well 
be the case on this record, defendants were found to have violated the Sherman Act in a number of these 
local areas, a proper decree, directed to those markets, as well as to 590*590 general corporate features 
relevant to the condemned practices, could be fashioned. On the other hand, a gross definition of the market 
as nationwide leads to a gross, nationwide decree which does not address itself to the realities of the market 
place. That is what happened here: The District Court's finding that the market was nationwide logically led it 
to a decree which operated on the only national aspect of the situation, the parent company nexus, instead of 
on the economically realistic areas-the local situations. This Court now directs the trial court to require 
"some [unspecified] divestiture" locally by the alarm companies. This is a recognition of the economic reality 
that the relevant competitive areas are local. In plain terms, the Court's direction to the trial court means a 
"market-by-markef' analysis for the purpose of breaking up defendants' monopoly position and creating 
competitors and competition wherever feasible in particular cities. In my view, however, by so directing, the 
Court implies that which it does not command: that the case should be reconsidered at the trial court level 
because of the improper standard it used to define the relevant geographic markets. 
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The trial court's definition of the "product" market even more dramatically demonstrates that its action has 
been Procrustean-that it has tailored the market to the dimensions of the defendants. It recognizes that a 
person seeking protective services has many alternative sources. It lists "watchmen, watchdogs, automatic 
proprietary systems confined to one site, {often, but not always,) alarm systems connected with some local 
police or fire station, often unaccredited CSPS [central station protective services], and often accredited 
CSPS." The court finds that even in the same city a single customer seeking protection for several premises 
may "exercise its option" differently for different locations. It may choose 591 *591 accredited CSPS for one of 
its iocations and a different type of service for another. 
But the court isolates from all of these alternatives only those services in which defendants engage. It 
eliminates all of the alternative sources despite its conscientious enumeration of them. Its definition of the 
"relevant market" is not merely confined to "central station" protective services, but to those central station 
protective services which are "accredited" by insurance companies. 
There is no pretense that these furnish peculiar services for which there is no alternative in the market place, 
on either a price or a functional basis. The court relies solely upon its finding that the services offered by 
accredited central stations are of better quality, and upon its conclusion that the insurance companies tend to 
give "noticeably larger'' discounts to policyholders who use accredited central station protective services. This 
Court now approves this strange red-haired, bearded, one-eyed man-with-a-limp classification. 
The unreality of the trial court's market definition may best be illustrated by an example. Consider the situation 
of a retail merchant in Pittsburgh who wishes to protect his store against burglary. The Holmes Electric 
Protective Company, a subsidiary of Grinnell, operates an accredited central station service in Pittsburgh. It 
provides only burglary protection. 
The gerrymandered market definition approved today totally excludes from the market consideration of the 
availability in Pittsburgh of cheaper but somewhat less reliable local alarm systems, or of more expensive 
{although the expense is reduced by greater insurance discounts) watchman service, or even of unaccredited 
central station service which virtually duplicates the Holmes service. 
Instead, and in the name of "commercial realities," we are instructed that the "relevant market"-which totally 
592*592 excludes these locally available alternatives-requires us to look only to accredited central station 
service, and that we are to include in the "market" central stations which do not furnish burglary protection 
and even those which serve such places as Boston and Honolulu.[6] 
Moreover, we are told that the "relevant market" must assume this strange and curious configuration despite 
evidence in the record and a finding of the trial court that "fringe competition" from such locally available 
alternatives as watchmen, local alarm systems, proprietary systems, and unaccredited central stations has, in 
at least 20 cities, forced the defendants to operate at a "loss" even though defendants have a total monopoly 
in these cities of the "market"-namely, the "accredited central station protective services." And we are led to 
this odd result even though there is in the record abundant evidence that customers switch from one form of 
property protection to another, and not always in the direction of accredited central station service. 
I believe this approach has no justification in economics, reason or law. It might be supportable if it were 
found that the accredited central stations offer services which are unique in the sense that potential buyers-
or at least a substantial, identifiable part of the trade-look only to them for the services in question, and that 
neither cost, type, quality of service nor other factors bring competing services into the market. The findings 
here and the record do not permit this conclusion. 
The Government's market definition, accepted by the trial court, is a distortion which inevitably leads to a 
superficial and distorted result even in the hands of a highly skilled judge. As this Court held in Brown Shoe, 
supra, the "reasonable interchangeability of use or the 593*593 cross-elasticity of demand," determines the 
boundaries of a product market. 370 U. S., at 325. See also the Cellophane Case, 351 U. S., at 380. In plain 
language, this means that the court should have defined the relevant market here to include all services 
which, in light of geographical availability, price and use characteristics, are in realistic rivalry for all or some 
part of the business of furnishing protective services to premises. In the present situation, however, the court's 
own findings show that practical alternatives are available to potential users- although they vary from market 
to market and possibly from user to user. These have been arbitrarily excluded from the court's definition. 
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I do not suggest that wide disparities in quality, price and customer appeal could never affect the definition of 
the market. But this follows only where the disparities are so great that they create separate and distinct 
categories of buyers and sellers. The record here and the findings do not approach this standard. They fall far 
short of justifying the narrowing of the market as practiced here. I need refer only to the exclusion of 
nonaccredited central stations, which the court seeks to justify by reference to differentials in insurance 
discounts. These differentials may indeed affect the relative cost to the consumer of the competing modes of 
protection. But, in the absence of proof that they result in eliminating the competing services from the 
category of those to which the purchaser "can practicably tum" foi supplies,[?] they do not justify suc1'i total 
exclusion. This sort of exclusion of the supposedly not-quite-so-attractive service from the basic definition of 
the kinds of business and service against which defendants' activity will be measured, is entirely unjustified on 
this record.[S] 
594*594 The importance of this kind of truncated market definition vividly appears ifwe are to say, as the trial 
court here held, that if defendant has so large a fraction of the market as to constitute a "predominant" share, 
a rebuttable presumption of monopolization follows. The fraction depends upon the denominator (the 
"market") as well as the numerator (the defendants' volume). Clearly, this "presumption" is unwarranted 
unless the "market" is defined to include all competitors. The contrary is not supported by this Court's 
decisions in either the Cellophane Case, supra, or United States v. du Pont & Co. (General Motors), 353 U. S. 
586. The latter case defined the market in terms of the total products which could be used for the defined 
purposes: automobile fabrics and finishes. This embraces the total range of options for customers seeking 
these products. On the contrary, as the record here shows and as the findings, candidly read, imply, 
substantial options exist for services other than through accredited central stations providing protective 
services. Those options, whether for all or a part of the services in issue, must be included in the assessment 
of the market. 
In the opinion which this Court hands down today, there is considerable discussion of defendants' argument 
that the market should be "broken down" by different 595*595 type of service: e. g., burglar protection, fire 
protection, etc. The Court rejects this on the ground that it is appropriate to evaluate a "cluster'' of services as 
such. It points to Philadelphia Nat. Bank, supra, for support for its approach. In that case, MR. JUSTICE 
BRENNAN'S opinion for the Court carefully set out the distinctive characteristics of banking services: that 
some of these services (e. g., checking accounts) are virtually free of competition from other types of 
institutions, and that other services are distinctive in cost or other characteristics. 374 U.S., at 356-357. See 
also United States v. First Nat. Bank, 376 U.S. 665, 668 (per DOUGLAS, J.). Similarly, in United States v. 
Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, and International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 249-252, 
"first-run" moving pictures and championship boxing matches were held sufficiently distinctive in terms of 
demand in the market place to warrant consideration as separate markets. 
But no such distinctiveness exists here. As I have discussed, neither this record nor the trial court's findings 
show either a distinctive demand or a separable market for "insurance accredited central station protective 
services." The contrary is evident. None of the services furnished by accredited central stations is unique, as I 
have discussed. Nor is there even a common or predominant "cluster'' of services offered by the central 
stations. One of the defendants, Holmes, is engaged only in the burglary alarm business. Another, AFA, 
furnishes only fire and waterflow service. Only ADT among the defendants makes available to its customers 
the full "cluster." 
I do not mean to suggest that the Government must prove its case, service by service. But in defining the 
market, individual services, even if furnished in isolation, ought to be specified and here, as distinguished 
from the conclusion impelled by the circumstances in 596*596 Philadelphia Nat. Bank, supra, competitors for 
individual services ought to be taken into account. 
I do not intend by any of the foregoing to suggest that, on this record, the relief granted by the trial court and 
the substantially more drastic relief ordered by this Court would necessarily be unjustified. It is entirely 
possible that monopoly or attempt to monopolize may be found- and perhaps found with greater force-in 
local situations. Relief on a pervasive, system-wide, national basis might follow, as decreed by the trial court, 
as well as divestiture in appropriate local situations, as directed by this Court. It is impossible, I submit, to 
make these judgments on the findings before us because of the distortion due to an incorrect and unreal 
definition of the "relevant market." Now, because of this Court's mandate, the market-by-market inquiry must 
begin for purposes of the decree. But this should have been the foundation of judgment, not its superimposed 
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conclusion. This inquiry should- in my opinion, it must-take into account the total economic situation-all of 
the options available to one seeking protection services. It should not be limited to central stations, and 
certainly not to "insurance accredited central station protective services" which this Court sanctions as the 
relevant market. Since I am of the opinion that defendants and the courts are entitled to a reappraisal of the 
liability consequences as well as the appropriate provisions of the decree on the basis of a sound definition of 
the market, I would reverse and remand for these purposes. 
[*]Together with No. 74, Grinnell Corp. v. United States, No. 75, American District Telegraph Co. v. United 
States, No. 76, Holmes Electric Protective Co. v. United States and No. 77, Automatic Fiie Alaim Co. of 
Delaware v. United States, also on appeal from the same court. 
[1] 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S. C.§ 2 (1964 eel.). 
[2] Expediting Act§ 2, 32 Stat. 823, as amended, 15 U.S. C.§ 29 (1964 ed.); United States v. Loew's, Inc., 
371 u.s. 38. 
[3] These are the record figures. Since the time of the trial, Grinnell's holdings have increased. Counsel for 
Grinnell has advised this Court that Grinnell now holds 80% of ADrs stock and 90% of the stock of AFA. 
[4] Among the various central station services offered are the following: 
(1) automatic burglar alarms; 
(2) automatic fire alarms; 
(3) sprinkler supervisory service (any malfunctions in the fire sprinkler system-e. g., changes in water 
pressure, dangerously low water temperatures, etc.-are reported to the central station); and 
(4) watch signal service (night watchmen, by operating a key-triggered device on the protected premises, 
indicate to the central station that they are making their rounds and that all is well; the failure of a watchman 
to make his electrical report alerts the central station that something may be amiss). 
[5] In 1959, ADT complained that AFA's share of the revenues was excessive. AFA replied, in a letter to the 
president of Grinnell (which by that time controlled both ADT and AFA), that its share was just compensation 
for its continued observance of the service and territorial restrictions: "[T]he geographic restrictions placed 
upon us plus the requirement that we confine our activities to sprinkler and fire alarm services exclusively, 
since 1907 and presumably into the future, has definitely retarded our expansion in the past to the benefit of 
ADT growth .... [AFA's] contribution must also include the many things that helped make ADT 
big." (Emphasis added.) 
[6] Thus, of the 38 nondefendant firms operating a central service station protective service in the United 
States in 1961, 24 offered all of the following services: automatic fire alarm; waterflow alarm and sprinkler 
supervision; watchman's reporting and manual fire alarm; and burglar alarm. Of the other firms, 11 provided 
no watchman's reporting and manual fire alarm service; six provided no automatic fire alarm service; and two 
offered no sprinkler supervisory and waterflow alarm service. Moreover, of the 14 firms not providing the full 
panoply of services, 1 0 lacked only one of the above-described services. Appellant ADT's assertion that "very 
few accredited central stations furnish the full variety of services" is flatly contradicted by the record. 
[7] Since the record clearly shows that this monopoly power was consciously acquired, we have no reason to 
reach the further position of the District Court that once monopoly power is shown to exist, the burden is on 
the defendants to show that their dominance is due to skill, acumen, and the like. 
[8] Although the Government originally urged that the decree was inadequate as to divestiture in that it 
permitted Grinnell to distribute the stock of the other companies to Grinnell's shareholders, it has abandoned 
that point in this Court. 
[9] Specifically, the areas of disagreement are: (1) Defendants urge that barring them from offering five-year 
contracts would put them at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis nondefendant firms; the Government 
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responds that since they violated the law, they may properly be subjected to restrictions not borne by others. 
See United States v. Bausch & Lomb Co., 321 U. S. 707, 723-724. (2) Some customers of defendants may 
wish to have long-term contracts; the Government responds that this may be explored on remand. (3) There 
is some dispute as to whether, if the central station company cannot retain title to the equipment it installs, the 
insurance companies will accredit the system. This, too, is a proper subject for inquiry on remand. 
[1 0] Prior to trial, the defendants agreed that this would be an appropriate provision in a decree were the 
Government to prevail in all its claims of antitrust violations. Although defendants now maintain that this 
pretrial discussion was "settlement talk," that earlier concession is a relevant factor that the District Judge can 
properly take into account on remand. 
[11] This provision, too, gained pretrial acceptance. See n. 10, supra. 
[12] 28 U.S. C.§ 144 (1964 ed.) provides in relevant part: 
"Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the 
judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any 
adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such 
proceeding." 
[13] Judge Wyzanski referred the question of his disqualification to Chief Judge Woodbury of the Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit who after hearing oral argument held that no case of bias and prejudice had been 
made out under § 144. 
[1] United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 447-458; United States v. Alcoa, 377 U.S. 271, 273-
277; United States v. 
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STARR KELSO 
Attorney at Law #2445 
P.O. Box 1312 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 816 
Tel: 208-765-3260 
Fax: 208-664-6261 
Attorney for Plaintiff Brannon 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JIM BRANNON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY-bF COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO, 
a municipal corporation, et.al 
Defendants. 
ST A 'FE OF IDAHO ) 
ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
Case No. CV-09-10010 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
STARR KELSO 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
DISQUALIFY JUDGE HOSACK 
Starr Kelso, being first duly sworn upon oath, testifies as follows: 
1. I am over the age of 18 years, competent to testify, and I make the below statements 
upon my own personal knowledge; 
2. After 4:00 p.m. on September 7, 2010 upon reaching my law office after the 
completion of the first day of a binding arbitration proceeding in Kootenai County 
Case No. CV -09-1002 I was met by Jim Brannon the Plaintiff in this matter. He was in 
an extremely agitated state. I was advised by Mr. Brannon of some extremely 
disturbing events that occurred at the Contempt Hearing held in this matter earlier in 
the afternoon on the ih, regarding a complaint of Defendant Kennedy and his attorney 
1 AFFIDAVIT OF STARR KELSO 
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Scott W. Reed that Bill McCrory should be held in contempt of court for signing an 
affidavit that I had prepared and filed as the attorney for Plaintiff in this matter. 
3. I have previously filed my affidavit regarding the preparation, filing, and reason for my 
filing of the affidavit of Bill McCrory in this matter. 
4. The description of the events conveyed was so disturbing to me that Mr. Brannon and I 
telephoned Biil McCrory, the defendant in the civil contempt proceeding that had 
occurred earlier on September 7, 2010, so that I could obtain his perspective of the 
events that had transpired at the hearing. 
5. That when Bill McCrory was contacted by telephone he was in such an emotionally 
distressed state over what had occurred that he was unable to discuss the events that 
had transpired. 
'6. I was, however, informed that a transcript of the hearing had been, or was being, 
ordered in an expedited fashion. 
7. I was delivered a copy of the transcript of the hearing of September 7, 201 0, by Bill 
McCrory, mid-afternoon on September 11, 2010 at my office where I was at preparing 
for the trial in this matter scheduled to commence at 9:00a.m. on September 13, 2010 
before Judge Hosack. 
8. I was not able to review the transcript until later in the evening on September 11, 2010. 
9. According to the Court records in this matter the original transcript of the hearing has 
been filed with the Court in this matter. A copy of the transcript that I received is 
attached hereto as Exhibit 1 and incorporated herein by this reference as if fully set 
forth hereat word for word. 
10. The copy that I received is not signed by the court reporter, Keri Veare, but the copy 
does reflect a signature date of September 9, 2010. Given that Court's records reflect 
that the original of the transcript of this hearing has been filed with the Court, I have no 
reason to question that the copy I received on the afternoon of September 11, 2010 is 
not a true, accurate, and complete copy of the actual, signed, original hearing transcript 
on file with the Court in this matter. 
11. In reviewing the hearing transcript I had a difficult time believing what Judge Hosack 
was stating, particularly beginning at page 30, line 14, and continuing thereon: 
2 AFFIDAVIT OF STARR KELSO 
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14 .... "On the other hand, the Court has a concern in this litigation about the rights of 
the citizen voters. This type of litigation which may be and no doubt is and should be 
important in litigants has ramifications upon the average voter that in the view of this 
court is not a salutary connotation. 
And there's been arguments even made in open court that because this is an eiection 
case, a court should exercise extraordinary powers never used in civil litigation before 
in the history of American jurisprudence and haul citizens back at their own cost into 
court for a hearing for trial because they voted. That's very disturbing to this court .... 
To have litigation, publishing voters' names, calling whether their affidavits are 
correct, whether they're legal or illegal, whether they can be hauled into court, grilled 
by a judge with regard to their votes is an anathema to everything about our democratic 
process. 
So the secrecy, the confidentiality, the privacy of the voter is of paramount concern 
to the Court, and some apparent disregard of those issues by litigants or participants is 
of concern to this court .... 
The confidentiality, the most important duty of the Court is to assure the voter of 
their right to vote and do so freely and free of interference and certainly free of the 
threat of litigation." 
12. I certify that this Affidavit, the Motion to Disqualify Judge Hosack, and the 
Memorandum filed herewith are all made in good faith under the rules, after 
consultation with a number of other attorneys and individuals. 
13. At the time of the hearing on August 31, 2010, to the knowledge of either Plaintiff or 
his attorney, Judge Hosack had not expressed or intimated anything other than judicial 
interest in the proceeding; 
14. At no time before or at the time of the hearing on August 31, 2010, was it known to 
either Plaintiff or his attorney and possessed unrevealed personal opinions that election 
contests of the nature of this case have "ramifications upon the average voter" that are 
"not a salutary connotation." 
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15. At no time before nor at the time of the hearing on August 31, 2010, was it known to 
either Plaintiff or his attorney that Judge Hosack harbored and possessed unrevealed 
personal opinions that Idaho's election contest statutory procedures set forth in Title 34 
Chapter 20 of the Idaho Code which specifically require ( 1) identifying voters by 
name, (2) voters to appear and testify in court as to facts from which it can be 
determined if they are, respectively, legal voters, and (3) voters, if it be determined 
based upon facts introduced at trial that they were not legal voters, to be "grilled by a 
judge" to testify for whom they cast their ballot, "is an anathema to everything about 
our democratic process." 
16. At no time before nor at the time of the hearing on August 31, 201 0, was it known to 
either Plaintiff or his attorney that Judge Hosack harbored and possessed unrevealed 
personal opinions that (1) the privacy of even illegal voters is of paramount concern to 
him and (2) the most important duty of the Court is to assure that voters, even illegal 
voters, of their right to vote and do so freely and free of interference and certainly free 
of threat of litigation. 
17. That the transcript of the September 7, 2010 hearing (first received and reviewed on 
September 11, 201 0) revealed for the first time Judge Hosack's harbored and 
possessed unrevealed personal opinions that: 
1. Idaho's election contest statutory procedures set forth in Title 34 Chapter 20 of 
the Idaho Code which specifically require (1) identifying voters by name, (2) 
voters to appear and testify in court as to facts from which it can be determined 
if they are, respectively, legal voters, and (3) voters, if it be determined based 
upon facts introduced at trial that they were not legal voters, to be "grilled by a 
judge" to testify for whom they cast their ballot "is an anathema to everything 
about our democratic process." 
2. (1) the privacy of illegal voters is of paramount concern to him and (2) the most 
important duty of the Court is to assure voters, even illegal voters, of their right 
to vote and do so freely and free of interference and certainly free of threat of 
litigation. 
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3. Judge Hosack harbored and possessed unrevealed personal opmwns that 
election contests of the nature of this case have "ramifications upon the average 
voter" that are "not a salutary connotation." 
18. That as reflected by the definition attached hereto as Exhibit 2, "an anathema to 
everything about our democratic process" means that an election contest process as 
estabiished by the Idaho Legisiature is detestabie, not agreeabie with, a curse upon, an 
execration, and an evil to our democratic process. 
19. That as reflected by the definition attached hereto as Exhibit 3, for a person to state 
that an election contest process established by the Idaho Legislature "has ramifications 
upon the average voter that in the view of this court is not a salutary connotation" 
means that this court, Judge Hosack, believes that an election contest is not 
wholesome, healthy, or promoting or conducive to all of the City of Coeur d'Alene's 
legal voters who cast their legal votes in the November 3, 2009 City of Coeur d'Alene 
General Election. 
20. In my opinion the statements made by Judge Hosack, in open court regarding the 
merits of this statutorily mandated election contest and procedures is not based upon 
the merits of this case. 
21. This Affidavit, Motion to Disqualify, and Memorandum is not filed in an attempt to 
oust Judge Hosack because of any adverse ruling. The most recent ruling of Judge 
Hosack was to deny Defendant Kennedy's Motion for Summary Judgment. While the 
same ruling also denied Plaintiffs Motion to file a Third Amended Complaint because 
of"colorfullanguage" (fraud or corruption), Judge Hosack orally ruled from the bench 
that Plaintiff would be permitted to put on evidence in that regard during the course of 
the trial and, if appropriate, seek amendment of the pleadings at the end of the 
testimony. 
22. The statements made by Judge Hosack reflect a personally held bias and prejudice 
against Plaintiff Brannon for bringing what he describes as a non-salutary (to voters) 
action and bringing such an action that is "an anathema to everything about our 
democratic process." These statements, made in open court, can only be based upon 
his personal perception, unsupported by any case decision or treatise, reviewed by 
5 AFFIDAVIT OF STARR KELSO 
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affiant, that this election contest is (1) not favorable to, healthful, or conducive to the 
election process and the average voter, and (2) "is an anathema" (a vehement 
denunciation, cursed, damned, reviled, loathed, or shunned) "to everything about our 
democratic process." 
23. It is my opinion that these statements, in open court, dramatically and clearly reveal a 
1 • ro • 1 1 t • • _ _1 1 _ t_ • ... • _ t_ 1 _ • _ t• _ ..~._• . _ _t _t~ ____ • .. • _ r Dent or mma, ana a aramauc anu Clear OoJecnonaole mcnnanon anu mspusmun 01 
Judge Hosack to this election case, regardless of any evidence that will be introduced 
at trial, and that these deep seated opinions will prevent him from having any 
impartiality in any Judgment. 
Starr Kelso 
On this 13th day of September, 2010 before me the undersigned Notary Public, personally 
appeared Starr Kelso known or identified to me, to be the person whose name is subscribed to 
the within · / rument, and cknowledged to me that the statements contained therein are true and 
correct t. he be t of his b lief and that he executed the same. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: A copy was faxed to Michael Haman attorney for Defendants 
City and Weathers, and Defendant Kennedy's counsel Scott Reed and Peter Erbland on the 13th 
day ofSepte r, 2010. 
Starr Kelso 
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1 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
2 OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
3 --ooo--
4 JIM BRANNON, 
5 Plaintiff, 
6 vs. Case No. CV-2009-0010010 
7 CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, et 
al., 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
AT: 
Defendant. 
CONTEMPT HEARING 
Kootenai County Courthouse 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 
ON: September 7, 2010, 1:31 p.m. 
BEFORE: The Honorable Charles W. Hosack 
17 APPEARANCES: 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
For the Plaintiff: 
SCOTT W. REED, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
401 Front Street 
PO Box A 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
For the Defendant Bill McCrory: 
ARTHUR B. MACOMBER, Esq. 
MACOMBER LAW, PLLC 
408 East Sherman Avenue, Suite 215 
PO Box 102 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0102 
25 Reported By: Keri Veare, CSR 675, RPR 
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1 September 7, 2010; 1:31 p.m. 
2 P R 0 C E E D I N G S 
3 --ooo--
4 THE COURT: This is in civil 09-10010 Brannon 
5 versus City, and others. This is on the contempt 
6 proceedings. Have counsel received a notice? I was 
7 checking with the clerk. Did a written notice go out 
8 with regard to the 17th of September trial setting in 
9 this case? 
10 I was looking at the court minutes. I 
11 remember setting it for trial. Thumbing through the 
12 file, I didn't find a notice. But the file is rather 
13 thick, so I could have missed it. Are counsel -- do 
14 counsel recall whether a written notice of that trial 
15 setting has been received by counsel? 
16 MR. MACOMBER: Your Honor, I received a notice 
17 of trial that today was the court trial, scheduled 
18 today. And nothing about a later date. And I received 
19 that by fax back on August 19th at 2:30 in the 
20 afternoon. That's the only thing I received. 
21 
22 
THE COURT: August 19th. Let's see. 
MR. REED: My understanding, your Honor, 
23 exactly what you have said, that the hearing upon the 
24 motion was to be held today and trial was to be on the 
25 17th. 
3 
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1 THE COURT: All right. 
2 MR. REED: I don't recall receiving a notice, 
3 but there's been a blizzard of papers, so I can't say 
4 yes or no. 
5 THE COURT: Well, yeah, the notice of trial as 
6 Mr. Macomber states does say the court trial scheduled 
7 Tuesday, September 7th, contempt proceedings at 1:30. 
8 The -- and that was done. That was -- that's on the --
9 it's -- the notice is in error because the trial setting 
10 was for September 17th. That's what the court minutes 
11 reflect. That's what the Court ordered. That's the 
12 date that we have and that's the date we're going with. 
13 So the notice of trial is misnamed, really. 
14 It's a court hearing on the -- basically, the motion to 
15 dismiss the contempt proceedings. And we'll get out a 
16 notice of trial setting. 
17 The court minutes clearly reflect that that 
18 was the order of the Court. The matter was set for 
19 trial, remains set for trial on September 17th at 
20 9:00 a.m. 
21 All right. And although we're here on these 
22 contempt proceedings, I do -- have had in the file here 
23 Mr. Reed's order on motions. That was sent out to all 
24 counsel; although, Mr. Macomber's not really involved. 
25 Mr. Kelso's not here. But there's been no objection 
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1 from either Mr. Haman or Mr. Kelso. You've heard no 
2 objection to the form of the proposed order; is that 
3 correct? 
4 
5 
MR. REED: {Nods head.) 
THE COURT: All right. The order, written 
6 order doesn't reflect that the second amended -- motion 
7 for second amended complaint was withdrawn, which I 
8 think is what we actually talked about, but the end 
9 result is the same. The second amended motions have 
10 been denied. One was denied, I guess, for reasons that 
11 had been withdrawn. So we'll go ahead and-- there 
12 being no objection to the form of the order, we'll go 
13 ahead and enter the order and the form submitted by 
14 Mr. Reed. 
15 MR. REED: Your Honor, in compliance with 
16 Mr. Kelso's objection, I submitted another order that 
17 said what he said, which wasn't what I recalled, but as 
18 you point out, it doesn't make any difference. 
19 
20 objection? 
21 
22 
23 
THE COURT: There's another order and another 
MR. REED: Well --
THE COURT: Some of this stuff -- pardon? 
MR. REED: I prepared an order and faxed it 
24 over to the Court on Friday that reflected the fact that 
25 he had objected and said there wasn't a motion to --
5 
(
d 
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1 that he had withdrawn the second 
2 
3 
4 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. REED: -- motion. 
THE COURT: So there's another proposed order 
5 that's been sent over to the Court that I haven't 
6 MR. REED: It was sent over. But again, your 
7 Honor, it's -- I don't think it makes any difference, 
8 but yes, there's another order filed that somehow didn't 
9 get upstairs. 
10 THE COURT: So it hasn't got to the Court 
11 file, all right. 
12 Well, I'll go ahead and fiddle with the 
13 language and make the corrections. Apparently, there is 
14 a note here that has some scribblings from Mr. Kelso, so 
15 I'll work that through and we'll go ahead and enter the 
16 form, the order -- the form is -- doesn't make any real 
17 difference because the substance is the same. 
18 All right. Then moving to what we're here 
19 today on, which is the motion to dismiss the contempt 
20 proceedings, and we now have the briefs submitted by the 
21 parties pursuant to the briefing schedule. The courts 
22 have had an opportunity to review the parties' briefs. 
23 So it is, of course, Mr. McCrory's motion to dismiss. 
24 So Mr. Macomber? 
25 MR. MACOMBER: Thank you, your Honor. Your 
6 
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1 Honor, the first thing I would like to bring up, most of 
2 our pleadings centered on the sufficiency of the 
3 affidavit, and I believe that is also a proper motion to 
4 dismiss under 12(b) (6). But we also see a potential 
5 motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction according to 
6 12(b) (1) and (2). Frankly, I'm not sure if it is one or 
7 two. One is the lack of jurisdiction over the subject 
8 matter and the second is lack of jurisdiction over the 
9 
10 
person. 
This also has to do with the affidavit itself. 
11 And I want to bring the Court's attention to a case 
12 called Steiner v Gilbert, which is 144 Idaho 240. And 
13 it says on page 881 of that case, quoting out of the 
14 Pacific Reporter, 159 P.3d 881, "Until the claimant can 
15 provide a sufficient affidavit, the Court does not have 
16 jurisdiction to proceed." 
17 This is -- the Court says this is a contempt 
18 case, and they're talking about sufficiency of the 
19 affidavit under Idaho Code 7603. And it says, "The 
20 affidavit constitutes the complaint which functions to 
21 apprise the alleged contemnor of the particular facts of 
22 which he is accused so that he may meet such accusations 
23 at the hearing," and the case Steiner cites from In Re 
24 Contempt of Reeves, which then the Court went on in 
25 Steiner to say, "Until they can provide a sufficient 
7 
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1 affidavit, the Court does not have jurisdiction to 
2 proceed," which leads us directly to the affidavit. 
3 And then once I the affidavit is really a 
4 12(b) (6), your Honor, but we should talk about 
5 jurisdiction initially. And if we look at the Hazel 
6 affidavit, what we find is there is really nothing 
7 that's required by the case law or the civil rules to 
8 give the Court jurisdiction in this case. And if we 
9 move to look at Rule 75 at (c) (2), it talks about 
10 contempt not initiated by a judge, motion, and affidavit 
11 must be commenced by motion and affidavit. 
12 In this case, Counsel Reed, on behalf of 
13 Defendant Kennedy, filed the affidavit of Christa Hazel. 
14 And what it says in Rule 75(c} (3) at the top of the new 
15 rules page, it says, "The written charge must allege the 
16 specific facts constituting the alleged contempt. Each 
17 instance of contempt, if there's more than one, must be 
18 set forth separately." That was certainly not done 
19 here. 
20 "If the alleged contempt is the violation of a 
21 court order, the written charge or affidavit must allege 
22 that either the respondent or the respondent's attorney 
23 was served with a copy of the order or had actual 
24 knowledge of it." I am not aware to this day, your 
25 Honor, of any order issued by the Court related to 
)
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1 Mr. McCrory's behavior. 
2 And then it closes out and it says, "The 
3 written charge or affidavit need not allege facts 
4 showing that the respondent's failure to comply was 
5 willful." So when we go to the Hazel affidavit, what we 
6 see is this was filed on August 5th, 2010. It gives her 
7 name. It says she is 18. She resides in Coeur d'Alene. 
8 And what she purports to have personal knowledge of is 
9 that basically she has looked at various Web sites, 
10 including OpenCDA.com. She doesn't at any time allege 
11 that Mr. McCrory is subject to a court order. She 
12 doesn't allege that there is any interest that Christa 
13 Hazel has in getting relief from this court. 
14 She doesn't allege that anything that she 
15 cites in her affidavit in terms of Mr. McCrory's posting 
16 to OpenCDA had anything to do with disrupting the 
17 Court's process in any way, undermining the Court's 
18 process or the Court's again, there was no order. 
19 There's really a bunch of statements about how 
20 Ms. Hazel surfed the Web, but -- and then it doesn't 
21 show anything about any damages to anyone. 
22 Now, under the Steiner case, what it says 
23 if -- well, it talks about the court order again, of 
24 which there is none here. It says, "An affidavit shall 
25 be presented" -- this is -- I'm sorry, your Honor. It's 
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1 Steiner quoting a case Jones v Jones 91 Idaho 578. 
2 "When the contempt is not committed in the immediate 
3 view and presence of the Court or a judge at chambers, 
4 an affidavit shall be presented to the Court or a judge 
5 of the facts constituting the contempt or a statement of 
6 the facts by the referees or arbiters or other judicial 
7 officer." 
8 There's really no way that you could read 
9 Christa Hazel's affidavit and see any allegation of a 
10 contempt. She says, "I surfed the Web and I saw all 
11 these things and that's it." It is insufficiency 
12 personified. 
13 And if this was given to Mr. McCrory, it 
14 certainly would not apprise him of any particular facts 
15 of which he is accused of contempt. And the Court will 
16 remember that the two contempt charges are composed of 
17 my clients' affidavit being filed with this court by 
18 Starr Kelso, which we should note in passing did not 
19 suffer a contempt charge by Defendant Kennedy for 
20 actually filing it. 
21 And the second contempt charge is the posting 
22 on OpenCDA after that affidavit was filed with the Court 
23 when it was clearly a public record. Whether it was 
24 properly made a public record by filing with the Court 
25 may be a question, but my client did not file that or 
w
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1 cause it to be filed. 
2 In fact, in his objection, Defendant Kennedy 
3 makes a couple of statements about how if McCrory did 
4 not file the affidavit himself, certainly he was in 
5 league with Kelso to get it done. 
6 Now, again, at that point, we're faced with 
7 the fact that Attorney Kelso is not accused of contempt 
8 for actually filing it. And I would just like to say 
9 for the Court that it is good legal practice to capture 
10 evidence as soon as it is available. And that, to me, 
11 is why the affidavit appears to have been made. The 
12 events occurred. They were quite detailed. 
13 Mr. McCrory's affidavit does show quite a bit 
14 of detail about absentee ballot envelopes. And so 
15 capturing that information is not outside of the 
16 boundaries of anything that a normal, good counsel would 
17 
18 
not do. 
And so when we get to the affidavit, we're 
19 really left with nothing. And we cannot -- we cannot 
20 base the case on the pleadings of Mr. Kennedy in this 
21 case. We have to base -- we have to base the 
22 allegations on the affidavit. And so that is 
23 Mr. McCrory's first motion to dismiss based on that 
24 12(b) {1) or (2). And I don't know if the Court has 
25 questions about that before I move forward or if that 
11 
O
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1 should just ... 
2 THE COURT: Why don't you go ahead and present 
3 your -- I'm sure Mr. Reed will have some response. 
4 MR. MACOMBER: Okay. The next issue in this 
5 case is actually insufficiency of process 12(b) (5). 
6 Insufficiency of service of process. And the reason 
7 this comes up is because in Rule 75, under the 75(d) 
8 like David, nonsummary proceedings, service, time limits 
9 at No. 2, "If the respondent is not a party to the 
10 pending action in which the contempt proceedings are 
11 brought, service shall be as provided in Rule 4, but the 
12 respondent need not be serviced with a summons." 
13 And when we go to Rule 4, what we find is a 
14 standard rule on personal service in Idaho, which was 
15 not accomplished in this case, but which is found at 
16 Rule 4(c) --I'm sorry, Rule 4(d) (2), "Service upon 
17 individuals," and this affidavit and motion were 
18 required to be served personally on my client. They 
19 were not. They were actually served on someone who is 
20 not my client's attorney, who is Starr Kelso. 
21 And if we look at the actual motion that was 
22 filed with this court, motion to strike affidavit -- oh, 
23 let's see. I'm sorry, your Honor. I wanted to look at 
24 the notice to William L. McCrory to appear. And I have 
25 a copy; although, it's not file stamped with the Court, 
o.
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1 and there's an affidavit of service in there that says 
2 that Steven Reed served it on my client at his house, 
3 and I had not -- I had seen the notice given to Starr 
4 Kelso. So perhaps I should withdraw this portion, your 
5 Honor. I did not know that my client was personally 
6 served by Steven Reed. It appears that he was. 
7 However, then we get to 12(b) (6), and we find 
8 that even if he was served with the motion and 
9 affidavit, he would have no idea what Ms. Hazel and her 
10 affidavit meant to him. 
11 Now, I've discussed the affidavit somewhat. 
12 And again, it's really completely insufficient to give 
13 Mr. McCrory notice of any contempt before this court. 
14 And, in fact, in the Hazel affidavit, she talks about 
15 copies from the Web site and comments that were made by 
16 various people, and then she gives a complete copy of 
17 William McCrory's affidavit. And there's really nothing 
18 in her affidavit that says that there was any order of 
19 the Court or any knowledge could be had on his part that 
20 this contempt proceeding would pursue against him. 
21 There is the case of In Re Contempt of Reeves, 
22 which is 112 Idaho 574 where the Court on the Pacific --
23 no, I'm sorry, that is the Idaho page, page 581, says, 
24 "In such a case, the affidavit constitutes the 
25 complaint. Its function is to apprise the alleged 
O
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1 contemnor of the particular facts of which he is accused 
2 so that he may meet such accusations at the hearing. 
3 Where the affidavit fails to allege all essential 
4 material facts, the deficiency cannot be cured by proof 
5 supplied at the hearing." And so the affidavit provided 
6 to this court, your Honor, and to my client, is 
7 completely insufficient to assist him and to understand. 
8 And if it puts sort of a bold underline under 
9 that, I will share with the Court that I was hired and I 
10 analyzed the case, and I thought I had a contract case 
11 on my hand. I have neither done civil contempts, which 
12 I assumed to be in my purview, nor criminal contempts, 
13 which I will argue later is actually the situation here, 
14 that there's a criminal sanction pending. 
15 And so related to the motion to dismiss, I 
16 will not be belabor the Court with the other things that 
17 we mentioned in the pleadings. The Court has stated 
18 they've read the pleadings and I don't feel a need to 
19 follow up further on that. And so Plaintiff requests 
20 the motion to dismiss, and based on the situation here, 
21 we, again, renew our request for attorney's fees and 
22 costs regarding the motion and all this prior action. 
23 The affidavit is so insufficient, it seems to 
24 me that if Defendant Kennedy had actually done the 
25 research on a civil contempt and then found out when a 
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1 civil contempt turns into a criminal sanction, that this 
2 probably wouldn't have occurred, or if it had, it 
3 certainly would have occurred with a sufficient 
4 affidavit as the complaint. Thank you, your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: Mr. Reed? 
6 MR. REED: Thank you, your Honor. The new 
7 charge made by Mr. Macomber starts off with looking at 
8 Rule 75(c) subsection-- 75(b) in which-- get it right 
9 yet. 75(c) (2), contempt not initiated by the judge 
10 says, "All contempt proceedings, except those initiated 
11 by the judge as provided, must be commenced by a motion 
12 and affidavit." 
13 There was a six-page motion filed -- seven 
14 pages, actually with this affidavit, which set forth 
15 in some detail the basis for the complaint. The motion 
16 and the affidavit have to be taken together. 
17 Cases in which there was only an affidavit 
18 filed are not apropos here. We followed the rules 
19 exactly by filing a motion and an affidavit. If I can 
20 get to what counsel opposed in the briefs that we 
21 received, there was indeed an order of this court as I 
22 set forth in my brief. 
23 The order of the Court was from Judge Simpson. 
24 Mr. Kelso started this process out by issuing a subpoena 
25 duces tecum to Kootenai County to bring all of the 
IS
S
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1 ballot records, the ballot envelopes and so forth. 
2 Kootenai County opposed it and said that given enough 
3 opportunity the parties can cast ballots to determine 
4 the -- can evaluate the ballots to determine the caster 
5 of the ballots by allowing Mr. Brannon or anybody else 
6 unfettered access, appears to be realized. They 
7 
8 
ordered sought an order for quashing the subpoena. 
Judge Simpson followed that, and I provided to 
9 the Court the transcript of the hearing before Judge 
10 Simpson in which he agreed the secrecy of votes is 
11 guaranteed by the Idaho constitution. Absolutely 
12 protects the secrecy of the ballots. Constitution 
13 absentee ballot statute cited above are intended to 
14 protect the secrecy of absentee voter ballots. And then 
15 he quashed the subpoena. 
16 What followed thereafter was an attempt to 
17 comply with the statute, first of all, by appointing a 
18 judge, Judge Marano, to look over the -- to supervise 
19 the examination of the ballots, then they're followed 
20 obviously as we just cited in -- well, as the 
21 prosecuting attorney's affidavit recites, there were 
22 negotiations between the prosecuting attorney and 
23 between Starr Kelso, and they reached an agreement on 
24 how this would be done and where it would be done, and 
25 that Judge Marano would preside over that, and together 
16 
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1 they approved the form of the confidential agreement. 
2 It's not a contract. It's an agreement in which all of 
3 those who were not members of the clerk's office, pledge 
4 that they will keep everything confidential and pledge 
5 that -- not pledge, set forth that in the event they do 
6 not, that they are going to be subject to contempt of 
7 court. Plaintiff agreed to follow the Simpson 
8 restrictions. Those are the orders. You don't have to 
9 have another order when there's been a previous order 
10 and then they agree to comply with it but do not. 
11 That's our position. 
12 As far as the particular action is concerned, 
13 the county, of course, was not part of this lawsuit for 
14 reasons I can't understand, but they have not been made 
15 part of it by Mr. Kelso. We filed this action as an 
16 officer of the court on behalf of the Defendant Kennedy 
17 who, in fact, was injured by those publication in the 
18 paper and the rest of whatever went on was there. But 
19 he's not seeking -- it's not the sort of fence-line case 
20 where you keep the gate open or keep the gate closed. 
21 He's not injured in that sense. He's just 
22 injured in the general sense of this political lawsuit. 
23 The Stevens (sic) versus Gilbert case, very 
24 specifically -- 144 Idaho, very specifically says that 
25 you're not confined to rule Idaho Code 7-6 and so forth, 
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1 to all the listings there of what they're there. I'm 
2 quoting, "The Court has held that Idaho 7-611 does not 
3 preclude alternative civil sanctions under common law or 
4 Idaho Code 1-1603," quote, "Marks versus Vehlow. Every 
5 court has the power to compel obedience to its 
6 judgments, orders and process." 
7 Courts have recognized it doesn't attempt to 
8 delimit the power recognized therein; therefore, doesn't 
9 abuse its discretion by imposing reasonable sanctions 
10 that are not specifically articulated. Courts have 
11 unlimited power to enforce their orders and that's what 
12 we're seeking. 
13 Counsel has -- well, and then I get to the 
14 question to the motion to dismiss. Motion to dismiss, 
15 as we set forth, has a very high bar. I have to confess 
16 that I rather like the US Supreme Court decisions that 
17 he cited, and I thought that if they had been applied 
18 here, we could have got rid of this case in June, but 
19 they were not applied here. Those are rather strict in 
20 favor of dismissal. 
21 Our law, Copeland and Beta Theta (phonetic) I 
22 quoted, issue's not whether the plaintiff will not only 
23 prevail but whether he's entitled to offer evidence to 
24 support the claims. Harper, practical matter of 
25 dismissal under 12(b) (6) is likely to be granted only in 
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1 the unusual case in which plaintiff includes allegations 
2 showing on the face of the complaint there's some 
3 insurmountable bar to the reading. For all those 
4 reasons, we think the motion to dismiss should be 
5 
6 
denied. 
Counsel has mentioned something that has 
7 occurred to me that is entirely separate and apart from 
8 the motion to dismiss at the present time. When 
9 Mr. Macomber put together his brief, I was compelled 
10 not compelled. I was invited to look at other law than 
11 what we had previously cited. I came across Camp versus 
12 East Fork Ditch Company 147 Idaho, which goes into great 
13 detail on what contempt is. 
14 We brought this action as a civil contempt. 
15 That's all we were seeking. We were thinking what had 
16 been done here was wrong, should be subject perhaps to a 
17 fine, perhaps to reprimand, something like that. 
18 We were not seeking a criminal contempt. Camp 
19 versus East Fork Ditch Company makes an analysis of all 
20 of this. It says, "If the contempt involves doing what 
21 the Court ordered the contemnor not to do," which is the 
22 situation here, "then under Idaho law the Court can only 
23 impose a criminal contempt sanction, a determinate fine 
24 and/or determinate jail sentence. The contemnor cannot 
25 go back in time and not do what he did." 
19 
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1 That puts us in a situation where we are 
2 looking at a jury trial on a criminal charge. And while 
3 I believe sincerely that what was done here was wrong, I 
4 do not believe that this should be a case in which 
5 Mr. McCrory should be subject to a criminal charge. I 
6 was unaware of that at the time we started this. 
7 Talk about a jury trial. I don't mind the 
8 jury trial. Be happy to do that. Can handle that. I 
9 just don't think that the punishment that might come or 
10 even the record that might come in a criminal action 
11 would be appropriate. 
12 I point this out to the Court as long as we 
13 understand that the motion to dismiss should be denied 
14 and that we had reasonable cause for bringing the same, 
15 and that we proceeded at this point without any 
16 justification for attorney's fees or anything like that. 
17 I would be willing to have the contempt charge 
18 dismissed. 
19 This is new information. I was not aware of 
20 it until I finished completing the brief I had and put 
21 the stuff together and started looking at that 
22 particular language. But since there is no way that 
23 Mr. McCrory can undo what has been done, it makes it a 
24 criminal contempt charge, and that is my own personal 
25 opinion that that is not an appropriate punishment for 
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1 what was done and the lesser punishment is not available 
2 based upon that opinion. 
3 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Macomber? 
4 MR. MACOMBER: Thank you, your Honor. 
5 Defendant Kennedy provides no legal support of the 
6 contention that the motion and the affidavit need to be 
7 considered together by this court or by Mr. McCrory upon 
8 delivery by AAYS at his home of the affidavit. And 
9 there is I will find the case that says they cannot 
10 rely on the pleadings. They must rely on the affidavit. 
11 In any case, I will come back to that. 
12 Kennedy states there was an order from Judge Simpson. 
13 The only order that I'm aware of is the order generated 
14 on March 8th, and you saw the transcript at least was 
15 sent by counsel for Mr. Kennedy related to the hearing 
16 that day. And nothing in the order indicates that Judge 
17 Simpson would have required a confidentiality agreement 
18 of this sort. 
19 I can quote directly from the order. It says, 
20 "It is further ordered that the plaintiff and Kootenai 
21 County, by and through their respective counsel, confer 
22 with each other to determine a plausible procedure for 
23 inspection. This includes determination of the 
24 appropriate place and method, as well as an appropriate 
25 presiding officer to be appointed by this court if 
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1 inspection is so ordered pursuant to Idaho Codes 34-2018 
2 and 2019." 
3 The place and method of inspection really has 
4 nothing to do with a confidentiality agreement. The 
5 confidentiality agreement would have to do with a 
6 condition of an inspection imposed by the holder of the 
7 documents, Kootenai County, on anyone that may wish to 
8 view them. The order doesn't mention that. 
9 The order -- I just -- I don't see anything 
10 calling for this document. The method of inspection was 
11 the appropriate place, I suppose I should cover first, 
12 was here in Kootenai County at the elections office. 
13 And the method was that, as I recall Judge Marano, was 
14 to actually view the ballots and Mr. McCrory was one of 
15 those people that observed Judge Marano counting the 
16 ballots. That's my understanding of the method. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
The method by the Judge and I think it's 
pertinent here to mention that there was quite a bit of 
discussion in that March hearing related to the prized 
status of the ballot, the secret ballot in this country, 
21 in this county, in this case. And unfortunately, what 
22 we see is that there's been a conflation continually 
23 between ballots and envelopes. And if one looks at 
24 Mr. McCrory's affidavit and views the ballot envelope 
25 copies that are attached with it, what the Court will 
22 
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1 see is that there's no mention of Mr. Kennedy. There's 
2 no mention of Mr. Brannon. There's no mention of any 
3 knowledge of the way those ballots are shown in the 
4 envelopes, and, in fact, they're not. 
5 Judge Simpson found earlier that when the 
6 ballots are separated from the envelopes, they're mixed 
7 into the pool for that precinct and therefore you would 
8 have to look at all the ballots in the whole precinct in 
9 order to figure out which were the absentee and which 
10 were not. 
11 And now my understanding is, from reading the 
12 case filings, is that those ballots are now 
13 irretrievably mixed; that you really wouldn't be able to 
14 tell an absentee ballot from a ballot that was cast on 
15 the day in the election booth. So there's been a 
16 conflation here where suddenly my client is being 
17 accused of somehow undermining this court's ability to 
18 analyze a ballot situation, which is the claim in this 
19 case, because of anomalies he noted in the envelopes. 
20 And we just don't think that's applicable at all. 
21 The next thing is counsel for Defendant 
22 Kennedy says that there has been some sort of injury to 
23 his client by publication in the paper or some --
24 perhaps the public filing with the Court once it becomes 
25 public record, there's been some injury, but there's no 
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1 information presented to the Court about how he's been 
2 injured by my client's rendition of his inspection of 
3 envelopes. 
4 My client did not inspect the ballots. In 
5 fact, I'm not aware that Judge Marano has tendered to 
6 this court any information about the actual ballots that 
7 he inspected. And so we're not seeing any injury here 
8 at all to Defendant Kennedy. And I still believe that 
9 what we have is it would be proper for the Court to see 
10 that this is really a contract breach claim by an 
11 implied third-party beneficiary, Kennedy, because 
12 Kootenai County didn't say that he violated the 
13 agreement. 
14 Certainly there's been no pleadings here by 
15 Kootenai County. Christa Hazel appears to have no 
16 standing whatsoever. I haven't seen her before the 
17 Court. She submitted an affidavit that said she surfs 
18 the Web. It's very difficult to see how this court's 
19 process could be injured by my client's rendition of 
20 ballot envelope anomalies. 
21 And so we have all that, your Honor, and then 
22 we have the pleadings of Defendant Kennedy in this case. 
23 And, for example, there's a brief in motion of support 
24 of summary judgment filed by Mr. Kennedy on August 2nd, 
25 brief in support of motion for summary judgment, and on 
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1 page 10, Defendant Kennedy states, "Affidavit of William 
2 L. McCrory regarding his observations with copies of 
3 some absentee ballots." Actually, he did not view 
4 ballots. He viewed ballot envelopes. "Since it cannot 
5 be determined for which candidate any absentee ballot 
6 was cast, there is no issue of material fact." And so 
7 Defendant Kennedy has said, On my behalf, I'd like this 
8 court to recognize that Bill McCrory's affidavit 
9 presents the Court with no issue of material fact, even 
10 where they say he viewed ballots when he didn't; he 
11 viewed envelopes. 
12 And this actually occurs at several cases. On 
13 page 12 of that brief, Defendant Kennedy talks about and 
14 cites a case Noble v Ada County Election Board, and it 
15 talks about hand delivery and it talks about ballots. 
16 And it says, you know, the Court would not -- the Court 
17 would not cancel those ballot votes that were made 
18 because they didn't want to disenfranchise the electors, 
19 but it says nothing about ballot envelopes, which have 
20 absolutely no information for this court for plaintiffs 
21 or defendants in this case related to the gravamen of 
22 the case, which is a 5-ballot difference, as I 
23 understand it. 
24 And so, your Honor, we're not seeing any 
25 situation where there's been either a violation of a 
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1 known order -- and frankly, your Honor, I need to say 
2 that, frankly, I'm surprised at Kootenai County and 
3 counsel for plaintiff in this case and defendant in this 
4 case attempting to really hijack this court's remedy for 
5 violations against this court, and say, If you do 
6 anything with these materials, you'll be subject to 
7 contempt of court. 
8 Well, I just don't think anybody has that 
9 power in Idaho, your Honor. I think the Court has that 
10 power and the Court's -- the Court should dismiss this 
11 case, and perhaps this is back to my contract cause of 
12 action here, but I just don't see any benefit to the 
13 Court to allowing parties believe that they can go out 
14 and write a third-party contract unviewed by the Court, 
15 some -- call it a method of viewing discovery which has 
16 been ordered by the Court, and then hijack the Court's 
17 remedy for a violation of the Court's process, the 
18 court's orders. This seems to me a step down a road 
19 that we don't want to see taken in any case much less 
20 this one. And so that's all I have to say presently, 
21 your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: Do you have a response to the 
23 Crawford stipulated dismissal? 
24 MR. MACOMBER: My understanding of the 
25 response is that the dismissal is stipulated with each 
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1 party carrying their own fees and costs; is that 
2 correct? 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
MR. REED: That's correct. 
MR. MACOMBER: All right. Your Honor, I'll 
need to counsel with my client briefly and then respond 
if that's all right. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you want to have a 
moment to do that or is it something you need not 
something you're prepared to --
MR. MACOMBER: Well, I think we can just take 
a moment and do that right now. 
THE COURT: Okay. If you think -- if you have 
sufficient time to make the decision, fine. If you 
don't, I mean, that's understandable, too. 
MR. MACOMBER: Your Honor, my client has 
16 decided to reject the offered stipulation. 
17 THE COURT: All right. 
18 Now, in terms of the -- your argument of the 
19 powers of the Court and hijacking the remedy and so on, 
20 just on a generic question, parties want to jointly 
21 discover some sort of records. Just whatever. And 
22 they-- there's confidentiality issues, secrecy issues, 
23 for whatever reason, whether it's antitrust. Doesn't 
24 make any -- just a very generic question. So they 
25 stipulate to an order allowing the parties to look at 
27 
ey 
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1 these items and then hold that information in 
2 confidence, then the Court so orders based upon the 
3 stipulation orders the discovery to go forward and the 
4 parties hold the matters in confidence. 
5 One of the parties then publishes that 
6 information on the Internet. Would the Court have the 
7 power to step in at that point and -- I mean, your 
8 point, you know, there's no damage. There's no, you 
9 know, there's no affidavits and so on. But under the 
10 inherent powers of the Court, could the Court hold the 
11 party that inspected these items pursuant to an order of 
12 confidentiality and then turn right around and publish 
13 them on the Internet, could the Court hold that party in 
14 contempt? 
15 MR. MACOMBER: Your Honor, I think the power 
16 of the Court in the pending case is plenary, and if the 
17 Court finds something that occurred in a case that it 
18 can act sua sponte regarding any belief that it has, 
19 that there has been a disruption of the process or a 
20 contempt has occurred. Now, I'm not aware and I don't 
21 believe that Judge Simpson issued this order or ever 
22 actually saw the stipulation or that the stipulation 
23 said here's a copy of our confidentiality agreement and 
24 thereafter approved it. 
25 THE COURT: Well, I'm-- you know, I'm not '  
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talking about -- I'm aware of those issues, but I am--
in the absence of an order I mean, there's a 
stipulation of confidentiality here, and my question 
talks about an order being then entered based upon that 
stipulation to confidentiality. 
There's no question that that order, that 
7 order was not entered. And the reference by Mr. Reed is 
8 backed by prior orders by Judge Simpson and so on and so 
9 forth, and so we bog down the facts of this case. But 
10 my question is just, I mean, would not the Court have 
11 the power to hold that party in contempt? Saying, you 
12 know, I said you could look at these box of records and 
13 subject to confidentiality and not disclosing it to 
14 third parties, I'm looking at an Internet publication 
15 here of the items you just inspected pursuant to my 
16 order. Don't you think the Court could hold that party 
17 in contempt? 
18 MR. MACOMBER: I think if the Court found that 
19 the nature of the method agreed upon by the parties was 
20 clear enough, that it would indicate to the Court that a 
21 contempt should be found, but then I think as Counsel 
22 Reed has stated, then it turns into a criminal sanction 
23 as opposed to a civil because now McCrory cannot 
24 avoid -- he can't unring the bell. 
25 THE COURT: Well, that's correct. But --
29 
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1 okay. Fine. The -- I guess you answered the question 
2 as best -- as best you could. 
3 Well, we don't have a stipulated agreement to 
4 dismiss the contempt proceedings. The and, of 
5 course, a power to award attorney fees or those kinds of 
6 decisions is obviously a decision by the Court. 
7 So certainly I don't need to have -- don't 
8 have to have a stipulation in order to go ahead and 
9 basically dismiss the contempt proceedings. There are 
10 some very meritorious arguments here raised by 
11 Mr. Macomber with regard to the technical inadequacies 
12 of this particular contempt proceeding. 
13 And I'm not certain that we necessarily need a 
14 trial for the Court to resolve those. On the other 
15 hand, the Court has a concern in this litigation about 
16 the rights of the citizen voters. This type of 
17 litigation which may be and no doubt is and should be 
18 important in litigants has a ramification upon the 
19 average voter that in the view of this court is not a 
20 salutary connotation. 
21 And there's been arguments even made in open 
22 court that because this is an election case, a court 
23 should exercise extraordinary powers never used in civil 
24 litigation before in the history of American 
25 jurisprudence and haul citizens back at their own cost 
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1 into court for a hearing for trial because they voted. 
2 That's very disturbing to this court. 
3 The wisdom of the American democracy is not 
4 delivered by the fiercely partisan voting. The wisdom 
5 of the American democracy is delivered by the average 
6 citizen that goes down to the voting place on the day of 
7 the election and votes as they see best to serve their 
8 community and does so out of public duty. Not because 
9 they have some crusade or some test point that they want 
10 to prove, but because they want to see their community 
11 work. 
12 To have litigation, publishing voters' names, 
13 calling in whether their affidavits are correct, whether 
14 they're legal or illegal, whether they can be hauled 
15 into court, grilled by a judge with regard to their 
16 votes, is an anathema to everything about our democratic 
17 process. 
18 So the secrecy, the confidentiality, the 
19 privacy of the voter is of paramount concern to the 
20 Court, and some apparent disregard of those issues by 
21 litigants or participants is of concern to this court. 
22 I think that Judge Simpson's order was very 
23 clear. The confidentiality, the most important duty of 
24 the Court is to assure the voter of their right to vote 
25 and do so freely and free of interference and certainly 
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1 free of the threat of litigation. I recognize all the 
2 procedural difficulties, and I'm going to have to deal 
3 with that. And there may well be issues that indeed 
4 this court has advised Mr. McCrory that the Court's not 
5 going to pursue criminal sanctions if Mr. Reed's 
6 correct. I guess the Court has worked itself into a 
7 position where the Court is going to dismiss the 
8 proceedings. Because according to Mr. Reed, the only 
9 thing left are criminal remedies, and the Court itself 
10 advised Mr. McCrory that there were only civil 
11 sanctions. So may be that the Court needs to dismiss 
12 the case based upon the orders of the Court itself. 
13 But I'm certainly -- and if there was a 
14 stipulation and agreement, the Court would not have any 
15 essence to do so, but the concern here of -- I recognize 
16 all the technical difficulties. The technical 
17 difficulties are very real. Indeed, some of the 
18 technical difficulties now are created by the Court in 
19 which Mr. Reed argues today, and we may not be able to 
20 proceed. 
21 On the other hand, in a very broad picture, we 
22 have a spirit of confidentiality, if not a letter of the 
23 law. But certainly a spirit of confidentiality. But as 
24 far as this court can see, it was utterly, blatantly, 
25 intentionally, recklessly violated. That's not to be 
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1 taken likely. The Court needs to consider this and make 
2 its own decision. Parties not having stipulated, the 
3 Court will do that. 
4 But the matter remains set for trial on the 
5 17th of September. I have -- I'm obviously going to be 
6 focusing on issues in this case, but it may well be, 
7 during the course of the trial, may well -- and who 
8 knows, the trial of the case may still be going on on 
9 Friday and perhaps all we would do is address procedural 
10 issues on the time set of 9:00 o'clock on 17th of 
11 February -- September. 
12 On the other hand, I'm going to look at the 
13 particular issue here raised by Mr. Macomber here 
14 which -- and Mr. Reed, which basically says, well, 
15 really, this is only a criminal contempt proceeding at 
16 this point. And if that's true, the Court, having 
17 advised Mr. McCrory that the Court's only advancing with 
18 regard to civil contempt, the Court may well just decide 
19 to dismiss the proceedings and be done with it on its 
20 own motion between now and September 17th. If not, 
21 that's obviously the first thing we would be addressing 
22 at 9:00 a.m. on September 17th. 
23 So at this point, we'll just take the matter 
24 under advisement and pending further rulings of the 
25 Court or be addressed again at 9:00 a.m. on 
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1 September 17th. All right? 
2 MR. REED: Your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: We're in recess. Well, yes? 
4 MR. REED: Just to make it formal of record 
5 for the reasons I have stated on behalf of my client, I 
6 would move to dismiss the proceeding with the 
7 understanding that the costs and attorney's fees would 
8 not be involved, but I felt very strongly that we should 
9 not be going through a criminal trial and there doesn't 
10 seem to be any alternative to that based upon these 
11 orders, so I present that to the Court for your 
12 consideration. 
13 THE COURT: Mr. Macomber, you agree, I think, 
14 with Mr. Reed's position at this point, correct? I 
15 mean, as far as if the -- if we do proceed in this 
16 matter, you would agree with Mr. Reed that contrary to 
17 the Court's advice to Mr. McCrory at our last hearing, 
18 indicating this was a civil contempt proceeding, the 
19 Court is actually limited to having to proceed for as a 
20 criminal contempt, and that's -- you agree with Mr. Reed 
21 on that point, do you not? 
22 MR. MACOMBER: Yes, your Honor. The case of 
23 Camp v East Fork Ditch, 137 Idaho 850, is quite clear on 
24 this point. And it brings me, as Mr. McCrory's counsel, 
25 to a point where I need to notify the Court that I have 
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1 no idea about Idaho criminal law. And if the Court sees 
2 fit not to dismiss the case, then I will be submitting a 
3 motion to look for substitute counsel because I -- the 
4 case goes into quite a bit of detail about the criminal 
5 protections that become attached, if you will, to these 
6 types of sanctions. And I am a property lawyer, your 
7 Honor. I have no idea about Idaho criminal defense and 
8 so I will find myself at sea 
9 THE COURT: All right. 
10 MR. MACOMBER: in such an environment. 
11 THE COURT: Well, we can -- again, I'm going 
12 to take it under advisement and it may well -- may well 
13 be able to resolve the matter. We just need to think it 
14 through and prior to September 17th. I guess if we --
15 at 9:00 a.m. on September 17th, if for some reason the 
16 Court is up for the notion that it is, in fact, a 
17 criminal contempt proceeding and we are going to proceed 
18 in the criminal contempt proceeding contrary to what the 
19 Court advised Mr. McCrory at the initial hearing, if, in 
20 fact, you wish to move to continue at that point in time 
21 in order to substitute counsel and address the issue 
22 that would, of course, be granted. Because, obviously, 
23 it's a different -- you would find yourself dealing with 
24 a different proceeding on the morning of September 17th 
25 than you had been advised by the Court if it was, in 
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1 fact, going to occur. So if you needed additional time 
2 for that purpose regardless of whatever objections might 
3 be raised by the other side, you certainly would be 
4 granted that right to do that. 
5 
6 
MR. MACOMBER: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I understand your position. All 
7 right. Then court's in recess. 
8 (Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
2:31p.m.) 
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1 STATE OF IDAHO 
SS: REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
2 COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
3 I, Keri Veare, a notary public and duly 
4 certified court reporter in and for the State of Idaho, 
5 DO HEREBY CERTIFY: 
6 That the foregoing proceedings was taken on 
7 the date and at the time and place herein stated; 
8 That the foregoing is a true and correct 
9 transcription, to the best of my ability, of my 
10 shorthand notes taken down at said time and place in the 
11 above-entitled litigation; 
12 I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not related to any 
13 of the parties or attorneys to this litigation and have 
14 no interest in the outcome of said litigation. 
15 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my 
16 hand and seal this 9th day of September, 2010. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
KERI VEARE, RPR, CSR 675 
Court Reporter, Notary Public for the 
State of Idaho, residing in Coeur 
d'Alene, Idaho. 
My Notary Expires: 5/6/2011 
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nathema "" definition of anathema by the Free Online Dictionary, 1besa. .. http://www .thefreedictionary.com/ anathema 
1 of3 
Download our official FREE toolbar 
TEXT 
Ci TheFreeDictionary r Google r Bing 
I anathema Search ? 
2,273.489,082 visitors ser..ed. 
Ci Word I Article r Starts with r Ends with r Text 
Dictionary/ Legal 1· Financial I Acronyms: Idioms I Encyclopedia I Wikipedia 
thesaurus dictionary dictionary I I I I encyclopedia i 1 
anathema Also found in: Legal, Encyclopedia, Wikipedia, Hutchinson 0.03 sec. 
? 
anathema Sponsored links I Page tools 
Create a Free Account and Download High Resolution Images for I Printer friendly Feedback 
Add definition Free. [ Cite /link 
Dreamstime.com . Email 
Anathema at Amazon ~__ ________________ _j 
Low prices on new & used music. Qualified orders over $25 ship free 
Amazon.cornlmusic 
Anathema 
Get the best prices on everything from thousands of trusted retailers. 
\WtW.dealtime.com 
a·nath·e·ma (~ll.'lit~·~~) 
n. pl. a·nath·e·mas 
1. A formal ecclesiastical ban, curse, or excommunication. 
2. A vehement denunciation; a curse: "the sound of a witch's 
anathemas in some unknown tongue" (Nathaniel Hawthorne). 
3. One that is cursed or damned. 
4. One that is greatly reviled, loathed, or shunned: 
"Essenualisrrr-a belief in natural, immutable sex differences 
-is anathema to postmodernists, for whom sexuality itself, 
along with gender, is a 'social construct'" (Wendy Kaminer). 
[Late Latin anathema, doomed offering, accursed thing, from 
Greek, from anatithenai, anathe-, to dedicate: ana-, ana-
+ ti thenai, to put; see dhe- in Indo-European roots.] 
The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition copyright ©2000 by 
Houghton Millin Company. Updated in 2009. Published by Houghton Millin Company. All rights 
reserved. 
anathema [a'nce9arna] 
npl-mas 
1. a detested person or thing he is anathema to me 
2. (Christianity I Ecclesiastical Terms) a formal ecclesiastical 
curse of excommunication or a formal denunciation of a doctrine 
3. (Christianity I Ecclesiastical Terms) the person or thing so 
cursed 
4. a strong curse; imprecation 
[via Church Latin from Greek: something accursed, dedicated (to 
evil), from anatithenai to dedicate, from ANA- + tithenai to set] 
Collins English Dictionary- Complete and Unablidged © HarperCollins Publishers 1991, 1994, 
1998,2000,2003 
Thesaurus Legend: !Synonyms !Related 
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mthema - definition of anathema by the Free Online Dictionary, Thesa ... http://www .thefreedictionary.com/anathema 
2of3 
[words IAntonyms 
\ Noun 1. anathema - a detested person; "he is an anathema to 
1 me" 
lbete noire 
I disagreeable person, unpleasant person- a person who is not pleasant or agreeable 
2. anathema- a formal ecclesiastical curse accompanied 
by excommunication 
!curse, execration, condemnation- an appeal to some 
I S·u·n ... -, na•.·u··· Cl-·. [",."}we· •o 'nflict e·•• on """"'"""ne nr "'""""' gr~~P .--·· , • 1111 • .... • .. ~ .. ...-... ~ --.. ~ 
Based on WordNet 3.0, Farlex clipart COI1ection. © 2003-2008 Princeton Unillersity, Farlex 
Inc. 
Advertisement (Bad banner? Please let us know) 
anathema 
noun I abomination, bete noire, enemy, pariah, bane, bugbear 
Violence was anathema to them. 
Collins Thesaurus of the English Language- Complete and Unabridged 2nd Edition. 2002 
© HarperCollins Publishers 1995, 2002 
Charity 
Feed a hungry child -
donate to school feeding 
program 
? 
Translations ADTECH 
AD SERVING 
Select a language: --------------------
~--~-. 
How to thank TFD for its existence? Tell a friend about us, add a link to 
this page, add the site to iGoogle, or visit webmaster's page for free 
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Please bookmark with social media, your votes are noticed and 
appreciated: 
Mentioned in 
Anathema Maranatha 
Anathematization 
anathematize 
bete noire 
curse 
disagreeable person 
Maranatha 
References in classic literature 
To a people of ttis nature the Homeric epos would be 
inacceptable, and the post-Homeric epic, with its 
conventional atmosphere, its trite and hackneyed diction, 
and its insincere sentiment, would be anathema. 
Collection Of Hesiod, Homer and Homerica by Homer 
View in context 
Paurs perfection, that he would wish to be anathema 
from Christ, for the salvation of his brethren, it shows much 
of a divine nature, and a kind of conformity with Christ 
himself 
The Essays by Bacon. Sir Francis View in context 
To do anything TI-EY have never done is anathema 
maranatha. 
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Gmail - salutary 
salutary 
1 message 
stan.kelso@frontier.com <starr.kelso@front!er.com> 
To: kelsolawoffice@gmail.com 
sal•u•tar•y 
'seal ye,tEr iShow Spelled[sal-yuh-ter-ee] Show IPA 
-adjective 
1. 
favorable to or promoting health; healthful. 
2. 
promoting or conducive to some beneficial purpose; wholesome. 
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STARR KELSO 
Attorney at Law #2445 
P.O. Box 1312 
· Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 816 
Tel: 208-765-3260 
Fax: 208-664-6261 
Attorney for Plaintiff Brannon 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST ruDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JIM BRANNON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO, 
a municipal corporation, et.al. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CB-09-10010 
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY 
ruDGE HOSACK PURSUANT 
TO IRCP RULE 40 (d) (2) (A) (1) and (4) 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff Jim Brannon, by and through his attorney Starr Kelso, and 
pursuant to Idaho Ru1es of Procedure Ru1e 40 (d) (2)(A) (1) and (4) moves this Court to 
disqualify himself for and based upon the grounds of (1) interest and (2) bias and/or prejudice 
against Plaintiff Brannon and this election contest as being not a salutary connotation to the legal 
voters of the City of Coeur d'Alene and an anathema to everything about our American 
democratic process. 
This motion incorporates, as if set forth herein word for word, the affidavits, transcript of 
the Contempt Hearing held on September 7, 2010, and the Memorandum of Law filed herewith. 
Starr Kel o, Attorney for Plaintiff Brannon 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: A copy was faxed to Michael Haman attorney for Defendants 
ciz and Weathers and Scott Reed and Peter Erbland attorneys for Defendant Kennedy on the 
13 dayo~ember, 2010. 
0~~ 
Starr Kelso 
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Michael L. Haman 
HAMAN LAW OFFICE 
923 N. 3rd Street 
P.O. Box 2155 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-2155 
Telephone: (208) 667-6287 
Facsi!!lile: (208) 676-1683 
ISB # 4784 
Attorneys for Defendant City of Coeur d'Alene/Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JIM BRANNON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. Case No. CV-2009-10010 
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, et al, DEFENDANTS' FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW Defendants. 
COMES NOW Defendants City of Coeur d' Alene and its Clerk, by and through their 
counsel of record, and hereby submit their Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to the 
Court's Pre-Trial Order. Said Defendants adopt the Findings and Conclusions submitted by the 
Defendant Kennedy. In addition: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
A. On August 18, 2009, the City Council for the City of Coeur d'Alene entered into an 
Agreement with Kootenai County whereby the Clerk of the District Court ofKootenai County would 
DEFENDANTS' FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW -1 
[J ORIGINAL 
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conduct the general municipal election for the City of Coeur d'Alene on November 3, 2009, under 
the supervision of the City Clerk for the City of Coeur d' Alene. Said agreement was authorized 
pursuantto Idaho Code§§ 67-2332,67-.2326, et. seq., and 34-1401. This Court has concluded that 
the subject contract was legal and valid. 
B. On November 3, 2009, Kootenai County supervised and conducted the County Bond 
election as well as general elections for various municipalities, including the general election for the 
City of Coeur d' Alene, which included election for Council Seat No. 2 for the City of Coeur d' 
Alene. 
C. On November 9, 2009, the Elections Manager for the Office of Kootenai County 
Elections, under the supervision of Dan English, Clerk of the District Court of Kootenai County, 
prepared a report of the election results and presented the same to the City for the final canvass of 
votes for the November 3, 2009, general election for the City of Coeur d'Alene. This final election 
results was presented to the City Clerk for the City of Coeur d' Alene. 
D. On November 9, 2009, the Mayor and Council for the City of Coeur d' Alene met per 
Idaho Code § 50-467 for the purpose of canvassing the results of the City of Coeur d' Alene general 
election. The City Council voted to accept the canvass of votes and authorize the City Clerk, 
Defendant Susan Weathers, to sign any and all necessary documents formalizing the election results 
as set forth in the canvass. 
E. On January 5, 2010, the City ofCoeurd' Alene installed those candidates who were 
declared elected by the City Council for the City of Coeur d' Alene. 
DEFENDANTS' FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW -2 
 Al
 
.
 Ale
SC 38417-2011 Page 2132 of 2676
F. On March 3, 2010, the Court dismissed all claims levied by the Plaintiff against the 
City of Coeur d' Alene, and in doing so declared that the City's contract with the County of Kootenai 
to oversee, supervise and conduct the City of Coeur d' Alene's General Election was valid and legal. 
G. On May 25, 2010, the Court Ordered that the City of Coeur d'Alene a.nd its Clerk 
shall be proper parties to the subject lawsuit for purposes of carrying out and executing any and all 
orders issued by the Court relating to the Plaintiff's claims. No other claims levied by the Plaintiff 
against the City of Coeur d' Alene were reinstated. Further, the Court reaffirmed the validity of the 
subject contract and declared that the County oversaw, supervised and conducted the subject 
election. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. There is no evidence that the City of Coeur d'Alene, or any of its employees, violated 
any provisions of Title 50, Chapter 4, or Title 34 in relation to the 2009 City of Coeur d' Alene 
General Election. And, moreover, as noted the subject contract between the City of Coeur d'Alene 
and the County of Kootenai regarding said County's supervision and conduct of the subject election 
was valid and legal. 
B. There is no evidence that Kootenai County, a non-party, or any of its employees, 
violated any provisions of Title 50, Chapter 4, or Title 34 in relation to the 2009 City of Coeur d' 
Alene General Election. 
C. There is no evidence that the County knowingly received any illegal votes; and, there 
is no evidence of any error committed during the City's canvass or in declaring the result of the 
election. 
DEFENDANTS' FINDINGS OFF ACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 3 
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D. There is insufficient evidence of illegal votes cast that would alter or change the result 
of the subject election for Seat 2 for the City of Coeur d'Alene. 
E. There is insufficient testimony from any alleged illegal voter regarding which 
candidate said witness voted for in regard to Seat 2 in the 2009 City of Coeur d' .Alene General 
Election, as required under I.C. 34-2017. 
F. The Defendant Mike Kennedy was lawfully elected and installed to Seat 2 for the City 
Council for the City of Coeur d'Alene in the 2009 General Election for the City of Coeur d'Alene. 
G. The Amended Complaint filed against the City of Coeur d'Alene and its Clerk, of 
which the claims against said Defendants were dismissed on March 3, 2010, was pursued against 
said Defendants frivolously and unreasonably. 
Dated this _!_l_ day of September, 2010. 
HAMAN LAW OFFICE 
------/ By~~~-----~---------_-______ _ 
Michael L. Haman 
Attorneys for Defendants City/Clerk 
DEFENDANTS' FINDINGS OFF ACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW- 4 
 Ale
l
 l  Ale
 Ale
2 
.
By // L-..... . 
  
SC 38417-2011 Page 2134 of 2676
CERTIFICATE OF SERVING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this/~ day of September, 2010, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW by the 
method described below to: 
Starr Kelso 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1312 
1621 N. Third Street, Ste. 600 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Fax: 208 664-6261 
Scott Reed 
P.O. Box A 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Fax: 208 765-5117 
Peter Erbland 
Paine Hamblen 
701 Front Ave., Ste. 101 
P.O. BoxE 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Fax: 208 664-6338 
U.S. First class mail 
---
--Fax 
---
___ Hand Delivery 
U.S. First class mail 
---
,....... Fax 
---
___ Hand Delivery 
U.S. First class mail 
----.,-
_./. Fax 
---
___ Hand Delivery 
Michael L. Haman 
DEFENDANTS' FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW- 5 
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Michael L. Haman 
HAMAN LAW OFFICE 
923 N. 3rd Street 
P.O. Box 2155 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-2155 
Telephone: (208) 667-6287 
Facsimile: (208) 676-1683 
ISB # 4784 
Attorneys for Defendant City of Coeur d'Alene, Weathers 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JIM BRANNON, 
Plaintiff, Case No. CV-2009-10010 
vs. DEFENDANTS' EXHIBIT LIST 
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, et al, 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW the Defendant City of Coeur d' Alene and its Clerk, by and through their 
counsel of record, and hereby submits the following list of exhibits identifying those exhibits the 
Defendants anticipate offering at the trial of this matter. The Plaintiffhas previously been provided 
with copies of these exhibits, or has inspected them, or may inspect them upon reasonable request. 
A. Resolution No. 09-033. 
B. Agreement between Kootenai County and City of Coeur d'Alene dated 8-18-09. 
C. Designated Polling Places 2009. 
D. Correspondence and correction sheet re designated polling places dated 8-31-09. 
DEFENDANTS' EXHIBIT LIST - 1 
rd 
I
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E. Canvass of Votes prepared by Kootenai County for and presented to City of Coeur 
d'Alene dated November 9, 2009. 
F. City Council Meeting Minutes for November 9, 2009. 
G. 2009 Election Manual for City Clerks 
H. Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant City's Interrogatories dated July 9, 2010. 
I. Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant Kennedy's Interrogatories dated July 9, 2010. 
Defendants reserve the right to supplement this disclosure and to utilize as exhibits any 
exhibits offered by the Plaintiff and admitted. Defendants also notify the Court and all parties that 
it will utilize at trial any and all relevant and material pleadings submitted and filed in this case. 
The Defendants reserve the right to modify and/or supplement this disclosure as discovery 
warrants and upon Plaintiff's compliance with the Court's Pre-Trial Order. The Defendant further 
reserves the right to utilize any and all exhibits identified by the Plaintiff and/or the Defendant 
Kennedy. 
Dated this _jJ__ day of August, 2010. 
DEFENDANTS' EXHIBIT LIST - 2 
HAMAN LAW OFFICE, P .C. 
By a~· 
Michael L. Haman 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _]j_ day of August, 2010, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Defendants' Exhibit List by the method described below to: 
Starr Kelso 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1312 
1621 N. Third Street, Ste. 600 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Fax: 208 664-6261 
Scott Reed 
401 Front Ave. 
Ste. 205 
P.O. Box A 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Fax: 208 765-5117 
Peter Erbland 
Paine Hamblen 
P.O. BoxE 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Fax: 208 664-6338 
DEFENDANTS' EXHIBIT LIST - 3 
U.S. First class mail 
-t/---,.~ Fax 
___ Hand Delivery 
U.S. First class mail 
t/ Fax 
-----"---
___ Hand Delivery 
U.S. First class mail 
J Fax 
___ Hand Delivery 
---
U.S. First class mail 
Fax 
---Hand Delivery 
Michael Haman 
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LIST OF EXHIBITS 
CASE NUMBER CV 09-10100 DATE 8/31/10 
TITLE OF CASE ____ BRANNON V. CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE , ET AL. 
D 
D 
D 
No. 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
I 
PLAINTIFF'S ExHIBITS (list numerically) 
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS (list alphabetically) 
THIRD PARTY EXHIBITS STATE PARTY 
Description By Stip. Offered Received Refused Reserve 
Resolution No. 09-033. 
Agreement between Kootenai County 
and City of Coeur d'Alene dated 8-18-
09. 
Designated Polling Places 2009. 
Correspondence and correction sheet re 
designated polling places dated 8-31-09. 
Canvass of Votes prepared by Kootenai 
County for and presented to City of 
Coeur d'Alene dated November 9, 2009. 
City Council Meeting Minutes for 
November 9, 2009. 
2009 Election Manual for City Clerks 
Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant City's 
Interrogatories dated July 9, 2010. 
Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant 
Kennedy's Interrogatories dated July 9, 
2010. 
' ,
----
C
 Ale
 Ale
,2
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Peter C. Erbland, ISB #2456 
Paine, Hamblen, Coffin, Brooke & Miller, LLP 
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101 
Post Office Box E 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0328 
Phone(208)664.S115 
FAX (208) 664..S338 
Scott W. Reed, ISB#818 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. BoxA 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
Phone (208) 664-2161 
FAX (208} 765-5117 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JIM BRANNON, 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
Vs. ) 
) 
SUSAN K. WEATHERS, in her capacity ) 
as the City of Coeur d'Alene City Clerk; ) 
MIKE KENNEDY, in his capacity as the ) 
incumbent candidate for the City of ) 
Coeur d'Alene Council Seat #2; ) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
Case No. CV-09-10010 
,/ 
CORRECTED SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE 
SEPTEMBER 10,2010 
On March 22, 2010 defendant Kennedy filed a Motion in Limine with supporting brief 
to exclude all evidence related to Tammy Farkes, Monica Paquin and Alan Friend all of 
whom cast votes from Canada and all of whom were named in the Amended Complaint. 
Plaintiff has since added to the list of challenged absentee voters Kimberly Gagnon 
and Denise Dobslaff who voted absentee from British Columbia. Each of the five is a 
registered voter within the City of Coeur d'Alene. 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 
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The plaintiff's Preliminary Witness List identifies the five as witnesses but none will 
appear. (Nos. 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23.) Plaintiff's Preliminary Witness List Names other 
witnesses (Nos. 17, 18, 24, 25, 26 ,27, 28, 49 and 50) to testify as to residence and/or 
conversations with one or more of these five voters. 
As set forth in the initial brief in support, each of these persons mailed an absentee 
ballot which was received, properly checked against registration and counted along with 
all other absentee ballots. Idaho Code Section 34-107 (3) allows for absentee votes from 
qualified electors. The Uniform and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, cited and 
attached to the opening brief, allows out of state and out of country absentee voting. 
As stated under oath in their respective applications for absentee ballots, all of 
these five persons retain residence in Coeur d'Alene for voting purposes. All of the five 
had the right under federal and state laws to vote in the Coeur d'Alene City Election on 
November 3, 2009. 
The actions of the county election officials was purely ministerial. Deedie Beard as 
the Election Manager and her staff had a "clear legal duty" to accept the absentee ballots 
as received without any discretion to investigate or to reject the same. Utah Power & Ught 
Companyv. Campbell, 1081daho 950,953,703 P.2d 714, (1985), Dalton v.ldaho 
Dairy Products, 107 Idaho 6, 9, 684 P.2d 983, (1984). 
The federal and state law is clear and explicit. Plaintiff in the five months since this 
motion in limine was filed has presented no contrary legal authority and for good and 
sufficient reason. There is none. 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 2 
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The proposed testimony of witnesses Nos. 17, 18,- 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 49 and 50 is 
irrelevant and should be excluded along with any and all testimony or evidence offered 
relating to any of these fiVe voters. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true copy of the above and foregoing was served by fax, this 1Oth 
day of September, 2010 to: 
Starr Kelso 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box 1312 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
FAX (208) 664-6261 
Michael L. Haman 
Haman Law Office 
P. 0. Box 2155 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
FAX (208) 676-1683 
Arthur B. Macomber 
Attorney at Law 
408 E. Sherman Avenue - Suite 215 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
FAX (208) 664-
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 
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Court Minutes: 
Session: HOSACK09131 OA 
Session Date: 09/13/2010 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Reporter: Nunemacher, Valerie 
Clerk(s): Rohrbach, Shari 
State Attorney(s): 
Public Defender(s): 
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09/13/2010 
09:19:16 
Recording Started: 
09:19:16 
Case called 
09:19:31 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
This is the time set for court trial. I've 
discussed in chambers some 
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09:19:46 
09:19:59 
09:20:05 
09:20:23 
09:20:37 
09:21:41 
09:22:20 
09:22:49 
09:23:58 
09:25:33 
09:25:49 
09:27:00 
09:27:40 
09:29:02 
09:29:26 
09:30:28 
09:31:25 
09:32:38 
09:33:53 
09:34:19 
09:35:18 
09:36:13 
09:36:29 
ligisics. There are some preliminary motions. 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Pers. Attorney: Reed, Scott 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
We'll take the Motion to DQ first. 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Motion is brought pursuant to Rule 40d. I've 
received information from 
various attorneys that Judge Hosack used to 
represent City of CDA. At the 
contempt proceeding against McCrory, I was not 
present. This case was 
vilified by Your Honor. I got a transcript of 
the hearing, reads from 
transcript. 
What the Court is saying is that you don't see 
this as beneficial to the 
voter ofCDA. It's the responsibility ofthe 
court to call voters back to to 
Argues. 
Words show what deep seeded feelings are. 
Statute requires publishing voters 
names. 
The secrecy and privacy ofthe illegal voter is 
not paramount. 
It wasn't known you possessed deeply seeded 
emotions. 
The Court is well aware of what election 
procedures require. 
In a prior hearing you referred to anarchy. 
Election contest is anything but 
anarchy. Sancity of free elections is a 
cornerstone of democracy. You cannot 
poceed, you have shown personal bias. You cannot 
decide this case. We ask for 
and demand a hearing on this, and that you 
recuse yourself. 
Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK09131 OA Page 4, ... 
   t
SC 38417-2011 Page 2144 of 2676
09:37:01 
09:37:27 
09:38:04 
09:38:23 
09:38:39 
09:39:12 
09:40:03 
09:40:29 
09:40:32. 
09:41:33 
09:41:45 
09:42:02 
09:42:18 
09:42:46 
09:43:11 
09:43:40 
09:44:10 
09:44:32 
09:44:49 
I've never seen anything like this. I don't know 
he has to yell. He heard 
throgh some lawyers that you use to represent 
City of CDA. Cites cases, that 
does not provide reason the recuse yourself. 
Bell v Bell, there have been 
adverse rulings, we live with that. Just because 
we disagree with the ruling 
doesn't mean the Court is biased. I don't take 
lightly the attack on this 
Court. I'm embarassed for Mr Brannon. Anyone who 
disagrees is a member of a 
conspiracy. 
When people take the voting process and turn it 
into a circus. 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Obj. 
Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
The court commented to what the court had 
observed. They don't want to go to 
trial today because they're not ready, they 
don't have the evidence. I urge 
this Court to know that when people take shots 
like this at the Court, it's a 
serious matter. Ask the Court to deny the 
Motion. 
Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
You last represented the Court in 1996-97, 
thirteen years before the 
election. You had no involvement with any 
election issues. The mayor now is 
not the mayor from then. You sat on Sanders 
Beach cases, argues. On behalf of 
the city, concurr with the comments ofMr 
Erbland. 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Issue had nothing to do with representation of 
CDA, I only pointed it out. It 
was brought today because we didn't get a 
transcript until Sat. We're not 
complaining about adverse rulings. Sup Court 
case, should be without bias. 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 5, ... 
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09:46:21 Issue is does this election case proceed with an 
unbiased judge. 
09:46:38 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I've know Mr Kelso for probably 30 years, I 
don't feel it is an attack upon 
09:47:17 the Court, is an advocate for client. As Mr 
Kelso points out the contempt ~ 09:47:45 proceeding had nothing to do with his client. 
Comments were made in the 
09:48:10 context of a conempt proceeding, and were made 
hypothetical to Mr McCrory's 
09:48:47 attorney. The issue before the Court was an 
alleged court order regarding 
09:49:48 confidentiality, then publishing that 
information. For purposes of that 
09:50:32 hearing, we had a party obtain information and 
publish it on the internet. 
09:50:51 Nothing was said about illegal voters. Mr Kelso 
wasn't there and missed the 
09:51:12 context ofthe conversation. A lot of people 
don't like litigation. 
09:52:06 
09:52:44 Mr Kelso may have some personal involvement as 
to the preparation of the 
09:53:28 affidavit. Mr Brannon has no involvement. 
09:55:21 Comments were focused to that issue. 
09:55:52 Now the Motion in Limine. This deals with, under 
the statute, voters to be 
09:56:25 listed 3 days prior to trial, 34-2017 b. 
09:57:27 Pers. Attorney: Reed, Scott 
Elections are subject to human error. Volenteers 
at precints and in clerks 
09:58:27 office. We are willing to stip and concede that 
two people voted ilegally and 
09:58:47 voted for Kennedy. Nancy White operated a 
business here. 
09:59:35 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Question re: names on the list. 
09:59:51 Pers. Attorney: Reed, Scott 
There are two people who voted not on the list. 
The persons named in the 
10:00:47 Amended Compliant are the five. 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 6, ... 
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10:01:33 
10:02:04 
10:02:13 
10:02:34 
10:03:05 
10:03:22 
10:03:26 
10:03:48 
10:03:57 
10:04:31 
10:04:40 
10:07:50 
10:09:01 
10:09:46 
10:10:10 
10:11:01 
10:12:09 
10:13:06 
10:14:18 
10:14:51 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
How do you know they're legal voters, he had to 
call them as a witness. 
Pers. Attorney: Reed, Scott 
As a matter of law they are legal voters. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
How do I know that, Mr Kelso has to call his 
witness. That's what the trial 
is for. 
I am not going to preclude the PL from calling 
witnesses. 
Motion deneid. 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Move to exclude witnesses. 
Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
We don't agree, discretionary with the court. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Absent an agreement of the parties, will not 
exclude witnesses. Do you wish 
to make an opening? 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Yes. Opening comments. This case is about 
fairness ofthe election. 
We have no list as requested of ballots, 
received, absentee. Three days 
after the election, there were 2047 ballots. 
Five were deemed void, and 
Harris voted twice. Ten more ballots were run 
through the ballot machine. The 
2047 includes Harris twice. The five were voided 
because they voted twice. 
The 2051 comes from Deede Beard. The difference 
in the race is five votes. On 
Nov 6, elections department was aware numbers 
didn't match. 
About Nov 13, Mr McHugh is alerted of this by 
email. About Nov 15, he 
responds and says you have to file an election 
contest. On Nov 16 another 
list was run. That list shows 2049 absentee 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK09131 OA Page 7, ... 
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10:15:25 
10:16:34 
10:17:46 
10:18:44 
10:19:23 
10:20:03 
10:20:31 
10:21:34 
10:23:01 
10:23:30 
10:24:45 
10:26:23 
10:34:17 
10:35:10 
10:36:00 
10:36:37 
10:37:03 
10:38:01 
10:39:14 
10:39:31 
10:40:46 
10:40:55 
ballots were received, 7 were 
voided. On Nov 24, another list is run, it shows 
2056 absentee ballots were 
received, 7 are voided as received after the 
election, untimely. Then you 
have to take out one of the two Harris votes. On 
Aug 19, 2010 another list is 
done by Ms Phillips, approx 2,180 ballots were 
received. 169 were void, or 
late or something wrong. 2019 absentee ballots 
were received.There is no 
record that shows 2051. We're saying there 
weren't 2051 ballots. Each machine 
has a printout, they reflect absentte ballots 
were run in machine 2 and 3. 
They reflect 2051 ballots. Machine 2 reflects 
"dups". Judge Marano will 
testify there were 17 duplicates. Those aren't 
included in any totals even 
though they reflect they were run through the 
machine. We have attempted to 
subp illegal voters who listed CDA residence. 
Statute requires a fixed home 
or abode. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Which are covered by section b? 
Let's take a break and get the list. 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
That's the list, I don't know how I can be any 
clearer. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
This list is not the list under 34-2017b, which 
individuals are on that 
list? This is a list of 53 people. 
Mr Kelso develope the list, then we'll meet in 
chambers and talk about this. 
Giving me 53 names, some of whom may or may not 
be on the list, does not meet 
the requirement. Please give me the list. 
Recess. 
Stop recording 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 8, ... 
 
SC 38417-2011 Page 2148 of 2676
11:07:40 
Recording Started: 
11:07:40 Record 
Etal, City of CDA 
11:07:44 Stop recording 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 9, ... 
 
SC 38417-2011 Page 2149 of 2676
Court Minutes: 
Session: HOSACK09131 OA 
Session Date: 09/13/2010 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Reporter: Nunemacher, Valerie 
Clerk(s): Rohrbach, Shari 
State Attorney(s): 
Public Defender(s): 
Prob. Officer(s): 
Court interpreter(s): 
Case ID: 0003 
Case number: CV2009-1 0010 
Plaintiff: Brannon, Jim 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Defendant: Etal, City of CDA 
Pers. Attorney: Reed, Scott 
Co-Defendant( s): 
State Attorney: 
Public Defender: 
Division: DIST 
Session Time: 08:22 
Previous audio and annotations can be found in case: 0002 
Additional audio and annotations can be found in case: 0004. 
09/13/2010 
11:07:46 
Recording Started: 
11:07:46 
Case recalled 
11:08:10 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Back on the record. The Court has again met with 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A 
Courtroom: Courtroom9 
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counsel to identifY the 
11:09:09 persons to be listed as to alleged illegal 
votes. Mr Kelso has now gone 
11:09:27 through his list and identified 21 ofthe 53, 
identified as allegedly cast an 
11 :09:57 illegal vote. The Court has the list and will 
mark it as Court exh A. Reads 
11:11:15 list. No testimony shall be received as to 
illgal votes on anyone other 
11:12:46 than those just listed. Will go back to Mr 
Kelso's opening statement. 
11: 13:51 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
We were at county residences. Continues with 
opening. 
11:18:27 We'll show that some people were given the wrong 
ballot and voted. 
11:19:56 State Attorney: 
11:20:14 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Opening statement. Mr Kennedy believes the count 
is legitimate. 
11:22:36 Some witnesses won't be here, some can't 
remember who they voted for. Canvas 
11:22:55 shows there were 2051 ballots run through the 
machine. There will be alot of 
11 :23:40 critizism of how the election was conducted. 
11:24:13 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Opening statement. The City legally contracted 
for the election. It was well 
11 :25: 12 conducted and supervised. Final vote of 2051 was 
presented to city counsel. 
11 :26: 16 Evidence will show canvas was correct. 
11:26:30 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Call Susan Weathers 
11:27:07 Other: Weathers, Susan 
Sworn by clerk. I'm city clerk. I'm Chief 
Election Official. I'm familar with 
11:28:31 IC 50-403. I'm to exercise general supervision 
ofthe election, to achieve 
11:33:12 correctness. We did contract with the county. 
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Municipal Elections manual. CDA 
11:36:58 Municipal code is Title 50 Ch 4. 
11:37:23 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Obj. •: 
11:37:27 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Sustain 
11:37:40 Other: Weathers, Susan 
If you look through the code it refers to Title 
34 in certain situaitons, it 
11:38:10 it just Title 50. This is the handbook the city 
utilizes. 
11:39:16 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Obj, Court already ruled the city contracted to 
the county. 
11:39:36 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
0/R, as foundation. 
11:39:52 Other: Weathers, Susan 
Under 404 a contract was entered into with the 
county. 
11:43:04 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Will mark City Exh B as admitted and work with 
that copy. 
11:43:28 Other: Weathers, Susan 
Reads from City exh B. 
11:44:53 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Are we going to have her read the whole 
document? Let's go with questions. 
11:45:09 Other: Weathers, Susan 
Prior to the election process I published legal 
notices, received notices of 
11:45:35 candadicy, reviewed names on the ballot. Worked 
with tabulation of the votes 
11:45:55 and typed minutes. I took the copy Deedie Beard 
sent me and presented it to 
11:46:27 the council. Exh 86 is the tabulation of the 
election which shows 2051. I did 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 12, ... 
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11:48:29 not look at the ballots. 
11:49:01 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Move to admit 86. 
11:49:08 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
NO obj. 
11:49:11 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Admit 86. 
11:50:16 Other: Weathers, Susan 
IC 50-451, I've read it. It's contracted with 
the county to maintain the 
11:53:31 absentee list. From Nov 3 through close of polls 
I did not ask to see the 
11:55:23 record the county keeps. 
11:55:29 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Obj., calls for legal interpretation. 
11:55:34 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Sustain 
11:55:39 Other: Weathers, Susan 
11:56:27 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
She is the chief election official, I want to 
know this witnesses 
11:56:51 understanding. 
11:57:00 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Renew obj. 
11:57:04 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
She's testified what's happened, sustain. 
11:57:18 Other: Weathers, Susan 
My understanding is that the county maintained a 
record, I've not seen it. 
11:57:52 Dan English and Deedie Beard told me they kept a 
record for absentee ballots. 
11:58:16 I did not ask specifically your question as to 
.. 
maintaining the records under 
11:59:42 IC 50-451. Through Nov 9 I was not provided a 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 13, ... 
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record ofthe canvas. Pursuant 
12:00:56 to subp I brought records. Exh 85, I received on 
Nov 9. I received exh 86 on 
12:04:45 Nov 9. Exh 87 is the minutes from canvas of 
votes. I prepared that document 
12:06:01 after the council meeting. 
12:07:17 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Move to admit 85 and 87. 
12:07:25 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Noobj 
12:07:29 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Noobj 
12:07:31 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Admit 85 and 87. We're into the noon hour so 
will take a lunch break, return 
12:07:47 by 1:15. 
12:08:12 Stop recording 
13:20:14 
Recording Started: 
13:20:14 Record 
Etal, City of CDA 
13:20: 19 Stop recording 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 14, ... 
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09/13/2010 
13:20:22 
Recording Started: 
13:20:22 
Case recalled 
13:20:35 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Back in session. Continue with witness 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK09131 OA 
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examination. 
13:22:27 Other: Weathers, Susan 
Exh 87 are the minutes I prepared. Both exh 85 
and 86 were provided by 
13:24:31 Kootenai Co. IC 50-414, Kootenai County acted as 
the registrar. IC 50-445 the 
13:27:10 County did that, checked absentee ballots. To be 
qualified you must 
13:28:24 registered and be a resident. Reads definition 
for a resident. 
13:30:27 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Obj 
13:30:30 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Rephrase the question. 
13:30:47 Other: Weathers, Susan 
A person must meet each requirement. The County 
is the registrar for the 
13:32:15 city. I can't tell you what they prove for 
residency. They ask for proof of 
13:32:39 residence. Exh 85 indicates "canvass". The city 
accepted the documents the 
13:36:17 county provided. Pl Exh 5, I've not seen that 
before. It's the county report 
13:38:19 on absentee ballots dated 11-6-09. 
13:39:08 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Obj, she says she hasn't seen the document 
before. 
13:39:25 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
The exh hasn't been admitted. 
13:40:08 Other: Weathers, Susan 
Exh B, my signature is on the last page. The 
County does not do a canvass, 
13:41 :06 the county tabulates the votes. 
13:42:46 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Obj 
13:42:48 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
To the degree it's calling for a legal 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK09131 OA Page 16, ... 
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conclusion, the court already made a 
13:43:09 finding. 
13:43:22 Other: Weathers, Susan 
The County is not required to do a canvass, they 
do a tabulation. The canvass 
13:45:38 consists the two documents from Beard and 
English. Between Nov 3-9 I was not 
13:46:57 aware of an absentee ballot report. 
13:48:28 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
oBI 
13:48:32 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
The city has independently contracted. 
13:49:18 Other: Weathers, Susan 
My duties were contracted away for the election 
process. 
13:50:51 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Obj 
13:50:53 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Sustain, the Court has ruled the city can 
contract. 
13:51:16 Other: Weathers, Susan 
I do not recall if the city established an 
absentee voting precinct. In the 
13:53:41 contract it provides for absentee votes. A 
consolidate holding precinct is 
13:55:45 where you take two precinct and put them at one 
precinct. 
13:58:33 IC 50-447, was contracted to the county also. 
50-449, I didn't to that, the 
13:59:59 county was supposed to. Exh 1, resolution. I did 
not review poll books. I 
14:05:19 reviewed Mr Brannon's petition for canidacy. IC 
50-452(4), I don't know if 
14:08:19 there was an absentee record and poll book, 
you'd have to ask the county. IC 
14:08:50 50-458. I was in the building, not where the 
voting machines were operated. 
14:10:05 !don't know what ballot codes are. I have a copy 
of the municipal codes the 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK09131 OA Page 17, ... 
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14:11:14 city follows. 
14:12:18 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Obj 
14:12:32 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
0/R if she can answer the question. 
14:12:53 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
No questions. 
14:12:57 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
CROSS 
14:13:09 Other: Weathers, Susan 
14:13:29 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Obj 
14:13:33 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
0/R 
14:13:43 Other: Weathers, Susan 
The poll books were kept with the county. We 
were anticipaing a recount, we k 
14:14:14 ept them at a secure location which was with the 
county. There never was a 
14:14:33 recount. No one filed for a recount. The County 
said they maintained the 
14:15:20 absentee ballots. 
14:15:26 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
REDIRECT 
14:15:30 Other: Weathers, Susan 
The night of the reelection, I told Mr Brannon 
he had the right of a recount. 
14:16:00 It would be through the Sec Gen, they oversee 
it. I'm not aware of anyone 
14:16:45 asking for a recount, not through me. Kennedy 
did ask for a recount, I think 
14:17:04 after the Nov 9 meeting. 
14:17:38 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Call Dan English 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK09131 OA Page 18, ... 
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14:17:57 Other: English, Dan 
14:18:10 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Could we take a break? 
14:18:18 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
OK, ten minute recess. 
14:18:39 Stop recording 
(On Recess) 
14:31:40 
14:31:40 
14:31:54 
14:33:12 
14:33:48 
14:35:08 
14:36:47 
14:37:45 
14:40:18 
14:41:30 
14:41:50 
14:42:36 
14:43:40 
14:45:40 
14:46:53 
14:47:24 
Recording Started: 
Record 
Eta!, City of CDA 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Back in session. The witness was sworn. 
Other: English, Dan 
Sworn by clerk. I live in Rathdrum. I'm the 
elected county clerk. I was here 
when Ms Weathers testified. Exh B is the 
contract, my signature is on the 
last page. The election was run under Title 50 
and 34, its a combination, 
both titles have application. 
IfDeedie Beard testified it was run under Title 
34 I would not disagree. IC 
50-451, I'm familar with it generally, title 50 
is the city code. Most of my 
familiarity is with title 34, county code. I 
supervise the supervisor of the 
elections, I don't deal with the code as much. 
The persons who requested an 
absentee ballot are entered into a state data 
base. The data was entered 
into the state data base. I don't think a list 
was run Nov 3. The earliest 
list I'm aware of is Nov 6. Exh 5 is the printed 
absentee report. I don't 
know for sure if its the one Mr Spencer 
obtained. I've never run a list, the 
staffwould have run it. Exh 91 is a statute. 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 19, ... 
: 
:  
: 
 
l
 
SC 38417-2011 Page 2159 of 2676
14:49:49 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Obj, mistates his testimony. 
14:49:56 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
0/R 
14:50:02 Other: English, Dan 
The record would have been available within the 
system. 
14:51:51 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Obj, its maintained within the data base. 
14:52:16 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Rephrase the question. 
14:52:39 Other: English, Dan 
As ofNov 4, 2009, the information was kept in 
the electronic date base, I'm 
14:53:21 not aware we printed it out. It's a state wide 
data base, maintained in real 
14:53:39 time which is mandated by federal law. So its 
subject to changes. So the 
14:54:13 information was there. We might have printed one 
out. This would be the first 
14:56:33 time I've seen exh 5 in its entirety, I've seen 
the last page. On 11-3-09 at 
14:58:32 8pm an absentee list would be in the date base. 
There would be a signed 
15:00:19 absentee envelope, and a form. IC 50-449, I 
wouldn't be the person to answer 
15:02:54 that. IC 50-447, when we receive them back 
ballot would be date stamped. I 
15:05:21 bel eve the ones that came back through the mail 
system were, and the ones 
15:05:35 walked back were date stamped. We might not know 
the date or hour, the key is 
15:06:14 that they are there by 8pm on election day. 
Anything after wouldn't be 
15:06:34 counted. There's a running tally in the system 
when they're logged in. The 
15:07:55 process is when its received its looked up in 
the state date base, confirm 
15:08:10 its a registered voter and there might be other 
elements. Idaho Voter 
15:08:37 Registration System is the real time system, 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 20, ... 
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controlled by Idaho. That's the 
15:08:57 same system that would run the reports. I've 
responded to different 
15: 11 :29 affidavits. Review of English Affd from Sept. 
15:14:14 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Obj, 
15:14:49 Other: English, Dan 
15:15:55 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Obj 
15:16:01 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I'll allow him to answer. 
15:16:33 Other: English, Dan 
I don't know all the specific steps of how they 
check absentee ballots. Prior 
15:18:05 to Nov 9 I can't say specifically as to the 
date, in the general time frame, 
15:18:25 there was a page that had a different amount 
than the 2051. I can't say 
15:19:50 there's a report, we have the ballots and we 
know how many went through the 
15:20:06 machine. I can't verify exh 5 was prepared by an 
employee ofKootenai county. 
15:21:40 
15:22:22 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Ask for a break to find an original document. 
15:22:33 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Are there other areas of examination? 
15:22:42 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
I'm proceeding down a line, explains. 
15:22:57 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I hate to stop in the middle of testimony, we 
can go back to that point. 
15:24:34 Other: English, Dan 
A consolidated election is when two or more 
districts have an election on 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK09131 OA Page 21, ... 
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15:24:55 the same day and share polling cites or 
staffing. Poll books are lists of reg 
15:26:11 istered voter for each precinct. Each precinct 
has a poll book. I've seen a 
15:27:12 list ofCDA precinct numbers. There was an Affd 
that had reference to two 
15:29:11 different lists, if that's what you're talking 
about I do recall that. The 
15:29:56 Affd would be what I believed to be true. IC 50-
403, I heard the city clerk 
15:31:33 testify they contracted to the county. I 
exercised general supervision. IC 
15:32:34 50-445, the stafflooks up each ballot that 
comes back to verify as a 
15:33:50 registered voter. When they look them up in the 
system, it verifies 
15:34:30 information. The data base system tracks 
registered voters, boundaries, 
15:35:29 addresses, helps generate letters. A card is the 
physical card they fill 
15:35:48 out. They scan in the signature. Would verify a 
person had an absentee ballot 
15:37:05 on file, request made on a yearly basis, except 
for under the overseas act. 
15:38:01 IC 50-402(C), I'm familar with it generally, its 
a city code. If a requst is 
15:41: 17 to go to Canada, staff would make sure absentee 
request is on file, and they 
15:41:55 feel this is their last place of abode and they 
intend to return we've been 
15:42:20 intructed to count as a valid request. Reviews · 
IC 34-104, defines a qualified 
15:45:31 elector. One deals with the state or county, 
one is the city. IC 50-402, 
15:48:49 definition of a resident. 
15:49:18 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Obj, 
15:49:20 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
0/R 
15:49:35 Other: English, Dan 
Habitation is fixed could mean a house, some 
connection to the community. 
15:50:17 Some people are RVers. This is where they refer 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 22, ... 
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to as home. For a person in 
15:51:40 an apartment, a person can still intend on 
returning to this area. Affd 
15:54:08 signed Dec 27, five names were authorized to 
vote. 
15:55:13 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Obj 
15:55:29 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
0/R 
15:55:39 Other: English, Dan 
In the case of those voters they were determined 
to have absentee requests in 
15:55:59 place. They would have signed a form that they 
swore to the information. To 
15:56:58 my understanding there isn't a time limit for 
federal. So I believe they were 
15:57:39 valid registered voters. Hurst letter refers to 
Constitution, and Title 34. I 
16:00:43 Hurst letter doesn't refer to title 50. 
16:01:01 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
I'm done for today. 
16:01:06 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
We're at 4:00 so we'll take evening recess. 
16:01:33 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Offer 91. 
16:02:13 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Statutes are not generally exhibits, its the 
law. 
16:02:29 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
The Court would make its own determination, for 
the purpose of 34-1 011. 
16:03:48 Stop recording 
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Court Minutes: 
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09:08:22 
Recording Started: 
09:08:22 
Case recalled 
09:08:35 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Calls, court trial continues. Mr English retake 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A 
Courtroom: Courtroom9 
Page 24, ... 
1 /
SC 38417-2011 Page 2164 of 2676
the stand, still under oath. 
09:09:59 Other: English, Dan 
Explains positions and departments I supervise. 
The supervise at that time 
09:11:37 was D. Beard. We bring other staff in as we get 
closer to election. You asked 
09:15:24 for the people who worked on the election and I 
have that. Exh 92A and 92B, 
09:18:13 list of poll workers and list of accts payable 
for workers. 
09:18:28 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Move to admit. 
09:18:32 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
NOobj 
09:18:36 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
NOobj 
09:18:39 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Admit 92A and 92B. 
09:19:29 Other: English, Dan 
Explains how absentee ballots are processed. 
They have to give name & 
09:19:57 address, signature. They can fax request to us. 
Check to see if they're in a 
09:20:26 district, we mail an envelope with instructions. 
Two envelopes, one comes 
09:21:06 back to elections with the Affd they sign. 
Another envelope says voted 
09:21 :28 ballot. When we are open for early voting they 
can vote early. Every absentee 
09:23:37 balllot has an envelope. The ballot addressed to 
that person is intended to 
09:29:26 that person only. If there wasn't a signature it 
wouldn't be counted or a 
09:30:12 valid ballot. Election Dept would try to contact 
that voter to have them sign 
09:30:38 by election day. I personally don't do it but 
when the envelope comes back 
09:32:01 signature would be verified. Ifthere's a doubt 
for the signature then its 
09:33:59 referred to D Beard to make the call if it 
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matched or not. Temps frequently 
09:35:05 handle absentee ballots. IfMs Beard determines 
the signatures are not the 
09:36:39 same she would contact the voter to have them 
come in to verifY, make every 
09:37:08 attempt to contact the voter in order for the 
vote to count. The person would 
09:40:00 be required to do something to satisfY D. Beard 
for the signature. Reviews 
09:42:48 exh 92A and 92B for the name Donald Boehm, I 
don't see his name. It would be 
09:45:27 important to have a record of each person who 
has touched a ballot. 
09:46:01 Reviews document, I've seen this before. It's an 
Affd from Donald Boehm, exh 
09:46:35 93. 
09:46:56 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Stip to admission. 
09:47:03 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
No obj. 
09:47:06 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Admit 93. 
09:47:59 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
No obj to just reading it into the record. 
09:48:34 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
If you want to read it outloud that's fine. 
09:48:45 Other: English, Dan 
Reads Affd, exh 93. 
09:50:01 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Is this the original filed with the Court? 
09:50:11 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Yes. 
09:50:13 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Let's just stip? 
09:50:21 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Yes. 
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09:50:42 
09:52:33 
09:53:19 
09:54:20 
09:56:10 
09:58:36 
09:58:42 
10:00:31 
10:00:58 
Other: English, Dan 
Reads body ofBoehm. Boehm opens absentee 
ballots. Only one ballot per 
envelope. 
He says he opened every absentee ballot. There 
should be same number of 
envelopes and ballots. My understanding ofthe 
canvass is when they actually 
accept the numbers provided for the vote. I'm 
familiar with Title 34-2001-6. 
Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Obj, legal conclusion. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Sustain, rephrase. 
Stop recording 
(On Recess) 
Recording Started: 
10:00:58 Record 
Etal, City of CDA 
10:01 :02 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Approach? 
10:01:09 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
We can step out. 
10:01:14 Stop recording 
(On Recess) 
10:06:22 
Recording Started: 
10:06:22 Record 
Etal, City of CDA 
10:06:27 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Back in session. The Court has had a discussion 
with counsel, all are in 
10:06:43 agreement, the motion was made to exclude 
witnesses and the court denied 
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10:07:37 that. These are open proceedings. Demonstrations 
are made, counsel is aware, 
10:08:20 gestures, demonstrations of disagreement or 
agreement, can't do that. May .. 
10:10:11 proceed. 
10:10:14 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Continues with direct. 
10:10:20 Other: English, Dan 
Exh 8, Affd of Dan English. 
10:12:37 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Counsel are in agreement these are exh I and J 
as referenced in exh 8. 
10:13:13 Other: English, Dan 
Yes, they're the same thing. 
10:13:18 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Move to admit 8. 
10:13:23 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
No obj 
10:13:28 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
No obj 
10:13:31 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Admit 8, and exh I will become 8A and exh J 
will become 8B and admit. 
10:17:38 Other: English, Dan 
Exh 5, absentee ballot report. last page is 
where I gained the information 
10:20:13 for my Affd number 5 and 6. 
10:25:04 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Move to admit 5. 
10:25:09 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
No obj 
10:25:14 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Noobj 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 28, ... 
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10:25:16 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Admit 5. 
10:25:45 Other: English, Dan 
Exh 8a reflects 5 ballots voided, Exh 8b 
indicates 7 ballots voided. Criteria 
10:29:11 was the same for both reports. Report run on Nov 
6, 2047 ballots input and 5 
10:31:26 voided. The report prepared on Nov 16 reflects 
2049 ballots with 7 void. Page 
10:34:12 106 ofexh 5, and first page shows the codes for 
the document. Page 1 06 
10:38:11 indicates one void, page 136 indicates a void, 
page 154 indicates a void, 
10:41:27 page 159 indicates two voids. 
10:44:37 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
This is a good time for a break. Will take 
morning recess for ten minutes. 
10:44:58 Stop recording 
(On Recess) 
10:58:35 
Recording Started: 
10:58:35 Record 
Etal, City of CDA 
10:58:38 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Back on the record. 
10:59:15 Other: English, Dan 
I don't see other ones that were marked void. 
Page 66, name Harris has same 
11:01:24 voter ID number. The code "0 1" is "in person 
absentee". The second entry 
11:02:52 indicates "IP" stands for "in person absentee". 
Her name shows up twice with 
11:03:35 different codes for absentee. Same voter ID. 
Neither vote shows a void. Page 
11:05:19 159, two entries for Thomas, Beulah, one entry 
indicates a void. For Thomas, 
11:06:43 Paul, same voter ID number, reflects a void. One 
vote was counted, one was 
11:07:14 void. 
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11:07:24 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Obj, we're talking about ballots, not votes. 
It's a distinction. 
11:07:51 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I understand the distinction, it's an entry on 
the data base. 
11:08:50 Other: English, Dan 
For Harris it reflects two entries. I'm not sure 
why its a double entry. In 
11:09:31 some cases there'd be a void. One Harris should 
reflect void on this report. 
11:13:13 Exh I (8A) indicates 5. 
11:14:08 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Obj to the language votes. 
11:14:19 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I understand its a data base. 
11:14:39 Other: English, Dan 
One Harris entry should have shown up as a void. 
M Spencer requested a report 
11:16:24 of absentee voters.A ballot is not necessarily 
synomous with a vote. A ballot 
11: 17:25 is not the same thing as a number of votes. 
11:20:15 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Is a ballot, in Kootenai is a ballot a piece of 
paper? 
11:20:38 Other: English, Dan 
Yes. 
11:21:14 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
A vote is received by a piece of paper called a 
ballot. Can we agree? 
11 :21 :40 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Yes. 
11:22:38 Other: English, Dan 
The data base can fluctuate on a daily basis. 
Exh J (8B) I don't know if 
11:25:56 Kootenai County possess the full 175 page 
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11:28:08 
11:30:51 
11:31:33 
11:33:57 
11:38:03 
11:39:22 
11:39:23 
11:39:42 
11:40:04 
11:40:21 
11:40:29 
11:41:37 
11:42:56 
11:44:40 
11:46:38 
11:48:26 
11:49:25 
11:49:53 
11:52:35 
11:57:08 
11:58:22 
report. Exh J (8B) report generated 
on Nov 16, the number went up by two. It shows 
2049, 7 voided. Leaves 2042, 
less one that should have been voided, leaves 
2041. I don't recall a Nov 24 
report. I have what we refer to as out training 
manual and some other 
material. THis is a red manual/instruction used 
by election department. Gives 
written direction on election procedure. This is 
the manual from my office. 
Prob. Officer: 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
It's the original which is why we're going to 
make a copy. It's listed as exh 
89, but then as agreed by counsel a true and 
correct copy will be given to 
the court to be used as an exhibit, the original 
to stay with the elected 
officer. 
Admit 89. Who is going to make a copy? Counsel 
can advise the court. 
Other: English, Dan 
Reviews Table of Contents. Procedure 6 is 
Entering Absentee ballots for 
Mail-out. They run a report daily, is with the 
other items we have. I didn't 
bring those. Election Data Information document, 
I didn't prepare this, I 
believe it's part of a Power Point presentation. 
Judges/clerks manual used in 
training. I don't know if it was used for the 
election. Flip Chart, I don't 
know if it was utilized in the election. Poll 
Book Clerk flip chart, I don't 
know if it was utilized in the election. Exh 81, 
reviews. I don't believe 
I've seen this before. I don't know if- Exh 91. 
Can't go back and recreate a 
report, that is my understanding. IC 34-1011 
describes what the clerk is to 
keep. The information was available to run. It's 
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not the same as the list 
11:59:30 that I would run today. 
12:00:17 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Obj 
12:00:20 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Concurr, I don't see the relevance. 
12:01:03 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
0/R 
12:01:12 Other: English, Dan 
I don't know if Idaho Secretary of State has 
given any information about 
12:01:50 50-907. Exh B, I agree as clerk I do the duties 
of the city clerk. 
12:04:04 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
This is a good time for recess. 
12:04:10 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Will recess. 
12:04:17 Return by 1:15. 
12:04:25 Stop recording 
(On Recess) 
13:20:56 
Recording Started: 
13:20:56 Record 
Etal, City of CDA 
13:20:57 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Back in session. 
13:21:29 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Continues direct of Mr English. 
13:22:12 Other: English, Dan 
Information is entered manually or barcode, into 
the state data base. Was 
13:23:44 entered by one ofthe employees. It can be 
affected by someone outside the 
13:24:17 county, explains. Exh 25, I recognize it as 
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Susan Smith Affd. 
13:26:45 Explains what ballot codes are, they are a code 
that tell what the ballot is 
13:27:09 associated with. One individual received a wrong 
ballot, Rahana. She received 
13:29:41 -I believe there was a ballot mixup. She should 
have gotten a county only 
13:30:25 ballot, and she got a CDA ballot. I'm not 
personally aware ifPrecinct is a 
13:31:48 split precinct. Reviews document. Precinct 22 
was a split precinct based on 
13:32:30 this. This is an Affd from myself. The poll 
books are available. I believe , 
13:35:05 they are in the building. Exh 94, is' an Affd 
from myself dated 8-10-10. 
13:37:27 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Move to admit 94. 
13:37:36 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Noobj 
13:37:40 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
No obj 
13:37:42 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Admit 94 
13:38:31 Other: English, Dan 
I visit many precinct during the day, it would 
have been briefly. Reviews 
13:39:26 Precinct 38 book. Was a split precinct. The book 
lists names, the ballot code 
13:42:14 indicates county or city. For some names the 
code is not preprinted. It 
13:47:21 doesn't indicate whether they received a ballot 
for the city or the county. 
13:49:16 There is no record that Kootenai County has that 
verifies which ballot some 
13:49:55 voters received. I was not aware of this on 
election day, it wasn't pre 
13:52:20 printed in the book. I've taken the position 
they were provided the right 
13:53:48 ballot. The Secretay of State recomm the book be 
preprinted with city 
13:56:36 or county. 
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13:58:43 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
I'm finished. 
13:58:51 Just a housekeeping, Mr English indicated we 
could use the instruction manual 
13:59:52 as the exhibit, they have another. 
13:59:59 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Mark as exh 89. 
14:00:11 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
CROSS 
14:00:17 Other: English, Dan 
The preprinted ballot book has codes. Same day 
registration is if a person 
14:01:31 comes in and wants to vote, the poll worker 
checks photo ID, checks address, 
14:01:52 confirms they are in the correct precinct. 
14:02:54 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Obj 
14:02:56 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
0/R 
14:03:01 Other: English, Dan 
They are given the appropriate ballot for their 
address. The two best 
14:05:45 individuals to know the data base is D Beard and 
Susan Smith. Exh 8 Affd, 
14:06:47 indicates report will not reflect absentee 
ballots. Mr Brannon did not 
14:07:47 request a recount. I'm aware the ballots were 
recounted by retired Judge 
14:08:20 Marano. I remember Don Boehm was not on the list 
of poll workers. I asked for 
14:09:05 a list ofthose who had worked and been paid. 
His salary would have come out 
14:09:23 ofthe maintainance dept. 
14:10:04 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
CROSS 
14:10:10 Other: English, Dan 
The county provided the city the final counting. 
Canvassing is the formal 
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14:10:47 
14:11:17 
14:11:22 
14:11:28 
14:11:52 
14:12:15 
14:13:16 
14:14:27 
14:16:37 
14:17:24 
14:19:30 
procedure of accepting the numbers. They city 
voted to accept the results. 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Obj. 
Withdraw the obj 
Other: English, Dan 
The vote was consistent with the count of the 
county. 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
REDIRECT 
I need to see poll book 54. 
And 57. 
Other: English, Dan 
Precinct poll book 57, I don't see Rahana 
Zellers. As I recall there were 
adjacant precincts, I see her in precint 54. 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
I guess we need to see Precinct 56. 
Other: English, Dan 
I see her name with a notation for 57. It 
doesn't have a ballot code. 
14:20:48 Rahana Zellers in Precinct 56 has a signature. 
14:22:15 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Who spoke up - that person needs to leave. That 
is exactly what the court was 
14:22:33 talking about. 
14:23:13 Other: English, Dan 
Precinct 56 is not a split precinct. It appears 
to be city. Rahana Zellers 
14:25:04 was a county resident, and listed in a city poll 
book. She is in 54 and no 
14:26:17 signature. Precinct 54 is a city only. Her name 
was in city poll books. 
14:28:33 Precinct 54, Dustin Ainsworth, page doesn't have 
a page number on it. For 
14:32:36 same day vote he would have had to prove he was 
a resident as his residence 
14:32:56 for 30 days prior. Photo ID and something with 
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14:34:42 
14:35:58 
14:36:54 
14:37:36 
14:37:55 
14:39:51 
14:41:23 
14:41:27 
14:41:30 
14:41:32 
14:41:38 
14:42:35 
14:43:27 
14:44:20 
14:46:58 
14:47:09 
14:47:55 
14:48:24 
the address. The individual 
poll worker is not listed. A registration card 
has printed on it that they'd 
be guilty of perjury ifthey stated otherwise. 
There is a warning about 
perjury on the voter registration card. 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Request a break so we can pull up a registration 
card for Mr Ainsworth. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Let's go ahead, we need to move this along. 
Other: English, Dan 
Exh 95, a blank voter registration card. 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Move to admit. 
Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
No obj 
Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
No obj 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Admit 95 
Other: English, Dan 
Reads under penalty portion. It doesn't ask if 
he's been a resident of the 
city of CDA. Kootenai uses this for every voter. 
We use a form prescribed by 
the state. The Sec of State has oversight and 
guidance over all election 
officials ofthe state. I believe D. Ainsworth 
was given a city ballot. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
You can make a copy, we'll admit it 
Admit as 38, and make a copy you can agree on. 
It's identified on the page as 
Ainsworth. 
Will take afternoon recess for 10 minutes. 
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14:48:39 Stop recording 
15:02:22 
Recording Started: 
15:02:22 Record 
Etal, City of CDA 
15:02:31 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Back in session. 
15:02:37 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
No questions. 
15:02:44 No question. 
15:02:52 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
You should have copies of#38 that was admitted. 
15:03:20 State Attorney: 
15:03:32 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Call Susan Smith 
15:03:53 Other: Smith, Susan 
Sworn by clerk. I live in Post Falls. Employed 
by Kootenai Co in the 
15:04:14 elections dept. I am an elections clerk, since 
1997. I use the Sec of State 
15:05:02 data base alot. Exh 5, I have seen the last 
page. Exh 8B is only the last 
15:08:44 page, not the entire report. It looks like a 
voided and handwritten , I don't 
15:09:07 know how that came to be. I believe I printed an 
absentee report on Nov 16. 
15:09:51 Exh 25 is an Affd by myself. A list run on Nov 
24, I prepared the document. 
15: 11:13 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Move to admit 25 and 1 which is the disk. 
15: 11 :34 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
No obj 
15:11:40 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Noobj 
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15:12:07 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Does the court have the information? 
15:12:33 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
We can reproduce a hard copy. 
15:13:47 Other: Smith, Susan 
Was prepared by me on Nov 24. It reflects 2056 
absentee ballots on the 
15:15:15 document. All ballots from 11-4 thru 11-5 on 
that page would be void. It 
15:18:14 could be sorted in any manner. Seven are void 
because they're late. Page 102 
15:21:42 of exh 5, shows a void. Page 136 shows a void. 
For Stormogipson - one entry 
15:26:11 was void. Thomas was voided are 10-22, the 10-30 
one is valid. Exh 5 
15:29:11 indicates void. One P. Harris would have to be 
void. As ofNov 24, the data 
15:32:05 base reflects 2043 absentee ballots by active 
voters. Exh 2 as attached 
15:33:51 to my Affd does not have the names we just went 
through. Three reports, Nov 
15:35:38 6, Nov 16, Nov 24. I don't recall if it was a 
request or ifl was directed to 
15:36:32 make this list, dated Nov 24. I'm not aware of 
other reports. 
15:40:21 A report was compiled for absentee voters about 
2 weeks ago. I am aware C 
15:42:22 Phillips prepared a report, I was on vacation. 
Nov 6 report as exh 5 was 
15:43:33 prepared at the request ofMr Spencer. I 
probably glanced at it to make sure 
15:44:00 it was in the correct format. I did not keep a 
copy. I'm sure I told my supv 
15:44:57 I prepared this report, my supv D Beard, I'm 
sure it would have been on the 
15:45:13 same day. I do not recall telling her ofthe 
absentee number of2047. I 
15:46:08 would most likely have told Mr Spencer that the 
report is not exact, no 
15:46:40 report is considered final until the canvass had 
taken place, that it is a 
15:46:54 live report and changes. I would not have told 
him this was the final drop 
15:47:10 dead report. We do make reports, no report is 
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final until after the canvass 
15:48:28 ofthe vote. I believe the canvass ofthe vote 
was Nov 9. Exh 85, this is the 
15:50:26 canvass of the vote. These are in house reports 
of people who request 
15:51 :30 absentee ballots, they change. Exh 5 is not a 
final absentee list. I've been 
15:54:29 told the canvass is when the number of votes is 
accepted. As the information 
15:55:50 was in the live data base on Nov 16- that would 
be the report. Regarding the 
15:57:49 Nov election I helped with registration, 
absentee, answered the phone, 
15:58:14 mailing labels. I would not have doing all the 
entry into the data base, 
15:59:02 temps and other people who work in the office 
would. Anybody in the office 
15:59:19 has access. There is a code word, each person 
has an access code. The supv 
15:59:54 gives the access code. I don't know the exact 
number of temp workers. Approx 
16:00:50 8 workers, a total of8 people. Approx 12 
computers. From Nov 3 to when I did 
16:02:50 the report I can count 13 computers. Exh 96, 
witness draws diagram of the 
16:04:24 election office. 
16:04:55 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Will take a stretch break. 
16:05:04 Stop recording 
(On Recess) 
16:13:25 
Recording Started: 
16:13:25 Record 
Etal, City of CDA 
16:13:36 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Back in session, diagram is complete. 
16:14:11 Other: Smith, Susan 
Explains diagram. Fourteen computers. They all 
could access the data base. 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 39, ... 
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16:20:51 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Move to admit 96 for illustrative purposes. 
16:21:06 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Noobj 
16:21:14 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Noobj 
16:21:17 Jndge: Hosack, Charles 
Admit 96. 
16:21:48 Other: Smith, Susan 
Nov 16 report, the last page show my initials. I 
prepared the report. I do 
16:22:36 not recall why I prepared it. I don't recall the 
date I first saw exh 85. It 
16:23:44 does not reflect who prepared it. This is done 
on a reporting system, I'm not 
16:24:01 familiar with it. D Beard is familiar. I think 
Dan English and C Phillips 
16:24:21 have used it some. I don't recall the date I 
would have known the absentee 
16:25:39 number. Exh 86, I've seen it before, signed by D 
Beard. Dated 11-9-09. The 
16:27:12 first I saw it was 11-9-09. I would have typed 
the document for D Beard. I 
16:27:49 don't remember doing it but I'm pretty sure I 
did, that is our ususal method. 
16:28:05 It reflects 2051 absentee ballots. D Beard 
provided me the information.! 
16:29:11 probably handed it to her. I didn't mention to 
Deedie that the report didn't 
16:31:14 match, not that I remember. PI exh 89, I'm 
familiar with it. I've never been 
16:33:47 told by D Beard or Dan English to not raise 
questions. The 2051 is the number 
16:35:06 counted by the machine. The other report is 
purely inhouse report on a system 
16:35:24 that changes every moment of every day. 2051 is 
the number counted absentee 
16:36:46 by the machine. and the number of envelopes that 
came back with the correct 
16:37:09 signature. An accepted signature. And absentee 
ballot request form filled out 
16:39:52 by voters. We also had absentee reports. I had 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 40, ... 
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16:46:54 
16:50:10 
16:50:45 
16:51:04 
16:52:30 
16:53:09 
16:53:51 
16:54:47 
16:55:00 
16:55:16 
16:55:42 
16:55:57 
16:56:16 
16:56:30 
16:56:38 
16:56:48 
16:57:16 
16:57:26 
not counted the envelopes. I 
did not review the absentee request forms. 
Exh 5, Mr Spencer asked for the report. I 
believe he should have filled out a 
public request form. Usually we charge a nickel 
a page. Sometimes right after 
an election we do not, we allow people to have 
results. By Nov 16 we probably 
charged pursuant to public records request. We 
maintain public records 
requests. I don't recall if the Nov 24 report 
was requested by a patron or 
something my supv asked me to do. 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Ask that we take a break until tomorrow.l'd 
like to question this witness 
about those receipts. I have another witness 
scheduled for 9:00 tomorrow. Or 
I could reserve the right to recall her, 
however. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
You're asking her to go back to the office and 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
She says they're maintained there. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
The Court doesn't normally direct discovery 
during litigation, order a 
witness to conduct 
Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
She's not my client. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
If you want to try recalling her I'll give you 
that leaveway. Any cross? 
Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Yes, the morning would be preferable. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
We'll take the evening recess, we're now two 
days into trial. Getting a 
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16:57:42 
16:57:56 
16:58:05 
little concerned about the pace, ask that 
counsel join me for a couple 
minutes. Recess. 
Stop recording 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 42, ... 
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housekeeping things, Exh 25, Smith 
09:06:35 Affd and DVD, I was distracted about reading the 
info DVD, Court intention is 
09:07:06 it was admitted, correct? 
09:07:38 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Yes. 
09:07:54 Other: Smith, Susan 
09:08:08 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Ms Smith was on the stand, still under oath. 
09:08:24 Other: Smith, Susan 
Gives training and experience. Explains "real 
time" data base and how changes 
09:10:07 can be made in another county. The voter ID 
number stays the same no matter 
09:10:24 where they are in the state. You can register as 
soon as you arrive in a 
09:10:55 different county. We get a monthly list from 
Vital Stats, obituaries and if a 
09:12:07 person says spouse has died to update the data 
base. I've seen different 
09:13:46 numbers for the absentee ballots. 
09:14:03 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Obj 
09:14:05 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
0/R 
09:14:18 Other: Smith, Susan 
We would use the 2051 number, not the data base 
report. 
09:14:44 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Obj 
09:14:46 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
0/R, I'm taking it as information this witness 
has. 
09:15:06 Other: Smith, Susan 
It would not be appropriate to use the absentee 
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ballots count from the data 
09:15:34 base report. I was never told to not raise any 
kind of question. I was told 
09:16:11 the opposite, and I do do that. There was no 
reason to talk to D Beard or D 
09:17:08 English about the numbers. 
09:17:19 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
No questions. 
09:17:22 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
REDIRECT 
09:17:36 Other: Smith, Susan 
I was a little unclear about bringing request 
for public records. I tried to 
09:18:11 reach people. The only appropriate number is the 
one from exh 85. I'm not 
09:21:06 familiar with code sections pertaining to 
elections. 
09:21:23 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Obj 
09:21:57 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Argues 
09:22:24 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
She's testified she didn't know the statute, 
let's go to something new. 
09:22:53 Other: Smith, Susan 
You can acces a report at any time. 
09:24:05 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Object to continued use of writing everything 
she says - its taking so much 
09:24:32 time. 
09:24:35 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Agree. 
09:24:37 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
It's true, but Mr Kelso said he might be able to 
wrap up today. 
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09:25:06 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
These are going to be used for further exam of 
witnesses. 
09:25:22 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
It's very laborious. You've not cited any case 
that says election cases 
09:26:06 should be under other manner. 
09:26:16 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Continues with redirect. 
09:26:26 Other: Smith, Susan 
Any election employee could have entered the 
data base and entered or taken 
09:27:13 information out at 8:01 on Nov 3. Exh 25 shows 
the names that had been purged 
09:28:37 out of the system- by our office. As election 
clerk I am to achieve and 
09:30:26 maintin correctness. 
09:30:31 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
I have a couple questions. 
09:30:38 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
OK 
09:30:43 Other: Smith, Susan 
I maintain correctness to the best of my 
ability. Exh 25, reads last 
09:31:05 sentence. 
09:31 :31 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Reserve right to recall. 
09:31:39 Call Eugene Marano 
09:32:07 Other: Marano, Eugene 
Sworn by clerk. I reside in Kootenai County, 
Senior Magistrate Judge. 
09:32:53 At the request of Barry McHugh and yourself! 
agreed at great discomfort to 
09:33:18 myself! counted ballots on June 22 at the 
election office. Pursuant to order 
09:33:38 of Judge Hosack. I went to the election office, 
viewed a video and with the 
09:34:21 help ofyour son I counted ballots. The absentee 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 46, ... 
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envelopes were provided to 
09:34:54 me, from the CDA 2009 election. C Phillips put 
them in front of me and Matt 
09:35:34 and I counted them. Total number was 2086. Four 
were of question as to city 
09:36:05 or county. I was there just to count, they could 
not determine city or 
09:36:38 county. My notes are sealed in the file, could I 
have those? 
09:37:35 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Let's take a break and get those. 
09:38:23 Stop recording 
(On Recess) 
09:39:03 
Recording Started: 
09:39:03 Record 
Etal, City of CDA 
09:39:17 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Back in session. 
09:39:36 Other: Marano, Eugene 
When I go to a total, I don't distinguish the 
four out. I also counted 
09:41:12 ballots themselves. I counted 2027, which does 
not include 17 duplicate 
09:41 :48 ballots. I was there to count only and not draw 
any conclusions. I arrived at 
09:42:54 2027 absentee ballots. I was called back to 
count ballots that were located, 
09:43:34 that was July 2. A ballot box labeled CDA write 
in was given to me by 
09:44:20 D. Beard. Pl exh 77, 
09:45:26 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Move to admit 77. 
09:45:30 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
No obj 
09:45:34 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Noobj 
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09:45:35 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Admit 77. 
09:45:55 Other: Marano, Eugene 
We counted some on July 14. I was handed ballots 
by C Phillips, I counted the 
09:46:41 ballots given me. It doesn't show what they 
were. There were 17 ballots 
09:47:27 labeled duplicates, there were 16. And two 
handed to me by Van Pallen. They 
09:48:54 were numbered 1-16, but there was no number 2. I 
don't know what they 
09:49:12 represented. I was there on 3 ocassions. I 
counted 2027 ballots. I was called 
09:50:23 back to count 7 more ballots, 7 were represented 
as invalid. 
09:50:50 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Obj, 
09:51:19 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
That would be the best evidence. 
09:51:29 Other: Marano, Eugene 
Exh 77 says invalid 7. I took it as to count 
whatever was put in front of me. 
09:52:16 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
We'd stip he was ordered to count. 
09:52:23 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
That's what we'd like to see. 
09:52:33 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I'm not going to keep getting the court file to 
pull out documents, obj is 
09:52:47 sustained. I don't see the relevance. 
09:52:58 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Argues re: relevance. 
09:53:07 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
His testimony is what he counted. 
09:53:30 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
I'm done with this witness. 
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09:53:41 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
CROSS 
09:53:53 Other: Marano, Eugene 
Hands notes to Mr Erbland for review. 
09:54:17 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Returns notes to witness. 
09:55:16 Other: Marano, Eugene 
I was asked to sign an Affd, I haven't yet. I'm 
willing to sign, I have it 
09:55:44 here. The part after July 2 is not entirely 
accurate. We met at election 
09:56:49 office, Matt Kelso was there to help out. I 
counted 2086, 4 undetermined. I 
09:57:09 was not there to determine which was city or 
county. I do not know if the 
09:57:36 2082 were solely for the county election. I then 
began county absentte 
09:58:18 ballots. C Phillips opened a box from machine 
3A. I counted 977. Then 
09:59:05 Phillips unsealed box from machine 3B, I was 
told some were duplicates. I 
09:59:48 counted 640, not counting the 15 duplicates. 
Then machine 4, advisedd 2 were 
10:00:48 duplicates. 410 not including the duplicates. 
Total2027. To add the 
10:02:32 duplicate ballots I come to 2044. 
10:03:38 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Obj. 
• 
10:03:44 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Hold it, let's maintain a degree of 
professionalism. 
10:04:09 Other: Marano, Eugene 
On July 2, Starr, Matt Kelso, McCrory, and 
Brannon there. Envelope with 
10:04:52 writing on it was handed to me. Seven ballots in 
it. 
10:05:30 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Obj, this witness was to count only. 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 49, ... 
l 
SC 38417-2011 Page 2189 of 2676
10:05:46 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Let it go ahead. 
10:06:06 Other: Marano, Eugene 
2044 plus 7 is 2051. 
10:07:09 Ofthe 15, number 2 was out of sequence, 2 is 
missing. I was handed ballots 
10:08:30 to count by Van Pallen, two. Phillips handed me 
410 from machine 4, not 
10:09:10 counting 2 duplicates. 
10:09:20 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
May we have the judges' notes marked as an exh. 
10:09:35 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr . 
No obj 
10:10:23 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Admit J, judges' notes. 
10:11:04 Other: Marano, Eugene 
10:11:51 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
REDIRECT. Exh 97, E. Marano Affd. 
10:12:02 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
No obj 
10:12:09 
10:12:11 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Noobj 
10:12:13 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Admit 97, as unsigned Affd. 
10:12:32 Other: Marano, Eugene 
If it helps I can sign it now. I was sworn. 
Signs Affidavit. 
10:13:10 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
No obj to his signature. 
10:13:18 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
No obj. 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 50, ... 
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10:14:43 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
REDIRECT 
10:15:26 Other: Marano, Eugene 
Reviews Affd, I was there to count. I draw no 
conclusion as to what Ms 
10:18:37 Phillips said. 
10:19:10 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I'm only one person, but there's a lot of 
repetition here. It's the same 
10:19:57 thing I've heard 3-4 times before. I just 
mention that. 
10:20:30 Other: Marano, Eugene 
Continues with review of Affd. Some ballots are 
kicked out by the machine, 
10:22:38 that is what was represented to me by Deedie 
Beard or Carrie Phillips. I 
10:24:32 received an email that there were more ballots 
to be counted. On July 2 I 
10:25:25 counted ballots- there were 7. No further 
absentee ballot envelopes were 
10:25:59 counted. 
10:27:08 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Obj, cumulative. 
10:27:14 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
There's been a lot ofthat. 
10:27:59 Other: Marano, Eugene 
10:28:54 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
That's all I have. Will take the morning recess. 
10:29:23 Stop recording 
10:40:40 
Recording Started: 
10:40:40 Record 
Etal, City of CDA 
10:40:47 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
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Back in session. 
10:41:35 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Call Carrie Phillips 
10:41:59 Other: Phillips, Carrie 
Sworn by clerk. I reside in Hayden. I'm the Supv 
of the Elections Dept. I 
10:42:25 was learning the position during the 2009 
election. I've worked for the 
10:42:40 county 9 years. Prior to election office I 
worked in the recorders office. I 
10:43:03 started in the election office Aug 3, 2009. Exh 
26 is my Affd date Aug 2010. 
10:44:13 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Move to admit. 
10:44:20 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Noobj 
10:44:23 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Noobj 
10:44:26 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Admit26. 
10:45:03 Other: Phillips, Carrie 
The Exh 26 disk is the absentee ballot request 
for 2009 election. From the 
10:47:06 Sec of State live data base. It shows 2185 names 
on the list. You need to 
10:48:21 take one name off as line 1 has other 
information, total would be 2184. D 
10:49:04 Beard retired Nov 30, 2009. Out ofthe 2184 
requests, as of the date this was 
10:50:32 prepared. 
10:53:13 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
I propose to give this witness a list, let her 
review and recall this witness 
10:53:29 back. 
10:53:45 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
You're asking to hand her a document and then 
proceed with your questioning? 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 52, ... 
 
 
t 
 
SC 38417-2011 Page 2192 of 2676
10:54:05 lfyou have the document go ahead. 
10:54:22 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
It has to be reflected on the wall or printed. 
10:54:35 I want her to verify our numbers. 
10:55:03 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Give her the document while we're on the record 
so its clear. 
10:55:56 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Hands document, four pages. 
10:57:10 Other: Phillips, Carrie 
You want me to compare the number on this 
(paper) list to the list up there 
10:57:32 (displayed on the wall.) 
10:58:03 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
We'll excuse this witness for a moment, and Mr 
Kelso can call another 
10:58:26 witness. 
10:58:29 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
You can plug in a computer whereever you want. 
10:59:01 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
If she's not prepared then she can't answer your 
question then we go on with 
10:59:18 another witness. 
10:59:42 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
She can use that computer, we'll call our next 
witness. 
11 :00:23 Call Dustin Ainsworth 
11:00:40 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Is he present? 
11:01:03 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
I don't see him. 
11:01:16 Call Nancy White 
11:01:25 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Present? 
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11 :01:31 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
I've never laid eyes on her, she's subp. 
11:01:42 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
We're going to assume then that if the person 
doesn't respond they're not 
11:02:07 here. 
11:02:15 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Call Barry McHugh 
11:02:36 Other: McHugh, Barry 
Sworn by clerk. Reside in Kootenai Co. Current 
position is County Prosecutor. 
11:03:26 I am the elected county prosecutor. John 
Cafferty is an attorney in the 
11:03:52 civil division. I recall being contacted about 
ballot count, I was contacted 
11:05:05 by email. If I recall the email was from Larry 
Spencer. Exh 47 is the email 
11:05:44 and my two responses, dated Nov 16. 
11:06:13 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Move to admit 4 7. 
11:06:28 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
No obj 
11:07:02 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Noobj 
11:07:05 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Admit 47. 
11:07:09 Other: McHugh, Barry 
Reads email from Mr Spencer. 
11:09: 13 I responded, reads email. After email from Nov 
16 I eventually contacted 
11:10:45 election dept. I responded to Mr Spencer again 
on Nov 17, reads email. I've 
11: 12:42 had alot of contact with the election office, I 
don't recall who I contacted 
11 : 12:5 6 first. I believe I've only seen the last page of 
the Nov 6 report. I may have 
11:15:03 discussed the email with Dan English before this 
Compliant was filed. Prior 
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II: 15:44 to the filing of the suit there may have been 
conversations with Dan English 
II: 16:04 or Deedie Beard, I'm not sure. Exh 48, I don't 
recall seeing it before but I 
II: 17:00 may have, its dated Dec I. It's directed to Mr 
Cafferty. I believe Mr 
II: 17:40 Cafferty communicated to me about a meeting, I 
don't recall the date. My 
II: 18:27 memory is that he contacted me to tafk about the 
meeting of counsel to talk 
II: 18:44 about the Complaint, counsel for defendants. 
The Kootenai Pros office has no 
II :22:26 position as to who they'd like elected to this 
seat. Kootenai County would be 
II :22:43 neutral. I didn't ask Mr Cafferty is Mr 
Brannon's attorney would be invited 
II :23:29 to the meeting. We would have met with any body's 
counsel. We were invited to 
II :24:25 the meeting. I don't know that there is a 
written summary of what happened at 
II :24:58 the meeting. What I recall, there was a 
discussion of filing answers, 
II :25:18 discussing the claims generally. There's been 
communication of different 
II :27:24 sorts. Exh 50, I don't see that this was copied 
to me, not sure if I've seen 
II :27:50 it before. At that point, I'm not sure ifl 
knew. 
II :31:35 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Obj 
II :31:37 Jndge: Hosack, Charles 
He's already testified he didn't have knowledge 
of the email. 
11:32:20 Other: McHugh, Barry 
On or before Dec 9 I don't recall I had 
knowledge ofMr Cafferty 
11:33: II communication with other attorneys. We had a 
discussion about him being lead 
II :33:35 attorney in this suit. He kept me advised on a 
regular basis, to discuss how 
II :34:22 to go forward. Exh 51, I'm not sure I've seen it 
before. Exh 55, I've seen 
II :38:04 this before, I don't recall when. I'm aware an 
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Amended Compliant was filed. 
11:39:47 We recieved the Amended Complaint, I don't 
believe Kootenai was served the 
11:40:16 Amended Compliant, not sure, Kooteani wasn't a 
party on the Amended 
11:40:35 Complaint. We were neutral after we weren't a 
party. Neutral as to 
11 :41: 16 litigation. I was aware Cafferty communicated 
with Reed. 
11:42:59 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Obj 
11:43:02 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Concurr 
11:43:11 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
0/R 
11 :43:21 Other: McHugh, Barry 
I don't recall any specific communication of 
that. 
11:44:46 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Obj 
11:44:50 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Obj 
11:44:52 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
What is the relevance? 
11:45:09 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Goes to 
11:45:21 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
There are discovery disiputes all the time. 
11:45:30 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
He's testified that Kootenai is neutral, we will 
show Kootenai has actively 
11:45:51 participated in doing everything possible to 
obstruct in obtaining 
11:46:08 information, goes to showing Kootenai knew 
ballots were not correct. 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 56, ... 
 
  
 
 
 
  1
OI
 :
 
 
 
  
  
  :
 
SC 38417-2011 Page 2196 of 2676
11:46:59 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Discovery disputes in this case is known to the 
court, what is that going to 
11 :4 7:29 prove to me? 
11:47:38 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Exh 55 
11 :48:35 .Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Wouldn't it be more useful to talk to Mr 
Cafferty about this? 
11:48:50 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
I will, argues. 
11:49:28 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
OK 
11:49:44 Other: McHugh, Barry 
I testified I'd seen it before, just not the 
date of when. 
11:50:11 I believe Deedie made a comment about her 
computer being cleaned, or Carrie 
11 :51 :02 did. My memory is that that took place within 
the last six months. I didn't 
11:52:14 know when it happened, I know if there's a 
standard protocol with our 
11:52:31 information department. It didn't raise any 
concerns. I don't know what was 
11:53:36 deleted or cleaned. I'm can't recite statute 
wording, but I'm aware there are 
11:54:29 statutes relating to keeping election documents 
for a year. 
11:55:30 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
CROSS 
11:55:42 Other: McHugh, Barry 
Exh 4 7 and exh 5. I've been in court while the 
elections clerk testified to 
11:56:29 it. Exh 5 is dated 11-6-09, its 175 pages. It 
shows 2047. Elections people 
11:57:20 would best be able to tell what report is. It is 
common for attorneys of 
11:57:44 co-defto meet and discuss. I know ofno rule 
against that. I've believe it's 
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11:58:18 good practice, I think it's appropriate. My 
office has responded to requests 
11:58:48 of Affd being signed, office has cooperated. 
11:59:09 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
No questions. 
11:59:12 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
REDIRECT 
11:59:18 Other: McHugh, Barry 
Kootenai's interest has been to ensure the 
validity of the election. I know 
12:03:55 there was a point about providing the 
ballots/envelopes and I became involved 
12:04:14 in that process. It was in the process of 
happening. 
12:04:48 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
We're at the noon break. Return at 1: 15. Recess. 
12:05:38 Stop recording 
-. 
(On Recess) 
13:19:39 
Recording Started: 
13:19:39 Record 
Etal, City of CDA 
13:19:51 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Back in session, where isMs Smith? 
13:19:52 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
We can proceed with a different witness. Call 
Timothy Hurst 
13:20:37 Other: Hurst, Timothy 
Sworn by clerk. Chief Deputy of Sec of State 
office. Our responsibility is to 
13:22:10 make sure election laws are correctly 
intrepreted. I'm familiar with IC 
13:23:12 34-1011 and 50-451, they're basically the same. 
The data base is a voter 
13:24:36 registration for Idaho. If they register in one 
county it can notifY the 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 58, ... 
r
l
-, 
r
l
 
r
SC 38417-2011 Page 2198 of 2676
13:25:05 other county. I did not issue a directive that 
50-451 was not required. 
13:27:45 Information is required to be kept for each 
election. They keep track of the 
13:28:27 amount of ballots kept after election night. 
13:30:26 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Obj 
13:30:28 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
0/R, I'll note the obj. 
13:30:40 Other: Hurst, Timothy 
The main purpose of the record is to make sure a 
person doesn't vote twice. 
13:31:18 Also to validate the number of absentee ballots. 
Exh5. 
13:33:52 Exh 85, tells how many ballots were counted. 
Based on exh 5 
13:38:10 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Obj 
13:38:11 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I'll let the witness answer. 
13:38:20 Other: Hurst, Timothy 
If all the info was entered when the ballot was 
received, the system is only 
13:38:45 as good as the people who enter the data. Exh 8, 
8a and 8b. The number from 
13:43:24 exh 8 would flucuate, it would include 
additional ballots recieved after Nov 
13:44:07 3. It should say somewhere on the report whether 
or not they were counted, or 
13:44:22 voided. Based on data base, if all info was 
entered, 204 7 minus five were 
13:47:21 received. Nov 16 report shows increase oftwo. 
Exh 85, doesn't match the 
13:48:53 number entered. Data base shows 2047, deduct 
five for void. Total received 
13:50:18 was 2042, according to the document. The only 
evidence I've seen is exh 5 for 
13:51:29 the total received, which reflects 2042. Sec of 
State's office doesn't have 
13:52:24 juisdiction over 50-451. A record under 30-1011 
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should be kept, under 
13:53:01 statute. 
13:53:43 Apparantly not doing his doing if not keeping 
the records. 
13:54:21 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
CROSS 
13:54:24 Other: Hurst, Timothy 
Exh 5 could not be accurate because another 
county could have put info in or 
13:55:19 remove. Could remove info, that could explian 
reduction in the number. I 
13:56:07 haven't seen all the evidence in this case. The 
purpose of recounts is to 
13:56:40 count the ballots. The reports are dependent 
upon the person entering the 
13:57:12 record. As far as the count - the best evidence 
if the ballot themselves. A 
13:57:37 person could count the ballots. You could look 
at the envelopes to know how 
13:58:20 many were received. Compare it to see if it was 
valid, and when recieved. If 
13:59:58 you want to know how many ballots were run 
through the machine - you count 
14:00:12 them. Our office was not asked to get involved 
in the ballots or 
14:00:44 registrations. I've given opinions on whether 
certain voters were valid 
14:02:16 under state law. This document is a letter I 
wrote to Dan English re: 
14:03:04 eligibility re: four people. Exh K 
14:04:50 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Noobj 
14:04:53 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
AdmitK 
14:04:58 Other: Hurst, Timothy !" 
Exh K is a letter from me to Dan English. When • 
someone is outside the county, 
14:05:50 away for temporary purposes, with the intent of 
making Kootenai their home 
14:06:17 they can vote in accordance with state law. 
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14:07:18 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
No questions. 
14:07:24 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
REDIRECT 
14:08:29 Other: Hurst, Timothy 
Exh K, I had a copy of voter registration card 
for each person. That was it. 
14:10:40 IC 34-1075 provides for residency in state or 
county. There's only one voter 
14:11:31 registration and that's through county. It 
doesn't mention municipality. For 
14:12:15 a municipal election same as a county election, 
resident ofthe city for 30 
14:12:39 days prior to election. Exh 95, voter 
registration card. It doesn't ask about 
14:14:54 resident ofCDA, it only asks about resident of 
the county. 
14:15:27 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
We agree a person has to be a resident ofCDA 
for city election. 
14:16:14 Other: Hurst, Timothy 
Exh K, I only had voter registration card. 
According to the address on the 
14:17:26 card, it said they were resident ofCDA. I'm 
speaking from memory. Gregory 
14:19:09 Proft should not have been considered a resident 
ofCDA. 
14:19:31 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Stip to that. 
14:19:36 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
The court is accepting no stip by counsel unless 
formally accepted by the 
14:19:56 court. 
14:20:14 Other: Hurst, Timothy 
IC 50-402, describes residence. Number 2 says 
they don't loose their 
14:21:22 abode if out on a temporary time. 
14:22:27 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
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14:23:06 
14:23:45 
14:23:47 
14:23:56 
14:24:36 
14:25:13 
14:25:56 
14:26:21 
14:26:30 
14:26:40 
14:27:55 
14:30:14 
14:31:02 
14:35:18 
14:36:40 
14:39:45 
14:41:00 
14:42:36 
14:43:44 
How is this going to help me? Let's go to 
evidence we can work with. 
Other: Hurst, Timothy 
Add Ius: Erbland, Peter 
Obj 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
0/R 
Other: Hurst, Timothy 
Based on evidence I've seen in court, best 
evidence is the Nov 6 report. The 
absentee envelope should be stamed date and time 
when received. If it doens't 
have the signature it doesn't count. If the 
envelope doesn't have a date/time 
there isn't proof of when received. 
Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Obj, he's being asked to speculate. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I'll let you ask. 
Other: Hurst, Timothy 
The system does not let you issue new ballots 
for absentee after the day of 
voting. We determined the number of people who 
moved out of Kootenai, the 
number who voted in city election. There were 4. 
We did not determine if they 
voted absentee. 
The data base doens't hold the time, they enter 
the date. If they use the bar 
code it automatically scan the date. The data 
base itself didn't generate 
that, it was drug out and put in a spread sheet. 
If an envelope doesn't have 
a date received the date is whatever date its 
put in the data base. The law 
in 2009 a recount consists of running the 
ballots thru the machine again. A 
recount would have given the number of absentee 
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ballots. Exh 47, 
14:47:14 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Obj 
14:47:17 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Counsel is not taking any attention to the 
court's comments. At the close of 
14:47:42 tria! today we will meet and discuss time 
limits. 
14:47:59 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
14:48:04 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
You'll have time to discuss that. 
14:48:22 0/R 
14:48:43 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
That's all I have. 
14:48:52 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Will take our afternoon recess for ten minutes. 
14:49:09 Stop recording 
(On Recess) 
15:03:40 
Recording Started: 
15:03:40 Record 
Etal, City of CDA 
15:04:45 Stop recording 
(On Recess) 
15:21:04 
Recording Started: 
15:21:04 Record 
Etal, City of CDA 
15:21:05 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Back in session. 
15:23:23 Stop recording 
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(On Recess) 
15:27:16 
Recording Started: 
15:27:16 Record 
Etal, City of CDA 
15:27:44 Stop recording 
(On Recess) 
15:27:52 
Recording Started: 
15:27:52 Record 
Etal, City of CDA 
15:28:02 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Back in session. 
15:28:12 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
We've met and believe we have a resolution re: 
three of the people. Kennedy, 
15:28:34 Brannon and the city agree, that they were not 
qualified electors, two voted 
15:28:55 for Kennedy and one for Brannon. 
15:29:04 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I have to relate it to my list from the 
beginning oftrial. 
15:29:29 Pers. Attorney: Reed, Scott 
15:29:51 
Nancy White voted for Kennedy, Dustin Ainsworth 
voted for Kennedy, 
15:30:07 Phdntiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Gregory Proft voted for Brannon, not qualified 
to vote. 
15:30:34 Pers. Attorney: Reed, Scott 
He's not on the list. 
15:31:11 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
The effect of that stip is that the Court should 
find those three were not 
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15:31:29 qualified to vote Nov 09, and those votes should 
not be counted. That stip 
15:31:54 will be accepted. 
15:31:58 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Move to amend the Compliant to conform with the 
evidence, malconduct based on 
15:32:29 Mr Hurst testimony, documents were not kept. 
15:32:43 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I'd just as soon address that when we take legal 
arguement, you're not 
15:33:05 waiving anything. 
15:33:12 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
OK. 
15:34:05 Call John Cafferty. 
15:34:32 Other: Cafferty, John 
Sworn by clerk. I reside in Kootenai County, 
employed by Kootenai County as 
15:35:16 deputy prosecutor, assigned to civil division. I 
was here when Mr McHugh 
15:36:59 testified. Exh 47, I've seen this. Standard 
practice is when I receive 
15:39:49 something like this I contact Mr McHugh. I can't 
pin point exactly when I 
15:41:43 discussed it. The city adopted their canvass, 
they adopted this, we've been 
15:42:25 in discussion for some time, I don't know when 
the discussion started. I 
15:43:49 can't tell you what happened the two weeks of 
Nov 17 to Dec 1. A recount was 
15:44:10 anticipated because ofthe five vote difference. 
They not meant to be the 
15:44:29 same things so they don't match. They're drawing 
different data. I probably 
15:45:10 first became aware ofthe suit the day it was 
filed, with the county we're 
15:45:36 provided a courtesy copy. I may have read it in 
the newspaper. I'm not sure 
15:46:03 service was ever affected, we discussed that we 
would accept service, we 
15:46:24 would waive formal service and accept it 
informally. I wouldn't imagine I had 
15:47:33 discussed this case with the other atty re: 
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this case prior to Dec 1. 
15:48:34 Exh 48, email re: election meeting. I attended a 
meeting, I have no reason to 
15:50:39 believe it wasn't Dec 1. My invitation was from 
the city, I was defending 
15:51:18 the county in that suit. It didn't give me pause 
the other defense attorneys 
15:51:54 would be there. After the meeting I prepared a 
proposed answer to the 
15:54:54 the Complaint, I provided a copy to the other 
attys. Exh 50, an email to 
15:55:36 other atty on Dec 10. We were neutral to the 
outcome of the election, we were 
15:56:48 a named defendant in the suit. We're interested 
in the fairness and 
15:57:51 
15:58:33 
15:59:21 
16:00:16 
16:01:05 
16:01:53 
16:03:51 
16:04:22 
16:07:26 
16:07:47 
16:07:52 
16:07:53 
16:07:55 
16:08:20 
correctness of the election. As a courtesy, I 
send a copy of the answer to 
defenseatty, as it turns out it was never filed 
as you amended the Complaint. 
I didn't know Kootena was no longer a defuntil 
the judge ruled. I anticpated 
Kootenai would be named given the allegations. 
The Amended Complaint alleges against Kootenai. 
Exh 51, email from Gridley to 
Reed, Erbland and Cafferty. As of May 2010 I was 
still concerned Kootenai 
would be brought in as a def. I couldn't tell 
you when Deedie retired. I know 
she is retired now. Exh 98, is a response to a 
request, a letter from me to 
you. 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Offer 98 
Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Noobj 
Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
No obj 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Admit 98. 
Other: Cafferty, John 
Reads letter. 
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16:09:36 Deedie is no longer there, I relayed info from 
my client. Information Systems 
16:10:17 could pull up information for past two years. 
16:10:31 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Obj 
16:10:33 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Sustain 
16:10:37 Other: Cafferty, John 
The computer was cleaned sometime before May 6. 
The emails are not gone, 
16:11:44 they're not on that computer. Dan English 
reviewed what he had and gave you 
16:12:16 what he could find. A more thourough search is 
available to you. Exh 55, ale 
16:14:10 tter I recieved from S. Reed. 
16:14:24 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
No obj 
16:14:26 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
No obj 
16:14:29 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Move to admit. 
16:14:32 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Admit 55. 
16:15:51 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Reads letter. 
16:15:57 Other: Cafferty, John 
That is what the document indicates. 
16:16:18 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Obj, 
16:16:23 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
0/R 
16:16:57 Other: Cafferty, John 
I don't know what Scott Reed was thinking. This 
was the Aff you had been 
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16:17:18 
16:18:28 
16:19:48 
16:20:21 
16:20:38 
16:21:34 
16:21:40 
16:22:00 
16:22:02 
16:22:07 
16:22:44 
16:22:49 
16:23:41 
16:24:16 
16:24:33 
16:25:35 
solicitating around this time, was around the 
mediation. We did prepare the 
Affd. I sent the Affd to Mr Reed, that's what 
the document states. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I just have to say here, you're asking questions 
about sending faxes to other 
attorneys, its just attorney chatter. 
At the moment it doesn't tie to anything. 
Tell me where you're going. 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
I've made a motion re: 34-1011 re: malconduct, 
it may lead to fraud and 
corruption. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
What does this tie to? 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
The Affd of English as to what the county should 
say or not say. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I'm lost. 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
I'll go back. I had sent an Affd for English to 
sign, Cafferty sent it to Ree 
Other: Cafferty, John 
I can't tell you why I sent it to Reed, if I had 
my notes maybe I could tell 
you. There are other Affd floating around. The 
Affd English signed is the one 
we prepared. I don't know what was in Mr Reeds' 
mind. My recollection was 
that the case was worked out because of 
mediation. 
16:27:02 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I did follow where you were going. 
16:27:27 Other: Cafferty, John 
I would have liked to have seen all the Affd. I 
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16:31:47 
16:33:30 
16:33:45 
16:34:07 
16:34:27 
16:35:20 
16:36:12 
16:36:57 
16:38:33 
16:38:52 
16:44:01 
have a recollection of an 
Affd ofBeard and English filed not prepared 
through me. 
Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Obj, attorney - client communications. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
It does appear to raise that, do you want to 
assert? Is is something other 
than that? 
The relevance is cumulative, and it does get 
into privilege. Sustain 
Other: Cafferty, John 
I had communication with Kennedy's attorney re: 
what testimony would be at 
trial. We met on three times, not so much to go 
over testimony. There were 
questions about documents, like exh 5. Exh B. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
We'll take a stretch break, off the record. 
Stop recording 
(On Recess) 
Recording Started: 
16:44:01 Record 
Etal, City of CDA 
16:44:02 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Back on the record, continue. 
16:44:24 Other: Cafferty, John 
I've reviewed Exh B. I did not play a part in 
its drafting. It may be a from 
16:44:53 document from the county or prepared by the 
city, I don't know. 
16:46:42 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
and Mr Erbland: obj 
16:46:53 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
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What is the relevance? 
16:46:59 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Goes to prejudic~ of all the county witnesses. 
16:47:24 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
It's in evidence. 
16:47:35 Other: Cafferty, John 
The city has not made a claim - that I know of. 
16:49:46 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Obj 
16:49:49 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
What's the relevance? 
16:49:55 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
OK. 
16:50:04 That's all the questions I have. 
16:50:13 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
CROSS 
16:50:17 Other: Cafferty, John 
There are also Affds in the record that bear the 
letterhead of Starr Kelso. 
16:50:44 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
No questions. 
16:50:51 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Next witness? 
16:50:58 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
I'd prefer to start at 9:00, not 4:50. 
16:51:11 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I need a list of witnesses and a length of time, 
I need that. We're 3 days 
16:51:51 into a 4 day trial. Will recess until 9:00AM. 
16:52:35 Stop recording 
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Court Minutes: 
Session: HOSACK091310A 
Session Date: 09/13/2010 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Reporter: Nunemacher, Valerie 
Clerk(s): Rohrbach, Shari 
State Attorney(s): 
Public Defender(s): 
Prob. Officer(s): 
Court interpreter(s): 
Case ID: 0007 
Case number: CV2009-1 0010 
Plaintiff: Brannon, Jim 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Defendant: Eta!, City of CDA 
Pers. Attorney: Reed, Scott 
Co-Defendant( s ): 
State Attorney: 
Public Defender: 
Division: DIST 
Session Time: 08:22 
Previous audio and annotations can be found in case: 0006 
Additional audio and annotations can be found in case: 0008. 
09116/2010 
08:36:11 
Recording Started: 
08:36:11 
Case recalled 
08:36:21 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
On the record. Counsel have shown up early to 
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discuss some evidentiary issues 
08:36:40 we were discussing yesterday. One issue became 
the ruling re: witnesses 
08:37:07 listed by the PL. They are witnesses not alleged 
to have cast a ballot, but 
08:37:30 witnesses PL wishes to call. PL wishes to call 
re: residence and vote. 
08:38:50 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr ' I. 
RE Pacquin, farkes, Dobslaff, Friennd and Gagnon 
there are Affd of 
08:39:28 nonservice. 
08:39:28 State Attorney: 
08:39:30 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
PL attempted to serve them in Kootenai Co? 
08:39:46 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Correct. 
08:39:50 Pers. Attorney: Reed, Scott 
We are prepared to argue on the substance that 
they are legal voters, we 
08:40:15 don't care about the service. 
08:40:24 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Court will accept the stip that PL has attempted 
to serve them in Kootenai 
08:40:48 and no service. 
08:40:52 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Re: Dobslaffthere is an additional factor, 
there has been an Affd filed with 
08:41:36 the Motion to Amend, the third time. 
08:41:58 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Court can take judicial notice of what's filed. 
You can draw the court's 
08:42:17 attention to that. 
08:42:46 Pers. Attorney: Reed, Scott 
Obj to judicial notice. 
08:42:52 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 72, ... 
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08:43:13 
08:43:31 
08:43:41 
08:43:57 
08:44:16 
08:45:01 
08:45:26 
08:47:33 
08:47:43 
08:50:26 
08:51:08 
08:51:35 
08:52:00 
08:52:05 
08:52:07 
08:52:52 
I think there's case law on looking at another 
file, I think I can look at 
the file being tried. 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Witnesses include Jenkins, Johnson, 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
I wouldn't address those, we're discussing 
Pacquin, Parkes, Friend, Dobslaff 
and Gagnon. If they don't show we're calling 
others 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Who are the others? Jenkins, Johnson, 
Johannessen Gossart? 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Yes. Also Currie, Mrs Currie, Gagnon, Powers, 
Parker, Gibson. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Others are being called as to their legal 
residence as to their vote? 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Correct. Based on treatise of American Election 
Law. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
One issue is their residence and can evidence be 
introduced as to residence? 
Next issue is if a person was a legal voter, 
this Court is not going to grill 
a voter as to how they voted, that's a 
Constitutional prohibition. Do the 
residence first. 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Correct. 
Johannessen is the apartment manager where 
Pacquin says she lives. Gagnon is 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 73, ... 
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08:53:13 
08:53:34 
08:53:41 
08:54:01 
08:54:35 
08:54:38 
08:55:32 
08:56:21 
08:58:39 
08:58:48 
08:59:13 
08:59:38 
09:00:55 
09:01:08 
09:01:37 
09:02:38 
09:03:15 
09:03:35 
09:04:59 
09:05:19 
the resident of the residence that Gagnon claims 
as her residence and is her 
daughter in law. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Let's discuss that - its a defined issue. 
Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
There are two issues, residence and then the 
vote. Mr Reed will discuss the 
residency. 
Pers. Attorney: Reed, Scott 
I have put together a brief the I think 
establishes them as legal voters. IC 
34-450 and 54-15, absentee provisions. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I need some evidence, what evidence is there? 
What is your position re: the 
admission ofthe evidence. 
Pers. Attorney: Reed, Scott 
The testimony as residence is not the best 
evidence. Best evidence would be 
the testimony of each person. Mr Kelson filed 
that he was going to take 
depositions, he did not do so. 
The opportunity was there and I guess I have 
nothing else to offer. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I'm not sure about the probative weight, you can 
call that person and we'll 
see. It has arguable relevance. 
The next question is, I'll have to make an 
interlocutory ruling, make a 
finding that the person was not a resident and 
becomes an illegal voter. Then 
the prohibition about asking as to how they 
voted does not apply. 
We know they voted, no disagreement about that? 
Other: Parties:, All 
Agree. 
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09:06:13 
09:06:24 
09:07:01 
09:07:35 
09:07:44 
09:08:50 
09:09:28 
09:09:57 
09:10:30 
09:11:05 
09:11:32 
09:11:59 
09:12:23 
09:12:45 
09:13:08 
09:14:33 
09:15:14 
09:17:17 
09:17:42 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
You want to call people as to how she/they 
voted? 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Yes. There is information published on the 
internet and a recorded phone call 
as to how Pacquin voted. A Huckelberry blog. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
This is for illustrative purposes. 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Yes, I'm still relying on the treatise, argues. 
Page 143, number 2, the 
person who cast a ballot may be called. You can 
prove the vote based on 
circumstantial evidence. It'll go to the weight. 
Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
We're talking about admissability of extraneous 
evidence. PL wants to admit 
recorded phone calls, blogs. Audio is 
inadmissable unless the person is 
present in court. If the declarant is not 
present then the audio is not 
admissable, hearsay. 
The treaty is saying the circumstantial evidence 
can be considered, but it 
must pass the authentication test, it still must 
be admissable. The treaty 
does not trump the rules of evidence. It's 
inadmissable, is for impeachment. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I would agree, under the rules of ev_idence. In 
para 2, reads. I don't see how 
it applies. 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Argues re: para 2, showing the ballot is 
illegal. To get to who they voted 
for we have to get to the illegal vote first. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I understand the argument and the language of 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 75, ... 
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the treatise. That's before 
09:18:19 women could vote. 
09:18:24 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
We're not challenging that. 
09:18:30 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Rules of evidence the Court always applies. You 
don't change the rules of 
09:19:01 evidence because ofthe nature ofthe case. I'm 
not going to make that 
09:19:49 exception on my own. Will apply the normal rules 
of evidence. If the person 
09:20:03 hasn't come in to testify -there's no issue. 
09:20:49 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Can I prepare an order on this because there was 
a Motion in Limine. 
09:21:02 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Well, that the ruling of the Court. Let's get 
started. 
09:21:23 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Ask for a short break? 
09:21:36 Stop recording 
(On Recess) 
09:27:02 
Recording Started: 
09:27:02 Record 
Etal, City of CDA 
09:27:02 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Back in session. Call your witness. 
09:28:22 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
I have procedural clarification, my 
understanding of your ruling is that we 
09:28:48 can present testimony as to residence, but 
limited on how they voted. My 
09:29:08 question is we can present witnesses to 
establish non qualification and then 
09:29:36 let those people go, then its for no purpose. 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 76, ... 
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09:30:04 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Ifthe parties can stip re: witnesses. 
09:30:27 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
09:30:30 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Maybe we should spend five minutes working this 
out. 
09:30:50 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
If I determine they're illegal then what am I 
going to do with it? 
09:31:14 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Right, maybe we should work it out. 
09:31:19 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Recess. 
09:31:22 Stop recording 
(On Recess) 
09:46:29 
Recording Started: 
09:46:29 Record 
Etal, City of CDA 
09:46:29 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Back on the record. 
09:46:36 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Call Mike Gridley 
09:47:06 Other: Gridley, Mike 
Sworn by clerk. I reside in CDA. I'm the city 
attorney for 8 years.Exh B, 
09:47:57 I've seen it before. I'm generally familiar with 
it. I don't recall how it 
09:48:14 came to be prepared, it's standard form used for 
a number of elections over 
09:48:33 the years. The city has not filed a claim. 
09:49:34 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Obj 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 77, ... 
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09:49:36 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
0/R 
09:49:42 Other: Gridley, Mike 
I recall making a presentation in re: to 
Mcgoverns inquiry.Mr Wilson is Chief 
09:51:08 Deputy Civil Atty. I vaguly recall a letter from 
you to the mayor, I don't 
09:51:53 recall my response. I do recall that you, like 
any other citizen, can make a 
09:52:20 presentation of 3-5 minutes. I don't recall the 
exact contents of the letter. 
09:5 3: 17 I responded to a letter you sent. I recall 
something like a public comment, 
09:53:55 unless council wants to hear more. Exh 48, email 
that I sent. 
09:55:53 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Move to admit 48. 
09:56:00 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
No obj 
09:56:03 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
No obj 
09:56:04 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Admit 48 
09:56:24 Other: Gridley, Mike 
In the email I ask other attorneys to attend a 
meeting. I don't recalll when 
09:57:04 I first learned Mr Erbland agreed to represent 
Mr Kennedy. The meeting did 
09:57:26 occur. Kennedy was one of my clients, Mr Brannon 
was just a man on the street 
09:57:52 at that point. You sued city counsel, I went to 
the meeting - to the extent 
09:58:39 of the suit. I organized the meeting, I think it 
was the right thing to do. I 
09:59:09 don't care who wins or looses, I care about a 
suit that claims things were 
09:59:27 done illegal. Exh 47, I don't see my name on it 
so I don't think I've seen 
10:00:51 it. I may have read in the newspaper ofMcHugh 
telling Spencer remedy is an 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 78, ... 
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10:01:29 election contest, I think that's the remedy 
under Idaho law. I contributed to 
10:02:29 Mr Kennedys' campaign. 
10:02:36 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Obj 
10:02:38 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
obj 
10:02:41 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I'm going to take the position that city 
attorneys meet with their clients. 
10:03:08 Other: Gridley, Mike 
Reviews document. (Exh 99) 
10:03:21 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
I don't know what he's showing. 
10:03:59 Obj 
10:04:02 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Goes beyond the scope. 
10:04:08 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Sustain. 
10:04:35 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
It's foundational, trying to get to a point. 
10:04:55 Other: Gridley, Mike 
John Bruni name appears, and Ron Edinger. I 
don't know who made the motion as 
10:05:31 to vote totals. 
10:06:02 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Obj, the treatment of this witness should be 
respectful. 
10:06:14 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
10:06:17 Other: Gridley, Mike 
I didn't say that. 
10:06:23 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 79, ... 
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I didn't hear. 
10:06:27 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
I didn't hear. 
10:06:30 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I'm well aware the parties don't like each 
other, it makes no difference to 
10:06:46 me. 
10:07:03 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
I asked a question. 
10:07:19 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Obj 
10:07:21 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Sustain 
10:07:37 Other: Gridley, Mike 
I give the city counsil my legal opinions. 
10:08:01 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Obj 
10:08:02 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Sustain 
10:08:14 Other: Gridley, Mike 
I didn't suggest to the city they should count 
votes, that was delegated to 
10:09:45 the county. 
10:09:54 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
No questions 
10:09:58 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
No questions. 
10:10:08 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Call Carrie Phillips 
10:10:17 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
You're being recalled, still under oath. 
10:10:45 Other: Phillips, Carrie 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 80, ... 
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10:12:08 
10:12:27 
10:12:43 
10:14:19 
10:14:22 
10:14:47 
10:15:38 
10:16:17 
10:17:45 
10:18:39 
10:21:35 
10:23:25 
10:24:10 
10:25:29 
10:25:48 
10:27:44 
10:28:01 
10:28:17 
10:28:37 
When I was last on the stand I had a list to 
compare.! was looking at items 
on the list that did not have a valid return 
date. 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
From her affd exh 26. 
Other: Phillips, Carrie 
I briefly went through it yesterday, there were 
about 165. Exh 100 
Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Noobj 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Let's have it identified. 
Other: Phillips, Carrie 
exh 100 is a list of numbers that correspond to 
no ballot returned or 
received after the election. I don't recall the 
dates, I wrote the dates on 
the CD, it's for ballots requested for Nov 09 
elecction. 
There were 2184 requested, 165 not received back 
or after election date. 2019 
sounds about right, for returns. For Orville 
Benjamin shows date requested, 
and date issued. The last column does not have a 
recieved date. Exh 5, I've 
located his name. This report shows absentee 
request was in person, from 
10-14-09. I think we're on the wrong line, his 
name is on there two times, he 
may have been entered in incorrectly, needs to 
be voided. He's only on this 
report one time ( exh 5). Page 31 of exh 5, 
Comfort, Mary, shows she was 
issued two absentee ballots. I don't know the 
search parameters for each 
report, I don't know if they were the same. 
She voted in person, that's why the dates are 
the same, Mr Benjamin did also. 
If a person requests a ballot then votes in 
person the first one would be 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 81, ... 
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10:29:27 spoiled. Exh 5 was run based on a received date, 
the one I ran was for all . 
10:31:44 absentee ballots. If we reissued him a ballot we 
would void the first one. 
10:33:21 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
What's the county source document? 
10:33:50 Other: Phillips, Carrie 
Search parameters are different. Exh 5 are for 
ballots received. That report 
10:34:25 shows ballots requested. The state system gives 
you everything. 
10:37:46 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
CROSS 
10:38:13 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Obj 
10:38:20 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
The testimony has been data base shows 
everything. 
10:38:34 Other: Phillips, Carrie 
The report attached to exh 26 is an example of 
live data base. I wrote the 
1 0:3 9:21 date on the CD I created. This report would not 
show people who moved away. 
10:40:04 We don't know how many that is. It would not 
show people who passed away, or 
10:40:21 who were disquaified because of being convicted 
of a felony. The 2019 is just 
10:40:40 the number on the report. It is not necessarily 
the number who received a 
10:41:12 ballot for the 2009 election. Orville Benjamin 
shows up twice on exh 26, one 
10:42:10 was not received back, it cannot become a vote. 
Mary Comfort entered twice, 
10:42:57 one ballot did not come back, if it doesn't 
become a vote. Beullah Thomas 
10:43:44 entered twice, on exh 5 one was voided, she was 
in person in our office -
10:44:53 requested it be mailed. If it's voided it can't 
become a vote. I was here 
10:46:12 when Judge Marano testified. I was present 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 82, ... 
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during that process. During that 
10:47:20 process representatives ofMr Brannon were 
there. I advised Judge Marano 
10:47:51 there were duplicates. Explains what duplicates 
are, unreadable by the 
10:48:14 machine, duplicate done so it can be run through 
the machine. I recall there 
10:49:28 was a location of write-in absentee ballots. I 
wasn't there when they were 
10:49:50 counted. Explians write-in ballot. The ballot is 
counted, and taken to a 
10:50:32 board to declare. If invalid it's still a 
ballot. By definition not a void. 
10:51:45 2051 went through the machine and counted as 
absentee. Original duplicates 
10:52:47 were later viewed, and counted. When Judge 
Marano came it was not determined 
10:54:19 that some were determined to be county. Mr Kelso 
and Mr McCrory looked at 
10:54:45 those. There was discussion about 2086 absentee 
envelopes. 
10:55:41 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
10:55:46 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
No questions. 
10:55:49 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
REDIRECT 
10:56:44 Other: Phillips, Carrie 
Ballot box 3A was in a locked sealed ballot box 
when presented to Judge 
10:57:16 Marano. Box 3B also. Also #4 was a locked and 
sealed ballot box. On June 22, 
10:59:03 2010 I was custodian ofthe records. Also 
election supv. Those ballots were 
11 :00: 13 kept at a storage faciilty at the sheriffs 
dept, a locked facility. Exh 97, 
11:02:00 affd of Judge Marano, #6, at that time that was 
correct. 
11:02:42 I was present when Chief Sec of State testified. 
I recall he testified that 
11:04:07 four people had been eleminated from the data 
base. 
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11:05:48 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Obj 
11:05:57 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
The Court will not that 4 added to 2019 does 
equal2023. 
11:06:30 Other: Phillips, Carrie 
When you add those together you get that number. 
Exh 97, #4 the only part I 
11:08:26 dispute was that there was only one tub, but 
there were multiple blue tubs in 
i 11:08:49 the room. I was the custodian of the tubs at 
that time. They'd been under 
11:09:28 lock and key at the sheriffs office. 
11:12:21 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
No questions. 
11:12:27 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
No questions. 
11:12:31 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Will take a short break before next witness. 
11:12:47 Recess. 
11:12:56 Stop recording 
(On Recess) 
11:24:25 
Recording Started: 
11:24:25 Record 
Etal, City of CDA 
11:24:27 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Recall, I show ex 100 as admitted, clarifies. 
That's the attorneys' 
11:25:01 understanding? 
11:25:09 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Correct. 
11:25:10 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Correct. 
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11 :25: 11 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Conect. 
11:25:13 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
11 :25: 16 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Ask for sidebar. 
11 :25:21 Stop recording 
(On Recess) 
11:33:07 
Recording Started: 
11:33:07 Record 
Etal, City of CDA 
11:33:08 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Back in session. 
11:33:14 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Call Rahana Zellers 
11:34:14 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Record will reflect no one is responding. 
11:34:46 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Let the record reflect she was served a subp. a 
11:35:07 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
And a return filed? 
11:35:15 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
If it hasn't been it will be. 
11:35:33 Call Marte Chamness. 
11:35:46 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Do you know this person? 
11:36:02 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
She was here, I believe Tues. We tried to 
contact her, left a message. 
11:36:25 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
She's not present, same finding, she is not 
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present but apparantly was here 
11 :36:44 Tus. 
11:36:46 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Call Julie Chadderton 
11:37:00 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Do 
11:37:21 Plaintiff: Brannon, Jim 
She is not in the courtroom. 
11:37:30 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
She was subp, will be a return. 
11:37:37 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Representation are that she was subp. 
11:37:58 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Approach 
11:3 8:53 Stop recording 
(On Recess) 
11:39:37 
Recording Started: 
11:39:37 Record 
Etal, City of CDA 
11:39:56 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
The next five are in a group, can call in a 
group. 
11 :40:10 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Call M Pacquin, T Parkes, T Friend, D Dobslaff, 
K Gagnon. 
11:40:37 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Does anyone on behalf of the PL know these 
people? 
11 :40:52 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Would not physically recognize them. No contact 
during the trial. 
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11:41:16 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Record would show 
11:41:27 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Four absentee ballots to Canada, one to CA. 
11:41:45 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Physically out of state or country. 
11 :41 :57 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
There are affd of nonservice. 
11:42:03 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
There has been no service of the subp within the 
boundaries ofKootenai Co. 
11:42:34 And no one present when called as a witness. 
11:43:01 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
That covers the record. 
11:43:06 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
That covers the record. 
11:43:08 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
That covers the record. 
11:43:14 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
There are some other legal issues to discuss. 
Counsel suggested an early 
11:43:30 break and then start early. Return at 12:45. And 
if counsel could join the 
11:44:34 Court briefly. 
11:44:45 Stop recording 
13:03:40 
Recording Started: 
13:03:40 Record 
Etal, City of CDA 
13:03:41 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Back in session. 
13:06:04 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Call Deedie Beard 
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13:06:28 Other: Beard, Deedie 
Sworn by clerk. I reside in CDA. I worked in 
elections department, I was 
13:07:15 supervisor. I worked through the 2009 election. 
Exh 101 and 102, I recognize. 
13:09:11 Exh 101 Affd of mine, file stamp 1-5-10 & Exh 
102 is stamped 8-2-10. 
13:09:26 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Move to admit both. 
13:09:27 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Noobj 
13:09:28 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Noobj 
:• 
13:09:30 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Admit 101 and 102 
13:11:07 Other: Beard, Deedie 
Exh 102, Affd says McKinley, that is a typo, its 
McCory. I've seen the 
13:13:17 agreement between the city and the county, I was 
acting as the election 
13:13:35 manager for CDA for that election. I'm pretty 
familiar with the election 
13:14:13 laws. My Affd says Title 34, not Title 50 
applies. If an absentee envelope 
13:16:27 comes back I check signatures. I felt that was 
my responsibity, not a temp. I 
13:17:15 was the only one that made the final call. If 
there was no signature we would 
13:17:57 try to notify the voter and ask them come in and 
sign. If unable to come into 
13:18:11 the office a staff would take it to their house 
let them sign and return it 
13:18:33 so it would count. Some are scanned in with the 
barcode and some put in by 
13:19:10 hand. A staff or temp staff would enter info, 
either scan or hand enter. I 
13:20:26 usually had two temps assigned to that. I don't 
know if the barcode pops up 
13:21:00 on screen, or just the signature. If the 
signature on the envelope doesn't 
13:22:04 match the signature on screen, if the last name 
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is the same and date the same 
13:22:47 then my instruction was to accept it, explains. 
The labels are optional, 
13:23:55 nothing says we have to do that. That helps us. 
If it comes back with no 
13:24:28 signature we contact the person because the 
ballot would not count. Exh 66, 
13:25:06 front and back of a valid envelope. The last 
names are the same as the 
13:25:39 barcode. The signature is not Israels, its 
Donna. If they came in at the same 
13:27:26 time, then we'd accept it. We probably would not 
call in this instance. I've 
13:28:19 kept a phone log, but I might not be the person 
that made a call. I don't 
13:28:53 think any envelope indicates who processed it. 
We have a process of counting 
13:30:28 50 envelopes at a time and processing them. 
They're held all day until tally 
13:30:45 is done and then put in ballot box. They don't 
check signature, when they put 
13:36:11 the persons name it info comes up. My 
instructions from the Sec of State is 
13:3 7:17 that when a person signs a poll book they're 
signing an Affd that address is 
13:37:38 correct. When an application is received we put 
name in and it pulls them up, 
13:38:19 it has the taxing district, etc so they know 
what ballot to give. The address 
13:39:00 data base is kept up on a daily basis. The data 
base is in the system, when 
13:40:25 you put the address in it brings up the taxing 
codes. The information comes 
13:42:20 from the voter registration card that had been 
filed some time previous. We 
13:44:49 presume a person is at that address, we would 
have no information different. 
13:45:28 If a person is voting in person the clerk would 
ask them, if not they would 
13:45:56 re-register. We presume that's the address 30 
days prior to election. Exh 5, 
13:49:21 page 123, Pacquin has Garden Ave address. The 
Garden address would come up on 
13:51 :30 the screen. It tells the district for which 
ballot should be sent. Quebec is 
13:52:11 where the absentee ballot be sent. Based on 
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address, its determined a CDA 
13:52:51 ballot. I don't know if a clerk would think 
about that address, we mail to 
13:53:28 addresses all over the world. There is no 
procedure to investigate if a CDA 
13:54:33 address is still the correct address. I said 
we're not the election police, 
13:54:50 that was a quote from the Sec of State's office. 
That came up with election 
13:55:22 day registration, the question came up and that 
was stated to us. We don't 
13:55:54 go out and check addresses. Page 39, Dobslaff, 
Denise. It shows a CDA 
13:58:25 address. Balllot would be based on the 
registration card. There application 
13:59:12 would also have the address. New election year 
you would have new election 
14:00:08 process. Her application date was Jan 11, 2008. 
Page 123, Pacquin application 
14:02:13 requested Oct 9, 2008. According to this report. 
To stay active you have to 
14:04:10 vote once every four years. Depending when the 
application came it - it could 
14:04:41 be 2 or 4 years. They would not have to send in 
a new application. It would 
14:05:55 be automatically sent. Page 47, Parkes, I don't 
know who that person is. 
14:07:42 Request received in Apri12009, its a request 
form, no affidavit goes with 
14:08:08 that. It's not like a registration card. On 
Friend, page 53, his went out 
14:09:11 automatically also. IC 34-1003 the registration 
card makes them eligible to 
14:11:04 vote, as long as 30 days prior to election. They 
would have to continue to 
14:11:20 vote to maintain the registration. With Mr 
Ainsworth I'm assuming the poll 
14:14:45 clerk made a mistake, explains. I don't remember 
the exact date I learned Mr 
14:17:19 Ainsworth voted in the city election, its just 
been in the last little while 
14:17:39 I learned about it. My understanding was that 
the judge said Title 34 was 
14:18:30 involved. Title 50 runs almost identical to 34. 
I was at the hearing, that 
14:18:51 was my understanding that he made that 
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statement. There's different 
14:19:45 residency, they're pretty close. IC 50-402C. If 
a postcard comes back we 
14:23:56 delete them. We don't make an investigation to 
the residence 30 days prior to 
14:25:53 election. 
14:26:00 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Ask for recess. 
14:26:26 Stop recording 
(On Recess) 
14:34:27 
Recording Started: 
14:34:27 Record 
Etal, City of CDA 
14:34:31 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Back in session. 
14:34:58 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Call Julie Chadderton 
14:35:50 Other: Chadderton, Julie 
Sworn by clerk. live in Fernan Village. I voted 
in 2009 at Lakes Middle 
14:36:15 School. I was provided a ballot. There was a 
question raised as to the 
14:36:43 ballot. I told them my name, handed a ballot, I 
said this is the wrong one, 
14:36:58 they handed me the correct one. 
14:37:22 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
CROSS 
14:37:25 Other: Chadderton, Julie 
I voted the correct ballot. 
14:37:31 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
You may be excused. Recalll Ms Beard 
14:38:01 Other: Beard, Deedie 
I knew about a week ago about Ainsworth vote. I 
learned from office staff, I 
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14:38:37 knew that he might not have shown proof of 
residency for 30 days. I heard 
14:38:53 about N. White some time ago, that she had been 
turned over to the pros for 
14:39:07 investigation, I believe the county pros, I may 
be mistaken. 
14:39:34 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Obj, this is not discovery deposition. 
14:39:44 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
What was the question? 
14:39:57 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
No stipulations. 
14:40:10 Other: Beard, Deedie 
I heard some time ago that Nancy White was being 
investigated for not living 
14:40:27 in the city. Exh 101, signed Dec 2009, page 7 
para f. I generated the report 
14:43:42 from software from the county machine. You put 
the disk in to print out that 
14:44:12 data. It identifies count and number ofballots. 
A disk is taken from the 
14:45:05 machine and put in the computer software. Exh 
85, appears to be the printout. 
14:47:16 2051 were the ballots that went through the 
machine. I ran report during the 
14:47:54 day. We prepared for the canvass the next day. 
You account for all the 
14:48:24 ballots, when we prepare for the canvass we go 
through all the stuff. I 
14:49:12 didn't compare 2051 for a total. I'm familiar 
with 34-1011. Kootenai didn't 
14:50:46 print out such a record immediately after the 
election. The girls were 
14:51:15 running reports the next day. Exh 5, run on Nov 
6. I've never seen this full 
14:52:01 document, first I saw was when you presented it 
in court. I don't know what 
14:52:41 date I was aware ofthe 2047 instead of2051. I 
don't remember who told me 
14:53:18 about the difference. Exh 86, sometimes I did 
this, sometimes Susan Smith did 
14:54:30 this. The information would have come from me. I 
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didn't compare it with the 
14:55:32 state registration system because you never know 
if its correct depending on 
14:55:55 what's been done. We have absentee voting in our 
office. Precinct 73 was for 
14:57:59 absentee voting, that's where I was reviewing 
the documents. At the polling 
14:58:21 place there's a judge and clerk. They don't 
count the ballot. Each precinct 
14:59:05 has a poll book, except for absentee. But 
absentee doesn't have registered 
14:59:34 voters so you can't make a poll book. IC 50-450, 
we're a central count 
15:01:49 county. It would be the same as Title 34.IC 34-
1008 - but we're a central 
15:03 :29 count county so that doesn't happen in Kootenai. 
For absentee date/stamp is 
15:04:20 for mail in. Ifthey walk in we put it in the 
system. 34-1005, county 
15:05:40 statute. I don't know of a statute to tell me to 
do that, and I've talked to 
15:06:50 the Sec of State. If they sign in front of the 
clerk. I think that's a vague 
15:07:26 code. When I don't understand it I go to the Sec 
of State's office who has 
15:07:41 never told me I need to time stamp them. They 
say it is a vague code. I've 
15:08:02 talked to them about it. Tim Hurst did not say 
in-person envelopes have to 
15:08:43 be time stamped. IC 34-1011 pertains to the 
record. Iftwo ballots are in one 
15: 11 :41 envelope we have counted both, that was not done 
in this election because 
15:12:01 there were no multiples. I can only recall one 
time that that happened. 
15:12:48 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Obj 
15:12:50 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
It has no relevance of what we're talking about. 
15:13:06 Other: Beard, Deedie 
IC 50-440 -2, we don't do that, we're a central 
count precinct. 
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15:15:03 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
15:15:09 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Obj, that's not the statute in effect at the 
time. 
15:15:27 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Obj, relevance. 
15: 15:41 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Argues re: absentee ballot numbers. It's very 
relevant. 
15:16:11 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Obj, statute says "may", discretionary. 
15:16:32 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Can answer as to what she does. 
15:17:51 Other: Beard, Deedie 
· I C 34-1 0 11, if any ballot is rejected it remains 
in the sealed envelope. I 
15:19:45 heard testimony about the Nov 16 record. The 
main it might have increased is 
15:20:23 that ballots come back a day or so after the 
election and they're put in and 
15:20:36 voided. You can't add anybody after the election 
day, the system won't let 
15:20:58 you. Exh 5 was run on Nov 6, you cannot add 
voters after the date. You can ' 
15:21 :51 scan in eve lopes. You can't add new voters, you 
can accept ballots and scan 
15:22:33 them in. 
15:23:49 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
It doesn't do any good to have this witness 
assume, its nonprobative. I've 
15:24:35 heard your arguement for the last 2-3 days. 
15:24:50 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
I'm finished. 
15:24:56 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
CROSS 
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15:25:02 
15:25:57 
15:26:20 
15:27:31 
15:28:03 
15:28:31 
15:28:51 
15:29:40 
15:30:23 
15:30:53 
15:31:07 
15:31:51 
15:32:30 
15:33:09 
15:33:51 
15:34:08 
15:34:32 
15:34:54 
15:34:58 
15:35:22 
15:35:52 
15:36:24 
Other: Beard, Deedie 
IC 34-435, deals with purging registration every 
4 years who have not voted, 
that's the law. IC 34-431 the law that allows 
someone to challenge the 
registration. 34-1002 is the statute under 
It allows for a federal type form, I've seen 
many. I've sent out many 
absentee ballots under that. I give workshops to 
poll workers as to what 
they're to do. They're to ask for ID and 
something to show they've lived in 
the city for same day registration. There is 
only one registration. For 2009 
poll workers were instructed. We do not check on 
people on where they reside. 
I've not been instructed by Sec of State to do 
that. I'm aware ofwrite-ins, 
I know there were 7, I looked at that 
personally. You have to be a declared 
write-in for that to count. Machine verifies 
info. The ballot counts in the 
machine. You have to declare it to be a write-in, 
there's a time frame for 
that. It's still a valid ballot. A dup ballot is 
a ballot that is damaged and 
the machine won't read it, the machine is 
stopped, explains. There were 17 
duplicate ballots, I looked at that personally 
and verified that. I've been 
doing elections a little over 27 years when I 
retired. My opinion is that the 
ballots counted by Judge Marano came out the 
same as the machine. 
Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
CROSS 
Other: Beard, Deedie 
There's a software reporting program, there's a 
precinct report on the 
machine. The reports on the machine add up to 
the 2051, I check the audit 
trail. Exh 86 is my final tabulation that I 
presented to the city clerk. I'm 
not aware of any illegal accepted votes. 
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15:36:42 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
REDIRECT 
15:36:57 Other: Beard, Deedie 
I was here when Tim Hurst testified. I agree a 
ballot counting machine 
15:37:20 counts the number of ballots put through the 
machine. 
15:39:32 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Will take a short break and work on stipulation. 
Counsel will join me. 
15:40:01 Stop recording 
(On Recess) 
16:06:02 
Recording Started: 
16:06:02 Record 
Eta!, City of CDA 
16:06:03 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Back in session. 
16:06:49 Proceed to your next witness. 
16:07:02 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Call Ronald Pryor 
16:07:47 Other: Pryor, Ronald 
Sworn by clerk. My primary place of abode is 
Avondale Loop. That was my 
16:08:12 primary home by Oct 3, 2009, we moved in a few 
weeks prior to that. We cast a 
16:08:55 vote in the 2009 election. We were registered at 
Industrial Way, that's our 
16:09:19 business location. 
16:10:28 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Wait a minute, there's nothing in the record if 
he's a legal resident of CDA 
16:10:48 or not. The Court has not made a determination as 
to residence, we need to 
16:11:11 have a record. 
16:11:17 Other: Pryor, Ronald 
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Primary residence is on A von dale Loop, 
officially the city of Hayden. The 
16:11:56 address on voter registration card was 
Industrial Way, city ofCDA. That has 
16: 12:26 since been changed, the business address -
because of 911. I didn't sleep 
16:13:30 there from Oct 1 or after. 
16:13:55 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I've not done this before so will allow cross. 
16:14:08 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
No question re: residence. 
16:14:17 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
No question re: residence, but it may be best 
for the next inquiry to come 
16:14:32 from the court. 
16:14:35 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I've read the statute, it would be appropriate 
to let attorneys inquire.lt 
16:15:08 would seem the testimony is that's he lived in 
Hayden. Does anyone want to 
16:15:31 argue? 
16:15:33 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
No dispute on that. 
16:15:37 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Find that he did not meet the 30 days 
requirement, moved into unqualified 
16:16:09 voter. 
16:16:17 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Inquires. 
16:16:21 Other: Pryor, Ronald 
We were deposed at your office in Jan, I do not 
remember who I voted for. I 
16:16:58 remember a phone call in which the person that 
talked to us, tried to get me 
16:17:15 to state who I voted for. He tried to lead me. I 
didn't know then, and I 
16:17:35 don't know now. I said I might have voted for 
the incumbant, I might have. I 
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16:18:00 
16:18:24 
16:18:38 
16:18:44 
16:18:48 
16:18:51 
16:19:03 
16:19:39 
16:20:05 
16:20:27 
16:20:45 
16:20:49 
16:20:53 
16:21:08 
16:21:14 
16:21:34 
16:21:50 
voted for somebody. 
I didn't know what incumbant was, I was 
concerned with other things on that 
ballot. 
Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
No questions. 
Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
CROSS 
Other: Pryor, Ronald 
I was under oath at Mr Kelso's office, as I am 
today. 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Call Susan Harria 
Other: Harris, Susan 
Sworn by clerk. 
My primary place ofhome is Avondale Loop, 
Hayden Idaho. I voted in Nov 2009 
election. I used business address as permanent 
address. 
Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Mr Kennedy would stip as to testimony being the 
same as last witness. 
Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Concurr 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Accept stip. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
To be consistent, court would make the same 
ruling, you can inquire as to 
nature of the vote. 
Other: Harris, Susan 
I do not clearly remember who I voted for. I 
didn't know the name of the man 
that called, got me upset and confused. He was 
talking about ballot being 
absentee. I was upset. I don't know what was 
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said, I was upset, I didn't know 
16:22:37 who incumbant was. I might have said anything 
to make him go away. I really 
16:22:59 don't remember. 
16:23:06 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
No questions. 
16:23:09 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
CROSS 
16:23:12 Other: Harris, Susan 
I was under oath at deposition, and today. 
16:23:44 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Call Rahana Zellers again. 
16:23:56 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Once again nobody responding. Court will make a 
finding, as previously, Ms 
16:24:21 Zellers is not here for purposes of testifying. 
16:25:14 Stop recording 
(On Recess) 
16:32:36 
Recording Started: 
16:32:36 Record 
Etal, City of CDA 
16:32:38 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
IN session. 
16:34:24 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
REvisiting Rule 804(5). I'd ask the court to 
reconsider based on Rules. 
16:36:39 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
There's nothing pending so I'm not sure .. 
16:36:48 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
The ruling on hearsay. 
16:37:16 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Reconsider the ruling re: proffered testimony? 
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16:37:30 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
I'll proceed. The ruling this morning was we 
wouldn't be able to offer 
16:38:14 statements as to who these people voted for. 
16:38:40 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
RE: the five and who they voted for? 
16:39:06 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Yes. 
16:39:10 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Not a statement against interest, ruling remains 
the same. 
16:39:53 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Call Beatrice Johannessen 
16:40:28 Other: Johannessen, Beatrice 
Sworn by clerk. I live at E Garden, CDA. I'm 
self employed, its a residence 
16:41:16 and 11 units that I rent out. I rented to Monica 
Pacquin. That was her 
16:42:18 address in unit 3 from 2006 thru 2007. She left 
that unit in fall of 2007. I 
16:42:50 rented that unit to another person. Ms Pacquin 
contacted me but never said 
16:43:37 she wanted to come back to unit 3. 
16:44:19 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Obj 
16:44:21 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Join 
16:44:24 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
The next question would have to be analyzed 
independtly. 
16:44:50 Other: Johannessen, Beatrice 
16:45:05 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Obj 
16:45:08 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
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Sustain 
16:45:19 Other: Johannessen, Beatrice 
That unit is presently rented to someone. It was 
rented to someone during Oct 
16:45:38 2009. I've sent letters toMs Pacquin, an 
address in Canada. 
16:46:10 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Obj. 
16:46:15 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
She said "yes." 
16:46:24 Other: Johannessen, Beatrice 
One letter was returned as not deliverable. I 
had not put on the apt number. 
16:47:28 A letter was written prior to Oct 2009, I 
forwarded a package to her. I don't 
16:48:09 have her phone number. I mailed papers to her 
probably sometime in 2008. She 
16:49:30 was employed in CDA, on 11th Street. 
16:50:22 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Obj 
16:50:26 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Would have to have some foundation. 
16:50:34 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
I'm finished. 
16:50:40 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
No questions. 
16:50:45 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
No questions. 
16:50:48 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Call Wileen Gagnon 
16:51:27 Other: Gagnon, Willeen 
Sworn by clerk. My primary place of abode is 9th 
Street. I've lived there 11 
16:52:07 years. I know Kimberly Gagnon, she is my 
daughter in law. 
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16:53:07 
16:54:14 
16:54:47 
16:54:51 
16:55:19 
16:55:33 
16:55:59 
16:56:19 
16:56:40 
16:57:00 
16:57:22 
16:57:28 
16:57:31 
16:57:36 
16:57:59 
16:58:28 
16:58:43 
16:58:54 
16:59:09 
16:59:28 
I correspond with her, address is CA. My husband 
lives with me, same primary 
residence. No one else resides with us during 
those 11 years. 
Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
CROSS 
Other: Gagnon, Willeen 
My son is John, he's in the Coast Guard, for 24 
years. My daughter in law is 
a house wife, was in the military. They 
've been married 21 yrs, they use our address. 
They plan to move her when 
retired in 6 yrs. Daughter in law is disabled, 
she served 3-4 years. They 
both use our address for registration purposes. 
Son was raised here. To my 
knowledge they do not vote anywhere else. Approx 
6 years ago daughter in law 
became sick, I don't recall her staying with us. 
She has stayed with me for a 
period of time. 
Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
No questions. 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
REDIRECT 
Other: Gagnon, Willeen 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Nothing. 
I'd like to call Marte Chamness again. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Is anybody present? 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
She was here on Tues and told she would not be a 
witness on Tues. She was not 
told she was released from sub. Phone calls have 
been left. I've just been 
informed from her husband I need to reserve her, 
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I don't think that's true 
16:59:51 but that's what I've heard. 
16:59:58 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
That's more than we had last time. 
17:00:31 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
We subp call Yvonne 
17:01 :20 Other: Kindall, Yvonne 
Sworn by clerk. I reside in CDA. I own Lake City 
Medical Billing, office on 
17:01:47 Gov't Way, CDA. I moved in Aug 2009. It's a home 
converted to office space. 
17:02:33 Garage has been converted to office space, I 
lease one. Nancy Powers is the 
17:03:02 landlord. Nobody resides as primary place of 
abode at that address. I've not 
17:04:02 met Allen Friend. Art Bistline leases the big 
house, Nancy Powers shares 
17:04:48 office space, and another offfice spaced lease 
to Janelle Simpson. They were 
17:05:20 leasing in Oct 2009. 
17:06:03 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
NO questions. 
17:06:07 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
No questions. 
17:06:38 Other: Currie, Richard 
Could I be excused? I need to be someplace. 
17:06:52 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
He's here. 
17:06:56 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Before I go down that road I need to confer, 
there's an issue. 
17:07:19 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
You're not going to call him today? 
17:07:28 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 103, ... 
SC 38417-2011 Page 2243 of 2676
17:07:33 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Why don't we take a moment and see. Recess. 
17:07:57 Stop recording 
17:14:03 
Recording Started: 
17:14:03 Record 
Etai, City of CDA 
17:14:04 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Back in session. The Court's understanding is 
with regard to Elmer Rick 
17:14:38 Currie, the service of subp is for Senior Mr 
Currie, so you're not under 
17:15:03 supb. 
17: 15:18 Other: Currie, Richard 
There is no 
17:15:29 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I'm advised there is no service upon you. 
17:15:59 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Also note for the record, this Currie's mother 
was also served. 
17:16:16 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
That's another problem the Court can't do 
anything about. Neither the elder 
17:16:36 Curries are present so they will not be called. 
17:17:36 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Called Denise Dabsloff, subp was returned with 
no service, Mr Brannon has 
17: 18: 11 stip to entry of Affd of Proft, Exh 103 affd of 
Dobslaff. Should be admitted 
17:19:17 d into evidence. 
17:19:29 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
In observing the rules of evidence, obj on basis 
of hearsay. 
17:19:47 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
It is hearsay, comments regarding hearsay, it is 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 104, ... 
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17:21:05 
17:21:51 
17:22:40 
17:23:05 
17:23:14 
17:23:36 
17:24:10 
17:24:14 
17:24:41 
17:24:53 
17:25:48 
17:26:32 
17:26:48 
not admissable. We don't try 
cases with affidavits. Obj is sustained, affd 
will not be admitted. 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Argues, I just want it part ofthe record. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Trials are trials, rules are rules. As far as 
I'm concerned, it's reversable 
error, it's clearly inadmissable. 
Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
May I make a comment? Fairness is in the eyes of 
the beholder. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
OK. There isn't another live witness we're 
calling? I understand you still 
have the offers of proof. 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Yes, and the exhibits. We'll seek appropraite 
relief for Chamness, and elder 
Mr Currie and his wife. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
You haven't rested. If nobody is here at 9:00 we 
move on. In terms of 
testimony, we'll go into evening recess. 
If counsel would join the court in chambers. 
Stop recording 
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09:15:35 
Recording Started: 
09:15:35 Record 
Etal, City of CDA 
09:15:37 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
In session. Counsel have met and advised the 
court re: three exhibits. As I 
09:16:02 understand these can be offered and admitted 
w/out obj. Exh 104, 105, 106. 
09:18:23 These are admitted? 
09:18:28 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Yes 
09:18:32 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Yes 
09:18:33 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Yes 
09:18:40 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Hands actual exhibit. 
09:20:51 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
As I understand you were going to call R. 
Zellers 
09:21:02 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
That isn't hooked up yet. 
09:21: 15 Ask Mr Cafferty to get poll books, and I'll call 
Marte Chamness. 
09:22:09 Stop recording 
(On Recess) 
09:24:33 
Recording Started: 
09:24:33 Record 
Etal, City ofCDA 
09:24:34 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
We have have the books. Have witness come 
forward. 
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09:25:13 
09:25:48 
09:26:35 
09:28:01 
09:33:33 
09:35:30 
09:35:46 
09:36:06 
09:37:09 
09:37:58 
09:38:15 
09:39:46 
09:40:09 
09:40:22 
09:41:32 
Other: Chamness, Marte 
Sworn by clerk. Gives full name. My primary home 
is CDA Place. In CDA, Idaho. 
I've lived there two years. I moved there in 
2008. Prior to that I lived on 
Stonehendge Ave. in city limits of CD A. I did 
vote in the 2009 election. 
Reviews poll book for Precinct 37 and 38. 
Book 37, page12, shows my address. shows old 
address and new address. Note 
says I asked to check my address after I voted. 
I went to vote and was told I 
needed to go to Woodland School to vote. I 
believe I wanted to change my 
address after I voted. Precinct poll book for 
38, page 47, it says Chamness, 
John, that is my husband. I was not with my 
husband when he cast his vote. I 
walked in, showed my ID, driver's license, it 
had Stonehendge address, I 
voted. When I showed my identification, I asked 
to have my address changed. 
At the time I voted I told them my address was 
not the same. I presumed 
everything was fine. 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
At this stage I'd direct your attention to IC 
50-458(3)(4). 
09:41:56 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I've read the statute. 
09:42:50 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
I object to procedure, arguement with evidence. 
09:43:11 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I don't know how else to do this, re: asking a 
constitutionally illegal 
09:43:38 question. 
09:45:03 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
I would challenge the persons' vote for not re-
registering and at proper 
09:45:28 precinct. 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 108, ... 
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09:45:44 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
May I inquire of the witness? 
09:45:52 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Yes. 
09:46:01 Other: Chamness, Marte 
For 30 days prior to election I was a resident 
of CDA. Moved into house in 
09:46:21 2008, moved into the first residence in 2006. 
I've been a resident of CDA for 
09:46:40 4 years. I voted one time in this election. I 
informed the people at the 
09:47:03 precinct of my new address. 
09:47:09 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
I'd like to respond to the challenge now. This 
is a legal voter, argues. 
09:47:46 Statute doesn't say she has to re-register. 
09:48:12 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
09:48:37 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Noble v Ada County, reads. 
09:49:27 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
This witness didn't do anything intentionally 
wrong. Goes to a qualified 
09:50:01 elector is. If they change their residence they 
have to reregister, her 
09:50:26 husband voted at the proper precinct. Unde the 
law, because of failure to 
09:50:45 reregister, doesn't meet statutory requirements. 
Failure of election official 
09:51:09 s to administer the code. 
09:51:14 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Reviews statute, there is no showing here, she 
did everything she thought she 
09:51:45 was supposed to do. There's no way I can find 
anything wrong. Courts should 
09:52:06 honor the right to vote, technicality should not 
deprive right to vote. Find 
09:52:35 no basis to find her vote illegal. She's a legal 
voter. 
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09:53:03 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
And failure of poll woker. 
09:53:14 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
That does not disquality the legal voter. 
09:54:07 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
While Matt get the next witness hooked up I 
could do an offer of proof on the 
09:54:36 nonservice returns. 
09:54:44 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Ok. 
09:54:47 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
The originals are in the file, maybe the court 
could take judicial notice. 
09:55:01 I don't have the originals. 
09:55:11 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
The Court is not going to go through 12 files, 
you can prepare an offer of 
09:55:32 proof. The record can reflect there are records 
of nonservice in the file. 
09:55:53 We're attempting to call a witness through the 
marvels of modern technology. 
10:00:35 We'll go forward. 
10:00:42 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Call Elmer Currie. 
10:01:06 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Is Mr Currie present? 
10:01:25 The bailiffhas checked the hallway, no one 
responded. 
10:01:39 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Or Mrs Currie? 
10:01:46 Defendant: Etal, City of CDA 
10:01:51 Plaintiff: Brannon, Jim 
They're not present. 
10:02:01 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 110, ... 
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Mrs Elmer Currie was called and is not present. 
Call your next witness. 
10:02:18 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Our next witness is Rahana Zellers. 
10:02:37 Denise Dabslaff and Kim Gagnon are not available 
until this afternoon. 
10:03:04 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Other than those three, any other witnesses? 
10:03:25 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
I may call Aaron Jenkins and Johnson depending 
on the offer of proof. 
10:03:48 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
That can be made at any time. We need to give 
the defense a shot. 
10:04:37 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
No other witnesses. 
10:04:45 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Is the defense ready to call a witness? 
10:05:15 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
I do need to call Mr Jenkins re: impeachment. 
10:06:06 Other: Jenkins, Aaron 
Sworn by clerk. Office address is Cornerstone 
Drive. 
10:06:39 Other: Jenkins, Erin 
I conducted interviews. I contacted Prior and 
Harris by phone. I talked to 
10:07:15 both ofthem and two occassions. And one time I 
spoke with Susan at her home. 
10:07:37 I discussed the primary abode of Susan Harris 
and Ronald Prior. I discussed 
10:08:47 if they voted in the 2009 election. Harris 
provided information as to who she 
10:09:55 voted for. Prior provided information as to who 
he voted for. I recorded the 
10:10:45 conversations with a digital recorder. I have a 
copy of the recording with me 
10:11:57 today. I recall what they told me. 
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10:12:57 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Could we stop with this witness and go with 
Rahana? 
10:13:14 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Let's go with this witness. 
10:13:31 Other: Jenkins, Erin 
Harris told 
10:13:53 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Obj, 
10:14:08 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Offered for impeachment? 
10:14:17 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Yes. 
10:14:21 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Impeachment can't be substantative evidence, not 
relevant. 
10:15:09 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
As far as I can tell, it's impeachment evidence, 
for whatever the weight. 
10:15:30 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Then he should play the tape for the court to 
determine credibility. 
10:15:59 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Impeachment is a collateral issue. He doesn't 
need to play whatever 
10:16:34 recordings he recorded. 
10:16:42 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Continues direct. 
10:16:48 Other: Jenkins, Erin 
Conversations were on 1-26-10 with Harris, and 
at her home on 1-28-10. On the 
1 0: 18:26 26th she had agreed to sign an affd, I took it 
to her home. Then she didn't 
10:18:48 agree to sign. Then she was served a subp, when 
she didn't sign the Affd. On 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 112, ... 
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10:19:34 1-26-10 she told me she voted for Kennedy. The 
first time I spoke to them on 
10:19:56 the phone, they both said they weren't sure and 
couldn't remember. On calling 
10:20:13 them back, he said he voted for the incumbant, 
and Ms Harris said she had 
10:20:37 done the same thing. She also said she'd seen a 
newspaper article and 
10:21:05 recalled the person she voted for won. 
10:21:29 The purpose for the subp was for a deposition. 
10:21:50 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Is Ms Zellers ready? 
10:22:04 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
I don't have much. 
I 
i 
10:22:11 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Go ahead. 
10:22:15 Other: Jenkins, Erin 
I was not here when they testified. I've not 
reviewed their testimony. I had 
10:22:50 digital recorder. I did not advise them I was 
recording the conversation. I 
10:23:05 did not place them oath. In the first 
conversation Harris said she did not 
10:23:23 recall who she voted for. She said they voted 
republican. In the first 
10:24:08 converstion he said he didn't remember who he 
voted for. He said they vote 
10:24:21 republican. There was some confusion that they 
voted absentee. Harris 
10:25:14 communicated some concern that she was an 
absentee vote. I clarified that 
10:25:45 that was a mistake. Prior said incumbant. On the 
28th Harris told me to 
10:26:22 leave. She said they were not going to sign the 
affd. The affd had to do with 
10:26:58 where they live and who they voted for. She told 
me this was beyond the pale. 
10:27:14 Then I served subp. 
10:27:22 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
CROSS 
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I 0:27:25 Other: Jenkins, Erin 
The affd, she was there, her husband was not. I 
don't remember if the name 
10:27:56 Kennedy was on it. She said something like this 
was some kind of lawyer 
10:28:17 trick. Only she refused to sign. I never 
presented him with an affd. They 
10:28:31 both said they didn't know who they voted for 
when I first talked to them. 
10:28:48 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
REDIRECT 
I0:28:52 Other: Jenkins, Erin 
The deposition was scheduled the next day 
because they were leaving for 
10:29:12 Mexico the next day. 
I 0:29:34 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Ms Zellers? 
I0:33:18 Other: Zellers, Rahana 
Attempting video hookup. 
I 0:34:13 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
We'll go off the record, but the attorneys will 
stay here so that when she's 
10:34:27 on we can go. 
I0:35:I4 Stop recording 
(On Recess) 
10:40:08 
Recording Started: 
10:40:08 Record 
Etal, City of CDA 
10:40:I6 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Resume. 
I0:40:37 Comments toMs Zellers. 
I0:40:47 Other: Zellers, Rahana 
I'm in Portland OR. I'm in my house. I 
understand I'm being called to testify 
I 0:41:38 at a trial. I see the attorney. I understand the 
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10:42:16 
10:43:27 
10:44:43 
10:45:42 
10:46:55 
10:47:11 
10:47:17 
10:47:28 
10:47:39 
10:47:50 
10:48:06 
10:48:41 
10:48:48 
10:48:56 
10:49:21 
10:49:23 
10:49:27 
10:49:28 
attorneys will ask 
questions. The clerk will swear you now. 
Sworn by clerk. Before Oct I lived at 515 W 
Garden. As of Oct 1, I lived at 
Spingview Dr., CDA. In Kootenai County. I went 
to polling place to vote Nov 
3. I received a ballot. No one inquired ifl 
lived in the county. I 
understand the poll worker provided me a city 
ballot instead of a county 
ballot. 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Can I proceed to the next inquiry? 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
This establishes not a qualified voter. 
Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
We agree. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
She moved to a location outside the city but 
within the county, would not 
have satisfied the 30 day requirement. 
Other: Zellers, Rahana 
I didn't hear the judge. 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
He said I can ask this next question. 
Other: Zellers, Rahana 
I'm not sure who I voted for, I ususally vote 
democratic, probably Mr 
Kennedy. 
Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Obj 
Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Obj 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I'll take the first go round of answers. 
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10:49:38 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Others will ask you questions 
10:49:49 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
CROSS 
10:50:10 Other: Zellers, Rahana 
It's fair to say I'm not sure who I voted for. 
It's almost always the 
10:50:51 democratic. There was no indication who was dem 
or rep on the ballot. 
10:51:10 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
No questions. 
10:51:13 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
No further questions. 
10:51:37 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Except for offers of proof and checking the 
exhibits, and the calling of 
10:52:02 Dabslff and GAgnon, the PL can now rest? 
10:52:11 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Yes, reserving the Motion to Amend. 
10:52:26 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
The PL resting allows up to move to defense. 
10:52:48 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
It may not be necessary to call witnesses, 
depending on exh., explains. 
10:53:50 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Will take a recess, then counsel can advise the 
Court. 
10:54:14 Stop recording 
(On Recess) 
12:05:08 
Recording Started: 
12:05:08 Record 
Etal, City of CDA 
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12:05:08 
12:05:18 
12:06:14 
12:06:27 
12:06:50 
12:07:06 
12:08:50 
12:09:00 
12:09:18 
12:10:00 
12:10:09 
12:10:39 
12:11:03 
12:11:22 
12:12:05 
12:12:08 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Back in session. 
Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
We have met with counsel and have reached an 
agreement on exhibits. Stip to 
admission of PL 11-15 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Admit 11-15 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Stip is that I will ask Ms Beard a couple 
questions on those documents. 
Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Also exh G, city election manual. Exh A, And PL 
exh 90, and 56-60, that they 
were not located in Kootenai for service. 
AS an offer of proof, Mr Kelso would like the 
additional facts in those 
documents put in the record. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I think that's already of record. 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Yes, explains, the portion that they were not 
located in Kooteani County. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
As to the circumstances of nonservice. 
Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
With the testimony ofMs Beard we would have no 
further evidence. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Ms Beard retake the stand, you are still under 
oath. 
Other: Beard, Deedie 
Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Stipulation is that Mr Kelso can ask Ms Beard 
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some questions. 
12:12:25 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
OK. 
12:12:47 Other: Beard, Deedie 
Exh 11 pertains to M Paquin. There is no address 
information filled in. 
12:16:32 Indicates she is outside the city indefinately. 
Exh 12, Dobslaff, If you 
12:18:13 don't have a license number you put the last 
four of your social. Explains 
12:19:47 absentee ballot request. I don't know how they 
got the address. 
12:21:06 There was no application for 2009 absentee that 
they could find. remember 
12:21:30 them searching for an absentee request. I do not 
know where the address came 
12:22:09 from. Exh 13 for Parkes. It has no indication of 
year/months in Idaho. Exh 14 
12:24:35 for Friend. No indication of years/months in 
Idaho. He marked he was a US 
12:27:17 citizen residing outside the US indefinately. No 
license or ID. Exh 15 for 
12:28:59 Gagnon. Rec'd in 2004, not sure of the date, I 
can't make it out. She 
12:31:01 indicates a member ofthe uniform services or 
merchant marine or spouse. No 
12:31:45 ID number. Address is in CA. Different people 
recieve and review the 
12:32:37 document, Susan, Sherry Van Patten and temps. 
Exh 14 Friend, its a UOCAVA and 
12:33:25 they wouldn't investigate it further. The last 
four of the social was put on 
12:33:50 it, the state system checks that. UOCA VA is 
federal. Idaho does not have 
12:36:08 permanent absentee status, other states do. No 
inquiry is made as to voting 
12:36:56 in Canada, the affd states they're not 
requesting a ballot in any other 
12:37:16 jurisdiction or state. IC 50-, reads. 
12:38:57 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Obj, 
12:39:03 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
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12:40:01 
12:40:18 
12:40:23 
12:40:29 
12:40:34 
12:41:31 
12:41:56 
12:42:36 
12:43:00 
12:43:21 
12:44:03 
12:44:35 
I can read the rest of the statute. 
Other: Beard, Deedie 
The addresses on the registration card are 
within the city and that's what 
we'd go by. 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
That's all. 
Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
CROSS 
Other: Beard, Deedie 
Not having the year/months on a UOCA VA person 
does not concern me. For 
Pacquin there is form 76 which is a federal 
form. Pacquin filled it out, its 
an affd. 
She's authorized to fill it out. 
For Dobslaff, she filled out a UOCAVA card. 
Parkes filled out a registration 
card, asked for an absentee ballot, resides 
outside the US and not voting 
outside this area. Friend is also a form 76 and 
affirmed. Gagnon shows there 
is a form 76. She affirms a member of service or 
a spouse. 
12:45:17 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
CROSS 
12:45:22 Other: Beard, Deedie 
Exh 12, based on my information they are 
qualified to vote in 2009, same with 
12:45:43 exh 15. 
12:45:49 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
REDIRECT 
12:45:57 Other: Beard, Deedie 
I don't know re: federal law. 
12:47:48 Jndge: Hosack, Charles 
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12:48:09 Other: Beard, Deedie 
12:48:14 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Obj 
12:48:16 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Sustain 
12:48:25 Other: Beard, Deedie 
Obj 
12:48:28 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Sustain 
12:48:38 That completes evidence on behalf of the 
defense? 
12:48:50 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Yes. 
12:48:52 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Concluded with witness testimony except for 
Dobslafff and Gagnon. 
12:50:05 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Two more exh, 50 and 51 stip to those. 
12:50:25 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Admit 50 and 51. 
12:50:52 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Exh 11-15, we substituted some copies for the 
exhibits, the Court does not 
12:51:45 have those. 
12:51:47 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Right, whatever is with the clerk are the 
exbhits. 
12:52:03 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Rest. 
12:52:29 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
The city rests, save for something striking with 
Dabslaff and Gagnon. 
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12:53:02 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Right. Let's go offthe record and see if 
Dabslaff can go at 1:00. 
12:53:44 Stop recording 
14:04:45 
Recording Started: 
14:04:45 Record 
Eta!, City of CDA 
14:04:48 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Back on the record. Afther the close of 
evidence, there's been a pending 
14:05:10 motion to amend and the court has reserved 
ruling. 
14:05:24 One thing, the county records have been in the 
jury room and a jury starting 
14:05:42 Mon. I'm going to have the bailiff contact the 
Mr Cafferty and remove them 
14:06:09 sometime this afternoon. At present, I think 
we'll continue to tomorrow 
14:06:46 morning. 
14:06:47 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
On Motion to Amend, IC 34-2001. There was a 
failure of duty. Chief Deputy 
14:08:19 Hurst stated that. 133 I 139, July 1999, there 
were counting errors. In that 
14:10:34 case the court found there were a number of 
discrepancies. Proper remedy was 
14:10:56 to have a new election. That sums up this case. 
For malconduct, if there is 
14:11:37 error ofthejudges of any precinct, Ms Beard 
testified there was no daily 
14:12:14 count ofthe votes, no comparison to the daily 
reports, to arrive at a 
14:12:42 figure. Ms Beard accepted to count ofthe 
machine. The only way to determine 
14: 13:23 that then is under 34-1 010, so that you can go 
to a box and do a count. City 
14:14:22 clerk testified she accepted the number handed 
to her. The only number that 
14:15:51 has validity is the Nov 6 document. Hurst 
testified he never told any county 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 121, ... 
l
 t
 
r
l
l
r
: 
 t
 t
 
SC 38417-2011 Page 2261 of 2676
14:16:35 
14:17:52 
14:22:14 
14:23:06 
14:23:22 
14:30:27 
14:31:01 
14:31:11 
14:31:46 
14:32:38 
not to comply with statutes. He testified this 
is an election contest 
situation. 
You can't just rely on what is stated on a voter 
registration card. 
What we've seen through this trial is that they 
didn't follow the law, and 
most didn't know the law. 
Failure to maintain 34-1011 and 50-451 is 
malconduct. That record wasn't 
kept. 
Pers. Attorney: Reed, Scott 
The arguement Mr Kelso made is one that you will 
hear again tomorrow. The 
arguement is one that's been made before. In 
Noble v Ada, errors made in the 
clerks office could not disinfranchize the 
voters. Mistakes made here were 
14:33:08 from people who had no ax to grind, three votes. 
There's no showing of 
14:33:33 malconduct or fraud. Recount was done, and we 
came up with an accurate count. 
14:34:35 No evidence the duplicate ballots were not legal 
ballots. IC 34-1011, doesn't 
14:36:50 have anything to do with the conduct of the 
election. The ballot count was in 
14:37:14 the machine, just not printed. They went through 
the ballots and had the 
14:38:12 actual and that was given to the city counsel. 
Everything was done 
14:39:23 thouroughly. No basis for amending the 
Complaint. 
14:40:18 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Failure to keep a record, if true, isn't 
malconduct. Malconduct, if it's 
14:41:21 exists, would lie with Kootenai County, which is 
not a party to this suit. At 
14:42:19 this point, they've only gained one vote, they 
need four more. Malconduct 
14:42:46 isn't proven. 
14:42:52 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
You have a couple minutes to cover a response. 
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14:43:13 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
14:43:45 
14:44:19 
14:44:58 
14:45:33 
14:45:56 
14:46:40 
14:47:20 
14:48:51 
14:50:04 
14:52:55 
14:53:19 
14:54:40 
14:55:07 
14:55:32 
14:56:55 
14:57:13 
14:57:22 
14:57:47 
14:58:35 
We've submitted documentation of what we believe 
is malconduct. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Malconduct is not fraud or corruption. Just what 
malconduct is remains 
somewhat foggy. Nothing that I heard argued 
would be excluded if argued on 
closing. I don't see how adding the word 
malconduct would change any of the 
arguments. If there was anything there, it would 
go to the county. This 
Court has ruled the city can contract with the 
county. I mean no disrespect 
to Mr Hurst, but on the issues I'm deciding he 
couldn't add very much. His 
role is extremely limited. It's machine voting, 
who owns the machines, the 
county controls that. There isn't anything 
legally incorrect with the city 
contracting. The county is not a party. Deny 
Motion to Amend. 
Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
On behalf ofMr Kennedy, Motion to Dismiss. 
Looking at the light most 
favorable, remaining ground under 34-1011, five 
vote difference. Votes given 
up, now a margin of four. Who are the illegal 
votes such that it would change 
the vote? Harris and Prior testified they can't 
remember. Impeachment 
evidence but not substantive evidence. If you 
take Zellers, Dabslaff, and 
Gagnon - that's only three. Case should be 
dismissed - now. 
Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Adopt Mr Erbland's argument. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
It doesn't address subsection 6, not a 
determinitive argument. On subsection 
5, can't do that, deny. 
Will take a break, and see if Dabslaff is on 
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standby. 
14:59:04 Stop recording 
(On Recess) 
15:06:02 
Recording Started: 
15:06:02 Record 
Etal, City of CDA 
15:06:18 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Back in session. 
15:09:11 Stop recording 
(On Recess) 
15:17:29 
Recording Started: 
15:17:29 Record 
Etal, City of CDA 
15:17:39 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
In session. 
15:19:06 the process. 
15:19:33 Other: Dobslaff, Denise 
I understand I'm in court. I understand I'll be 
sworn. 
15:21:07 Sworn by clerk. 
15:21:13 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
DIRECT 
15:21:18 Other: Dobslaff, Denise 
My primary home in Vernon BC. From end of Sept 
2009 to present residence was 
15:22:10 in Vernon BC. I received an absentee ballot in 
the mail. It was just sent to 
15:22:43 me, I did not ask for it. When I received it I 
thought I was entitled to 
15:23: 13 vote. 
15:23:32 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
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15:23:35 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Any cross? 
15:23:44 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
CROSS 
15:24:26 Other: Dobslaff, Denise 
A few years ago I applied for absentee for 
presidential election. I did not 
15:25:02 know I was entitled to a ballot for the next two 
general elections. I did 
15:25:29 vote in the presidential election by absentee. 
At that time I was living in 
15:25:53 BC. I'm a US citizen, over the age of 18. I 
lived in CDA until I was 24 yrs 
15:26:26 old. When I'm in CDA I stay at my brothers' 
house on 11th Street. I own maybe 
15:26:59 one percent ofhis property, part of an 
inhereitance. When I signed the 
15:27:29 absentee ballot it was true to the best of my 
knowledge. 
15:27:58 Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
No questions. 
15:28:34 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
15:29:01 She's testified that information is correct, 
should put in the record what 
15:29:18 tha is. 
15:29:22 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Continues cross. 
15:29:36 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
I have a question. Approach? 
15:30:08 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
OK. 
15:30:55 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Continues cross. 
15:31 :05 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Obj, need to clarifY what affd. 
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15:31:35 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
0/R 
15:31:44 Other: Dobslaff, Denise 
I don't know what a form 76 is. I remember 
filling out a form. I said I 
15:32:45 resided outsided the US, indefinately, because I 
don't know when I'll be 
15:33:04 coming back. I'm an American. For now, I'm 
married to a Canadian. I haven't 
15:33:52 decided if after he retires we'll move to the 
States. I would like to be able 
15:34: 13 to vote in presidential elections. I voted in 
CDA city election. 
15:35:00 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
REDIRECT 
15:35:12 Other: Dobslaff, Denise 
I signed an affd and mailed it to your office in 
CDA. I said primary abode 
15:36:28 was in Vernon BC. 
15:36:36 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
I need to ask the court for a ruling. 
15:36:46 Question to witness. 
15:36:52 Other: Dobslaff, Denise 
I'm a landed immigrant in Canada!, I'm only 
allowed to leave- explains. 
15:37:33 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
She's testified she's livinng in Canada, but 
wishes to vote in presidential 
15:37:56 elections. does she wish to keep CDA as place to 
vote and registered to vote 
15:38:24 anywhere else? 
15:38:33 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Questions witness with judges' question. 
15:38:53 Other: Dobslaff, Denise 
I live in Canada, my wish is to continue to vote 
in presidential election 
15:39:31 even though I live in BC. 
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15:40:04 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
I have an objection. 
15:40:49 Other: Dobslaff, Denise 
That's what I understand from the consulate, I 
use the last address. I'm 46 
15:42:13 yrs now. I left when I was 24. I moved to Canada 
in July 1988. I've been a 
15:42:41 landed immigrant. I can leave for 3 months every 
5 years. I've not registered 
15:44:55 to vote anywhere other thann Kootenai. 
15:45:07 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
CROSS 
15:45:16 Other: Dobslaff, Denise 
When I come down I come to CDA, that is where my 
mother and brother abode, I 
15:45:34 have friends and family there. I stay at the 
house I have a small interest. I 
15:45:50 I intend to keep CDA as the place where I vote. 
When husband retires I would 
15:46:23 like to return to CDA, I don't know what he'd 
like. 
15:46:58 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
No futher questions on reidency issue. 
15:47:10 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Does anyone want to argue? 
15:47:24 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
IC 50-402. I have more questions for witness. 
15:47:56 Other: Dobslaff, Denise 
I'm not employeed. Husband works in the lumber 
industry, in Armstrong, north 
15:48:29 ofVernon. Family receives income in Canada, 
about 50% goes to taxes. We file 
15:49:02 joint taxes in Canada. I have an automobile, 
registered in Vern on, BC, I have 
15:49:38 a license in BC. 
15:51:14 Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Argues, residence for voting allows a person to 
be absent for a period of 
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15:51:30 time, regardless of duration, form 76 is 
consistant with that. That allows 
15:51:50 her to continue to vote. She intends to return, 
and would like to keep her 
15:52:04 voting status here. 
15:52:09 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Another question. 
15:52:18 Other: Dobslaff, Denise 
When I moved in 1988 it was a question if it 
would be temporary. After I got 
15:52:52 my landed immigrantcy I had to make this my 
residency. Landed immigrantcy · 
15:53:32 means I don't have to deal with the political 
stuff here. 
15:54:19 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Now I have the facts, I need to face the legal 
argument. UOCA VA has been 
15:54:42 adopted by Idaho. It addresses overseas citizen. 
UOCA VA rules appear to be 
15:55:50 addressing this. Would still like to maintain 
right to vote in CDA. Municipal 
15:56:41 statute is slightly different, reads. The ruling 
is going to be that under 
15:58:08 the federal witness had done what's necessary to 
continue to vote federally. 
15:58:24 Idaho has adopted that, municipal seems more 
restrictive. As a trial court, 
15:59:16 I'm disturbed to make a distinction to vote 
dependent on the office. A person 
15:59:47 has done what's necessary to vote for president, 
I'm not comfortable making a 
16:00:04 legal ruling not extending that to city 
election. Going to rule compliance 
16:00:46 with the federal statute makes that person a 
qualified elector, as long as 
16:01:05 they meet that requirement. My call is that she 
was a legal voter in 
16:01:24 returning the ballot to CDA. 
16:01:46 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
I'd like to ask a question. 
16:01:54 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 128, ... 
  
 
.
 
SC 38417-2011 Page 2268 of 2676
OK 
16:01:57 Other: Dobs1aff, Denise 
When I moved I went right to Vernon from CDA. 
16:02:47 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
16:03:01 
16:13:54 
16:13:54 
16:13:55 
16:14:03 
16:14:13 
16:14:34 
16:14:58 
16:15:02 
16:15:43 
16:16:03 
16:16:16 
We'll go off the record while we try to find our 
next witness. 
Stop recording 
(On Recess) 
Recording Started: 
Record 
Etal, City of CDA 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Back in session. 
Ready to call the next witness. 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
I've been informed by the coast guard office 
that Ms Gagnon is not available 
at this time. And if I would pay her ticket to 
fly up here she'd come visit 
her family. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
The ruling would be same as for a local person, 
with that the chance to call 
that witness is past. Any rebuttal? 
Evidence is at a conclusion? 
Other: Parties:, All 
yes. 
16:16:34 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
We can discuss where we go from here off the 
record. We've lined up a court 
16:16:50 reporter for tomorrow. I do want to hear your 
argument, and I have a jury 
16:17:16 trial next week. I appreciate counsel willing to 
come tomorrow. I was 
16:18:18 thinking about 9:30, the bailiffwill open the 
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door at 9:00. 
16:19:40 Other: Parties:, All 
Agree. 
16:19:49 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Adjourn. 
16:20:10 Stop recording 
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09:35:05 Other: NOTE: 
Allison Stouvall is the court reporter for 
Saturday, Sept 19, 2010, closing 
09:35:31 arguments. 
09:35:34 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Thanks attorneys for coming in on a Saturday, 
very much appreciate the 
09:36:07 courtesy of parties, comments. Has been a 
difficult case all the way around. 
09:39:35 I reviewed notes this morning. I want to review 
where we are on illegal voter 
09:40:08 issue, subsection 5, to make sure we're all on 
the same page. 
09:40:51 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
That's where my closing is. 
09:41:29 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I think it might be helpful for counsel if I 
tell them where I am on this, 
09:41:54 for purposes of determination of an illegal 
vote. And legal votes re: 
09:42:41 Dobslaff and Chamness. Is an issue for the Court 
on Paquin, Friend and 
09:44:39 Gagnon. 
09:45:35 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
I'm focusing on subsection 5 and 6. IC 34-2018, 
if inspection of a ballot in 
09:46:49 necessary, the balllot box is to be delivered to 
the judge unopened. Three 
09:47:29 sealed bins were presented to Judge Marano. From 
those bins he counted the 
09:47:50 ballots from each locked box. He arrived at 2027 
ballots counted by him. 
09:48:17 Seventeen duplicates, which are ballots that 
could not be run through the 
09:48:49 machine. 2010 can be run through the machine. 
Another ballot is prepared to 
09:49:32 run through the machine, to get back to 2027. If 
we add in the seven void, 
09:50:51 you have 2034. Susan Smith testified one 
absentee ballot return envelope 
09:51:40 equals one ballot. Boehm affidavit, 2086 
envelopes were counted, 4 were 
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09:52:51 unknown as to city or county. That leave 2082. 
For this analysis I'll presume 
09:53:22 county. Two weeks later, Judge Marano counted 
counted 32 of the 2082 that 
09:53:59 were said to be county. 2050 absentee ballot 
envelopes are left, ifwe 
09:54:40 presume they are all county. That's not 2051 
that were counted. 2050 existing 
09:55:05 envelopes, they are ballots that have to be 
determined void or not. On 11-6 
09:55:38 there were 5 voided, one person counted twice, 
so left with 2044, that's 
09:56:05 seven votes different. Now, let's start with 
2086, 4 city, 32 were county, so 
09:57:08 left with 2054 absentee ballot envelopes, which 
doesn't include the 5 voided. 
09:57:51 Less 6 is 2048. One final way, 2086 envelopes, 
let's presume for argument, 
09:58:53 less 2 for county, leave 2084 envelopes. Take 
the 32 that are county 
09:59:21 balllots, end up with 2052. Out of2052 you have 
to deduct the known void 
09:59:55 ballots of 6, leaves 2046, that's five votes. 
Regarding those, we're not 
10:00:39 arguing Ainsworth, and Croft. It's a five vote 
election. Three reports done 
10:02:11 in Nov, on 6, 16th, and 24. Nov 6 has 2041 valid 
ballots. Nov 16 report 
10:02:48 reflects 2049 total, without taking out the void 
ones. Nov 24 report reflects 
10:03:11 2056 total received, reflects seven after 
election. Take that out for 2049, 
10:03:49 the five that were voided before are still in 
this number, take that out, and 
10:04:07 the one that one person voted twice, end up with 
2043, that's 8 different. 
10:04:35 Still not including Ainsworth, White and Croft. 
The three known reports that 
10:05:06 we have reflect 2041, 2041 and 2043. Each of 
these reports came input into 
10:05:50 computers from election officials. None ofthe 
daily reports were produced or 
10:06:10 put in evidence. These numbers should equal out 
to the daily report, that was 
10:06:44 never compared. All these are more than the 
difference between the 
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10:07:24 
10:08:17 
10:10:02 
10:11:18 
10:12:16 
10:12:43 
10:13:49 
10:15:05 
10:16:19 
10:18:01 
10:19:15 
10:19:59 
10:22:11 
10:22:31 
10:22:46 
10:22:58 
10:23:58 
10:24:39 
10:27:32 
10:28:52 
10:29:20 
10:29:57 
canidates. Carrie Phillips report, searching for 
absentee request, after 
deducting the 165, total was 2019. Hurst 
testified four voters had moved and 
were deleted from the database. End up with 
2023. Four less than Judge 
Marano's count. 28 less than the amount run 
through the computer. Defense 
uses 2051 number ofJudge Marano's count of 
2027, add in 17 duplicates, and 7 
voids for 2051. 2051 matches the machine count, 
but not any other number. The 
problems lies in the 17 duplicates. You don't 
add the duplicates back in. If 
you don't add the 17 duplicates twice, you get 
2034. Illegal votes were 
received and counted. Let's talk about the 
canvass subsection. Gridley 
testified the city counsil did not count votes, 
the county did. Treatise 
election law, page 64, states the roll of city 
counsil is minisqual, but are 
required to count votes. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I understand you're argument on this, I've ruled 
on this. 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
The city was to count the vote, not recount. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Aren't you rearguing the ruling of the court? 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
No. Argues. 
Based on Nelson v Irrigation District, 1999, 
election was set aside. 
Treatise, Court has power to order new election. 
Removing this person from 
seat 2 will not impact the business of the city 
of CD A. Sup Court upheld 
Judge Moss' order for a new election. We're not 
asking you disinfranchize any 
voter of the City ofCDA. We're saying everybody 
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gets to vote in this new 
10:30:21 election. This Court should so order. Sup Court 
said that was proper in 
10:31:01 Nelson case. We're asking for a new election for 
seat 2. Let the voter's 
10:31:31 decide. Let every legal voter vote. It would be 
a simple matter to add seat 2 
10:32:39 to the Nov election. 
10:32:50 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Exh 86, which is the canvass, we don't have any 
evidence for ballots cast on 
10:33:37 voting day? 
10:33:44 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
We've never disputed 2051 counts from machine, 
but count should be 2041. 
10:34:32 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
All evidence is with regard to absentee? 
10:35:09 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
We didn't go through the 4000 
10:35:21 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Will take a short break. Recess. 
10:35:33 Stop recording 
(On Recess) 
10:45:51 
Recording Started: 
10:45:51 Record 
Etal, City of CDA 
10:45:55 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Back in session. 
10:46:02 Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
I've advised Mr Erbland I wanted to make a 
clarification. Exh 94, re: 
10:46:30 non-absentee ballot voters, the poll books do 
not reflect whether they 
10:4 7:04 received a city or county ballot. 
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10:48:25 
10:51:10 
10:52:31 
10:52:48 
10:53:09 
10:53:59 
10:54:16 
10:54:47 
10:55:30 
10:56:35 
10:57:45 
10:59:42 
11:02:53 
11:03:20 
11:04:49 
11:07:43 
11:11:26 
11:11:50 
11:13:59 
11:14:35 
11:19:59 
11:20:23 
11:21:21 
Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Closing argument. 
The margin today is four. IC allows reliefwhen 
challenged. AS far as Paquin, 
Friend and Gagnon the court has not determined, 
it is our position that that 
is moot. It's never been proffered as to how 
they voted, they were legal 
residents for voting purposes. We don't know how 
they voted. Harris and Prior 
are not legal voters, they testified they could 
not remember who they voted 
for. Impeachment evidence was Harris said 
Kennedy and Prior said incumbant in 
conversations with Jenkins. Argues regarding 
impeachment testimony, not subst 
antive evidence, it's black letter law. Zellers 
said I think Kennedy, but not 
sure. The margin remains at three. If you deduct 
Harris and Prior, still have 
one. IC 34-2101(5) allows a challenge. We look 
to see if any of this would 
change the result. 
The Brannon team prevailed upon the Court to 
inspect absentee 
ballots. Prevailed on a judge to do the 
counting. If we want to know the orig 
ian! count we look to Eugene Marano affd and 
notes. 
Reads from Eugene Marano affidavit. 
Ballots received Nov 3, 2009, was in a sealed 
envelope, the seal removed in 
front of Judge Marano, not an invalid ballot, 
but a invalid write-in. You add 
the seven and get 2051. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Exh 86, questions re: figures. 
Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Comments regarding a damaged ballot, machine 
kicks it out, hasn't counted the 
ballots. Duplicate ballot is made and the 
machine then counts it. The 
damaged ballot is fixed then counted. 
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11:22:14 
11:22:52 
11:27:57 
11:31:27 
11:32:41 
11:34:25 
11:34:44 
11:35:04 
11:36:03 
11:36:17 
11:37:28 
11:38:23 
11:38:43 
11:39:09 
11:41:09 
11:41:54 
11:42:21 
11:43:27 
11:43:47 
11:45:03 
11:46:47 
11:47:27 
11:49:08 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
In the court's mind sometimes the 2051 includes 
the 17 duplicates and 
sometimes it doesn't. Questions re: how 
duplicates are counted. 
Add Ins: Erbland, Peter 
Argues. 
Noble v Ada County, 
There is not such thing as a perfect trial, and 
there is no such thing as a 
perfect election. Sup Court has made it clear, 
and election should not be 
overturned based on allegations of 
irregularities. That applies to this case, 
ask the court to dismiss the case and find for 
defendants. 
Add Ins: Haman, Michael 
Closing argument. 
2044 absentee ballots were submitted, 17 were 
flawed, the machine didn't 
count them. The machine originally counted 2027. 
The 17 were corrected and run 
through the machine bringing it to 2027, then 
the write-ins of7 bringing it 
to 2034. Stipulated to 3 illegal votes. It's 
gone from a five vote difference 
now one. Case is about significant errors to 
change to vote. PL focus was on 
illegal votes. Kootenai county had an open door 
to explain the process to us. 
There were no secret meetings, PL was as some of 
the meetings. It was determi 
ned it was a correct election and the right 
person won. The best evidence is 
the count by Judge Marano. It comes to 2051, his 
count validated testimony. 
There were irregularities. All the workers did 
what the Sec of State 
instructed them to do. The city could not know 
of any irregularities. It 
wouldn't change the results. 
Plaintiff Attorney: Kelso, Starr 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 137, ... 
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11:52:32 
11:53:10 
11:53:53 
11:54:18 
11:55:02 
11:55:37 
11:56:16 
11:56:38 
11:57:39 
11:58:19 
11:58:36 
11:59:32 
Final closing. 
Court has the power to order a new election. The 
electors will be able to go 
to ballot box and know their vote was properly 
counted. 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I know I'll have 50% of the population thinking 
I failed. The decision here 
will not make a difference in the running of the 
city, no dispute that both 
canidates would do a good job. I am not going to 
be able to rule in this, one 
of the issues I want to think about is legality 
as to remaining votes that 
have been characterized. I think the task of the 
Court is to decide the 
disputed issues. 
I can't let letting this be added into the Nov 
election be at issue. I'll 
write, but if that gets bogged down, I may call 
you back into court and put 
it on the record. I appreciate the presentation. 
Stop recording 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK091310A Page 138, Final page 
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) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRI~WH-;;;_ 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOT·ENAI 
JIM BRANNON, ) 
) 
PLAINTIFF, ) 
) 
Vs ) 
) 
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, ) 
IDAHO, a municipal corporation, et al, ) 
) 
DEFENDANT(S). ) 
ISSUES 
CASE NO. CV2009-10010 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
This is an election contest case pursuant to Idaho Code Section 34-2001. 
The issues presented are (1) whether there were sufficient illegal votes cast to 
change the outcome of the election and justify the Court in setting aside the 
election results under Subsection (5); (2) whether there was an error in counting 
the votes sufficient to change the outcome of the election and justify the Court in 
setting aside the election results under Subsection (6); and, (3) whether there 
was any evidence of malconduct supporting the Motion to Amend filed by the 
Plaintiff seeking to set aside the election under Subsection (1). 
I. ILLEGAL VOTES 
On the issue of illegal votes under Subsection (5), Plaintiff listed, as 
required by Section 34-2017(b), twenty-two (22) potential illegal voters. Eleven 
(11) were qualified voters who were registered to vote and did cast a ballot. Ten 
(1 0) of these were absentee voters, and one was a registered qualified voter who 
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voted at the polls on election day. Although there are some irregularities as to 
how nine (9) of the absentee ballots were received or the form of the return 
envelope, no claim was made at trial that any of these votes were illegal. As to 
the 1oth absentee vote (of Patricia Harris), no evidence was presented that the 
voter voted twice. As to the one election day voter, (Marte Chamness), the Court 
has determined Chamness to be a legal voter. 
Of the remaining eleven (11) individuals listed by Plaintiff pursuant to 
Section 34-2017, Subsection (b), as allegedly illegal votes, the votes of six (6) 
voters have been found to be illegal. The votes of Nancy White, Dustin 
Ainsworth, and Gregory Proft have been deemed illegal and for whom the vote of 
each was cast was determined by stipulation. Two of those votes were for 
Kennedy, and one was for Brannon. Therefore, the vote difference between 
Brannon and Kennedy has been reduced from five to four. 
There remain three illegal voters who testified as to how they cast their 
vote. They are Susan Harris, Ronald Prior, and Rahana Zellars. The Court has 
not yet made a determination as to how they voted. Susan Harris and Ronald 
Prior both testified that they did not recall who they voted for. Rahana Zellars 
testified that she believes she probably voted for Kennedy. 
With regard to Susan Harris and Ronald Prior, the only evidence that 
contests their testimony that they do not remember who they voted for is the 
impeachment testimony by an investigator who interviewed them following the 
election. The investigator testified that both individuals indicated to him that they 
voted for Kennedy. However, the investigator testified that when he first 
contacted each of those two individuals, they both stated that they did not recall 
who they voted for. It was during continuing questioning by the investigator that 
statements were made about how they voted. 
Both individuals testified at trial that the private investigator's statements 
that they had told him that they had voted for Kennedy were not an accurate 
summary of their comments to the investigator as to the true nature of their 
knowledge. The Court finds the testimony of each that they do not remember to 
be credible. It is therefore unnecessary to rule on the legal issue raised by the 
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defense that the impeachment testimony is not substantive evidence and cannot 
be used as a matter of law to determine that Harris or Prior voted for one 
candidate as opposed to the other. The Court concludes that Susan Harris and 
Ronald Prior are credible with regard to their in-court testimony which is that they 
do not recall for whom they voted in the Kennedy-Bran non race. 
Rahana Zellars testified that she was uncertain as to her vote, but she 
also testified that she thought she probably voted for Kennedy. A statement that 
someone thinks they "probably" voted for someone does not necessarily mean 
one is certain enough to swear under oath as to whom they may have voted. The 
statement that one "probably" voted for a candidate could be immediately 
followed by another statement that the voter is nonetheless not at all sure. 
Certainly one who thinks something might be probable may be unwilling to swear 
under oath that it is in fact true. However, the nature of Rahana Zellars' 
testimony, and the way she gave it, with the apparent degree of certainty upon 
which she stated her "probability" of having voted for Kennedy, causes the Court 
to conclude that she did in fact vote for Kennedy. While the reasons given (she 
thinks she voted for Kennedy because she always votes for the Democrat) are 
not clear to the Court, since the race was nonpartisan and no party affiliation was 
shown on the ballot, nonetheless the Court finds that, for whatever reason, Ms 
Zellars was comfortable enough about the degree of the probability of her 
recollection that the Court can find that her statement that she probably voted for 
Kennedy is a correct statement of how she voted. 
Regarding the aforementioned three (3) illegal votes in question, the Court 
finds that two cannot remember how they voted and one voted for Kennedy. This 
reduces the vote total for Kennedy by one, so the vote difference is now three 
(3). 
The above discussion still leaves still five (5) individuals as potential illegal 
voters pursuant to Subsection (b). These are five (5) UOCAVA voters. (Paquin, 
Farkes, Friend, Dobslaff, and Gagnon). The Court has determined Dobsloff to be 
a legal voter, pursuant to the applicable UOCAVA criteria. 
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With regard to Paquin, Farkes, Friend, and Gagnon, there is the threshold 
issue of the legality of their residence. Defendants claim the residency issue is 
moot because there is no evidence as to how any one of the four voted. Even if 
all were found to be illegal residents, because there is no evidence of how they 
voted, any illegality of their residence cannot impact the outcome of the election, 
and is therefore irrelevant. 
Nonetheless, the issue of UOCAVA votes by Paquin, Farkes, Friend, and 
Gagnon arguably relates to alleged irregularities in the election process. The 
Court will therefore examine the legality of the residence of the four (4) 
individuals to determine the legality of their voter status. 
As to Monica Paquin, there was essentially no evidence other than the 
fact that she was no longer living at the Coeur d'Alene address given. However, 
under UOCAVA, Paquin was legally entitled to vote absentee. She was living 
overseas and had listed her last place of abode as her place of voting. She did 
not testify at trial, nor was there any evidence that would indicate that she was 
living abroad other than temporarily. Therefore, there is no evidence in the record 
for the Court to find her vote illegal. 
With regard to Kimberly Gagnon, the testimony at trial established that she 
is a spouse of a current member of the military and is a legal voter under 
UOCAVA. The evidence at trial only further supported her legal status to vote 
absentee pursuant to her UOCAVA application. 
With regard to Friend, he listed a commercial office as a residence 
address on his UOCAVA paperwork. The commercial nature of the address was 
established by evidence introduced during the trial. The fact that the location is a 
commercial space was not evident from the voter information. Apparently, the 
building was formerly a residential house, and has been converted to office 
space. Again, under UOCAVA, Friend was living abroad and entitled to list Coeur 
d'Alene as his voting residence as long as that was his last place of residence. 
While there may be an issue over listing what is apparently a commercial space 
when asked to list a residential address, there is no evidence showing that he 
was not a qualified voter and legal resident of the City of Coeur d'Alene prior to 
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moving abroad. Friend did not testify. Therefore, under the UOCAVA criteria, 
there is no evidence upon which the Court could make a finding that he was an 
illegal absentee voter. 
As to Farkes, no evidence was submitted during trial disputing her 
UOCAVA status as a legal voter. The UOCAVA paperwork submitted to the 
County shows that Farkes met the UOCAVA criteria, and the Court finds Farkes 
to be a legal voter. Mr. Hurst's opinion that Farkes was a legal voter, even though 
that opinion was based solely upon her registration and UOCAVA application, is 
therefore correct. 
Therefore, the Court finds that Paquin, Friend, Gagnon, and Farkes, were 
legal voters. 
While the Court understands the Plaintiff's concerns over election officials 
relying upon the UOCAVA criteria to qualify absentee voters, the County is 
simply following the law. The Court does not find there was an obligation on the 
County to check the address listed by Friend to see whether it was a commercial 
location or a residential location. A failure to investigate the accuracy of the 
information submitted for UOCAVA status is not any kind of irregularity by 
election officials. There is no duty to investigate. Any failure to do so does not in 
any way constitute an irregularity. This Court can hardly find the County at fault 
when it relied on the UOCAVA criteria. 
While Plaintiff did not prevail on the UOCAVA issue to establish illegal 
votes, the Plaintiff does raise legitimate concerns. The Court held on reviewing 
Dobslaff's status that meeting the UOCAVA criteria for valid absentee votes for 
federal and state elections would also satisfy the requirement for municipal 
elections. As Plaintiff points out, the statute regarding the municipal residency 
requirement is slightly different than for federal or state. The Court could find no 
applicable case law, and held that UOCAVA was meant to be applied equally to 
a citizen's right to vote absentee, and that therefore this Court would not 
differentiate the right to vote absentee based upon whether an election was 
federal, state or municipal. The issue will remain unsettled without further 
clarification by either a legislative body or appellate court. 
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The Court concludes that Paquin, Friend, Farkes and Gagnon are legal 
voters. The final tally of the twenty-two (22) individuals listed as alleged illegal 
voters pursuant to Section 34-2017(b), after striking the votes found to be illegal, 
leaves Kennedy with three (3) votes more than Brannon. The illegal votes 
received are insufficient to change the election result. 
II. ERROR IN VOTE TALLY 
(a) In Person Voters 
Plaintiff has presented evidence as to certain unknowns regarding in 
person voting on election day. For example, Plaintiff points out that for fifty-three 
(53) votes at the polls on election day, no record exists as to whether the voter 
received a City or County ballot. Plaintiff argues this inadequacy of record 
keeping is an irregularity which justifies the Court in finding the vote tally 
untrustworthy. 
There is no evidence that any of the fifty-three (53) in person votes were 
by unqualified voters. A failure to keep a record is not proof of an illegal vote. The 
burden on a party challenging an election result is to prove facts that would have 
made a difference. There is simply nothing in the record that would support any 
finding that any of these fifty-three (53) in person votes were illegal or that, even 
assuming there were illegal votes, such votes were cast in a manner that would 
have made a difference. 
The issue of the inaccuracy of the vote tally is limited to the dispute over 
the count of absentee votes. Idaho law holds that irregularities in election 
procedures do not disenfranchise legal voters. The evidence regarding in person 
voting, if it demonstrates any irregularities, does not in any way cast any doubt 
on the validity of the in person votes, (other than was discussed in the above 
section regarding alleged illegal votes). 
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(b) Absentee Ballots Cast 
The alleged error is that the final tally of absentee ballots cast (2,051), as 
adopted by the City in declaring election results (Plaintiff's Exhibit 86), is a larger 
number than the number of absentee return envelopes actually received. Since 
each return envelope contains only one ballot, Plaintiff claims that there must be 
an error in the vote tally, because the County ran more absentee ballots through 
the machine than the County had actually received from voters. 
Where the alleged error is that there were more ballots counted than there 
were voters, it is not necessarily required to establish how the "extra" ballots 
were voted. How the votes, if any, were cast on the alleged "extra" ballots cannot 
be determined. No voter ever existed, and no inquiry can be made. Under the 
Subsection (5) alleging illegal voters, it is necessary to determine how the illegal 
voter voted, so a determination can be made as to whether the illegal votes 
made a difference. Under Subsection (6), the test is not a mathematical count, 
but whether there were "extra" ballots counted in an amount great enough that 
the votes could have made a difference. By way of illustration, if 1,000 people 
voted in an election and 2,000 ballots were counted, and candidate A had 1,001 
votes and candidate B had 999 votes, a court could declare a new election based 
on an error in vote counting (1 ,000 ballots that did not get cast by voters were 
erroneously counted as votes) that made the difference in the outcome. This 
conclusion could properly be made under Subsection (6), even though no 
determination could be made as to how the 1000 extra ballots were in fact voted. 
In this case, Plaintiff claims that in a 6,370 vote election, of 2,051 
absentee ballots cast, ten (or more) were not ballots that voters filled out. Even if 
only the absentee vote is considered, an alleged ten extra ballots would be only 
% (one half) of one percent of the 2,051 ballots. Nonetheless, in a five (5) vote 
election, (out of 6,325 votes counted), although no one could know how the 
alleged ten or more "extra" ballots were filled out, the Plaintiff's claim raises the 
mathematical possibility that if all ten ballots contained votes for the race in 
question, and if all ten votes were cast for the winner, then the error in counting 
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these extra ballots in the vote tally made the difference in the election. Therefore, 
this allegation states a claim that requires a trial. (The same issue over counting 
more ballots than there were voters could arguably be addressed as an 
irregularity constituting malconduct under Subsection (1), but the Court has ruled 
that this issue is more properly raised and decided under Subsection (6).) 
The Court finds Judge Marano's ballot count of 2,051 for physically 
existing absentee ballots to be accurate. The 2,027 ballots, in boxes 3-A, 3-B, 
and 4 which were run through the machine, were counted by Judge Marano on 
June 22, 2010. The seventeen (17) duplicate ballots which were run through the 
machine were counted by Judge Marano on July 2, 2010. The seven (7) write-ins 
were valid ballots which were run through the machine and were counted by 
Judge Marano on July 14,2010. The sum for ballots cast is 2,051. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 85 is a County generated document for the City 
General Election printed on November 4, 2009. It shows 2,051 absentee ballots 
cast in the city election. The County then prepared a document (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
No. 86) to present to the City for the purpose of the City Council accepting the 
election results. Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 86 states the number of absentee ballots is 
2,051. The City accepted that number when accepting the results of the election 
as presented by the County election officials. 
(c) Discrepancy Between Absentee Ballots Cast and Absentee Ballots 
Received 
The central issue at trial was whether the Plaintiff has established that the 
County's figure of 2,051 absentee ballots cast was greater than the amount of 
absentee ballots actually received, and, if so, what was the amount of the 
discrepancy. 
Plaintiff argues that there are various documents in the record that 
establish that the actual number of absentee ballots received was substantially 
less than 2,051. While the number of votes cast will logically be less than the 
number of ballots (many voters may not bother to vote on all offices or issues 
appearing on a ballot), where the number of ballots run through the voting 
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machine exceeds the number of ballots actually received from voters, there is the 
potential that votes have been counted and included in the final vote tally that 
were on ballots that had not been filled in and voted by actual voters. The greater 
the number of "extra" ballots, and the closer the election, the greater the potential 
for "extra" votes to change the outcome of an election. 
Plaintiff's claim is that records in evidence show that the machine count for 
absentee ballots cast is greater (perhaps ten (1 0) more) than the number of 
absentee ballots that the County actually ever received. In an election decided by 
five (5) votes, Plaintiff's claim that the true number of valid absentee ballots 
actually received from voters may be substantially less than the 2,051 ballots 
shown as cast on the final vote tally raises a meritorious issue. Although there is 
no way to tell if the "extra" ballots resulted in "extra" votes for a certain candidate 
in the race in question, the potential exists. Although no one could ever know 
how an "extra" ballot was voted, Plaintiff argues that, since the election was 
decided by only five (5) votes, and given various other irregularities, a new 
election should be held. 
The allegation of more ballots having been counted than ballots received 
raises a potentially meritorious issue as to the accuracy of the vote tally. And 
when the vote difference is five (5), this alleged discrepancy of ten or more 
"extra" ballots may be large enough to arguably have made a difference, 
depending upon all the circumstances. 
As consistently pointed out by Plaintiff's counsel, the problem is that if ten 
or more ballots are included in counting the final vote tally, which such ballots in 
fact were never filled in by a voter, a recount is of no help. The ten ballots that 
should not be counted are automatically included in the recount, and the recount 
will simply repeat the mistake. The statistical data of the recount does not 
produce any information. 
The Court holds that, if there were ten or more ballots counted, which 
were "extra" ballots in fact never sent in by a voter, then the potential of ten 
"extra" votes could be sufficient in a five vote election under Subsection (6) to 
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establish an inaccurate vote count that made a difference, depending upon all 
the circumstances as shown by the evidence at trial. 
(d) Absentee Return Envelopes 
The Court finds that the number of 2,051 is an accurate count of ballots 
actually ran through the machine (absentee ballots cast). The evidence at trial 
was undisputed that there was only one absentee ballot contained within each 
absentee return envelope received. The dispute is about the number of valid 
absentee return envelopes that the County actually received from voters. 
During the litigation, the County produced 2,086 absentee return 
envelopes, which Judge Marano counted. Four of these, for some reason, could 
not be determined as City or County. Judge Marano subtracted all four, arriving 
at a total of 2,082 absentee return envelopes received. At trial, the County 
presented evidence that thirty-two (32) of the return envelopes presented to 
Judge Marano were from the County. The Court finds that the County has 
physical custody of 2,050 valid absentee return envelopes received for the City 
election. 
The discrepancy over the number of valid absentee return envelopes 
received is created by the existence of the Secretary of State database. This is a 
system for the entire State, under the control of the Secretary of State's office. 
Each county is required to participate. It is a centralized system, designed to 
provide up to the minute data on registered voters in the State of Idaho. The 
Secretary of State database shows voter identification, voter name, absentee 
code, residence address, mailing address, precinct, request date, issued date, 
received date, and, if voided, the reason. 
The database depends upon each County to input the data. The database 
for absentee ballots cast in the 2009 City of Coeur d'Alene election was inputted 
by Kootenai County election workers. 
The entries of most importance in this case are the request date for the 
absentee ballot, the issued date, the received date, and whether the ballot in the 
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received envelope was voided. This information tracks the record that the 
election official is to keep pursuant to Section 34-1011, Idaho Code, (or 50-451). 
As testified to by Mr. Hurst, a data entry system only provides information 
based upon the entries of data into the system. If the data is bad, or the entries 
are inaccurate, the usefulness of the information produced by the data entry 
system is reduced. 
There are several different versions from the State's database which are in 
evidence. One is dated November 6, 2009, Plaintiff's Exhibit 5. Another is dated 
November 16, 2009. A third is dated November 24, 2009. The fourth is dated 
August 19, 2010. The most important is the November 6, 2009, database. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 5). Mr. Hurst testified that, of all the databases, that would 
probably be the most accurate. Furthermore, it is the November 6, 2009, 
database that prompted Mr. Spencer's inquiry about the apparent discrepancy 
between the 2,051 tally of total absentee ballots cast in the City Canvass and the 
2,047 absentee return envelopes ballots received as shown on the November 6, 
2009, database. Furthermore, it is Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 that shows that, after 
deducting out the voided entries, the total of valid absentee return envelopes 
drops to 2,042. Plaintiff's Exhibit 5. Since the November 6, 2009, database 
shows that one entry was mistakenly made twice, this number drops to 2,041, 
the number probably most often referred to during the trial. 
The potential of "extra" votes is based upon the City tally showing 2,051 
absentee ballots cast, when the November 6, 2009, Secretary of State database 
shows only the 2,042 valid absentee envelopes returned. This has been in this 
case since the filing of the Complaint. Subtracting for the discovered duplication, 
the 2,041 figure for absentee return envelopes, or the potential of a ten (10) vote 
discrepancy, was established during trial. 
The Court does not find the databases other than Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 to be 
very useful. The system is in real time, so the further a database is removed from 
the date of election, the less reliable. The August 19, 2010, data base is 
apparently from a different search parameter, which merely underscores the fact 
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that the answer produced by the Secretary of State's database changes, 
depending upon when and how the question is asked. 
Furthermore, relying upon the database system is not justified, because, 
as Mr. Hurst testified, the system is only as good as the data entries. If any entry 
is omitted or duplicated, the data system simply reports invalid information. 
Mr. Hurst was quite clear that the State's database system was not 
intended to replace the record that the law requires the election officials to create 
and retain. However, Ms. Beard seemed to be under the impression that the 
Secretary of State database was in lieu of the County keeping a Section 34-1011 
report and that the database was the only report the County had. 
Ms Beard, however, also testified she relied upon the machine count 
shown on Plaintiff's Exhibit 85, and not on the database, because the database 
was not accurate. Furthermore, Ms Beard testified daily reports of the absentee 
ballots were made. Ms Beard appeared to be testifying that the County had the 
required information to make the report, but did not need to independently 
produce the report, and could instead provide a copy of the State database as 
the "record". 
Providing a database known to be inaccurate, and then not being able to 
provide the Section 34-1 011 record addressing the discrepancy when noted by 
an inquiring citizen, has been a factor in this litigation. If, when a citizen 
requested a report on November 6, 2009, regarding the November 3, 2009, 
election, the County had produced the record showing 2,051 absentee ballots 
cast and the 2,050 absentee return envelopes received, the issue of the one 
missing absentee return envelope could perhaps have been resolved. 
There was no evidence produced at trial showing that the stack of 2,050 
returned envelopes does not include all 2,041 valid names on the November 6, 
2009, database report. The record contemplated by Section 34-1101 turns out to 
be the stack of 2,050 absentee return envelopes. The nine (9) names that do not 
appear on the State's database would be on nine (9) of the return envelopes that 
physically exist in the custody of the County. 
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The Court is well aware that there is no Section 34-1011 report in 
evidence, and that there is no such report because no report was made. If such a 
record existed, that record could have been compared to the Secretary of State 
database. Instead, the 2,050 absentee return envelopes were apparently not 
available to the Plaintiff prior to discovery responses in July 2010. 
In fact, the 2,050 is the number arrived at during the September trial by 
subtracting the thirty-two (32) return envelopes identified by the County as being 
County ballots from the 2,082 figure counted by Judge Marano. 
The comments about the timing of disclosures of documents constituting a 
record is not a criticism by the Court of any of the parties (including the County) 
or their attorneys. Election litigation is very complex. The statute has been on the 
books since 1890, before women had the right to vote. Times have changed. 
Litigation under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure bears no resemblance to 
litigation in 1890. Society is much more mobile. The statute requires a trial in 
thirty (30) days, which in modern day society and modern day litigation has 
proved unworkable, at least in this case. The Court finds the parties and counsel 
did their best in litigating a difficult case. 
Nor does the Court fault the County election officials regarding the Section 
34-1011 record. Reliance upon the Secretary of State database is 
understandable, and the database is accurate enough that only in an extremely 
close election could any discrepancy create an issue. Having listened to six days 
of testimony, the Court is impressed by the complexity of the election process, 
and at how well the County ran the election. Notably, there was no evidence at 
trial, including any testimony from the Secretary of State's office, as to how just 
exactly County election officials were to create and maintain this record in 
municipal elections. Nonetheless, the fact that this determination of what the 
record would have shown can only be made after six days of trial underscores 
the need for election officials to maintain the statutorily required record. 
In short, the Court finds that the discrepancy between the 2,041 return 
envelopes shown on Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 (November 6, 2009, database) and 
2,050 return envelopes physically counted by Judge Marano is most probably 
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explained by the failure to input the nine (9) envelopes in the stack of 2,050 along 
with the names that do appear on the list of 2,041 valid absentee return 
envelopes shown on the Secretary of State's November 6, 2009, database. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 5. The Plaintiff bears the burden of proof, and there is no 
evidence before the Court that the nine (9) envelopes in the stack of 2,050 
absentee return envelopes kept by the County are anything but absentee return 
envelopes of valid absentee voters. There is no evidence that nine (9) of the 
envelopes in the stack of 2,050 bear names of people other than qualified voters 
who actually voted. 
The Court finds that the County did receive 2,051 absentee return 
envelopes with each envelope containing one valid ballot. Whether the missing 
return envelope was lost, or was mistakenly left out of the City stack and put in 
the County stack, is not in the record of this trial. Whether the missing return 
envelope is one of the four return envelopes that could not be determined as City 
or County but were all removed and subtracted by Judge Marano from the 2,086 
counted in order to come to 2,082 is not known. Despite the absence of a 
Section 34-1011 record, the Court finds that County election officials performed 
well and in good faith. The Court finds that the most likely explanation for one 
missing return envelope is that it got lost through clerical error, and that the 
County did in fact count 2,051 valid absentee ballots sent in by 2,051 valid 
absentee voters. 
The fact that there is one missing absentee return envelope is simply 
insufficient for the Court to find an error in counting the vote. Even though there 
is an "extra" ballot (in the sense that there is one more absentee ballot than there 
is absentee return ballot envelopes), the evidence causes the Court to conclude 
that it is the return envelope being misplaced, and not a ballot that a voter never 
cast being counted, that explains the discrepancy between 2,050 and 2,051. This 
is particularly true where there is a complete absence of evidence, or even a 
suggestion, as to how an "extra" ballot could have been created, by whom or 
why. 
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The existence of more absentee ballots cast than absentee return 
envelopes physically existing in the custody of the County election officials does 
not, on the facts of this case, create an error in tallying the vote that would have 
changed the outcome of the election. 
Ill. ALLEGED IRREGULARITIES DO NOT CONSTITUTE 
MALCONDUCT 
Plaintiff has asserted through a continuing motion to amend the complaint, 
that irregularities in the election process amount to malconduct, requiring this 
Court to set aside the election. Idaho case law regarding malconduct in 
association with electoral procedure is limited. However, a review of these cases 
reveals that irregularities must be sufficient and substantial enough to have 
potentially changed the outcome of the election, such as through fraud or illegal 
voting, for such irregularities to constitute sufficient grounds to set aside an 
election. 
In Chamberlain v. Woodin, 2 Idaho 642, 23 P. 177 (1890), the court 
provided a working definition of malconduct: 
Our statute does not define what constitutes malconduct of the officers of 
election, but it must be held that any proceedings which result in unfair 
elections, that deprive the qualified elector of the opportunity of peaceably 
casting his ballot and having it counted as cast, or that permit illegal votes 
to be cast and counted, are within the statutory provisions. 
/d. at 645, 23 P. at 178. The Court therein determined that the malconduct, 
preventing legal votes, in conjunction with allowing illegal votes, justified the trial 
court's declaration of a new winner in the election. /d. at 650, 23 P. at 180. 
However, Chamberlain is highly distinguishable. The acts constituting 
malconduct included the arrest of legal voters, illegal votes, threats against legal 
voters who challenged illegal voters, intimidation of legal voters, and similar 
behavior. /d. at 645, 23 P. at 178. Here, such blatant and fraudulent elective 
practices are neither present nor alleged. Additionally, the potentially large 
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volume of illegal votes played a role in the Court's determination where, as here, 
the alleged illegal voters were identified before the Court and evidence submitted 
during trial, and, as explained in this memorandum, the illegal votes were not 
sufficient in number to independently result in a new election or reversal of the 
election results. 
Irregularities alone, without proof of fraud or corruption, have not been 
held sufficient in the State of Idaho to be considered malconduct for which an 
election should be set aside, nor was counsel able to provide the Court with 
authority to the contrary. 
In Noble v. Ada County Elections Bd., 135 Idaho 495, 20 P.3d 679 (2000), 
the court expressly held that "[a] showing that election officials failed to follow 
every election procedure precisely, without more, is insufficient under I.C. § 34-
2101(1) [to show malconduct]." /d. at 504, 20 P.3d at 688. Therein, the court 
rejected as malconduct a number of irregularities, including ten illegally counted 
votes, the failure of election officials to place time stamps, date stamps, or names 
and addresses of persons delivering absentee ballots, the failure of an election 
official to keep track of the number of ballots from prior elections taken from and 
then returned to a warehouse, discarding voter sequence cards, and the 
changing of poll books after the canvass to ensure absentee voters received 
credit for voting. /d. at 503, 20 P.3d at 688. 
Similarly, Ball v. Campbell, 6 Idaho 754, 59 P. 559 (1899) involved many 
irregularities which appellant/contester argued were sufficient to declare him the 
winner of the election. There, irregularities included, among other things, 
individuals voting outside of a private, enclosed space such that spectators could 
view for whom votes were cast, voters discussing candidates with one another at 
the polls, voters sharing voting stalls, voters procuring ballots and subsequently 
leaving the enclosed space and the building without voting and while still in 
possession of a ballot, and one person was allowed to vote without being 
registered. /d. at 756-57, 59 P. at 560. Therein, the Court explained, 
[b]efore the court will assume to set aside the expressed will of a majority 
of the electors, it should well be satisfied that there has been such a 
disregard of the provisions of law enacted for the conduct of elections as 
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taints the entire poll with fraud. It is not every irregularity that will justify the 
court in invalidating the poll of an entire precinct. 
/d. at 758, 59 P. at 560. The court continued: 
Should a judge of election, after his attention had been called to an 
infraction of the law, refuse or neglect to proceed at once against the 
derelict then, indeed, might there be some ground for charging him with 
malconduct. But to say that a judge of election is guilty of malconduct 
because of the commission of irregularities (and none of the acts charged 
in the complaint amount to more than irregularities, except the voting of 
one person ... without being registered) of which he did not have, and 
cannot reasonably be supposed to have had, any knowledge, when such 
charge involves such serious consequences as the disfranchisement of 
many hundred voters, is a proposition we cannot entertain. 
/d. at 759, 59 P. at 561. Therefore, the Court held that the trial court properly 
sustained a demurrer to appellant's complaint, as such complaint did not 
sufficiently set forth specific facts to warrant the relief therein requested. /d. at 
760, 59 P. at 560. 
Assuming, without deciding, that it is possible for cumulative irregularities 
apart from any showing of fraud or corruption to provide a court with discretion to 
set aside an election, such is not present here. Here, a number of election 
procedure irregularities have been alleged, including allowing illegal votes and 
errors in taking the vote tally and keeping records. Neither Idaho case law, nor 
any argument by counsel, provides authority for this Court to cumulatively treat 
such irregularities as an independent grounds for finding malconduct and thus 
set aside the election, particularly when the alleged acts are exclusively acts of 
the County, which is not even a party. 
Plaintiff cites Nelson v. Big Lost River Irrigation Dist., 133 Idaho 139, 983 
P.2d 212 (1999) as support for the proposition that cumulative irregularities 
provide grounds for a court to conclude that the election process was not "fair", 
and, particularly where the election outcome is close, for the court to step in and 
set aside the election and let the voters decide. This Court views the holding of 
Big Lost River very differently. 
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In Big Lost River, the appellant had lost the November 5, 2006 election by 
two votes (241 to 239). The appellant brought suit on December 30, 1996. Trial 
was held by Judge Moss on February 12, 1997. At trial, Judge Moss found that 
qualified voters had been turned away from voting by election judges' improper 
challenges. Of the identified voters who had not been able to vote, ten testified 
for whom they would have voted. Judge Moss found three more would have 
voted for appellant rather than respondent. As the result of the trial, the appellant 
(the loser, with only 239 votes) was therefore found to be the leading vote getter, 
with 245 votes compared to 242 for respondent. 
The trial court declared the election contest between appellant and 
respondent void, refused to declare a winner, and ordered a new election 
between the two. At the second election, held on May 27, 1997, the respondent 
was again elected. On August 19, 1997, appellant filed an appeal. 
The issue on appeal was whether the trial court had discretion to order a 
new election. If the trial judge was in error in refusing to declare a winner 
following the trial, the appellant (the loser at the November 1996 election, 241 to 
239, and also the loser in the second election on May 27, 1997) would be able to 
argue he should be declared the winner, based upon the vote count at the 
February 1997 trial of 245 for appellant and 242 for respondent. 
The Supreme Court held that the trial court had discretion to order the new 
election, when the number of votes had been found at trial to be sufficient to 
change the result. Big Lost River only addresses the issue of the trial court's 
discretion to refuse to declare a winner and order a new trial as a remedy, after 
the court has declared the election void based upon the vote count determined 
by the court at trial. Big Lost River does not stand for the proposition that, even 
though the illegal votes do not change the election outcome, a court can 
nonetheless set aside an election based upon cumulative irregularities. 
This Court has denied the motion to amend on the grounds the County 
was not a party. However, this Court finds that there is insufficient evidence in 
the record as a matter of law to find malconduct, and that the motion to amend 
can also be denied on the alternative grounds that, even if the County were a 
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party, the irregularities alleged in the proposed amended complaint simply fail to 
state a claim for malconduct under§ 34-2001(1). 
CONCLUSION 
The Court concludes that there were insufficient illegal votes cast to 
change the outcome of the election. The Court concludes that there was no error 
in counting votes that would change the result of the election. The Court 
reaffirms, on alternative grounds, its denial of Plaintiff's Motion to Amend. The 
Court confirms the election result of Mike Kennedy's election to Seat #2 on the 
City Council for the City of Coeur d'Alene in the November 3, 2009, Municipal 
election. 
Counsel for defendant Kennedy may prepare an appropriate Judgment. 
,--
DATED this ~ day of October, 2010. 
..~ 
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Fac~e:208-664-9933 
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IN Tim DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JIM BRANNON; ) Case No: CV-09-10010 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. 
SUSAN K. WEATHERS, in her capacity 
as the City of Coeur d'Alene City Clerk; 
MIKE KENNEDY, in his capacity as the 
incumbent candidate for the City of 
Coeur d'Alene Council Seat #2; 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
MOTION IN LIMINE RE: IDENTITY 
OF ACCUSER AND BRIEF IN 
SUPPORTTHEREOF ~ 
Date: October 12,2010 
Time: 4:00p.m. 
Location: Judge Hosack's Courtroom 
COMES NOW Respondent William L. McCrory, through his attorney Arthur B. 
Macomber, with this threshold motion to determine the identity of his accuser in these 
contempt proceedings. 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintifrs Amended Complaint filed December 10, 2009 in this action included 
the City of Coeur d'Alene, an Idaho municipality, defendant Mike Kennedy as "a 
member of the City of Coeur d'Alene City Council, and Mike Kennedy ''in his capacity 
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as the incumbent candidate for the City of Coeur d'Alene Council Seat #2." (Am. 
Complt., Dec. 10, 2009 at pp. 1-3.) 
On March 3, 2010, Judge Simpson issued his Order to Dismiss, among others, 
Mike Kennedy in his official capacity as member of the City Council for the City of 
Coeur d'Alene. 
On May 25, 2010, Judge Hosack in his Order on Motions confirmed defendant 
Kennedy's dismissal in his capacity as City Councilman "as to any cause of action based 
upon Idaho Code section 34-2001(1)," but apparently not as to other matters. In that 
same order, plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider was granted ''as to any cause of action as to 
Seat 2 based upon Idaho Code section[s] 34-2001(5) and 34-2001(6) ... and that the 
motion to dismiss defendant Kennedy be, and it is hereby, denied as to any cause of 
action as to Seat 2 based upon Idaho Code section[s] 34-2001(5) and 34-2001(6) .... '' 
Finally, that Order granted plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider the dismissal of the City of 
Coeur d'Alene, which had been ''properly named a party defendant.'' 
In their June 7, 2010 Brief, counsels Erbland and Reed for defendant Kennedy 
characterize in their caption their representation as "Mike Kennedy, in his capacity as the 
incumbent Candidate for the City Of Coeur d'Alene Council Seat #2,'' such 
representation thus apparently avoiding a potential conflict of interest wherein the City's 
outside counsel Haman concu.aently represented the City's Councilperson Kennedy. 
Messrs. Erbland and Reed for defendant Kennedy confmn their representation by stating, 
"Mike Kennedy is a proper defendant as incumbent" on page S of their Brief in Support 
of Motion for Summary Judgment filed August 2, 2010. 
On AugustS, 2010, defendant Kennedy motioned the court to hold Mr. McCrory 
in contempt, but did not state in what capacity he brought that charge, that and 
subsequent filings retaining the caption infonnation naming Kennedy , "in his capacity as 
the incumbent Candidate for the City Of Coeur d'Alene Council Seat #2." 
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ARGUMENT 
The Confrontation Clause of the sixth amendment provides: ''in all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him .. .. "State v. ShacklefordJ No. 27966,31928 (IDSCCR 2010); citing Davis v. 
Washington, 541 US 813, 821 (2006) and U.S. Const., Am. 6. 
In this case, Mr. Kennedy motioned through his co\UlSel for Mr. McCrory to be 
held in contempt, based upon the affidavit of Christa Hazel. However, there was never 
any clarity based on the capacity in which Mr. Kennedy brought his motion, whether he 
was bringing the motion "in his capacity as City Councilman" or "in his capacity as the 
incumbent candidate for the City of Coeur d'Alene Council Seat #2." I have also become 
aware of, but have found no pleading or order related to whether Mr. Kennedy brought 
the motion to find Mr. McCrory in contempt in Kennedy's capacity as an individual. 
While I believe Mr. KeJUledy in his capacity as City Councilman or incumbent candidate 
for Seat #2 would have standing to bring such a motion, I believe he would lack standing 
as an individual, based on defendant City of Coeur d'Alene's arguments against the 
intervention of Mr. McCrory found in its filing dated June 8, 2010. 
CONCLUSION 
Prior to the beginning of trial on October 12, Respondent McCrory hereby 
requests this Court clarify in what capacity Mr. Kennedy brought his motion for 
contempt. k. 
DATED this g+ day of 0 c.'-\o~, 2010. 
Arthur B. Macomber, Attorney for 
William L. McCrory 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the g+k day of October 2010, I caused to be 
se.IVed a true and correct copy of the foregoing: 
MOTION IN LIMINE RE: IDENTITY OF ACCUSER 
AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
Peter Erbland 
Paine, Hamblen, Coffin, Brooke & Miller, LLP 
701 Front Ave., Ste. 101 
P.O.BoxE 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-0328 
Main Phone: 664-8115 
FAX: 664-6338 
Attorney for Defondant Milm Kennedy 
Michael Haman 
P.O. Box 2155 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
FAX: 676-1683 
Scott Reed 
P.O. Box A 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
Main Phone: 664-2161 
FAX: 765-5117 
Attorney /or Defendant Mike Kennedy 
Starr Kelso 
P.O. Box 1312 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
FAX: 664-6261 
Attorney /or Plaintiff Jim Brannon 
4 
[ ] U.S. Mail~ Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[XXJ Facsimile: 664-6338 
[ ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
lXXI Facsimile: 676-1683 
[ ] U.S. MaU, Postage Prepaid 
[XX] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile: 765-5117 
[ ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[XX] Facsimile: 664-6261 
Arthur B. Macomber, Attorney for 
William L. McCrory 
rv
;
. 
·
e~ndant
f
,
f
[ ]
·
,
SC 38417-2011 Page 2306 of 2676
Peter C. Erbland, ISB #2456 
Paine, Hamblen, Coffin, Brooke & Miller, LLP 
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101 
Post Office Box E 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0328 
Phone(208)664-8115 
FAX {208) 664-6338 
Scott W. Reed, JSB#818 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box A 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
Phone (208} 664-2161 
FAX (208) 765-5117 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JIM BRANNON, 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV..OS-10010 
SUSAN K. WEATHERS, In her capacity 
as the City of Coeur d'Alene City Clerk; 
MIKE KENNEDY, in his capacity as the 
incumbent candidate for the City of 
Coeur d'Alene Council Seat #2; 
) MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANT KENNEDY 
) IN RESPONSE TO McCRORY MOTION IN 
) LIMINE RE: IDENTITY OF ACCUSED 
) 
) Date: October 12, 2010 
Defendants. ) Time: 4:00 p.m. 
) Location: Judge Hosack's Courtroom 
On Friday, October 8, 2010, at 4:52p.m., the undersigned received by fax from 
Respondent William L. McCrory, through his attorney Arthur B. Macomber, a Motion in 
Limine. Defendant and Petitioner Mike Kennedy will make this response recognizing 
that the Court will receive neither of these pleadings until the day of the hearing. 
Contempt proceedings are unique being governed by Rule 75, Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure and the decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court previously cited. 
MI;MORANDUM OF KENNEDY 
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It was. indicated in the Notice of Trial dated September 23, 2010, that the 
contempt issue is set for court trial without ;;i juty. 
This proceeding was not initiated by a judge but by defendant Kennedy following 
the initiation procedure set forth in Rule 75(c) (2), (3) and (4) and Rule 75 (d). In an 
open court hearing, respondent McCrory, through his counsel, made appearance and 
denied contempt. Rule 75(f) and(g). The trial is set before the court without jury as 
provided in Rule 75(i)(1). 
Defendant and Petitioner Kennedy at all times has characterized the proceeding 
as civil and has never sought criminal sanctions nor incarceration for any period of time 
as a sanction. 
Thit:; tg not a eAse where one party to a litigation is initiating contempt to compel 
the opposing party to comply wrth an order or judgment directing the opposing party to 
take action that he or she has refused to do. 
Instead, the contempt charge is that a non-party, William L. McCrory, violated 
the confidentiality imposed upon him and accepted by him by signing the Confidentiality 
Agreement to protect the constitutionally created privacy for voters. 
The unique nature of this alrea~y unique contempt proceeding is caused by the 
inexplicable refusal of counsel for plaintiff Jim Brannon to amend his complaint to name 
Kootenai County, which conducted the election, as the real party defendant. 
This Court in its Memorandum Decision, has decided the case dismissing the 
complaint and confirming the November 3, 2009 city election, so that issue is moot. 
However, the Confidentiality Agreement is the result of the confrontation 
between Kootenai County and plaintiff Brannon as related in the county's Memorandum 
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in Support of IRCP 26(c) Motion for Protective Order, and the subsequent Order of 
Judge Simpson made March 2, 2010 quashing the plaintiff's subpoena duces tecum. 
See Brief of Defendant Kennedy in Opposition to McCrory Motion to Dismiss Contempt 
Proceedings dated August 30, 2010. 
This is a civil proceeding. Kennedy has not initiated any criminal prosecution 
which could be subject to the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States of America. The introductory paragraph to Rule 75 
establishes that contempt is an incident exclusiVely to a civil lawsuit: 
Rule 75. Contempt. 
This rule shall govern all contempt proceedings brought in connection with 
a civil lawsuit or as a separate proceeding. It shall not apply to the 
prosecution of misdemeanor contempt under section 18-1801, Idaho Code, or 
any other criminal statute. 
The last section of Rule 75 explicitly negates any criminal rules: 
Rule 75(n). Other rules of civil procedure. 
Rules regarding discovery and other rules of civil procedure, to the extent that 
they are not in conflict with this rule, shall applY. to nonsummary contempt 
proceedings. The Idaho Criminal Rules shall not apply. (emphasis supplied) 
A petition for contempt not committed in the presence of the court and not initiated 
by the Court can be brought by anyone. Defendant Kennedy in this proceeding is the 
petitioner and non-party McCrory is the respondent or contemnor: 
MEMORANDUM OF KENNEDY 
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Rule 75(a). Definitions. 
(1) Petitioner. A petitioner is the person or legal entity initiating a 
nonsummary contempt proceeding. 
(2) Respondent. A respondent is the person or legal entity alleged to have 
committed an act of contempt 
(3) Contemnor. A contemnor is a person or legal entity adjudged to have 
committed an act of contempt 
As the pleadings have repeatedly set forth and as the Court has recognized in its 
Memorandum Decision and in oral comments during trial, this case involves political 
actions not limited to the election alone, but continuing thereafter from November 3, 
2009 to this date and no doubt hereafter. 
The filing of the McCrory affidavit and the subsequent publication to the world on 
the McCrory website openCDA.com the was hurtful to defendant incumbent 
Councilman Kennedy. The Coeur d'Alene Press extensive story headlined 11Affidavit: 
Many Ballot Irregularities" alleged many errors by the Kootenai County election 
department. Respondent McCrory's list of muttiple "anomalies" in the introductory 
openCDA.com UWho Decides VVhen Violations Matter" could be perceived by readers 
and viewers as evidence that Kennedy was illegally elected. That was injury and 
damage to reputation. 
Rule 75 gives some evidentiary guidelines. It is not necessary to show that 
respondent's failure to comply with the court order was willful. Rule 75(c) (3). The 
petitioner and the respondent each have the burden of proving the charge and of 
proving an affirmative defense by a preponderance of evidence. Rule 75(h) (2) and 
Rule 75 (j)(1). 
MEMORANDUM OF KENNEDY 
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The broad scope of contempt was described in State v. Abracadabra Bail Bonds 
1311daho 112,952 P.2"d 1249 (1998) previously cited. 
Trial courts are vested with the judicial power of contempt to vindicate their 
jurisdiction and proper function. Marks v. Vehlow, 105 Idaho 560, 566, 671 
P.2d 473, 479 (1983). The contempt power has its source in the Idaho 
Constitution, ld. Const Art. V, 2, and the common law. Vehlow, 1051daho at 
566, 671 P.2d at 479. McDougall v. Sheridan, 231daho 191, 128 P. 954 (1913) 
(inherent contempt power). This power is also recognized by statute. Vehlow, 
1051daho at 566, 671 P.2d at 479. As provided in I.C. § 1-1603(4), every court 
has the power to compel obedience to its orders. See also I.C. § 1-1901 (Every 
judicial officer has the power to compel obedience to its lawful orders); 1. C. 
1 .. 1902 ("For the effectual exercise of the powers conferred under [I.C. § 1-
1901 a judicial officer may punish for contempt."); I.C. §§ 7·601 to 614. 
(Contempts). 
1311daho at 119. 
Counsel for respondent McCrory has subpoenaed and petitioner Kennedy will 
call as witnesses in support, Christa Hazel, who signed the affidavit, prosecuting 
attorney Barry McHugh and County Clerk Dan English who has the major interests and 
undertook the procedures to protect the secrecy of voters in the municipal election. 
There is no need to determine the status of Mike Kennedy. He is the petitioner 
and his attorney is an officer of the court who had the right to have this Court determine 
whether the respondent William L. McCrory, in signing and filing his affidavit and in the 
subsequent publication on his website, is in contempt and therefore subject to civil 
sanctions as decided by this court. 
MEMORANDUM OF KENNEDY 
S!L 'd L6L9 '0N 
Respectfully submitted this 12th day of 
, One of the 
For Respondent Kennedy 
5 
 I , p
s 
I ,  I
,  I
 I ,
I.
U
 I
ai O  
SC 38417-2011 Page 2311 of 2676
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true copy of the above and foregoing was served by fax this 11th day 
of October, 2010 to: 
Starr Kelso 
P. 0. Box 1312 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
FAJ((208)664-6261 
Michael L. Haman 
Haman Law Office 
P. 0. Box 2155 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
FAX (208) 676-1683 
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Attorney at Law 
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Coeur d'Alene, 1083814 
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Court Minutes: 
Session: HOSACK101210P 
Session Date: 10/12/2010 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Reporter: V eare, Keri 
Clerk(s): Rohrbach, Shari 
State Attorneys: 
Public Defender(s): 
Prob. Officer(s): 
Court interpreter(s): 
Case ID: 0001 
10112/2010 
16:30:18 
16:30:18 
Case Number: CV2009-1 0010 
Plaintiff: Brannon, Jim 
Plaintiff Attorney: 
Defendant: Etal, City of CDA 
Pers. Attorney: 
Co-Defendant(s): 
State Attorney: 
Public Defender: 
Recording Started: 
Case called 
16:30:23 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Division: DIST 
Session Time: 15:45 
Calls, parties present. Continuation of a 
contempt proceedings. The last 
16:30:47 contact was during the trial and I set this in 
order to have a date as we 
16:31:09 weren't going to interrupt the election triall. 
We agreed to vacate that 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK101210P 
Courtroom: Courtroom 1 
Page 1, ... 
1 1
 
  
 
SC 38417-2011 Page 2313 of 2676
16:31:34 hearing and I did an amended notice. I set this 
for 4:00 which is obviously 
16:31:55 not a good time to start a court trial. As far 
as I was concerned this is a 
16:32:32 status conference, in off the record discussions 
there may be a resolution. 
16:33:03 How are we proceeding? What is the issue we are 
grappling with? Mr Reed has 
16:33:26 indicated he doesn't wish to continue. What is 
the issue here? 
16:33:46 Add Ins: Macomber, Art 
Mr McCrory has two issues he'd like to resolve. 
We've come so far we'd like 
16:34:03 to go to trial, withdraw the Motion to Dismiss. 
We'd like the opportunity to 
16:34:28 pt the facts in the record. And we remain unsure 
of what Mr Kennedy basis thi 
16:34:56 on. Is it Mike Kennedy in his official capacity, 
or in no capacity or Mr Reed 
16:35:26 that brought this as an officer of the Court. 
We'd like to get clarity on 
16:35:57 that. And to withdraw the Motion to Dismiss. 
16:36:15 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
For contempt of court, proceeding is addressed 
to the court, and the remedy 
16:36:44 is up to the Court. There is a procedure, if 
that person is not interested in 
16:37:15 proceeding, and the Court is not interested in a 
trial unless the Court was 
16:37:39 inerested in prusuing. At this point, the Court 
is not intersted in purseing 
16:37:53 contempt. So why would I want a trial? 
16:38:17 Add Ins: Macomber, Art 
The issue is that he believes there are not 
facts to bring the charge. 
16:38:33 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
But if a person dismisses, the dismissal is the 
end, the proceeding 
16:39:00 doesn't exist anymore. I don't understand the 
request. 
16:39:25 Add Ins: Macomber, Art 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK101210P Page 2, ... 
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It's the grounds for dismissal. 
16:39:32 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
There are lots of grounds, the Court would have 
to back track. Why do I wannt 
16:39:56 to go back and start all over again. Whatever 
the publication was on the 
16:42:28 internet, and it was never an issue at trial. 
Comments re: dismissal of 
16:43:43 contempt proceedings. Where are we going? 
16:43:56 Add Ins: Macomber, Art 
Everything you've said makes sense to me. We'd 
like to see a Motion to 
16:44:10 Dismiss, re: the grounds. He believes the 
contempt was baseless. When we come 
16:45:06 back for atty fees it could be an issue. We 
recognize that in Id there is no 
16:46:35 such thing as slap-statutes. We don't believe 
he's criminally liable and 
16:47:56 shoul be sanctioned at all. We look to the 
Court for justice. Where do we 
16:48:45 look for atty fee/costs? 
16:49:01 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I presume there are a great number of under 
currents the Court is not aware 
16:49:20 of. I see this as another swirl of the under 
currents, that is not the 
16:49:40 Court's concern. All we want to do is deal with 
the merits. On the face of 
16:50:18 this is not frivilous, there was an Order of 
Confidentially, he signed a 
16:50:36 stipulation. And then he published on the 
internet what he was to keep 
16:50:52 confidential. Ifyou think I"m going to sign an 
Order saying it was frivious 
16:51:15 then you miss the earlier comments. Does that 
mean the contempt was 
16:51:50 frivilous? No. The contempt stated something the 
Court needed to consider. 
16:52:09 Why, in heavens name, was the Affd filed? It was 
never mentioned again in the 
i6:52:25 proceedings. Why would he then publish the 
information he obtained? The Court 
16:54:01 made a mistake, I was not concerned about 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK101210P Page 3, ... 
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criminal contempt. I was focused on 
16:54:26 the merits. Now, apparantly the Court was wrong, 
I don't do contempt 
16:54:48 proceedings very much. The Court advised Mr 
McCrory inaccurately of his 
16:55:34 rights so the Court dismissed the proceedings. 
This needs to come to an end. 
16:56:01 The Petitioner isn't inteested in pursuing 
proceedings, the Court isn't 
16:56:18 interested. 
16:56:26 I'm going to dismiss the contempt proceeding 
because I inaccurately advised 
16:56:42 him ofhis rights. I'm in control and I'm 
dismissing the contempt 
16:57:11 proceedings. I'll prepare an Order saying what I 
just said. 
16:58:24 Add Ins: Reed, Scott 
Sometimes it's best not to say anything. I'd ask 
you enter the Order based on 
16:58:41 what you just said. 
16:58:47 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Costs/fee don't enter the Court's mind when 
entering an Order. 
17:00:00 Do you need a 54B certificate? If somebody wants 
that you'll have to ask for 
17:00:17 it. 
17:00:19 Add Ins: Macomber, Art 
If your entering a final judgment we'd ask you 
certifY it. 
17:00:39 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
If its a final order I don't need to certifY it. 
17:01:17 Add Ins: Macomber, Art 
I'm not sure if it should say dismissed with 
prejudice. 
17:01:38 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I'm entering the Order and I'm done with it.. 
17:02:21 Stop Recording 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK1 0121 OP Page 4, Final page 
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0 ct. 19. 2 0 1 0 9 : 16 AM Mar~~ber Law PLLC 
Jlfl Macomber Law, PLLC 
Hon. Charles W. Hosack 
First District Court ofldaho 
Kootenai County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene. Idaho 83816-9000 
No. 0487 P. 2 
S1Nt UF\I)AH~ }SS 
COUNTY OF V-QuTENAI 1 nlQ ~\LED: ~ \ \.t 
20 I 0 OCT \ 9 aM g: 2 8 East Sherman Avenue. Suite 215 
Offl 
Telephone: 208-664-4100 
Toll~free: 866-511-1500 
Facsimile! 208-664-9933 
Web: www.macomberlaw.c:om 
Re: Kennedy v. McCrory, Case No. CV~09~10010 
Your Honor, 
I realized this morning as the prevailing party in the contempt proceedings, that pursuant to your 
usual practice of requiring the winning attorney to generate a proposed judgment you may expect 
me to provide one for your review. However, I also realized that I have no knowledge of the 
grounds upon which you may decide the case, given that your statements in court the other day 
related to those grounds are in error, for which error I must reluctantly take credit. 
Additionally, I have no knowledge of the true identity of the person bringing the charges against 
my client, as stated on October 12, and thus no ability to construct a proposed judgment against 
an unknown party. This is because 1 remain in the dark as to whether Kennedy, as an individual, 
Kennedy, as a City Council person "in his capacity" as such. or whether Mr. Reed as an officer of 
the court is responsible for the contempt charges. 
Specifically related to the grounds for dismissal being in error, I was informed by Scott Reed at 
the September 7 hearing that my proposed stipulation to dismiss was in error, due to the August 
17 hearing providing sufficient notice to my client ofhis rights in the matter. For your 
understanding of that fact, I enclose for your review the face page and pages 10 and 11 of the 
Court's transcript of that August 17 hearing, which shows that the rights required to be given by 
I.R.C.P. 75(f)(1) were in fact given, thus the charges cannot be dismissed on those grounds. 
Further. my client's contention is that the proper grounds for dismissal remain that, if brought by 
Kennedy in his capacity for the City, that McCrory is due his attorneys' fees and costs because 
the action was brought "without a reasonable basis in fact or law" pursuant to Idaho Code section 
12-117, or, if brought by him as an individual or Reed, that the proceedings were brought 
"frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation," pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121 and 
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). To that contention, and in addition to sufficient evidence in the Court's file as 
to both the facts and the law on that contention, I submit to you the enclosed evidence of Affiant 
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Oct. 19. 2010 9:17AM Mar~~ber Law PLLC No. 0487 P. 3 
Hazel's glee at her successful abusive of this Court's process, along with my assurance to you 
that I have not as of today received the funds back from said Affiant. 
Sincerely, 
~ 
Arthur B. Macomber 
Attorney at Law 
Enc. Face page of Aug. 17, 2010 Court Transcript. and pages ten and eleven 
Huckleberries Online Article dated October 11. 2010 (2 pages) 
cc: Scott Reed 
Client 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JIM 
vs. 
CITY 
al., 
AT: 
ON: 
--ooo--
BRANNON, CERTIFIED COPY 
OF 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
) Case No. CV 09-10010 
) 
COEUR D'ALENE, et ) 
) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
CONTEMPT HEARING 
Kootenai County Courthouse 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 
August 17, 2010, 3:03p.m. 
BEFORE: The Honorable Charles w. Hosack 
APPEARANCES: 
' 
For Mike Kennedy: 
SCOTT W. REED, ESQ. 
LAW OFFICE OF SCOTT W. REED 
Post Office Box A 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
For City of Coeur d'Alene: 
MICHAEL L. HAMAN, ESQ. 
HAMAN LAW OFFICE 
Post Office Box 2155 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Coeur d'Alene Reporting 
court arul f})eposition ~eporters 
Phone: 108-765-3666 
Fax: 208-676-8903 
Ton Free 888-894-CDAR (2327) 
www.cdareporting.com 
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Oct.19. 2010 9:17AM Mar'~ber Law PLLC 
August 17, 2010 
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Violadon ol the coofid~ agttemErtt. vrllkh was 
baied upon Ill order otthls <OIIlt lllit llacll~ d~..,. 
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IIA. h£Eo• Th1rs con-ect, vour Honor. 
THe cOUilr: 1111 r1gbt. 
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;11\llllldelmiiO Mr. Aeed Just as well as I tal\. 
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in the end 
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Y. c;n.unaf bow that Christa Hazel was subpoenaed to 
testify in the contempt of 
court case against Bl.IJ 
McCrory (whlc:b was 
dismissed Tuesdey), 
springing from~ failed 
Jim Brannon election 
lawsuit. But did you know 
mat Christl:.' ~t her 
money's worth from d1e 
subpoena senreri Literally. 
Christa received her 
subpoena oil Oct. ~from a 
process .sen--erwith 
Con£\dential 
Investigations. E·mans 
Christa: "The process 
server with confidential 
Investigations 
band-delivered tbe 
subpoena. to n\y door but 
failed to provide the 
witness fees per Idaho 
Rules of Ch:il Procedtare. 
·He returned later In the 
daywith a check from the 
lnw offices of Arthur 
Macomber in the amount 
of$21 and change. 1 will 
promptly be eildorsingthls 
check and donating It ro 
Mike Kennedy's leirol 
defen.se fund." Woftt there's 
more. LaterbChrlstn wrote 
on her Fnce oolc page: 
1Witnessfee"' !20, 
Milegge to the court house 
.. $1.27, A!W'avatin~ d1e 
process server by roreing 
him to make two trips to 
my house to deliver my 
witnes:~ fee? Pa·iceless. 
Donating the witness fee-to 
Mike Kennedy's legru 
defense fund? The Cherry 
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Yov may know that Christa Hazel was subpoenaed to testify in the contempt of court case against 
BiD McCrol)' (which was dismissed Tuesday), sprlngfng from the failed Jim Brannon election 
lawsuit. But did you kMw that Christa got her money's worth from the subpoena server? Literally. 
Chri&ta received her subpoena on Oi:t. 8 from a process server with Confidential Investigations. E-
mails Christa: uTh.e process server with Confidential Investigations hand-delivered the subpoena to 
my door blllt faiJecl to provide the witness fees per Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. He returned 
later in tl'te day with a check from the law CJffices of Arthur Macomber in the amount of $21 and 
change. I will p rc mptly be endorsing this check and donating it to Mike Kennedy's legal defense 
fund." Wal·~ there's more. Later, Christa wrcte on her Facebook page: "Witness fee= $20, Mileage 
to the court house= $1.27, Aggravating H"le process server by farcing him to make two trips to my 
house to dleliver my witn-ess fee? Priceless. Donating the witness fee to Mike Kennedy's legal 
defense fund? The cheny on top." 
http://www.spokesman.comfstories/2010/od:/17/Witness-sel"'t'ed-i ~the-end/[10/ 1912010 8:48:50 AM) 
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STATE OF IDAHO , pouN~Y OF KOOTENAI!SS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF Ti'hfD· 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAIZOf-6 OCT 20 PH ~: ft8 
JIM BRANNON, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
SUSAN K. WEATHERS, in her capacity ) 
as the City of Coeur d'Alene City Clerk; ) 
MIKE KENNEDY, in his capacity as the ) 
Incumbent candidate for the City of ) 
Coeur d'Alene Council Seat #2; ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) ) ss 
County of Kootenai ) 
Defendants. ) 
CASE NO. CV-09-10010 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
SERVICE 
CLERK DJSi'RICT COURT 
~w{,,~ 
I, KALEB TRINKLE, am over the age of 18 years old, a United States Citizen, and a resident of 
Washington, County of Spokane, am competent to testify to the information set forth and BEING 
FIRST SWORN ON OATH, deposes and sayeth the following: 
1. On October 7, 2010 I received the following document for Christa Hazel: 
SUBPOENA FOR CHRISTA HAZEL TO APPEAR AND TESTIFY AT TRIAL. 
2. On October 8, 2010, at approximately 1: 10 pm, I personally served said documents to 
a female over the age of 18, who identified herself to me as Christa Hazel, and made claim that 
the serve was invalid because there was not a witness fee attached with the documents. She also 
informed me that she was an attorney. I picked up the witness fee from the attorney's office and 
went back to Christa Hazel's residence and delivered the witness fee to her. I asked her what 
state that she practiced law under and she informed that she didn't. When I asked her about 
10U IlS
MO. 
I I-O ~: ..  
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~····' 
telling me that she was an attorney she said "bye" and shut the door in my face. 
3. Said Service was completed at Christa Hazel's primary place of residence located at 
3795 N. Jimmy St, Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815. 
KALEB TRINKLE 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ll day of 
Oc\.obo c , 2010. 
I 
.~ .. ' 
~ •.... 11 
C 2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 6fFEf¥IE. . 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTEifll8 OCT 20 PM ~: ft(t 
JIM BRANNON, ) CLERK DISTRICT COURT 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) CASE NO. CV-09-10010 1 
,~lxuA 
vs. ) 
) 
SUSAN K. WEATHERS, in her capacity ) 
as the City of Coeur d'Alene City Clerk; ) 
MIKE KENNEDY, in his capacity as the ) 
Incumbent candidate for the City cf ) 
Coeur d'Alene Council Seat #2; ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) ) ss 
County of Kootenai ) 
Defendants. ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
SERVICE 
I, ERIN JENKINS, am over the age af 18 years old, a United States Citizen, and a resident of 
Idaho, County of Kootenai, am competent to testify to the information set forth and BEING 
FIRST SWORN ON OATH, deposes and sayeth the following: 
1. On October 7, 2010 I received the following document for Starr Kelso: SUBPOENA 
FOR STARR KELSO TO APPEAR AND TESTIFY AT TRIAL. 
tt· 
~+ 2. On October 8, 2010, at approximately 1:15 pm, I personally served said documents to 
, a male over the age of 18, who identified himself to me as Starr Kelso 
3. Said Service was completed at Starr Kelso's office located at 1621 N. 3rd Suite 600 
Coeur d'Alene, ID. 
1 
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c:::~ 
ERIN JENKINS 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this U day of October, 2010. 
2 
:
Notary Public 
Residing at.----':.....L>...."".;"'-\'~"'f_;;!;~_.___.__:_­
Commissi on expires :--'-Lf--'-=----'-+-'-"--¥-
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~&ftLl 0'\~Wf · ,}· ss · 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT CJlR.tBI~ O . .OT.ENAJ. ' ,< 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTElfWDOCT 20 PH·~: 40 
JIM BRANNON, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
SUSAN K. WEATHERS, in her capacity ) 
as the City of Coeur d'Alene City Clerk; ) 
MIKE KENNEDY, in his capacity as the ) 
Incumbent candidate for the City of ) 
Coeur d'Alene Council Seat #2; ) 
STATEOFIDAHO ) ) ss 
County of Kootenai ) 
Defendants. ) 
CASE NO. CV-09-10010, 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
SERVICE 
CLERK DISTRICT COURT 
·tlflf~ EPUT 
I, KALEB TRINKLE, am over the age of 18 years old, a United States Citizen, and a resident of 
Washington, County of Spokane, am competent to testify to the information set forth and BEING 
FIRST SWORN ON OATH, deposes and sayeth the following: 
1. On October 7, 2010 I received the following document for Barry McHugh: 
SUBPOENA FOR BARRY MCHUGH TO APPEAR AND TESTIFY AT TRIAL. 
2. On October 8, 2010, at approximately 1:50pm, I personally served said documents to 
a male over the age of 18, who identified himself to me as Barry McHugh. 
3. Said Service was completed at Barry McHugh's place of work located at Kootenai 
County Prosecutors Office 501 N. Government Way, Coeur d'Alene, ID. 
ftLlfit_ ,'}'S5' ru 0, , TENA', i 
1!  .~:
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KALEB TRINKLE 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this U day of ()c±o'DeC, 2010. b +O 'De ,201
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STATE OF IOAHO l 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI[ SS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRicti~P=THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOtitO.QCT 20 PH ·tt: ft(J 
JIM BRANNON, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
SUSAN K. WEATHERS, in her capacity ) 
as the City of Coeur d'Alene City Clerk; ) 
MIKE KENNEDY, in his capacity as the ) 
Incumbent candidate for the City of ) 
Coeur d'Alene Council Seat #2; ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) ) ss 
County of Kootenai ) 
Defendants. ) 
CLERK DISTRICT COURT 
ilfL~1~ 
CASE NO. CV-09-10010 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
SERVICE 
I, KALEB TRINKLE, am over the age of 18 years old, a United States Citizen, and a resident of 
Washington, County of Spokane, am competent to testify to the information set forth and BEING 
FIRST SWORN ON OATH, deposes and sayeth the following: 
1. On October 7, 2010 I received the following document for Daniel J. English: 
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM and SUBPOENA FOR DANIEL J. ENGLISH TO APPEAR 
AND TESTIFY AT TRIAL. 
2. On October 8, 2010, at approximately 2:00 pm, I personally served said documents to 
a female over the age of 18, who identified herself to me as Tina, and refused to give me her last 
name. Tina took the documents from me and walked back to Daniel English's office and handed 
the documents to Daniel English. Tina Wilde told me that Daniel English was walking into a 
meeting and wanted me to know that he received the documents. I asked Tina for her last name 
~: 
-'<-.
'.' 
;.
, 
E f D
. lr 5I :
oo itOll T 0P -I .. 0 
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SC 38417-2011 Page 2329 of 2676
"'"'' ~L 
O•H'" 
and she refused to provide it for my affidavit. I asked her if she had a business card and with an 
upset look she gave me her card that provided her name as Tina Wilde, Supervisor for the 
Kootenai County Recorder's Office. 
3. Said Service was compl~ted at Daniel English's place of work located at Kootenai 
County Recorder's Office, 451 Government Way, Coeur d'Alene, ID. 
KALEB TRINKLE 
. SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this U day of 
CC)cbtf'C, 2010. 
:\\\\\\\IIIIIIIIJil ~,,..,. 1\. JEN~.-~~~ ~ ~~ .... ··.'1/.A- ~ ~· ~.··· ·.;v~ ~ ~"'·· ·. ~ :::: ·· OTARJ'·. ~ 
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ORIGINAL 
Arthur B. Macomber, State Bar No. 7370 
Jonathan A. Burky, State Bar No. 8043 
Macomber Law, PLLC 
408 E. Sherman A venue, Suite 215 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone: 208-664-4700 
Facsimile: 208-664-9933 
Attorney for William L. McCrory 
STATE OfJB'AHO l 
COUNTY{)ff;.fCOOTENAif SS Fflf'D: · ·· 
ZDI 0 OCT 20 PH ·~t~ t. f 
CLERK DISTRICT COURT 
£ffrtrfr/~LuJ4 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JIM BRANNON; 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SUSAN K. WEATHERS, in her capacity 
as the City of Coeur d'Alene City Clerk; 
MIKE KENNEDY, in his capacity as the 
incumbent candidate for the City of 
Coeur d'Alene Council Seat #2; 
Defendants. 
) Case No: CV-:09-10010 
) 
) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF 
) AFFIDAVITS OF SERVICE OF 
) SUBPOENAS TO APPEAR AND 
) TESTIFY AT TRIAL FOR THE 
) FOLLOWING PARTIES: CHRISTA 
) HAZEL, STARR KELSO, BARRY 
) MCHUGH, AND DANIEL J. 
) ENGLISH 
) 
) 
) 
) 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 19th day of October 2010, I caused to be served 
true and correct copies of AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE of SUBPOENAS TO APPEAR 
AND TESTIFY AT TRIAL upon the following witnesses: 
1. CHRISTA HAZEL; 
2. STARR KELSO; 
3. BARRY MCHUGH; and 
1 
It
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4. DANIEL J. ENGLISH. 
Said AFFIDAVITS OF SERVICE were served upon the following parties: 
Peter Erbland [ ] 
Paine, Hamblen, Coffin, Brooke & Miller, LLP [ ] 
701 Front Ave., Ste. 101 [ ] 
P.O.BoxE [~ 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-0328 
Main Phone: 664-8115 
Attorney for Defendant Mike Kennedy 
Michael Haman [ ] 
P.O. Box 2155 [ ] 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 [ ] 
r4 
Scott Reed [ ] 
P.O. Box A [ ] 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 [ ] 
Main Phone: 664-2161 [~ 
Attorney for Defendant Mike Kennedy 
Starr Kelso [ ] 
P.O. Box 1312 [ ] 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 [ ] 
Attorney for Plaintiff Jim Brannon ~ 
DATED~his /Cf.'dayof t}cfel-J£,t-V ,2010. 
2 
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile: 664-6338 
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile: 676-1683 
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile: 765-5117 
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile: 664-6261 
o d-Davis, Paralegal 
erLaw,PLLC 
. . 
rxr 
l $o 0£,tY'"
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JIM BRANNON, ) 
) 
PLAINTIFF, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, ) 
IDAHO, a municipal corporation, et al, ) 
) 
DEFENDANT(S). ) 
__________________________) 
CASE NO. CV2009-10010 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
(OF CONTEMPT PROCEEDING) 
The Court, having reviewed the record of the contempt proceeding 
initiated by the filing of the Affidavit of Christa Hazel and being fully advised, and 
having determined that the Court advised McCrory at the first appearance, that 
this matter was not a criminal contempt proceeding, and the parties agreeing that 
the matter was a criminal contempt proceeding, and the Court having determined 
that it did not wish to proceed further with a criminal contempt proceeding, in that 
the Court has determined that the issue of the Court imposing any remedy is 
moot; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, and this does order, that the contempt 
proceeding is hereby dismissed. 
DATED this 00 day of October, 2010. 
QillQQ C~W HOSACK . 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL OFCONTEMPT PROCEEDING 
Brannon v City of Coeur d'Alene, et al CV2009-1 0010 
i
-------------------------) 
~w.
 
DEPUTY 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ;;;_I day of October, 2010, that a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed/delivered by regular U. S. Mail, 
postage prepaid, interoffice mail, hand delivered of faxed as indicated below: 
Starr Kelso 
Fax: 208-664-6261 4~1 
Scott E. Reed 
Fax: 208-765-5117 
4-~8 
Peter Erbland 4S'i' 
Fax: 208-664-6338 
Mike Haman 
Fax: 208-676-1683 4qo 
DANIEL J. ENGLISH 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
~~ 
DEPUTYCLERK 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL OFCONTEMPT PROCEEDING 
Brannon v City of Coeur d'Alene, et al CV2009-1 0010 
2 
~ /
'1
l(
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' 
Coeur d'Alene 
Reporting 
STA~E OF !O~HO Ph.n08-765-3666 Fax 208-676-8903 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI( Toll Free 888-894-CDAR (2327) 
FILED: 110 'Wa{{ace}lvenue, Lower Leve[ 
Coeur d'}lfene, Id'alio 83814 Court ana (])eposition CJ{eporters 2010 OCT 28 At1 9: 11 www.cdareporting.com 
October 27, 2010 
District Court Clerk 
Kootenai County Courthouse 
324 West Garden Avenue 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
DE.t'Ul T u --
Re: Brannon vs. City of Coeur d'Alene- Case No. CV-09-10010 
1 0/12/1 OContempt Hearing/Status Conference 
Dear District Court Clerk: 
NOTICE OF PREPARATION OF ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPT 
Notice is hereby given that a transcript totaling 25 pages, entitled Contempt 
Hearing Status Conference dated 10/12/2010, has been delivered to the 
following recipients: 
A copy has been delivered to: 
Arthur B. Macomber 
Macomber law Firm 
408 E Sherman Ave., Suite 215 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Scott W. Reed 
Attorney at law 
401 Front Street 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
The original transcript will be filed with the District Court. 
If additional copies of the transcript are requested, please call Coeur d'Alene 
Reporting at 208-765-3666. 
cc: Original transcript 
Court Clerk 
All Counsel 
Personable ... Dependable ... Flexible 
Depositions ~ Court~ Conference Room ~ E-Transcript~ Video ~Realtime Hookup 
, 
I p ,a
a{{ l eC
tij 1{eport M =
, tt' U
l ne 
/10
 pt  Realt
SC 38417-2011 Page 2335 of 2676
10/28/2010 08:22 FAX 2088848281 KELSO LAW OFFICE It! 001/004 
STATt UF I[)Al-10 } -. f,OL~!TY o:: V.OOTENA! SS i , 'v 
,-;LEL; , *~ :]0 Cv-
2010 (JrT 28 B.M 10: 32 
CLERK DISTRICT COURT 
0.~ ~,-A , ~. ~>.A.L Jv r ~ITL\r-..-0 DEPU . . \) C:"-i 
lN TJJE DISTRIC"l' C~OURT FOR THE FJRST .JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STAfF OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY or KOOTENAI 
JIM BRANNON. Case No. CV -09-100 I() 
Pla.intin: 
\'S. 
CITY OF COE\ JR D'ALENE. lD/\HO 
u rnunicipttl curpunilion. ~:t.al. 
OBJECTION TO DEFENI>AN"l'S' 
PROPOSED JUDGMEN'l' FORM 
Dcl~ndanl.s. 
COMES NOW th~ Plaintifl: by and through his ottomcy, and object" tn the entry nl' the 
proposed Jud~mcnl submillcd to the Court by Ddcndants. PlaintitThns suhmitied tn Dt:f'tmdants· 
counsel what is bd.ic·v~:d to he the appropriate fhrm nf Judgment in this statutory election contest. 
A copy l,f the saml.': i~ alhlch~d h~::n:to I(H th~ cnnvenicnc~ of the Court. 
The basis ol'this Objection is us f()llows; 
1. I.C. :~4-201 :·~ provides that the ldaho Rules ol' Civil Procedure only apply to how the 
"The pmCI:~dings shall be hdd." 
"' I. C. 34-:2021 spcc.ifics the .. Fonn uLJuugmcnt. '' 
.1. I.C. 34-7.0:?.0 (a) ~pccitically :Ms '')rth ''Liability for Costs:· 
4. In Noble ~··, Adu Coum_v A'h·clions /Jom·d. 135 Idaho 495 (2001) the Idaho Supreme 
Court :-~Lalt.xl that ··costs do not include attorney l~cs unh:ss <~Llorm:y Jb.::s arc expressly 
incluucd in the d~:.:linition ol' the lcnn cusls. Th~ k~ghd::tLurc's awar~ncss or Lhis ruk~ is 
dcmon~lr<'ltt.:d by its authoriatti(lll (lf t1warJ:s of costs and auorrH.:.y fc~..:s. When U1c 
JcgislaturL: has intended th~ilthc Lt.::nn cosL-; cover:-; allnmcy lees, it h~1s so provided." ld 
(1/ 504. 
The Dclcndant.s· p1·oposcd judgm~nt att<~mprs to expand the spcci11c provisions of the spcciJic 
dcction ~..~ontL~~~ ::-:tatutc that SpL~ciiic<illy provides l{)r '"co.st::;'' and specilically do~$ not rclimmc~:: 
I OHJEC'flON T<) DEFENDANTS" PROPOSED JUDGMENT; REQUEST FOR BRIEFING 
SCHEDULE AND REQUEST' FOR ORAl. ARGUMI::NT 
 l -'OL~! 0 m TE , I
' * :7 V
W
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armrncy tees, hy l't.~f~r~ncing Rule s~ (a) of the Idaho Rules or Civil Proccdun,:. They also SI!Ck to 
~xpand the clear and unamhiguous statute languagt! nf LC. 34-2020(<:~) by submitting language to 
the Court in its proposed Judgment that costs andf~·es ... bc awankd tll the pr·~.~vailing pani.;s ... in 
'lCCtll'dam:~ with apr,Jit.:ahh~ rules and ,\'latutcs f~( th(! Stale f~/1dulm. inc/mJin.!! .lclaho Code ,\'(:'.eli on 
34-2020(£1). 
II is submitted that the pi'Opos~!d Judgment, attached heret(\, suhrnincd by Pl.ainl.i IJ is the 
~llffC~o:librm of Judgment in this ca.-;e ru1-suan1 to the specific statutory provision~.' 
If the Courl. d1oosc~ to consider the l>cfcndantl'' proposed Judgmt:nL m~t disrcg~~rd il., and 
dcn.::rminc to not enter the propnsed .Judgment suhmiucd hy Plaintitl". it is r~.~srcclli.JIIy requested 
that rh~ Comi pcnnit [)l'icting on the issues raised in this Objection and furlhe.r requc~ls Oral 
argument prior to 1h~.: Court cnl~~ring any .Judgment. 
DATEJ.)-1J)i'··~· ... l~·;'" day ~fOcl'ohcr, 2010. 
~ ',, 
..... -.................. ,;~:~: .. ~.~t:.~.~:{~{<:_~···.· ............................ _... ......... , .. 
St~trr Kdso, i\uomcy lor PlaintiiT 
I HEREBY CERTlFY that on rh~ 281h d1.1y ofOctober, 2010, I caused to he s~.:rved a l~opy oflh~~ 
t~1rcgoing on the fnl\owing, hy fi1x: 
Peter C. 1-:.rbland 
Paine l·Jtunblcn LLP 
P.O. Box F 
Coeur d'Alene. ldnbo 83~16 
Fax: 664-6338 
M ichncl I •. Hnman 
I Iaman Law 011k~ 
P.O. Box 2155 
Coeur d'Alene. Idaho :n~o; 16 
Fax: 679.-:-~1-683 
................ ~Z.3l~~~.':::!~:i~\:::~:_·"' _ ... 
Starr Kelso 
Scott W. Reed 
A.Uorn~y at 1.~1w 
P. 0. Tlox A 
Coeur d'Alene. Idaho ~nx I() 
Fax: 765~5 117 
1 The lirslllm~c para/:'.raph); ol"lhc l.kli:ndtmls' proposed .ludgm~n1 wcr~ drafted by Phtin1ifr~ couns~l. The lim1l 
pamgmph ,~f their· l"'''pclscd Judgment is rh,~ J)Ctilll' of comenricm. J.'laimiff'~ counsd subrnined lht~ language in lhe 
l'imrlh p<mtgruph ol"lhc Pbintilrs propo);Cc.J Juclgrncrll. allachcd herem (which is consi.~lcnt with lh..: sccnnd uncllhird 
paragrarhs prcp11red hy Plaintitrs counsel) bccuu!a~. it specifically rcters to lhe specific relevant :,taune. Thi~~ 
langu;'lgc. w~1s r~j~.:ch.:tl by Dcf'cndanl Kennedy\ counsel. 
" OBJECTION TO I>ErENDAN'fS' PROPOSED JLIKrMFNl; REQUEST FOR BRIEFINU 
S<:IJEDULJ:: AND RJ~QUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
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IN TilE DlSTKICT COURT FOR THE FIRST Jl.IDJCIAI. DISTRICT OF 
THE S'J't\TI~: OF IDi\110. 1N J\ND FOR lHE COl JNTY OF KOOT.r~:NAI 
JIM KRANNON. 
Plaimiii 
VS. 
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE.lDAtiO 
a municipal cl'I\1.'(11'~Hinn. ~L;.tl. 
Dctcndan1.s. 
___ ............................................... . 
Cas~: No. CV -09-l 00 I 0 
Jl.JDGMEN'I' 
It! 003/004 
Thi~ mnllcr l:~nnc on for trial bd'im: Lhc Honorable Charles W. llosack. Senior· District 
Judge. on Septcn"lber 13 through 1 R. 20 I 0. PlainLi IT .lim Brannon was rcprcst~nlcd by Stal'r Kelso. 
Defendants City of" Coeur d'Alene and Susan WeaLhcrs City Clerk of the City ol"Co&:ur d'Alene 
was represented hy \V1ichacl L. J humm. Defendant Mich;.1cl Kcmtt:dy wa::; I'C!prcsenLt!d by Scou 
Reed nnd Peter Erhland. Wht:l'~llpOil the parties presented ~:vid~.:.":ncc in supp('111: or their claims and 
defenses and prCS(~tnc.:d ()l'al '-lrgum~~nt at the cnnclusion or the trial. Whcr·eupon the Cour·t issued 
its Memorandum D~~.:ision on Octo her 5. 20 I 0. 
NOW THEREH.>RE. IT IS HEREBY ORDERl:O. AD.Il JDGED AND DECREED, 
pursuantlo Idaho Code section 34-2021. that the Cily of Coeur d'Alene's November J. 2009 
<.h::ncr·al Flection i!" r..:onfirmcd. 
IT IS Fl.JR'T"IIER ORDERED. ADJlJDfiED AND DECREED. pursuant to Idaho Cod<~ 
s~clion :34-2021. rhnt Judgment i~ entered thai Mike Kennedy i$ declc.1rcd a::; ~.:"k~cl·cd to Lhc Seat :2 
position on the City of(\u:.ur d"Ait:nc's City CounciL 
IT lS flJRTllER ORDERED. AD.IIIJ>(iED AND DECREED, pursuam to Idaho Colk~ 
section 34-2020 (a), that judgment. for costs shall br.: rt·ndt:l\.:d against the contestant. Plaintitl.lim 
Brannon. Said costs. upon Court approval, shall he p~1id to th<:.~ exl~.;nt available from the 
JUDGMI·:NT 
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$5.000.00 hond. p(J:-;I.t:d in this mtlllcr by PlaimitT Brannon. lf the approved costs do nol CX(;eed 
the posted h()nd amnunt any rc.mnining balance shall be released to PJaint.i IT Brannon. 
EN'l'ERED this __ ......... _day ofOctoht::r. 2010. 
''''''''--MUUUUO ''""'<MOo ___ ,,,,,,, 00000--... --o\"'"'"'''''"""''"'''""'' 
Charks W. l [osack. Senior District judg~ 
R\JLE 54 (h) CERTIFICJ\l'E 
With rcspecllo the h:sucs determined by the ahnvc Judgment. it is hereby CERTIFIED. in 
~1ccon.luncc with T~uh.~ 54 (b). kl::~ho Rule:-; of Civil Pm<:cdure. that the Court ho!:' determined that 
thcr~ is no just reastm for the dclny nf the c.~ntry or i.l linn I j1.1dgmcnt and that rhc Court has and 
docs hereby dircl~l that the ah<W(~ judgml.1lt .shall be~~ final,iudgmc-nt upon which exccut:ion may 
issu~ and an appt.::al nu1y b~;; taken as provided hy ldah(l Code section 34-2025 (h). 
l::N-rERED t.his day n r Octo her. 20 I 0. 
···~ .......... ·······----~-··· ... '" .............. ~------.. 
CIIARLFS W. HOS.'\CK, :'knior District Juugc 
CLERK'S CERTlFJCATE OF SI.::RVlCE 
I HEREBY CERTLF't' thut on thc_day ofOcl.nher. 2010, I caus~d to he served a lruc 
and COITI:Cl c.opy oft.he l"orcgoin.g ny the method lndicatcd below. and addr~sscd lO lhc f(JJiowing: 
Starr Kelso 
Altorn~y at Law 
P.O. Box 13.12 
Coeur d'Alene, kk1ho R3816 
Fax: 664-6261 
Michncl l ,_ llam~m 
l hunan 1.<\w 01licc 
P_O_ Box 2155 
Coeur d'Ahme, ld~1ho 83816 
Fa .. x: 676-1683 
By: .................................. ····················----····· 
2 .llJDGMEN'T· 
Petc::r C. t-::rhlnnd 
Paine H.amblcn LLP 
P.O. Box E 
Coeur d'Alene. ldah.o ~J S l<i 
Fax: 664-633~ 
Scott W. Reed 
Atlomcy al Law 
P.o. n~1x A 
Coeur d' A knc. Jdnho R3 ~ 16 
Fax: 765-5117 
P :-;I u I11t l , I 01 ex(;e
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JIM BRANNON 
vs. 
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF IDAHO 
r · \ND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTf 
324 W. GARDEN A VENUE 
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83816-9000 
FILED 111112010 AT 01:33PM 
STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF KOOTENAI SS 
CLERK DJTHEDIST:UCJ)COURT 
BY ~-J\A.- ~ =-"""" DEPUTY 
Case No: CV-2009-0010010 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, ETAL. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is set for: 
Status Conference Thursday, November 04,2010 11:00 AM 
re: Entry of Judgment 
Judge: Charles W. Hosack 
Courtroom: 
I certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on November 1st, 2010. 
Plaintifrs Counsel: Starr Kelso 
P.O. Box 1312 
Coeur d'Alene ID 83816-1312 
Mailed Hand Delivered 
,_,-..,. 
~Faxed (208) 664-626 ~1; 
Defendant's Counsel: Michael L. Haman 
CV Notice Of Hearing 
P 0 Box2155 
Coeur d'Alene ID 83816-2155 
Mailed Hand Delivered 
Scott W. Reed 
P.O. Box A 
Coeur d'Alene ID 83814 
Mailed Hand Delivered 
Peter C. Erbland 
P.O.BoxE 
Coeur d'Alene ID 83814 
Mailed Hand Delivered 
ff]Faxed (208) 676-1683 
't'- s-~ 
\(JFaxed (208) 765-5117 
S:Sf 
)v,Faxed (208) 664-6338 
('{ S.:s9 
Dated: Monday, November 01,2010 
Daniel J. English 
Clerk Of The District Court 
By: Shari Rohrbach, Deputy Clerk 
VS.
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Court Minutes: 
Session: HOSACKII04IOA 
Session Date: II/04/20 I 0 
Judge: Hosack, Charles 
Reporter: 
Clerk(s): Burrington, Talisa 
State Attorney(s): 
Public Defender(s): 
Prob. Officer(s): 
Division: DIST 
Session Time: I 0:50 
Courtroom: Courtroom9 
Court interpreter(s): L/ c_/) ~ /J 
---------~--e~~~At,.,- ~, (J.cc 
Case ID: OOOI 
ll/04/20IO 
II:00:54 
II:00:54 
Case number: CVI989-9999 
Plaintiff: 
Plaintiff Attorney: 
Defendant: TEST, MIC 
Pers. Attorney: 
Co-Defendant(s): 
State Attorney: 
Public Defender: 
Recording Started: 
Case called 
11:04:I5 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
ATTORNEYFEESHEARING.STATUSCONFERENCEHEARING 
II :05:26 STARR KELSON, PETER EBERLIND, MIKE HAMON PRESENT 
II:06:14 Other: KELSO, STARR 
CITES IDAHO RULE. LANGUAGE DOESNT COMPLY WITH 
THAT. COSTS AND FEES. STATUE 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK11 041 OA Page 1, ... 
11 10
11104/ 1 1
li)
--- - f-e~~~~-~, ~
0001
11104/2010
11:0 :
11:0 :
1
:1 l
  .  C  
11  
11:0 :
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·11 :06:55 PROVIDES FOR THE LANGAUAGE WE SUBMITTED. VERY 
SPECIFIC LANGAUGE -IT IS 
11:07:39 APPROPRIATE LANGUAGE. 
11:08:39 
11:08:43 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
WHAT IS THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THIS. A PHRASE 
REFERRING TO COST AND FEES IS 
11:09:20 APPLICABLE - THAT IS MY JOB. CITES 2020A RULE. 
WILL BE LOOKING AT APPLICABLE 
11:11:29 RULES. NO POINT OF SUBSTANCE HAS BEEN RAISED. 
11:12:00 Other: EBERLIND, PETER 
LOTS OF STATUES. THAT IS WHY I SUBMITTED LIKE I 
DID. 
11:12:27 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I DONT KNOW WHAT IS GOING TO HAPPEN ON COSTS -
PURSUANT TO RULE 58 - WHO 
11:13:08 PREVAILS. I THINK THAT PHRASE NEEDS TO BE 
OBMITTED. 
11: 13:41 Other: EBERLIND, PETER 
I AM FINE WITH THAT 
11:13:47 Judge: Hosack, Charles 
I WILL SCRATCH THAT OUT- WILL INERLINEATE. RULE 
54 CERTIFICATE. THIS IS A 
11:14:26 FINAL JUDGMENT. 
11:14:49 I WILL WRITE DENIED AS MUTE. WONT ISSUE A 54B 
CERTIFICATE. COUNCIL TO 
11:15:13 APPROACH BENCH TO EXAMINE PAPERWORK. THIS IS THE 
FINAL JUDGMENT. 
11:16:03 ALL PARTIES AGREE. WE ARE ALL WORKING ON THE 
SAME PAGE. COPIES TO BE FAXED 
11:16:30 OUT TO ALL PARTIES. 
11:16:49 Stop recording 
Court Minutes Session: HOSACK11 041 OA Page 2, Final page 
I
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STATE bF IDAHO } 
COUNTY OF 0 E SS 
FILED: D 
AT · · O'CLOC.\ M cA:~ ~~rRE;~uR 
IN THE OJ STRICT COURT OF THE FiRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
J1M BRANNON, 
Plaintiff, 
Vli, 
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO. a. 
municipal corporation, et al., 
) Case No. cv 09·10010 ) 
~ JUDGMENT 
) 
) 
) 
) 
~ 
Defendants. ) _____________________________ 
This matter came on for trial before the Honorable Charles W. Hosack, Senior District 
Judge, on September 13 through 18, 2010. Plaintiff, Jim Bran.non, was represented by Starr 
Kelso. Defendants, City of Coeur d'Alene and Susan Weathers, City Clerk of the City of Coeur 
d'Alene, were represented by Michael L. Hanum. Defendant, Michael Kennedy, was represented 
by Scott Reed and Petel' C. Erbland. Whereupon, the parties presented evldence in support of 
their claims and defenses and presented oral argument at the conclusion of the trial. Whcroupon., 
the Coun issued its Mc.morandum Dceision on October S1 2010. 
DEPUTY 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED~ ADJUDGED AND DECREED, j -
pursuant to Idaho Code § 34-2021, that the CitY of Coeur d'Alene's November 3, 2009 General 
Election is confirmed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, pursuant to Idaho Code § 
34-2021, that Judgment is entered that Mike Keru1edy is declared as elected to the Seat 2 position 
on the City of Coeur d'Alene's City Council. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED. ADJUDGED AND DECREED. p\U'suant to Rule SS(a), 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, that judgment be entered in favor of the defendants, and that the 
plaintiffs claims nnd causes of action against the defendants be dismissed in their entirety and 
with prejudice, and that costs and fees, if any,~· B'Wtu'Eled to tile defendaMs as the prevaililtg 
parties, thG amollJit, if any~ be determined by the court in accordance with applicable rules and 
statutes of the State of Idaho, including Idaho Code § 34~2020(a). If the Hpproved costs do not 
exceed the posted bond amount of $5,000.00, any remaining balance shall be released to plaintiff 
Brannon. A 1. 1 L JJV lilt) IJ#fifJA/ 
ENTERED this .J_ day o~OJO. 
CHAR!Yw. HOSACK, Sen10r 
District JUdge 
RULE 54{b) CERIIEICATE 
With respe~t to the issues det~rmined by the above gment, it is hereby CERTIFIED. 
in accordance with Rule 54(b). Idaho Rules of · '1 Procedure. that the Court has determined 
that there is no just reason for the delax the entry of a final judgment and that the Court has 
and does he[eby direct that the a ve Judgment shall be a fmal Judg1nent upon which execution 
may issue and an appeal be taken as provided by Idaho Code § 34-2025(b). 
this_ day of October. 2010. 
JUDCMEN'I'-~ 
CHARLES W. HOSACK, Senior 
District Judge 
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~ERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __ day of October, 2010, I caused to be served a ttue 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below. and addressed to the following: 
Starr Kelso 
Attorney at Law 
Michael L. Haman 
Haman Law Office 
Peter C. Erbla11d 
Paine Hamblen LLP 
Scott W. Reed 
Attorney at Law 
H:\CDAOOCS\371 01\00001 \PU3A.D\C037834 
JVOCMRNT-1 
0 EMAIL to starr.kelso@fronJiq.com 
~ TELECOPY (FAX) to: 208 765-3260 
0 EMAIL to m.lhaman.law@gmail .com 
~ TELBCOPY (FAX) to: 208 676-1683 
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Peter C. Erbland, ISB #2456 
Paine, Hamblen, Coffin, Brooke & Miller, LLP 
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101 
Post Office Box E 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0328 
Phone (208) 664-8115 
FAX (208) 664-6338 
Scott W. Reed, ISB#818 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box A 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
Phone (208) 664-2161 
FAX (208) 765-5117 
S~AT~ "C" IC'AH~··'·. ~-m·P·!A'!l ·. 1 .:: u ... • "ii:!." 11 · llr,·<; "H'l COUNTY OF KOO · rtl11' ~~"~ '··~ 
Fll (:n-! L. ...... L. .. ~ 
2010 NOV -5 PH 12: 02 
~~ 
I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JIM BRANNON, 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
~- ) 
) 
SUSAN K. WEATHERS, in her capacity ) 
as the City of Coeur d'Alene City Clerk; ) 
MIKE KENNEDY, in his capacity as the ) 
incumbent candidate for the City of ) 
Coeur d'Alene Council Seat #2; ) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
Case No. CV-09-10010 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS OF 
DEFENDANT MIKE KENNEDY 
Pursuant to Rule 54 (d) (1), I.R.Civ.P. defendant Mike Kennedy as a prevailing party 
makes claim to the following costs as against plaintiff Jim Brannon: 
(C) COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT Amount 
1. Court filing fees: 
Court filing fee $58.00 
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2. Actual fees for service of any pleadings or document 
In the action whether served by a public officer or other 
person: 
3. Service by Steve Reed, AA YS of contempt pleadings 
upon William R. McCrory. 
4. Witness fees of $25.00 per day for each day in which a 
witness, other than a party or expert, testifies at a 
deposition or in the trial of an action: 
5. Travel expenses of witnesses who travel by private 
transportation, other than a party, who testify in the trial of 
an action, computed at the rate of $.30 per mile, one way, 
from the place of residence, whether it be within or without 
the State of Idaho: 
6. Expenses or charges of certified copies of documents 
admitted as evidence in a hearing or trial of an action: 
7. Reasonable costs of the preparation of models, maps, 
pictures, photographs, or other exhibits admitted in 
evidence as exhibits in a hearing or trial of an action, 
but no to exceed the sum of $500.00 for all of such 
exhibits of each party: 
8. Cost of all bond premiums: 
9. Reasonable expert witness fees for an expert who 
testifies at a deposition or at a trial of an action not to 
exceed the sum of $2,000 for each expert witness for all 
~ ,:;:Q "" '+' vv.vv
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
appearances: None 
10. Charges for reporting and transcribing of a deposition 
taken in preparation for trial of an action, whether or not 
read into evidence in the trial of an action: None 
11. Charges for one ( 1) copy of any deposition taken by any 
of the parties to the action in preparation for trial of the 
action: None 
Total Costs as Matter of Right pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54 (d) (1) (C): $ 116.00 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
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D. DISCRETIONARY COSTS 
Defendant Kennedy seeks discretionary costs as provided in Rule 54 d) (1) (D) for 
the following necessary and exceptional costs. 
FOR TRANSCRIPTS OF COURT HEARING 
February 12, 2010 Joann Shaffer, Court Reporter 
June 19, 2010 Anne McManus 
October 27, 2010 Coeur d'Alene Reporting 
Total: 
JUSTIFICATION 
60.42 
62.40 
73.75 
$196.60 
The hearings always involved multiple motions filed by plaintiff. Transcripts were 
necessary to verify the Court's various rulings in this complicated case. 
FOR INVESTIGATION OF VOTERS 
Bill Marlin, Marlin investigations April to September, 2010 
JUSTIFICATION 
$ 5,387.50 
The number of net illegal votes to change the result was six (6) out of 6,375. 
Investigators for plaintiff commenced interviews by telephone and in person as soon as or 
before suit was filed and continued to date of trial. 
Plaintiff in response to discovery requests provided names of over Fifty (50) 
questionable voters. It was necessary to check these voters with the election office and 
to interview or investigate. In addition, a concerted effort was undertaken to endeavor to 
3 
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find persons who had voted illegally for plaintiff. These were leads did not produce any 
questionable voters. 
All of this investigation peculiar and unique to this case constituted costs that were 
necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred. 
Total Discretionary Costs 
RECAPITULATION OF COSTS 
COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT 
DISCRETIONARY COSTS 
TOTAL COSTS 
$5,584.16 
$ 116.00 
$5.584.10 
$ 5,700.10 
The foregoing statement of costs actually incurred by defendant Mike Kennedy 
in this action is correct and in compliance with Rule 54( d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Dated this 5th day of November, 2010. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
~~~~~L!-----'-~ ~ 
Sco W. Reed, One of the 
Attorneys for Defendant Mike Kennedy 
Scott W. Reed, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
That I am one of the attorneys for defendant Mike Kennedy in the above-entitled 
matter and as such am better informed relative to the above charges than said 
defendant, that the charges as above shown are correct the best of my knowledge 
and belief, have been necessarily incurred in · 1on an are claimed in accordance 
with all provisions of Rule 54(d)(l), I.R.Civ.P. 
4 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 5th day of November, 2010. 
\\1 If II II I 11///-~\\ enG.B. ~ ~ / / ~\f~c;~~~~~ ~~ ~~ : _ ·: :::::: . OTARY PUBLIC for Idaho 
§ ~ 1 j ~ Residing at Coeur d'Alene 
-==-u;;.· ..... ~uau~./o~ My Commission Expires: 9/1/11 
-'/"Y/'; ············· rt~ %,t~~~)~\\\\'\ CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true copy of the above and foregoing was served by first class mail, 
postage prepaid, this 5th day of November, 2010 to: 
Starr Kelso 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box 1312 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
FAX (208) 664-6261 
Michael L. Haman 
Haman Law Office 
P. 0. Box 2155 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
FAX (208) 676-1683 
Art Macomber 
Attorney at Law 
408 E. Sherman Avenue- Suite 215 
Coeur d'Aie~n:e~, .tfld~g~';J/IJ_.1 FAX (208 
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morlinvestigation~ 
Bill Morlln lnvtmlgariva rerean:lr t~nd jollm<:llsm 
509.9£11.00% bmorlln@grnall.com 
P.O.Bmc 18781 Spokan~,WA9922S 
October 5, 2010 
TO: SCOTTW. REED 
Scott W. Reed Law Office 
401 Front StTect. P.O. Box A 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
:It 
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES for August and September 2010 
re: Mike Kennedy 2009 Coeur d'Alene City Council election 
Aug. 2- interview D.Ainsworth; research other names on plaintiffs' 
list; confer with MKennedy, SReed and CDA investigator 
Aug. 3- additional research ofu.ames on plaintiffs' list; conference 
calls with CDA investigator, MK.ennedy, SReed 
Aug. 4- trip to Kootenai Elections Office to get poll books and confer. 
with elections officials 
Aug. 14 - prepare CD of Kootena Co. voters an.d deliver to City of CDA 
Investigator 
Aug. 30- contact by Haman law and city investigator re: names on list 
Sept. 11 - various attempts to contact Rawana Zellers per counsel 
SUMMARY: 2.0 HOURS @ 40.00 --
14.0 HOURS@ 75.00-
(unpaid balance from Aug. 16~ 2010 
$80.00 
$1050.00 
for work done in March and .Tu1y 20 I 0) - $2945.00 
~DUE:$407~ 
PAY ABLE TO: Morlinvestigations LLC 
P.O. Box 18781 
Spokane, W A. 99228 
PAGE 02 
HOURS 
~40 ~75 
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Bill Morlin lnvestlgativeresearch and journalism 
509.981.0096 bmorlin@gmail.corn 
P.O. Box 18781 Spokane, WA 99228 
May 5, 2010 
TO: SCOTT W. REED 
Scott W. Reed Law Office 
401 Front Street, P.O. Box A 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES 
re: Mike Kennedy 2009 Coeur d'Alene City Council election 
HOURS 
@40.00 
March 16- travel Spokane-Coeur d'Alene-Spokane 2.0 
@75.00 
March 16 - case review with Scott Reed and Mike Kennedy 1.5 
March 17- research, phone calls 2009 election 1.0 
March 18 -travel Spokane-Coeur d'Alene-Spokane 2.0 
March 18 -pickup voter data Kootenai Co.; confer with Kennedy 4.0 
March 19 -research data base, phone calls; find five voters who 
registered after 11-3-09 5.0 
March 22 - case review and telephone calls; confer with Scott Reed 2.0 
March 23 - calls to obtain mortgage purchase records and review 2.0 
March 26 -research, phone calls, e-mails re: 2009 election 2.0 
SUMMARY: 4.0 HOURS@ 40.00 --
17.5 HOURS@ 75.00--
PAY ABLE TO: Morlinvestigations LLC 
P.O. Box 18781 
Spokane, WA. 99228 
$160.00 
$1312.50 
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scottwreed 
i 
From: "Mike Kennedy" <mike@idaho~ennedys.com> 
To: "'scottwreed'" <scottwreed@frd.ntier.com> 
Sent: Wednesday, October 27, 2010\1:21 PM 
Attach: Reed(Kennedy)S-1 O.doc 1 
Subject: FW: first billing I 
FYI- the numbers are what! sent earlidr, Scott. 
I 
From: am Morli~ [~~nt~:b~orlin@gmail.corJ 
Sent: Wednesday, October 27, 2010 12:52 PM 
To: Mike Kennedy 
Subject: first billing I 
Mike: I 
Page 1 of 1 
Here's the first bill I sent to Scott Reed Jn May 5. It totaled $1,472.50, but I was only paid 
$1312.50; the $160 balance was carrie~ over to the August bill and then to the September bill 
which he just paid. I 
I 
Thanks again for the opportunity to work for you guys. 
I 
- Bill Marlin 
Spokane 
I 
' 
1 0/?7/?01 () 
,
,201 \
dy)5- 0. I
/
YI -
Bill ilt~:b~orlin@gm I CO ]
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F A 
lNTERMAX NETWORKS 
7600 Mineral Drive, Ste. 900 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815 
208-762-8065 ext. 11 
www.intermaxnetworks.com 
Comments: 
Scott, 
X 
:E: 
. To: Scott Reed 
~ax number: 208-765-5117 
. ·..,co--::-:::................ .,..,.,"7':1........................... "nn-::1 ..... - .............. . 
From: Mike Kennedy 
Fax number: 762-8308 
PAGE 01 
lll>f'-T.'::'::'~=.............. .... ...,..:n: ... 
lr--·: .... , ... ...,..,.,nn:o::H ....................... m"r.'::":::'::-...................................... . 
; Date: 10/27/2010 ~ 2 pages total with cover 
lh,. .•,,.,...,, ---,-, ---,.,.=""""""'' ... = ...... = ....---OMJ.'":':t:.................................... .. . .., .. ,.,.cYIT,.,_.,_., ...... -···-··-· ......... -cr.-r:== 
I'm attaching one invoice for $4,075.00. The other invoice was for $1,312.50. 
Unfortunately I cannot find a copy of that invoice, though I got the amount from 
my campaign account check register. Both checks were made out to Scott Reed 
Law Office, as Bill was hired by you to do the investigative work. 
Thus the total invoiced by Bill Morlin was: $ 5,387.50. 
Let me know if you have any questions. 
Thanks, 
Mike 
I
x .  1:'- :0:- ::...... . . ... " ': .......... .." - : . _ 
r' -":"..  . .. .",,-,-. -_'''...,..I'·,IIT):'::'.= ,,= . . . .= .. . = ..  - .. .. .. .. t .. . 'C'::" : ';:'·" " ... = . .  = . .  ",-". - --, . ,  ,.= . .= . . =1 . 1 
i . " " • i .........  " .  .. .... . '":':!:, .... ....  ".... .... ...  •  , C"It ... __ .... _ ...... _ ..  " ..   
Regarding: 
Morlin Billing 
O ~~~!;,;.nI;~.:~; -;;;~~'~"'~'u'''''''''' m.,....· -b-er-f-~;·;~;=·i·~"'·~'''= .. ~-,..,~,.....p-: - ....... n::"''"" ...... " .. " ... , . -, .:. r.: (I :=:'~'::~:'-' 
If-.-,,,...,.. . _"_:'I':_~) .p:~,: ...... -  __ -.,.,... ~ ____ ". __ ---'1762-~~5 ext. 11 " 
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STAI~R K .. ELSO 
Attorney ::tt Law if2,:145 
P.O. Hox 1312 
Coeur d'Aicn~. lda!w 83816 
Tel: 20X-7t15-:tu,o 
Fax: 208-664-626! 
Anomcy t(w Plaint i IT Rraml(ln 
KELSO LAW OFFICE 141001/004 
STATt:. Or IDAHO } SS · 
COUNTY OF V-OOTENAI 
FILED: 
IN TilE DISTRICT COURT r:oR THE FIRS'I JtJI.>ICI!\1. DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN 1\Nl.> FOR Till·: COUNTY OF KOOTl:::NAI 
.JIM BRANNON. 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
CITY OF COEUR ()'ALEN.E. IDAIJO. 
a municipal corporation. ct.ttl 
r.klcndanl':-.;. 
___ ,,, ............... , _____ ,,,, ............ _,,, .............................. ''""""' 
Case No. CV -09-100 I 0 
MOTION FOR J\ NEW TRIM .. PURSUANT 
·ro IRCP Rlfl.t-: 51) (a) (6) and (7) OR IN 
THE Al...'.I'ERNATJVb MOTiON TO JN THE 
ALTERNATIVF TO J\1 TI~R Of{ .1\t\.tJJ.·:NJ.) 
TilE .It JIKiMENT PURSUANT TO IRCP 
Rt Jl .E 59( c) 
COrvtLS NO\V PL:\IN'l'IFF. hy and through hi.s attorney. and pursuant t~~ IRCP Ruk 59 
(a) (6) and (7) n·wv(:~ this Courl l'i'.lr a new trial (lr in t'h~: alt'crnativc pu~u~ull to lRCP rule 59 (e) 
moves this CntJn· to niter ot· amend its judgrrwnt and llt.lld I hat t.he dcclion fiJr Scat 2 is void. sc.:~l 
usid(~ the dcction i<H· Se::~t 2. and order a n~~w d~cl ion. 
The cvidcn,~e at trial is insui'Jicicnt tojusl.ily lh~ verdict and it is :t!!ainsl. the law ;JS a result 
l)f an error in the :.tppl ication ofthc burden or proof hy th~ Court in its dcci~iorL 
The Court cl'roneously dctcr'lllincd thnt il was lhc l'•laintifCs burd..::n of proof to produce all 
~on<~civ~lhlc t::vidcJKt' v.-hcthcr prob;:~tiw. rdcvant. or irrd~v~tnl: as 10 lhc mm1hcr oflegnl and 
v:.~lid ahscnll:~e hallor.s actually received in the ckctinn bcHm:." the close of the polls ttl 8:00 run. 
on Novt.>mbcr J. 2009. 'l'h~ Plaintiff inlroducl~d ~vidence. hy what the Couri. it:~df dct·crrnincd 
was the only usetiJ! dmnhnsc rcgMding whatl.ht:! number oflcgal and valid ahsc.mtec ballots wcr~~ 
artually received. that. a total of 1041. or a1 mo:;t 2042. kg.,.J and valio ahscnl.l~t..~ ballots were 
aclually l'C(~t:ivcd in the election hc1~wc rhc c:losc ol'the pol.ls and t'hul this nurnbcr of legal and 
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valiJ tlbscntce hallots is ~ontrary to that Lh~ vole c(Htnling madlil'l(: tabulation thai n.:ll~o.:ct:-; thai 
2051 ab~tmtcc ballnts were run through it. ()n(:c the Plaintiff introduced this (~vjd,mcc. th~ burd~n 
of proof shifted to Defendants tt1 produ~~c ~::vidcnc.,; thuL in Hli.:l 2051 k:J;nl and valid abs~nl~~ 
ballots were received by the ciMc nfthc polls. The Dcl~nu;mts introduced no ~~vidence other than 
what \vas introdw:.t~d hy Plaintiffthnt a number or envelopes counted by Judg~: Maran!) ~xisted. 
Envelopes hy thcmselv~:s ore not cvidcnc(: ol' legal and valid absentc;,~c b;:lllots. At' most it is 
~::videnc.c ofthc '::-;i~~t.l~m~c of a vulid. nr invalid. ballol. l.kl.i.:ru..lant.s inlrodu~.:i.:'U no evill~ncc as l.o 
whether all of the cnvclnpes ~.~onwin~d lcgtll and v<.tlid ab:o:;cnt~:.~,.~ lntl.lots. Tht..~ (.lilly evidence was in 
this r~gan..l was ~in ::rJ1davit. hy a person whl''l wn:::; not (ll'iginally idcnl.ilicd by Ckrk Dan English 
as (111 dcc.rion wnrh~r. that each envelope cfmtnincd om.: ballot. 'T'h~:re is nc..) l~vidcncc that each 
~:.:nvdop~~ contained a legal and valid ballot.. The only evidence bcfbr~ the Coul't. contrary to tlw 
statutory rcquir~::nu.~nls regarding absclllcc ballots. is that either 2041 nr 2042 lcgnl nnd valid 
absentee baiiOT.s ~~~ist(:d. The only t:vidt:n~c b~;.~fiJrc. the Cuurt establishes the exi::::1'encc of only 
2041. or 2042, leu.al end vnlid nhs~~Jllcc hullots. This 1:.'- idt.:rK~c establishes. without anv evidence 
. . 
to th~ tl.'mt.rw·y presented hy Defendants. th:11· a1 h:~asl nin"~ (9). and probably lt.'n (I 0), less 
abs":nLL~c hallot::: (that were legal and valid) were received than w~rc pl"ced in the machine to be 
mcchanic.ully couni~d. 
The Court forrhcr (:ommittcd error by requiring the Plainti n: de!"pitc th~~ tc~timo•lY l)f Mr. 
lJurst of the Sect'(:irwy (lf"Slat~.:'s Ol'lic~..~ that no rdcvam change occurred during, Nnwmb,~r 2009 
h.l 1h~: Secretary of State's database as rclkctt~d by l.~xhibi.l 5. 10 introdu"~c t!Vidcnc.c 1hnt th~ 
datahase 'could tWl. have bt.~l!n · changed. 
The Court. c.ommincd (WI'flr hy nol shifting the burden ol'pmoflo De1~~ndants when it 
based its decision lh~ttthe diiTerencc hctWC(~Il Exhibit 5 (2041) and the numh~r of envelopes 
counted by Judg~ Marano "is most prnbahly'' ~!xphtincd by ~1 l~tilure to inp111' n(llll~~s, on th~~ 
absence..~ of any evidt;:~nc~ int·hc r(~<.~ord. e.g. cnvdop~:s. /\ddiLionully, no evid(:tll:(~ was prcscnl~d 
thal each and every kgul and valid ab:-;cntcc b::tllot wo~ not inpul by the Clerk iow tht.:.: database. 
Th~:rc was testimony ihnl the dutahnsc could change. hut Mr. llurst"s testimony c~tHhlishcd that 
lh~ chan.g.~..:s that did occm· in the dnwhasc in the month ul'November 2009 hnd no dT~ct~ and 
mndc no chang~. to the data in Fxhibit 5. Tht..: Court Htiiurc lO not shift the hnrdcn of prool~ alter 
the presentation of the evidence hy the PlaintiiT I hal was sufticicnllo establish that ilk:gal voles 
1 MOTlON FOR 'NEW TRIAl .. OR IN AI.TERNATIVE MOTJC>N TO 1\i .TF.R OR AMEND 
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in :.t numbi.!r sul1ki(.~Jlt t.o change the rc::::ult ofth~: ch;:~~tion 1(,,. Se:H 2 w~..~n .. ~ wuot~..~d. wa~ ~Ill t.:rrt)l' 
nl'law. II was error !~lr the Cou111.o hilld thatt·hc l'laintiiJfililcd to m~.:~ct his i:HrJ'(h.~n.lhat no 
Dd~~ndtmt ~v~r argt11.:d, that th~.: numb~.:r or ~nvdnpcs was "th~ I'I.!'CI)!'d conh.:.mplntcd by St,;~cti\Hl 
.)4~1101'' ~~stahlisllcd by a mer.:: (:ount ofcnvdopcs Lh;.~.t 205(llcgal ~111d valid ahscnt.cc billlol~ 
were actually rcc~~h ... ~~d rcgnrding the election. 
The CO\llt cnmmit1cd crmr hy its l~liltm .. ~ to shin the hunJcn of' proof' In Ddcndant~ to 
introdul:!.: evidence 1 hat the November 6 .. 2009 report, Exhibit 5, had ht:\:11 changed in som~ 
nHHlllCrthat imp~1d1..:d the do~..~um~nlalion ol'l'ccciv~~i etbscn.tcc b~lllut:s l(,r till~ dcction when the 
Plaintiff introdu,:cd evidence rhnt no relevant chang~ in th~ database had ocnll'.rcd in N~..w~..~mbcr 
:2009. 
This motion is ~upportcd by the M~morandmn of Law lilcd hert.·with. J'[ is also supported 
by th~ Allidavit nfSfarr Kelso. which attadlCS a phutocopy or live (5) individual absentee ballot 
return cnvdorcs t.h:H were r~cdwd I~H· the: dectiouth::~t arc rn~trkcd as being ··void'' and, on their 
f:.tcc .. l'cfutc th1.~ fundamental hypothesis adoph::d by thr.; Court. J.Jm.l 2050 ~nvclopcs h~en 
irHmdu~..~e(.L hy :.tny ! )cfcnd:m1 in an a11cmp1 to meet and ClHJntc:r th~ Phlintiff"'s prima t(~cic 
evidence of ilk.g.a! vol'cs n~ceiwd and counlcd. thcs~ cnvdopt.'s would rt.~fk-cr that a1 least fh1c 
(5) envelope::: nn th<..~ir l::tcl:! document thai. at best. there C()ult.l only have b~cn 204€) legal and 
vnlid ~ehs~ntt.~t: hal lots n.:~dvcd. 1 Assuming the Court's supposition t:hal. one t~nvclopc "got lost 
t.ht·o·ugh ck~ril:al error;' ba~..:d upon lll..l ,.::vidence in lhc record. is correct the difference in numi.'lCI' 
is still Hv(~ (5) llw dim:rcm:.c in the number ..:ountcd ballots in the Scm 2 r..Kt'. Wht:.~n comhincd 
wil'h the nine (9) or ten (I 0) ··void"" ballut.s n.:Jlcewd by exhibits I his would 1\~suh in li:wrte~n ( 14) 
or fifteen (IS) illegal votes received nnd counl1.~d. Whm added Lo the finding nfthc Courr tha1 
there WUS (l f.\Vfl VOW d~(T~U~C in lhc lll(ll'!:~i n OJ' di11cCCriCC then~ WOUJd be a tot.ai of !;iXtCCil ( !6) 01' 
seventeen(, 17) ilkgnl vote::- r<..~ccivcd and countc:d. 
On1l argument i::.: rcqucsh:d. 
/" 
I>ATFI> th.j~ / day or November. 20 I 0. 
__ ............... J~~7 U.-.':~v(((..{~::~~: ................................... . 
Stal'r K~lso. J\t1omcy fbr Plaint11T 
1 /\~; thl! Clllll'l- ~ opini•.m nolf.:s lht: number ol\~•welopcs counted d•11J~ nn1 ~~~~n equal 1 he numhcr or ballots machine 
C(ll.lllll:tl hy on~. 
3 MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR IN ALTERN A TlVE MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND 
THE ..ltJI.l<.li\II!:NT 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERV I:CE: A copy was tl1xcd to Defendant City ~Lal. \; cnun{JJ-~1 Mik~~ 
I Jamon and Delcndant Kennedy's cnunsd Sc(ltt R~cd and Peter Erbland on the _O,,_<..Iay or 
Novcmb~r·, 2010. 
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StarrKdso 
Ill 004/004 
4 MOTION FOR NEW TRJAL OR lN ALTERNA'l'IVH MOTION TO AL'TER OR AMf·:ND 
Till.:: JUDGMF.NT 
/ /  :     L  I  
I WE: l\  t lxe  t  f t it  \; cnull <  I'v1jk~  
I ll1 l1 Cl  l l ' o ott  l  r l t  j.1. .. .I   
ovcll1b~, . . 
·/·····;L·· 
'--.,1 ii'
/ • >/ (j, .. i/··
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STARR KELSO 
i\ltorncy m Law fi2445 
P.O. Box 1312 
(\x:ur d'J\knc. hhdw X1X I (i 
'I' .I. "'11'10 ""lt~ C ') ··)t:JI J. I:.' I: -"IJO" I 1.1.1-, 1.::.1111 
Fax: 208-<iM-6261 
!\11orn~::y l(·,r Plai nli IT Brannon 
KELSO LAW OFFICE 
STAff: Of IDAHO } Q 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI vS 
FILED: 
IN TlJE DISTRICT COURT .FOR '1'1 .. 11:: I·TRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STA!'E OF 11)/\llO . .I.N AND FOR TilE COI...INTY OF KOOTENAI 
HM BR/\NNON. 
Plaintiii 
vs. 
CJ.TY OF COJ.::l JR D'/\LENt-:, IDAHO. 
~~municipal corporor:inn. t!Ul] 
Lk fend an l.s. 
Case No. CV -09-100 I 0 
M 1-:McJRANDl.J'M OF I ,A W 
IN Sl.!PPOtn· OF MOTIONS FOR 
NEW ·rRlAL A.ND/()R J\1\ilf·:ND OR 
ALTER .IUIXIMENT 
Ill 001/004 
The Courl in ils Memorandum Decision d(ttcJ (klnbcr 5. 20 I 0 hdd that Pl:~intiiT had IH.ll 
met. his hunh::n of f.ll'Ot)l' t~.' cstn.hlish lh<tl i1k.f:!HI ballots inn numhcr sufiicknl. l<'l change lhc result 
of the clccrion l()r s~al 2 were recciv~.":d (md l~ount(:d. The Court hdd l.hal ht:l-:ausc PlaintitT did 
no( introdul:l: the ]OXC1 ah..;;cmce return l~nvdopcs. counwd hy Judge M~u·ano. into <.::vidence and 
disprov~:. lh~o: (.\.HJI'l's hyrothcsis 1 that the c.ountc:d 2050 nbsentee ~nvdop~::; \vnuld rcvcnlninc (9) 
mis.sing munc.::~ nnd ~o.:swblish that 2051 legal and valid nhsentee ballot~ wc.::rl?: actunlly received on 
or hclim; the closl..': or t.hc: polls on Nowmbt::.r 3, 2009. This was an crmr of law by th1..~ CnU11 in its 
intcrpr~l.alion and ::~pplication ot'thc burden of proof: 
1\.':1- rdlcl~Wd by the Arlidnvit of Starr Kcbo Jilcd h~::rcwith tlwrt!' exist at lcnst live (5) 
nbsentee hallot cn.v(·l(,pes received by the dcclion.~ dc:partmcnt thnt, on lh<.::ir Hu::c. cstahli,.;;h that 
1 II i~ idl!nl.ificd as Lhe ( .. 'our(~~ hypolhc~ls h~:~~aw;c nnnc of th~ l.kl.'endanls prollcrl:d ~uc.h an argum-:nt. 
MEMORANI.H 1M OF LAW TN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW TKIAI, OR IN 
ALTERNAT!VF MOTION TO AMEND OR .ALTFI\ .lt .. IDGMFNT 
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at kH .. •::l lih· (5) cnvc-lopc.~ ..:xist that conl:ain-.:.d invalid and/t)r ilkgally n.:c.eivc.d and counn.::d 
(ll.'s~ntcc. 1 
Th~ general rulr.: a::: to burden ofproofappli"'s in election ~.~)nl.csts. Noh!c 1· .. fldo C.'ouwv 
Eh•,·tions Hoard. 135 Idaho PJ5. 20 P .. 3d 679 (2000j. The Court is ~OITCl~lt.h::lt the in.itial burden 
c.ount:ed hy tlu:: machine;; did not cqualth~ number orJcgal (Jnd vnlid ab~t:ntt.::(~ h::lllols actually 
received I.)Jl nr bclcl('(;' the (.~lose or the polls. In ot}ll.:r WNds the Plainti rr.s burden was to inlwduc~:: 
cvid~..:.ncc that illcgn.l votes :::urticicnt in number h.) chang~,.~ the ele-ctiun r~.~sults ,.vcre recciv~:~d and 
counk:d. ·''E.'C I .. C.. 3-1-2001 r5) The Plainl11l'.inu·odul:l:d evidence in lhis rcg::ll·d consisting t)l'lh~~ 
l(.lck of' an I.C.. section :;4-1011 J'ccord spcdlically required by stal.t:: slallllc; l·:xhihit 5 
docurw.:ming the r~:(:<~ipt ol' only 2041 v~1lid and I c.: gal abst:ntec ballots: Mr. I lurst 's testimony 
that thr.: Secretary pf St:Jte' s Ollk~~ dawhnsc did not c.ontain any chang~s in the datnhase during 
Nowmb~~r·1<HN th;n would have in any way changed tb~ Novr.:mher 6. 200<) report Exhibit 5: 
and lh~:. clc~~li<)l1 dcpartm~:nts machin.:! countllocum~nting thnt :2051 abs~~nt.~.:·~..~ ballots wt~rc 
l:llllll (~d. 
Indeed in the Court'.~ decision it. untk~l'"!:iCOI\Xi the net.::d tc)r ekction officials to maintain 
this critil~~ll sw1utorily rl~quircd .. After the Court's holding that a ·'nt:t'' l\VO ot.hc~r ballots were 
iJkgal ami counted. fhm1 various individual voters. t.h~! record rdlects that 1. 2 illegal votes were 
Th~: Cm.111 's holding_. despite its finding that r:xhihit 5 \:VffS the onl.y USt;l'i.ll datab~lSt:. then 
discounted E.-.;.hibi1 . .5 bl!.c<.tu::>(~ (\flestimony attributcllto Ms .. B'-;:arcl. thatth~:. S~o.:a(:l.ar·y oi'St:nc::'s 
d:.Hahnsc was ·suhjcriW d<Jily cl1~angc· is not supported by any cvidenel!. in r!H.~ rec(1rd thnt any 
rdcvnnt ch:.mge did int:;JCl Ol~Cur. Tht:re is rlll ~vidl.!nc~ in the record to c;onr.radi~o~l the t.estimouy 
of Mr. llurst th~ttll-w dat~1basl.! did not change durin~ Novt..~mh\~1' 2009 in anv ;·ckvanl manner. 
.... ~ " 
Th~~ ''~stimony of i\.1.r. l.lurst c;;:mblishcd. and it is unct.mlmdi~o~tcd, that rhc nnly changes to this 
databn:::c that Ol~curred during the ~:~ntin! month of Nov.;;mb~..~r 200t) did not :1ilect th~o: totnls 
rdkctcd in Ex·hihl1. ." h~::causc l.hc·y only pcnaincd to rcgist~rcd vt1ter~ who did nol vot~ in th~ 
··························-·---·····················----
·' Rt::gardkss of' wh~~t!Wr" rhe Courttkh.mllincs Lh;uthls :tftidavit can h~: ~·.lnsidcr~d or 1101 (which anilfavit is ollcr~-:<.1 
at this lime bc;·c(luse or lhl~ ~urpris~ l.i) Plaintifflhnt the Courl would require liN pitl'l or l'lainliff'.-; hurdcn or proof such 
dOClllllCiliS llJ be inri'Od(l(:cd ny Plainriffar Lriallo climinmc any pll~!:iibilil)' lhat these (.~1\Vd(lpe!;, which ill'~ 1101 in any 
,;,::;hi on ~on~;idl~r~d a p;ll't nl' rlw I.C. 3'1-1 0 I I r~~cord. wnuld reveal nine (9) n<UTJl~S) rhc l;1l~l. rl'lt\nlll!-i lh:at I he 
irnpo~;iJion ,,rlh'"~ plm:in:: of1his burden nn Pluinlil'l'i~llQI :;upporll~d bylh~ !,~(~lleral ruk n.:g;,rding burdc.:n ofpro,lt: 
2 J\.H~MORANDUM 01-' I .A WIN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW rRlt\L OR IN 
AI.TFRNAI'!VE ~·lOTION TO AMEND OR ALTER JUDGMt-:NT 
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t'lt:~tion iwcaus~ they w~re cit.h~r dec~as~:d or in _jail. The cvidt:nec..~ is undispul.t~d Lhul no c.hang.:s 
lo the dat.ahas<:: tho.t would. in any mann~r, hav~~ imp<K~Ied the Lola)::: in Exhihit 5 m.~l:urrcd and 
Exhibit 5 establishes that only 2041 legal aml valid ah~~nt.ce balkll~ w~rc rcecived J.i..,r the 
dc~t.illll. Here. ilf'-~lin. the Court misnpplit.:d th~ hunkn ofprool"by implicitly requirinp. Plaintiff 
t.o inlroducl: ~~vidence rhat lhl~ datahas(;:: could no! possibly ch<ln!?,~ in addition to rlw 
uncnnlradictcd testimony of Mr. llursl of the Secretary nf SL~1tc ·s Ol'lil:c £h(ll no rdcvant dwngc 
occ:umxi. The (.'(lore.~ denial l.'fDctcndums' lRCP l{uh; 50(a) Motion ic•r dirl~Ct(:d ven.lict <'•t the 
end or Plaintiff's c'1st:: in d1id~ sNvcs nnly to ~mphasis. even more. that Plnindff1.11r:.L his burden 
or pnlor. 
Once the Plaint.iiT introduced ~ubsr.anlhtl ,;vidence th~ll n nurnbl~t· nf illeg<ll ;md invnlid 
abscnt(•c hallot~, \n ::1 numhct· sullidcnl. lo dum:;~ the dcclion result, occurred th~:: P.urdcn nf 
proof shifkd to l.)cf~ndauts. Th~.: Court should hav~: hascd its decision nol on th~ l~"ll:l LhHt 
Pl~1intitT did nnr inLroduc:c lh!:! (:Jlvclopt::s into L.h,~ n:l:nrd. but rath~:.r un the f11.ct tht"ll th~;: 
Dt·ll::nda.nt::; fniled l.o irHJ.'O(hK~c..: into evidence lhc envelopes nnd then somd1ow csrnhlish that the 
~.:nvclopcs. hy thl.:tnsdw~ rmd which t~an not bl~ ti~~d hy ~my cvidl;."rK~l: iO ::my spccitic ballot. 
rcbullcd Plainriff·s t:.vidcnc.c. estahlishin~ ilkgal vo\"l;."s rctc..:ivl:!d and counlt~d .. H:'f Bongiol'i v . 
.Jwnison. 110 Idaho 73-1. 718 P. 2d I 172 (IY86J ami Ughmer v. Hardison. 36359 /{)(.'(.'('A 
Au,t~ust 5, 20 I 0 cos'' nu. 3625f)). The De.lcndam~ Jid not offer into Lhc nx:lH·d any cvidcn~c to 
contrndict M1·. Hurst's ''~stimony. that the database: had in fi.1ct. as oppt>s~.:d (o '\:ould havt:!··. been 
~hanged in ;1 rele-vant mann~.:r during the e-ntire month ol' November 2009. 
r>~rh~ps, j\lS!" pcrhap$. the return t!nvdupcs may huw by t.hcmsdv~:s. ()11 their Hlct:, 
somehow prnvkkd th~: Court with relevant. sub:-:tantial. and probative. l~vidcncc nf the actual 
numberol"kgal and valid absentee hallots received hy the clo~e ol"polls.lk~pill! the t:Jct.Lhalthc 
copies of Lhc t~n.vdop~s nltnched Lo Lh~~ submillcd anidovit rellccl olhL~n.vi:-;<..~. Hm\•ever. th1.~ 
absentee h:·lllor r·durn envelopes, whclhc.r 2086. 2054 or 20)0 in number, vvwc not offered into 
cvid,~nce hy any ~·f the Ddi..~ndnnt.s. It was the burden or the lkfendanrs 10 n:buL the Plaintilf's-
primn lhc..~il~ cnsc. tht:y didn't. The CoUJ1. under the well csli:lblishcd wles or the burd~n of' proof 
applicnblc r.o election C•)ntcsls. C<"ll"l not ignore thi.s Jt~ilurC' ol' pfOt)f on th~ JXl.rt of DcH.:ndnnt~ nnd 
then pluce that bur·~kn on th~,.: Plaintiff 
3 MFl\-tORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIA I, OR IN 
ALTERNATIVE MOltON TO AMEND OR J\J.:l'ER JUD(;MENT 
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The Cnurt ·~ dt~cision and .ludg.m~:nl ar~ based upon an I.~ITI)I' or law that n.~suhcd fi·om lhl.: 
(.'ourt's ~rront.:~nus application or the.~ bun.k:n of pronf and the Court's rcsult.:.ml hypothesis. bast:d 
upon fW ~.~vidence in the l\~(:ord, that each return .;nvclope c.onwin.:d not ju.st lllll.':. ballot. but 
containc;;:d on~ /ego! and valid absentee ballot. Exhihir. 5. as Wl.'ll as the ntlx~r database records 
rd1t:ci, in rhcir dm:u:nenlt:d numhcrs. !haL there were "void'' ballots. Certainly these "void'' 
baliDLs were rclllrt~t:d in cnvdnpes and thus th~: numhcr can not b~~ the nne suggcst~~d hy rh~ 
Court h1 he 205(). Tht;rc is absolutely no evidence 10 support the hypoth~sis, th~rt w[t$ not Mgued 
by any Dcli::ndant.. aniwd al. hy th(~ Court in its d~ci::;ion thal cac.;h or th~ 2050 countl.'d envelopes 
musl have contaimxl valid <rnd legal ballots. 
A:-; t''-~1lcctcd by th..: Aflidavit of Starr Kcl~o filed her~;~w·ith thi..TC: exist ~rt k(t•;t live (S) 
~..~nvdopc:::; t·hat on rh,~ir l"a\:c indicutt: rhat. they u "void." 'l'his numh!:r of <.~nvdopcs i!' in addition 
to the. six (6) "void'' ballots dncumcnte.d in Exhihit 5 n:sulting. in lhe numhel' 2041. The 
~.~vidence: in the rcl:ord, nol. what Defemlanls might have shown il"somc oth(;r ~vidcnc.;c had hccn 
intmdul~cd·;. is dt:tdrninativc ofwht.."lhcr the bunkn orpmof was mt~t. The PlnintilT's burden wrrs 
mel. The Delt:nd~Hlls olkrcd nn ev1dcncc: to meet and rehut Pla.intitrs proof or irs prima l·trci'~ 
":U$C. The hypmhcsis Lhal thl.': ctwelnp~s by thcm~clvcs: would sornchuw t:swblish th<.U 2051 legal 
and vtllid nhscnte<:.' bal.ll)l$ wc.:~rc J'cccived is just that., 3 hypotht!sis, and on~.~ 1·hm rht! Dclcndants 
did l'lfll' even choos<.: to argue or produc~ evidence regarding. 
The d~ci::::ion ur lh~o: C:owt and Lhc Jud~m~nl arc nnt suppori~d by lhc lnw. A new tritrl 
~hould he ordered, 1)r t.hc Judgment allcrc:d or am~ndcd tn void the l;!kclion for Seal. 2 and order a 
n~w clccrion. 
Di\TI':T> th1~ f ofNovcmbcr. 2010 . 
....-;·· ...... ' 
__ .... ..L?l-L"t<~::.~.~·l>~·... . ............................. . 
Sturr Kclsn 
CERTlFlCAll·: OF SERVJCE: A l.:l)py w~rs lhxcd to l)cJ\.:nJam City d,al. 's coun~l Mike 
Hamnn :md Dcli;:ndnnl Kennedy's counst:l Sc(lll J{e~d a.nd Pd.er F:rbh.tm.i on the .. ~ __ day of 
N1.WI!t11h~r. 20 I 0. 
1 Indeed the (\lufl r~.:.ie.d"d !ht' "ofl~r" ui"Ddcndant_Kenncdy's ~oun~c~l in d<•~ingnr~i~.Hillc:ntl·o "reopen'' 1hc trial. 
4 MEMORANDt !M or: LAW IN SUPPORT OF t\:lOTION FOR NEW TRIAl. C>R IN 
AI ;rERNATIVL MOTION TO AMEND OR ALTFR .ll.IDfll'vlENT 
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STATE OF IDAHO } QS 
COUNTY OF KOOTEW\1 'J 
FILED: 
2010 WlV -8 PM 3: 16 
(' STARR KI·:LSO 
Auorn~.:.y '11 l..Hw /f244) 
P.O. 11ox 1312 
Coeur d~!\lcne, hbho R:lS 16 
Td: 208-765-3160 
(o·~ LEA . ~ICT COUR.Tq:r~J ;/ 
\ .-4~' ~4 
1'f / A/ 
Fax: 208-664~62h 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR TllE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRJCl OF 
THE ST/\Tl.·: OF ID/\HO, IN AND FOR 'fHE COUNTY OF KOOTE.N:\1 
JIM BIV\NNON, 
Plai.nr.ill 
v~. 
CITY Of COEl.lf\ D'ALENE. JD/\1 10. 
a lllUni. .. ~ipnl ,~t'll'f.10I';;Hion. et.al 
Dt..~l~:ndanls. 
STt\ TF OF ID/\TlO ') 
County of Kooknai ) 
Case. N<.'.l. CV -09-1 001 0 
AFF'IJ)AVIT OF 
STARR KELSO 
S!arr K( . +m. br..:i.ng lirst duly svv·orn upon oath. tc::;tilk::: as t'l:lllows: 
f) I'~ \ . 
1. I am OVt~l' !h~ Hgt: or 1 R yt::ars, competent f.n kstif)', lll\d I make the h~.:•low Sll.ll.cmcnl.s 
upon my own personal kr·lo\ovk:dg~; 
"' /\1tnc.hed h.~~n~ro n . .;: Exhibits I,:?.. 3. 4. nnd 5 nrc: true~ and ~.~orrcct phorncopi~.~s of 
abs~nl(:l.~ btdlot J'd\!J'll CJlV(~IOj.')CS I'CI.~I.~iwd 1'\.~garding IlK~ November 3. 2009 City or 
Cocm d'Atcm~ (j\.~l.h~ral Fl~.~(1'ion hy the Kool(:nai County c.kctions departm~~IH. 
DATED _th-is f. of November. 20 I 0. 
c:--:1 ~ . l ' 
............. f..) ... ·rJ.,~:~ .. J .. e~::~:.~· .................................................................. . 
S1arr Kd:::o 
AFFIDAVIT f.W STARR KELSO 
II l
I (, 
ltom!,;)' ,II l.,(IW 1f
J)u
:nR
'I'
O'!R ? )
'.-4/y()/l1'I" ,/ A / 
()8-664~
I
A !.' I I or (nl~'N:\J
.11  1V\
t)I
or 1 R , I I J JO
nHl h.. ' ("I f-'n"mion, c
I.)l ,
,nA ")
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) -1 1
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( I'.
l~r ( (lgl: t:!<lI'S to Y in i,:,I(lw sl .Il.
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'1 A t , " 1,2. .  ri l'lI'~ 1 (lrrCCI l
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OCtJl' (~I.h II ~(1'i() t (' ll kc(i (1rtm~ nr
J, i S>' r JOC: -:l . 
...  'f. ).>,'rJ.,~ " ,t.:.l~ :~:.~  ,  "  " . " ..  "" ..  ""  "  ".""  
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On this ,f'day \)r Novcmbl:r. 2010 bd()r~ me tht..: undcrsig.n~o~d Notary Public, personally 
nppc::nrcd Stnrr Kdsn known or idcnt.itied to me, to he the per~on whose name is subscrib~o:d 10 
th~.:: within inslrum~n(, and (tcknowlcdg~..~d to me t.hal. thl~ statements (~(mjnintd rhcr·cin nrc t111e <and 
currccqtfthe hcstorhis hclicfand Umt be cxccutc:d the sam~. 
,t'~ :' •• •' _ .. ,.. 
~~ /,..· / /. I ,, 
"""'!·--<{<7' i~- d'-~-.,1 ' •' . 'A'<)~ .../' 
_ ... ,6:~~\YP"t]l31crt)r;t;l{j(i,\li<5 ....................... · · .. .. . 
ESII>IN{1 A<..t:Jt .. ·'"fl;~.~-·t" 
M y co M'Mti.~f<~)~·tx1fij{-:txs·~ .. ::.?.~k.~/tb 
CERTIFICAil.~ OF SERVICE: A copy was J~axcd to \f.)~l~ndanl. City ct.aL's counsd Mih~ 
Ham~m and Defendant Kennedy's counsel Scott Reed and Peter F.rhlund on tht: .. l .... day of 
Novcrnb~.r. 20 I 0. 
2 AFrJDJ\VlT C>F STARR KELSO 
l ( f )fI';: l ,; lI11dcrsig.nl. l e
W 01' 1.0 . ~() bscribl.!
I i. "lIm~ le ()wlcdgl 10 I, , I l: alcmc l~ on Cl' l l
q{i'l CSlor k wl cuk atll~.
,t'~," .'., ./1'" 
(~ ,..'./ ' / " 
'!'- { ; , ..- "j ,.'  -")
 ... '6:~~\~~P"l]1l1crt)r;t;1€i1i'\'i(5""""'''''''' .... ".. ." ... 
I)I fl (,./l/··:1 ;~.~ .  .. 
 Y jvlIi.~f<~)~·txj}ij{jXs·~"::, ~k.~/
l l J I l sel
m~1O lilt;"; "l.",
(lvcrnh~ 1
I \ ()
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STAT!: Ur !DAti() } S'S 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
FILED: if-if/l 
STARR KELSO 
Attorney ot Law #2445 
P.O. Box 1312 
2010 NOV -9 PM 4: 16 
Coeur d'Alene, idaho R3816 
Tel: 208-765-3260 
[';· ..... .,,\(1 /..~1! i~""ll~ 1 
C-ftLEf~ 
~~-.-=~~=~~ 
l"""..IJ\ .... ~\.10_\,,\,1~-\.f,.:.~'.l A 
Allorncy f(>r .Pia.intitT and Petitioner 
IN THF. DISTRICT COURT OF THE fi'JRST JlJI)lCIAI .. lliSTIUCT 01' TIU: 
STATE OI•'IOAHO, IN ANU FOR THf: COUNTY OF KOOTi!;NAI 
.JIM BRANNON, Ca~c No. CV·-09~10010 
Plaintiff~ 
Vs. 
CITY OF COEi.ll( J>'ALEN .. ~, IOAHO, I··:T. AI .•• : NOTICE OF HEARING 
ON ~,I .. AINTIFF'S 
.Defendants. MOTION FOR NI~W 
TRJAL OR lN THE 
ALTF.RNA TlVF. MOTION x.V TOAMf~NHORAI...TF:R U 
.n.JDG.MENT 
I> ATE: l>cccmber 7, 20Ha 
TIME: 2:00 s.1.M.. 
NO'l'lCE IS HEREBY GIVEN. that a hearing shaH be held on Tut~sday 
December 7, 2010 ut 2:00 o'd~k p.m., bdorc the Honorable Chal'lc~ W, Hosack. 
Scn.ior District Judg~ in the counhoust:: in Coeur d'Alene. Idaho upon th~': following~ 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRJAL OR lN THE ALTERNATIVE 
MOTION TO AMEND OR ALTER JUDGMENT 
Dawd this 9TH day ofNovcmbcr 2010. 
Starr Kelso 
Attorney tor Plaintiff 
I NOTICF:: OF' I·.JEARING 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERV1C1: 
1 certify !.hat a tnn: copy of the above and fbrcgoing was faxed on the 9TII day of 
November 20 l 0 to: 
Michad l... Hanmn 
Haman Law Otl'icc 
P.O. Box 2155 
Coeur d'Aicn~~- !dnho 83R16 
FAX (208-676-1683 
Peter C. Erbland. ISB#2456 
Paine. Hamblen. Cunin. Brooke & Miller, LLP 
701 Front Avcmw. Suite 101 
l,ost OIJicc B()::'< E 
Coeur d' Alen~- Idaho 83816-0328 
F/I.X: 208-664-633~ 
Scott W. Reed. ISB#818 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box A 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
FAX: 208-765-51.17 
" NOTICE OF HEARING 
~ 002/002 
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STARR KELSO 
Attorney at Law #2445 
P.O. Box 1312 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Tel: 208-765-3260 
Fax: 208-664-6261 
Attorney for Appellant Brannon 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JIM BRANNON, 
Appellant 
vs. 
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 
a municipal corporation, et.al. 
Respondents. 
Case No. CV-09-10010 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
"" TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE; SUSAN K. 
WEATHERS in her capacity as the City of Coeur d'Alene City Clerk; AND MIKE KENNEDY 
in his capacity as the incumbent candidate for the City of Coeur d'Alene Council Seat# 2; and 
THE PARTIES RESPECTIVE ATTORNEYS MICHAEL HAMAN, SCOTT REED, AND 
PETER ERBLAND 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellant, Jim Brannon appeals against the above named respondents to 
the Idaho Supreme Court from the final Judgment entered on November 4, 2010, Senior 
District Court Judge Charles W. Hosack presiding and all interlocutory orders entered by 
the Court prior thereto, simultaneously therewith, and subsequent thereto. 
2. That the appellant has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment 
described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a) (1) 
I.A.R. and Idaho Code section 34-2025 (b). 
3. Preliminary Issues on Appeal: 
1. Whether the district court erred in holding that the City and City Clerk were permitted 
in 2009 to enter into a contract with Kootenai County and the Clerk of the Court 
1 NOTICE OF APPEAL 
 l
 
 
 
 t 
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whereby all responsibility for the conduct of the City's election, and duties of the City 
Clerk, were delegated to the County and Clerk. 
2. Whether the district court erred in dismissing the complaint to set aside the entire 2009 
City of Coeur d'Alene General Election and only retaining the contest for Seat 2? 
3. Whether UOCAVA residency statutes are applicable to municipal elections? 
4. Wnether the faiiure of the County and Clerk to maintain an I.C. 34-1011 and I.C. 50-
451 absentee ballot record constitutes misconduct. 
5. Whether the district court erred in holding that mere return envelopes, some of which 
or marked "void" and some of which have no date and time stamp recording their 
receipt, is compliance with the absentee ballot record required to be kept by the Clerk 
pursuant to I.C. 34-1011 and/or I.C. 50-451. 
6. Whether the district court erred by not adopting the November 6, 2009 absentee ballot 
record (Exhibit 5) as being prima facie proof that more absentee ballots were counted 
than were actually received by the Clerk by the close of the polls? 
7. Whether the district court erred in holding, without any evidence in the record, that the 
2050 return envelopes counted by Judge Marano each contained a legal and valid 
absentee ballot when the absentee ballot record printed on November 6, 2009 (Exhibit 
5) documents that only 2041 valid absentee ballots were received prior to the close of 
the polls. 
8. Whether the district court erred by only requiring that the board of canvassers accept a 
print-out of machine vote totals to meet their responsibility to "count votes" pursuant to 
I.C. 34-2001 (6)? 
9. Whether the district court erred by not entering its order requiring voters that cast 
absentee ballots, who were not able to located within the city or the county for service 
of process, to appear at the trial as permitted by I. C. 34-2013? 
10. Whether the district court erred in not considering prior recorded statements of voters 
as substantive proof of who they cast their respective ballots for when they testified at 
trial that, at that time, they can not remember who they voted for in the election? 
11. Whether the district court erred in holding that Denise Dobslaff, a landed immigrant in 
Canada, was a resident for the purpose of voting in the City's municipal election? 
2 NOTICE OF APPEAL 
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12. Whether the district court erred in holding that the Clerk does not have an obligation 
under I.C. 50-445 to determine whether an applicant for an absentee ballot is registered 
and lawfully entitled to vote as requested by the applicant. (e.g. a resident ofthe city)? 
13. Whether the district court erred in holding that Kimberly Gagnon, who has never 
resided in the city, esd a qualified voter simply because she is the spouse of a current 
member of the military? 
14. Whether the district court erred in holding that Alan Friend, who listed his residence as 
a commercial building and whose internet advertising claims he is a permanent resident 
of Canada, was a qualified voter? 
15. Whether the district court erred by not requiring, under I.C. 50-402 "residence", that a 
voter living outside of the city must have a "fixed" principal or primary home or place 
of abode within the city, to which he intends to return to as opposed to a general intent 
to possibly someday return to the City? 
16. Whether erred, when the evidence establishes that at least two voters were provided the 
wrong ballots at polling places, by holding that in a "combined" election where more 
than one ballot is to be voted and the poll books are to document which type ofballot a 
person receives, that the fifty three "in-person" voters, for whom there are no records 
documenting which ballot they were respectively given, that the each were provided 
the correct ballot to cast their vote on when they appeared at the polls. 
17. Whether there is substantial competent evidence that supports the district court's 
holding that Judge Marano counted 2051 absentee ballots as being received. 
18. Whether the district court erred by not shifting that the burden of proof to Defendants, 
once the Plaintiff established that the only reliable absentee ballot record database 
documented that only 2041 valid absentee ballots were received by the Clerk and the 
machine reflects 2051 absentee ballots were counted which difference in number is 
five more than the difference in the vote totals attributed to Appellant Brannon and 
Defendant Kennedy? 
19. Whether the district court judge erred in not disqualifying himself given his pretrial 
statements in open court, on the record, that election challenges established is bias if 
election challenges were permitted would cause anarchy reign? 
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20. Whether the district court erred in holding that the proposed, but previously denied, 
requested amended complaint failed to state a claim for malconduct under I. C. 34-
2001? 
21. Whether the district court erred in confirming the 2009 City of Coeur d'Alene General 
Election? 
22. Wnether the district court erred in declaring Defendant Kennedy as duly elected to Seat 
2 in the 2009 City of Coeur d'Alene General Election? 
23. Whether the district court (Judge Simpson) erred in requiring Plaintiff to file a 
$5,000.00 bond. 
4. An order has not been issued sealing all or a part of the record. 
5. (a) A reporter's transcript is requested. 
(b) The appellants request the preparation of the reporter's transcript, including opening 
statements and closing arguments. Also a transcript of the oral argument all pre-trial 
hearings held except for the January 5, 2010 hearing. 
6. The appellants request the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in 
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: all motions for 
summary judgment, memorandums of law/briefs, affidavits, and exhibits filed in 
support thereof, or in opposition thereto, in this matter. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a 
transcript has been requested: 
(b) The clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of 
the reporter's transcript. 
(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the Clerk's record has been paid. 
(d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 
D this 15th day ofNovember, 2010. 
Starr Kelso, Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: I certify that a copy of the foregoing was faxed on the 15th day 
ofNovember, 2010 to: 
Michael L. Haman 
Haman Law Office 
P.O. Box 2i55 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
FPCK:208-676-1683 
Peter C. Erbland, ISB#2456 
Paine, Hamblen, Coffin, Brooke & Miller, LLP 
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101 
Post Office Box E 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0328 
F PCK: 208-664-6338 
Scott W. Reed, ISB#818 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box A 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 816 
FPCK:208-765-5117 
Coeur d'Alene Reporting 
Valerie Nunemacher 
Keri Veare 
Allison Stoval 
100 Wallace A venue 
Coeur d'Alene ID 83814 
Fax 208-676-8903 
JoAnn Schaller 
Anne MacManus 
Via fax: 446-1188 
Byrl C~inn JM1 753-3 
v 
Starr Kelso 
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Michael L. Haman 
HAMAN LAW OFFICE 
923 N. 3rct Street 
P.O. Box 2155 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-2155 
Telephone: (208) 667-6287 
Facsimile: (208) 676-1683 
ISB # 4784 
Attorneys for Defendant City of Coeur d'Alene, Weathers, Council and Mayor 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JIM BRANNON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, et al, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2009-10010 
DEFENDANT CITY OF COEUR D' 
ALENE'S AMENDED MOTION 
FOR COSTS AND FEES 
COMES NOW the Defendants City of Coeur d' Alene, its City Clerk, City Council and 
Mayor in their official capacities, (and after May 14, 2010, the City as a proper party and its Clerk 
in relation to Plaintiff's claim under I. C. 34-2001 ( 6) ), by and through their counsel of record, Haman 
Law Office, P.C., and hereby move this Court pursuant to Rules 54( d) and 54( e), Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and Idaho Code§§ 12-117, 12-121, 6-918A, and 34-2020, for an Order granting 
said Defendants their costs and fees incurred in the above action as the prevailing party on said 
Plaintiff's December 10,2009, Amended Complaint filed against said Defendants. This Motion is 
based upon the Order of the Court issued on March 2, 2010 (filed on March 3, 201 0), dismissing all 
DEFENDANT CITY OF COEURD' ALENE'S AMENDED MOTION FOR COSTS AND FEES 
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claims against said Defendants, the oral pronouncement on May 14, 2010 (thereafter reduced to 
writing on May 25, 201 0) that the City and its Clerk were proper parties and in relation to any claim 
under I.C. 34-2001(6)), the Court's October 5, 2010, Memorandum Decision and Order in favor of 
the City and its Clerk, and the November 4, 2010, Judgment. This Motion also is ba.;;ed on the 
Record herein. This Motion is also based on Defendants' Memorandum of Costs and Fees, and the 
Affidavit of Michael Haman filed contemporaneously herewith in support of said Motion for Costs 
and Fees. Said Defendants request oral argument. 
~ 
DATED this /-5 day ofNovember, 2010. 
HAMAN LAW OFFICE 
By:_/L -------· 
Michael L. Haman, counsel for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ;-5'day ofNovember, 2010, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing DEFENDANT CITY OF COEUR D' ALENE'S AMENDED MOTION FOR 
COSTS AND FEES by the method described below to: 
Starr Kelso 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1312 
1621 N. Third Street, Ste. 600 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Fax: 208 664-6261 
Scott Reed 
P.O.BoxA 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Fax (208) 765-5117 
Peter Erbland 
P.O. BoxE 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Fax: 208 664-6338 
__ ~_U.S. First class mail 
Fax 
---
___ Hand Delivery 
~~ .S. First class mail 
Fax 
---
___ Hand Delivery 
~- First class mail 
Fax 
--
___ Hand Delivery 
Michael L. Haman 
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Michael L. Haman 
HAMAN LAW OFFICE 
923 N. 3rd Street 
P.O. Box 2155 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-2155 
Telephone: (208) 667-6287 
Facsimile: (208) 676-1683 
ISB # 4784 
ZG!DriOV 16 AM 9:41 
Attorneys for Defendant City of Coeur d'Alene, Weathers, Council and Mayor 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JIM BRANNON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, et al, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2009-10010 
AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT CITY 
OF COEUR D' ALENE'S MOTION 
FOR COSTS AND FEES 
COME NOW the Defendants City of Coeur d'Alene, its Clerk, City Council and Mayor in 
their official capacities, (and after May 14, 2010, the City as a proper party and its Clerk in relation 
to Plaintiff's claim under I. C. 34-2001 ( 6) ), by and through their counsel of record, and hereby submit 
their Memorandum of Costs and Fees pursuant to Rules 54( d) and 54( e), Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and Idaho Code§§ 12-117, 12-121, 6-918A, and34-2020. Eachoftheitems of costs and 
the statement of fees set forth below are reasonable and were actually and necessarily incurred on 
behalf of the Defendants, and therefore should be awarded pursuant to the aforementioned Rules and 
Code provisions. 
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A. Prevailing Party. 
The Defendants should be entitled to costs and fees under Rules 54( d), 54( e), and Idaho 
Code§§ 12-117, 12-121, 6-918A, and 34-2020 as they clearly prevailed in the matter. As the Court 
well knows, Rules 54( d)(l )(B) and 54( e )(1 ), a..;; well a..;; the relevant Code sections provide, in part, 
that a party seeking costs and fees must establish that said party was the prevailing party in the 
action. The determination of a prevailing party requires the consideration of various factors within 
the discretion of the Court. In Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 
Idaho 716, 117 P.3d 130 (2005), the Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
A determination on prevailing parties is committed to the discretion of the 
trial court and we review the determination on an abuse of discretion standard. Idaho 
R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1)(B) guides courts' inquiries of the prevailing party question. It 
provides: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to 
costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment 
or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. 
The trial court in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an action 
prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may 
apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair and equitable 
manner after considering all of the issues and claims involved in the action 
and the resultant judgment or judgments obtained. 
Id. at 718-19, 117 P.3d 132-33 (citations omitted). In sum, the determination of a prevailing party 
for awarding fees and costs involves the consideration by the trial court of"(l) the result obtained 
in relation to the relief sought; (2) whether there were multiple claims or issues; and (3) the extent 
to which either party prevailed on each issue or claim." Joseph C.L. U Ins. Associates, Inc. v. 
Vaught, 117 Idaho 555, 557, 789 P.2d 1146, 1148 (Idaho App. 1990). 
AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT CITY OF COEURD' ALENE'S 
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There is no dispute that the Defendants here prevailed on all claims brought against them by 
the Plaintiff. The questions that remain are (1) the amount of the costs incurred as a matter of right, 
(2) discretional costs, and (3) whether the Defendants are entitled to fees. 
B. Costs Incurred as a Matter of Ri2:ht Rule 54( d)(l )(C): 
(1) Court filing fee (Answer) $58.00 
(1 0) Charges for one (1) copy of any deposition. 
See Exhibit "A," attached. 
A. Ronald Prior $42.00 
B. Susan Harris $67.20 
TOTAL COSTS ALLOW ABLE AS A MATTER OF RIGHT $167.20 
C. Discretionary costs. 
The Defendants also seek discretionary costs under Rule 54(d)(l)(D), Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. As the Court knows, the award of discretionary costs requires a showing that the costs 
incurred were not only necessary and reasonably incurred, but also exceptional. And, there must be 
a showing that the interests of justice demand such an assessment. See Rule 54( d)( 1 )(D); see also 
Bingham v. Montane Resource Associates, 133 Idaho 420,425,987 P.2d 1035, 1040 (1999). Here, 
the Defendants seek additional or discretionary costs for photocopies, postal costs and faxes that 
were incurred in the defense of this action. 
It has been stated that "[d]iscretionary costs may include 'long distance phone calls, 
photocopying, faxes, travel expenses' and additional costs for expert witnesses." Hayden Lake Fire 
Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 314, 109 P .3d 161, 168 (2005) (citations omitted). Here, 
it is the Defendants' position that costs incurred for items such as copies, postal charges and faxes 
AMENDEDMEMORANDUMINSUPPORTOFDEFENDANTCITYOFCOEURD' ALENE'S 
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were necessary and exceptional given the complexity and novelty of the issues involved, as well as 
the voluminous and perhaps unnecessary filings by the Plaintiff. This includes costs not only 
incurred in the defense of the action, but those related to the Plaintiff's failed attempt to enjoin the 
Defendants from installing the elected winners of the November 3, 2009, General Election. 
Perhaps a better way to say it, this matter certainly was not an ordinary and common action. 
Indeed, there are hardly any cases in Idaho pertaining to election contests. Plus, the complexities, 
as well as numerosity, of claims turned this into an unusual and exceptional case. As did the detailed 
and thorough preparation of all counsel involved. One need only consider the voluminous court file 
and one can realize that this case was complex and unusual, and exceptional. Finally, the it would 
serve the interests of justice to award discretionary costs. 
In other words, the prevailing party, in this case the citizenry, should not have to pay for a 
unnecessary and baseless challenge of an election. Indeed, the case was dismissed against these 
Defendants as a matter of law because the Plaintiff, for all intents and purposes, sued the wrong 
party. The statute was and is clear- the County ran and conducted the election, and was responsible 
for the same.1 In May, 2010, the City was brought back in as a "proper party," and also its City Clerk 
was brought back in to this litigation to defend claims arising under I. C. § 34-2001 ( 6). The City and 
its Clerk also found itself defending numerous attempts by the Plaintiff to amend and allege 
"malconduct, etc." Clearly, all ofthe Plaintiffs' attempts failed and were baseless. Indeed, there was 
1There have been questions regarding whether a municipality can avoid responsibility for 
errors that may have occurred in its own election. As the Court noted, controlling statutes place 
responsibility, if any, on the entity that conducted the election. In this case, the County conducted 
the City and County election, as well as elections of other neighboring municipalities. In sum, the 
Plaintiff sued the wrong party. 
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no evidence ever elicited showing or even suggesting a violation ofi.C. § 34-2001(6), let alone any 
evidence of "malconduct." 
In sum, in hindsight this litigation was unusually complex, exceptional (some might even say 
that it was grueling at times), and unusual. As such, the discretionary costs of faxes, postal charges 
and copy costs were necessarily incurred for the proper defense. Therefore, the Defendant requests 
that the Court award the following items of discretionary costs incurred: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Faxes 
Copy Costs 
Postal 
TOTAL DISCRETIONARY COSTS: 
$471.30 
$260.39 
$3.46 
$735.15 
TOTAL COSTS INCURRED (MATTER OF RIGHT AND DISCRETIONARY): $902.35 
D. Attorney Fees. 
Under Rule 54(e)(l) and Idaho Code§§ 12-117, 12-121 and 6-918A, an award of attorney 
fees to the prevailing party is mandatory if the Court finds that the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint 
was brought or "pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Rule 54(e)(1), IRCP. 
Indeed, in the recent unpublished opinion by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Lightner v. Ada County, 
2009 Unpublished Opinion No. 673 (Ct. App. November 13, 2009), the appellate Court stated: 
An award of attorney fees may be granted under I. C. § 12-121 and I.A.R. 41 to the 
prevailing party and such an award is appropriate when the court is left with the 
abiding belief that the appeal has been brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, 
orwithoutfoundation.Rendonv. Paskett, 126Idaho 944,945, 894P.2d 775,776 (Ct. 
App. 1995). Idaho Code Section 12-117 ... would similarly allow for the award of 
reasonable costs and attorney fees to the prevailing party in this case. 
Id. (Emphasis added.) See also Koch v. Canyon County, 145 Idaho 158, 163 177 P.3d 372, 377 
(2008) ("Under that statute [I.C § 12-117], it would be entitled to an award of attorney fees if it 
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prevailed and the Plaintiffs acted without a reasonable basis in law or fact in bringing the appeal.") 
Obviously, the question before the Court in the instant matter is not whether the Defendants 
prevailed. They did. Rather, the question is whether the gravamen of the Plaintiffs' lawsuit against 
the Defendants was brought and pursued without a reasonable basis in law or fact, i.e., without 
foundation. Clearly, it was. 
The Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint (dismissing the County) against these Defendants 
on or about December 10, 2009, alleging various claims centering around the City of Coeur d' 
Alene's alleged failures and conduct in conducting the November 3, 2009, General Election which 
incorporated City and County issues. Shortly thereafter, these Defendants filed their Answer and 
Motion to Dismiss on or about December 15, 2009. Therein, said Defendants took painstaking 
efforts to explain to the Plaintiff that the City of Coeur d' Alene had lawfully delegated to Kootenai 
County the conduct of the subject election, including referencing the authorizing agreements and 
enabling legislation. Indeed, as the Court noted, Idaho Code § 34-1401, among others, clearly and 
unequivocally provides and provided that a municipality can delegate its election to a county, and 
when the same occurs the county clerk assumes responsibility. Honestly, it was like talking to a 
wall as the Plaintiff ignored everything said to him by the City, by the County, by all involved. 
Indeed, after initial meetings, the City again met with Plaintiff's representative on December 
24, 2009, and again explained that the City had delegated the election to Kootenai County. There 
can be no dispute about this meeting. And there can be no dispute that it was a waste of time as the 
Plaintiffhad little interest in listening. And, on or about December 31,2009, representatives of the 
City of Coeur d'Alene and representatives ofKootenai County, including its Clerk and counsel, met 
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with Plaintiff and his counsel. At this meeting, the City of Coeur d' Alene again explained that the 
conduct of the election was delegated by the City to the County per statute and agreement; and, that 
the County accepted the same. This is undisputed. It also is undisputed that the Plaintiff again did 
not care or did not listen. 
Despite the clear and unequivocal language of Idaho Code§§ 34-1401 and 67-2332, the 
Plaintiff pressed forward with a Motion to Restrain the Installment of three council seats and the 
Mayor. On or about January 5, 2010, the Defendant City of Coeur d' Alene, et al., filed a 
Memorandum in Opposition to the Plaintiff's Motion to Restrain the Installment of the Elected 
winners of the November 3, 2009, General Election. Likewise, counsel for Defendant Kennedy in 
his individual capacity filed a supporting brief, and therein attached documents showing the 
legislative purpose behind Idaho Code § 34-1401. That is, the Legislature intended for cities to 
contract and delegate election duties to respective counties. Nonetheless, the Plaintiff pressed 
forward. 
In the Plaintiff's massive amount ofbriefing prior to the March 2, 2010, hearing on the City's 
Motion to Dismiss, the Plaintiff failed to articulate a legal basis that would suggest that a 
municipality could not delegate election duties to its respective county. The best the Plaintiff could 
come up with is that Idaho Code § 34-1401 exempted municipalities from said statute. Of course, 
the rest of the statute read that this exemption was not applicable if an exception applied; and, a clear 
reading of the Statute provided that municipalities could contract. This was also confirmed by the 
Secretary of State's Deputy Tim Hurst. 
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This was again spelled out to the Plaintiff in said Defendants' Reply to the voluminous 
briefing. Yet, the Plaintiff pressed forward without a legal basis in opposition to said Defendants' 
meritorious position that it had delegated all duties to Kootenai County, and that under the law the 
Countv therefore became resoonsible for the conduct of the suhiect election_ 
., ~ -J- -- ---- ------
Throughout all of this, and during all of the meetings and briefing, it was painstakingly 
explained to the Plaintiff and his representatives that there was no factual basis WHATSOEVER to 
show or even suggest that the City violated any ofthe provisions of Idaho Code§ 34-2001. And, 
at no time did the Plaintiff ever present any evidence that would show, suggest or even infer that the 
City violated the aforementioned provision or its subsections. 
In the end, the Court granted said Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, based in part on the fact 
that the City of Coeur d'Alene lawfully contracted and delegated the conduct of the November 3, 
2009, General Election to Kootenai County, and that the County accepted the same. 
In May, 2010, the Court granted the Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider to bring the City and 
its representatives (Clerk, Mayor, Council in their official capacities) back into the lawsuit. There 
was no evidence whatsoever to support this frivolous attempt. The Court granted the Motion only 
to the extent to bring the City in as a proper party, i.e., as an entity that could carry out the orders of 
the Court, if necessary. At the begging of Plaintiff's counsel, the Court also brought back in the City 
Clerk to defend a claim arising under Idaho Code§ 34-2001(6), i.e., whether there was an error by 
the Clerk in the canvassing of the election. No other official for the City was brought back in. And, 
if memory serves, there were questions asked of the Plaintiff regarding why the County was not 
being brought in. To date, those questions still linger. 
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Nonetheless, the City and its Clerk thereafter vigorously defended the remaining claim. 
Which, was not entirely difficult in itself because the Plaintiff never presented any evidence of any 
error in the canvassing. Indeed, numerous witnesses testified at trial, including the County officials 
and the Citv Clerk. statin2: that there was no error in the canvassinQ_ At no time did the Ph:tintiff ever 
., "' ......, . -- .. - ---- o· ------ ----- ----- ---- --- -----. --
present evidence or elicit any testimony to the contrary. The claim arising under I. C. 34-200 I ( 6) was 
pursued frivolously and arguably in bad faith in light of the numerous meetings and attempts to 
explain the issues to the Plaintiff in December, 2009. Of course, the Court found that there was no 
error in the canvassing and as such there was no merit to the Plaintiffs claim under I. C. 34-200 I ( 6). 
It should also be noted that on at least 4 perhaps 5 occasions the City successfully defended the 
Plaintiffs failed effort to allege "malconduct, etc." Even the Court questioned why the Plaintiff was 
pursuing such an amendment, especially without the presence of the County- the true proper party. 
In Gallagher v. State of Idaho, 2005 Opinion No. 3068 (Sup. Crt., January 24, 2005), the 
Gallagher Court said in response to the State's Motion for Fees per I.C. §§ I2-1I7, 12-I21 and 
I.A.R, that "when the law is well-settled and the Appellants have made no substantial showing that 
the district court misapplied the law, attorney fees are appropriate." !d. (Citing Bowles v. Pro 
Indiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 377, 973 P.2d 142, I48 (1999)). See also McCuskey v. Canyon 
County, I28 Idaho 213, 9I2 P.2d IOO (1996). Here, the law was well settled, and was well 
explained. And, the Plaintiff failed to make any showing that would suggest otherwise. 
In sum, said Defendants request an award of attorney's fees under Rule 54( e), and under 
Idaho Code § § I2-117, I2-I2I and 6-9I8A, on the basis that said Defendants prevailed at every 
AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT CITY OF COEURD' ALENE'S 
MOTION FOR COSTS AND FEES - 9 
y ti ll li t
# .. . • . • - - -- - - -- . 
1
 1
 
t nty -
1 1 1
L
I
1
1 1 100
1 1 1 1 1
SC 38417-2011 Page 2388 of 2676
stage of this action, the law is well settled, and the Plaintiff failed to properly pursue his claims. 
That is, the Plaintiff pursued his claims against these Defendants without foundation. 
Finally, it should be noted that there is a strong policy reason for awarding fees. If a loser 
in an election desires to forfeit his or ril!ht to a recount and sues. he or she should be held resnonsible 
--- --- -- - ----- -- ---- -- - - -- - - - f....l' j .... 
for the fees incurred ifhe or she loses in court. Otherwise, what is to prevent anyone who loses from 
suing? Worse yet, why would anyone run for election ifhe or she must pay out of pocket fees and 
costs to defend the seat he or she won? The chilling effect had by this frivolous adventure by the 
Plaintiff and his supporters, as well as those calling the shots, can only be offset by an award of fees 
and costs incurred by the prevailing parties. Here, the City prevailed as it said it would during 
numerous meetings last December, 2009. 
In sum, reasonable attorney fees for the Defendants from December 1, 2009, when the initial 
Complaint was filed, through the issuance of the Memorandum Decision and Order of October 5, 
2010, total a reasonable rate of just under $30,000.00 This is broken down as follows: 
MLH 
JM 
KH 
100.00 
55.00 
55.00 
Total Fees: 
$34,010.00 
$638.00 
$27.50 
$34,675.50 
This total is consistent with the requirements of Rule 54( e )(3 ). Indeed, counsel for said Defendants 
has been representing the same since 1997, and has an established relationship; and the rates charged 
to said municipal clients hardly have changed over this time. 
Additionally, this amount certainly is reasonable when compared to fees sought by other 
parties in this case. Indeed, rates charged to a municipality often are less than what would be 
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charged to private clients for a variety of reasons, including the fact that fees are being paid by the 
citizenry of said municipality. In fact, the fees and costs incurred by these Defendants is significantly 
less than the bond required to cover the potential costs of the remaining private Defendant. 
Further, the fees charged are reasonable in light of the voluminous records and numerous 
motions that were filed; and as such, the fees sought are not inconsistent with prevailing charges for 
similar work on such a complex and novel issue. Indeed, this matter was certainly complex and 
novel, and there hardly any cases in the State ofldaho addressing issues underlying election contests. 
Finally, given the work that was required, the political nature of the issues, the treatment in the 
media, the expedited nature of the case, etc., the matter certainly was not one of desirability by any 
means. In sum, there really can be no doubt that the fees sought comply with the criteria set forth 
in Rule 54(e)(3), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant timely (Judgment was entered on 11-4-1 0) requests that the Court award costs 
as a matter of right in the amount of$167.20, discretionary costs in the amount of$735.15, and 
reasonable attorney fees in the amount of$34,675.50. 
----DATED this _jj_ day ofNovember, 2010. 
HAMAN LAW OFFICE 
~· 
Michael L. Haman, counsel for Defendants 
AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT CITY OF COEURD' ALENE'S 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVING 
~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 12.._ day ofNovember, 2010, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT CITY OF 
COEUR D' ALENE'S MOTION FOR COSTS AND FEES by the method described below to: 
Starr Keiso ~S. First class mail 
Attorney at Law Fax 
P.O. Box 1312 Hand Delivery 
1621 N. Third Street, Ste. 600 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Fax: 208 664-6261 
Scott Reed 
P.O. Box A 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Fax (208) 765-5117 
Peter Erbland 
P.O. BoxE 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Fax: 208 664-6338 
hs. First class mail 
Fax 
--
___ Hand Delivery 
~- First class mail 
Fax 
---
___ Hand Delivery 
Michael L. Haman 
AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT CITY OF COEURD' ALENE'S 
MOTION FOR COSTS AND FEES - 12 
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Michael L. Haman 
HAMAN LAW OFFICE 
923 N: 3rd Street 
P.O. Box 2155 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-2155 
Telephone: (208) 667-6287 
Facsimile: (208) 676-1683 
ISB # 4784 
ST,\TE DF !!);,Jm ! ~~ CCU!~ i Y OF KOOTENAft J~ 
FIL..ED: 
CLERK DISTRICT COURT ~fa;.~ 
~·" " . / ( J lp 
Attorneys for Defendant City of Coeur d'Alene, Weathers, Council and Mayor 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JIM BRANNON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, et al, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss 
County of Kootenai ) 
Case No. CV-2009-10010 
AMENDED AFFIDAVIT OF 
MICHAEL HAMAN IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANT CITY OF COEUR 
D'ALENE'S MOTION FOR COSTS 
AND FEES 
Michael L. Haman, having been first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am an attorney with the firm Haman Law Office, attorneys of record for the 
Defendant City of Coeur d'Alene, its City Clerk, City Council and Mayor in their official capacities, 
in the above-entitled action, and after May 14, 2010, the City as a proper party and its Clerk in 
relation to Plaintiff's claim under I. C. 34-2001(6), and as such I am informed as to the items of costs 
expended in the defense of said action. 
AMENDED AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL HAMAN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT CITY OF 
COEUR D' ALENE'S MOTION FOR COSTS AND FEES - 1 
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2. I have reviewed the records and files concerning this matter and believe that the 
following items of costs (attached as Exhibit "A")are correct, are reasonable, have been necessarily 
incurred on behalf of the Defendant City of Coeur d'Alene, are exceptional and are in compliance 
with Rules 54(d)(1) and 54(d)(5), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure: 
(1) Court filing fee (Answer) $58.00 
(1 0) Charges for one (1) copy of any deposition. 
See Exhibit "A," attached. 
A. Ronald Prior $42.00 
B. Susan Harris $67.20 
TOTAL COSTS INCURRED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT: $167.20 
3. Further, the Defendants seeks discretionary costs pursuant to Rule 54( d)(l )(D), for 
the postal charges, copy costs and fax charges incurred in the defense of this action. Said items of 
costs were necessary and exceptional in light of the complexity and magnitude of the matter, and 
were reasonably incurred. Moreover, it would serve the interests of justice that the Plaintiff be 
ordered to reimburse the Defendant for said discretionary costs. This is on the basis that the costs 
were paid by the City of Coeur d' Alene, i.e., its citizenry, to defeat an action that was brought 
without legal foundation. Hence, the Order ofDismissal of the City of Coeur d'Alene, et al. 
4. I have reviewed the records and files concerning this matter, and the invoices attached 
hereto as Exhibit "B 1 ,"and the last pages to Exhibits "B2," "B3," and "B4;" and, I believe that the 
following items of discretionary costs incurred in relation to the defense of the claims levied against 
the Defendants in this case are correct, are reasonable, have been necessarily incurred on behalf of 
said Defendant, and are in compliance with Rule 54( d)(1 )(D), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure: 
AMENDED AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL HAMAN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT CITY OF 
COEUR D' ALENE'S MOTION FOR COSTS AND FEES -2 
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A. Discretionary Costs Ru1e 54(d)(l)(D): 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Faxes 
Copy Costs 
Postal 
TOTAL DISCRETIONARY COSTS: 
$471.30 
$260.39 
$3.46 
$735.15 
TOTAL COSTS INCURRED (MATTER OF RIGHT AND DISCRETIONARY): $902.35 
5. With regard to the fees, the rates charged by myself and the paralegal who assisted 
on this case likely are lower than the customary billing rates charged to governmental entities, and 
moreover the rates are reasonable and proper for the work performed in this case. Further, the rates 
for said legal professional likely are less than the fees charged by other independent/outside counsel 
representing governmental entities in the region for this type of litigation. Additionally, the rates 
charged are commensurate with said legal professionals' experience. 
6. Based on my experience in handling this type oflitigation, the fees incurred and the 
rates assessed by the Defendants' agent are reasonable and were necessarily incurred for the 
successful representation of said Defendant. Moreover, the fees incurred and the rates assessed were 
necessary and were reasonable given the novelty of the questions involved, the circumstances of the 
case and all that was entailed, the undesirability of the case, the nature of said counsel's relationship 
with the Defendants, and surely consistent with awards in any other similar case. Further, the fees 
incurred in defending what was a frivolous venture by the Plaintiff against the City on two fronts. 
Initially, the City defended claims that were u1timately dismissed in March, 201 0; in May, 2010, the 
City was brought back in as a proper party BUT also the City Clerk was brought back in to the action 
to defend claims arising under I.C. 34-2001(6). Despite reasonable efforts taken by the City dating 
AMENDED AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL HAMAN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT CITY OF 
COEUR D' ALENE'S MOTION FOR COSTS AND FEES - 3 
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back to December 2009 to explain to Plaintiff the frivolity ofhis claim, he nonetheless pursued the 
matter to trial where no evidence whatsoever was introduced to substantiate any claim under I. C. § 
34-2001(6). Second, the City was often faced with numerous motions to amend to allege 
malconduct. none of which were sunnorted bv an semblance of fact or law_ It should also he noted 
"' ~... J - - - - -- ------ -- ---.-- -- ---- ----- ----- -- --- -- ~, 
that the real and proper party in this case was the County but strangely the Plaintiff dismissed the 
County in December, 2009, and then tried to allege wrongdoing by the County via the City. This 
failed, miserably. 
7. Reasonable attorney rates and fees assessed total $34,465.50. See Exhibits "B2- B4" 
attached hereto. This is broken down as follows: 
MLH 
JM 
KM 
Total Fees: 
100.00 
55.00 
55.00 
$34,010.00 
$638.00 
$27.50 
$34,010.00 
8. The fees sought are consistent with Rules 54( e )(1 ), 54( e )(3), 54( e)( 5), and Idaho Code 
§§ 12-117, 12-121, 6-918A, and 34-2020. 
Further your Affiant saith not. 
~ 
DATED this (5 day ofNovember, 2010. 
Michael . aman 
. ~~\\llllllb . 1 r:::::. Subscnbed ~<Jr!l ~fore me this ___1_.2_ day ofNovember, 2010. ~~ ············ ~~ ~~ .... ··· .. 
;;:~: •;,.._ ~ §w:' ~oiARy \W~ 
=...,: : = 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVING 
--1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on this Ll_ day ofNovember, 2010, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing AMENDED AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL HAMAN IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT CITY OF COEURD' ALENE'S MOTION FOR COSTS AND FEES by the method 
described below to: 
Starr Kelso 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1312 
1621 N. Third Street, Ste. 600 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Fax: 208 664-6261 
Scott Reed 
P.O. Box A 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Fax (208) 765-5117 
Peter Erbland 
P.O.BoxE 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Fax: 208 664-6338 
--~-U.S. First class mail 
Fax 
--
--Hand Delivery 
/u.S. First class mail 
Fax 
--
--Hand Delivery 
/u.s. First class mail 
Fax 
--
--Hand Delivery 
.~·· 
Michael L. Haman 
AMENDED AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL HAMAN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT CITY OF 
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_;TON & ASSOC. REPORTI1~G 
~RVICE 
P.O. Box 880 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 816 
TAX ID. #82-0374519 
Date Invoice# 
1/30/2010 C0102B1 
I 1-M-:-:1a-:-;-L-. H-am_a_n--------------~1 I BRANNON VS CITY OF COE!JR D'ALENE 
HAMAN LAW OFFICE 
1110 W Park Place 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Terms Due Date Reporter Date Depo Taken 
Net30 3/1/2010 GEH 1/29/10 
Description Quantity Rate Amount 
1 Copy ofDEPO OF SUSAN R. HARRIS 32 2.10 67.20 
1 Copy ofDEPO OF RONALD E. PRIOR 20 2.10 42.00 
Postage/Handling 12.50 12.50 
Full Key-Word Index 2 15.00 30.00 
':opying of Exhibits 6 0.35 2.10 
153.80 
Please note Invoice. # on Check or send copy of Invoice when remitting. Thank you. Total $153.80 
Phone# Fax# E-mail 
208-667-8244 208-635-5217 gheston1@gmail.com ~ Defendant's ~ Exhibit 
e 
i A 
J ll
i e  
t -:-:l -a -a - --- --- -t· U
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Case costs on Brannon v City 
Case# CV 09-10010 
Costs from 12/1109-9/30110 
Fax Total- $471.30 
Postal Total- $3.46 
Copy Total- $260.39 
Filing Fee - $58.00 
Haman Law Office 
923 N. 3rd Street 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814 
208-667-6287 
i uerenoanrs 
~ Exhibit 
J 
! 1), 
e 
/ /  
t l 
rd 
 l
T
5
SC 38417-2011 Page 2398 of 2676
City of Coeur d'Alene - 415 
Attn: Mike Gridley 
710 E. Mullan Ave. 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Regarding: Brannon v City- 23962 
cv 09-10010 
Invoice No: 18813 
Services Rendered 
Date Staff Descri12tion 
12/01/2009 MLH Receipt and review Plaintiffs complaint 
and attend meeting with City Officials 
re: Plaintiffs claims (1.5); Research 
Idaho statutes re: Election laws (.5) 
12/02/2009 MLH Conference with City and County 
Officials re: Plaintiffs claims (1.0) 
12/03/2009 MLH Telephone conference with City re: 
Further action (.1 ); Review Idaho code 
and case authority re: Plaintiffs claims 
and in preparation of Motion to Dismiss 
(1.7) 
12/04/2009 MLH Further review of Idaho code and case 
authority re: Plaintiffs claims ( 1.1) 
12/07/2009 MLH Continued review of case authority and 
statutes in preparation of Motion to 
Dismiss (.8); Preparation of Motion to 
Dismiss (1.7) 
12/08/2009 MLH Continued research and review of case 
authority and statutes in preparation of 
Motion to Dismiss, and preparation of 
Motion to Dismiss (2.6); Telephone 
conference with County Attorney John 
Cafferty (.1 ); Emails to and from City 
re: Status (.2) 
12/09/2009 MLH Further research and 
i ueTenoanrs 
~ Exhibit 
e 
"' 
·• ~1.. .. 8 ~ 
Haman Law Office 
923 N. 3rd Street 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Date: 
Hours Rate 
2.00 $100.00 
1.00 $100.00 
1.80 $100.00 
1.10 $100.00 
2.50 $100.00 
2.90 $100.00 
3.60 $100.00 
2/04/2010 
Charges 
$200.00 
$100.00 
$180.00 
$110.00 
$250.00 
$290.00 
$360.00 
ity 
CV
ril
'".. l0-
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Haman Law Office 
Page No.: 2 
authority and statutes in preparation of 
Motion to Dismiss, and continued 
preparation of Motion to Dismiss, (3.6) 
12/10/2009 MLH Additional research and review of case 6.60 $100.00 $660.00 
authority and statutes in preparation of 
Motion to Dismiss (2.; ); Further 
preparation of Motion to Dismiss (3.0); 
Telephone conference with City re: 
Amended Complaint (.1 ); Telephone 
conference with Counsel for Kootenai 
County re: Plaintiffs claims and 
Amended Complaint (.3); Telephone 
conference with Counsel for Defendant 
Kennedy re: Plaintiffs claims (.1 ); 
Receipt and review Plaintiff's Amended 
Complaint, correspondence and 
Request for Admissions (1.0) 
12/11/2009 MLH Review Defendant Kootenai County's 6.50 $100.00 $650.00 
proposed Motion to Dismiss and 
Answer (.6); Further review of Plaintiffs 
Amended Complaint, attachments and 
request for Admissions (.5); 
Conference with City re: Amended 
Complaint (1.0); Continued preparation 
of City's Motion to Dismiss (2.7); 
Additional review of case authority and 
legislation re: Plaintiffs claims (1. 7) 
12/13/2009 MLH Further preparation of City's Motion to 3.70 $100.00 $370.00 
Dismiss, and preparation of Answer to 
Plaintiffs amended complaint (1.8); 
Further review of County materials, 
Plaintiffs pleadings, case law and 
legislation in preparation of City's 
pleadings (1.9) 
12/14/2009 MLH Additional preparation of City's Motion 6.70 $100.00 $670.00 
to Dismiss, and preparation of Answer 
(4.9); Further review of County 
materials, Plaintiffs pleadings, case law 
and legislation in preparation of City's 
pleadings (1.0), Email. from City re: 
Recommendations for Motion to 
Dismiss (.2); Telephone conference 
with City re: Plaintiffs claims and City's 
Motion to Dismiss (.6) 
12/15/2009 JM Telephone conference with Clerk re: 0.30 $55.00 $16.50 
Filing fee for appearance (.1 ); 
Telephone conference with Judge's 
Clerk re: Hearing for Motion to Dismiss 
(.1 ); Preparation of Notice of Hearing 
( .1) 
12/15/2009 MLH Final preparation of City's Motion to 3.90 $100.00 $390.00 
1 12
)
1 12
1 12
1 12
1 12
.  
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Haman Law Office 
Page No.: 3 
Dismiss and Answer (2.8); Further 
review case authority and statutes in 
preparation of Motion to Dismiss and 
Answer (.5); Email to and from City 
Attorney re: Motion to Dismiss and 
Answer (.2); Preparation of Notice of 
Hearing (.1 ); Telephone conference 
with City Attorney re: City's pleadings 
(.3) 
12/16/2009 MLH Telephone conference with City re: 0.30 $100.00 $30.00 
Future handling (.1 ); Receipt and 
review letter from Plaintiff's Attorney re: 
Plaintiff's claims (.2) 
12/17/2009 MLH Telephone conference with City re: 0.40 $100.00 $40.00 
Future handling (.1); Receipt and 
review letter from Plaintiff's Attorney re: 
Plaintiff's claims (.1 ); Emails to and 
from City re: Conference with Counsel 
(.2) 
12/21/2009 MLH Emails to and from City re: Plaintiff's 0.20 $100.00 $20.00 
Discovery Requests (.2) 
12/23/2009 MLH Emails to and from City re: Conference 0.20 $100.00 $20.00 
with Plaintiff's Attorney (.2) 
12/24/2009 MLH Conference with City and Plaintiff's 1.90 $100.00 $190.00 
Attorney re: Future handling ( 1.5); 
Receipt and review Answer of 
Defendant Kennedy (.2); Receipt and 
review Defendant Kennedy's responses 
to Plaintiff's Request for Admissions 
(.2) 
12/28/2009 MLH Emails to and from City re: Meeting 0.40 $100.00 $40.00 
with Plaintiff's Attorney (.3); Telephone 
conference with City re: Conference 
with Plaintiff's Attorney ( .1) 
12/29/2009 MLH Receipt and review letter from Counsel 0.50 $100.00 $50.00 
for Defendant Kennedy re: Plaintiff's 
claims, along with attachments (.3); 
Conference with Counsel for Defendant 
Kennedy re: Conference with Plaintiff's 
Attorney (.2) 
12/30/2009 MLH Receipt and review emails from City re: 2.50 $100.00 $250.00 
Plaintiff's claims and City's proposed 
response (.2); Telephone conference 
with City re: Conference with County 
and Plaintiff's Attorney ( .1 ); 
Preparation for and attendance at 
conference with Plaintiff's Attorney 
OAO
OAO
SC 38417-2011 Page 2401 of 2676
12/31/2009 MLH 
Expenses 
Start Date 
12/15/2009 
12/15/2009 
12/16/2009 
Total New Charges 
Staff Name 
JM Jen Myers 
MLH Michael L. Haman 
(2.1 ); Conference with City re: 
Anticipated Temporary Restraining 
Order (.1) 
Emails to and from Counsel for 
Kootenai County re: Additionai 
information sought by Plaintiff's 
Attorney (.3); Receipt and review email 
from Counsel for Kootenai County with 
attachments re: Response to Plaintiff's 
questions (.2); Telephone conference 
with Counsel for Defendant Kennedy 
re: Plaintiff's questions (.1 ); Email to 
Counsel for Defendant Kennedy re: 
Plaintiff's questions (.1) 
Description 
Fax Defendants' Answer to Court 
Fax Notice of Hearing to Court 
Haman Law Ck# 5305 to Kootenai 
County for filing 
Hours Rate Fees 
0.30 $55.00 $16.50 
49.40 $100.00 $4,940.00 
Time Keepers: (MLH) Michael L. Haman - Attorney 
(JM) Jen Myers, (KJH) Kari J. Henley- Paralegals 
Rates: Attorney- $1 00/hour; Paralegal- $55/hour 
TaxiD#:26-1731118 
0.70 
49.70 
Quantity 
8.00 
17.00 
1.00 
Haman Law Office 
Page No.: 4 
$100.00 
Total Fees 
Price 
$0.50 
$0.50 
$58.00 
Total Expenses 
$70.00 
$4,956.50 
Charges 
$4.00 
$8.50 
$58.00 
$70.50 
$5,027.00 
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City of Coeur d'Alene - 415 
Attn: Mike Gridley 
710 E. Mullan Ave. 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Regarding: Brannon v City - 23962 
cv 09-10010 
Invoice No: 18945 
Services Rendered 
Haman Law Office 
923 N. 3rd Street 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Date: 5/27/2010 
=D~at~e _____ ~S~ta~ff~-------~D~e~sc~r~ip~ti~o~n ____________________ _ Hours 
2.00 
Rate Charges 
$110.00 1/04/2010 JM Review file and preparation of City's 
1/04/2010 MLH 
1/05/2010 JM 
1/05/2010 MLH 
responses to Plaintiff's Requests for 
Admission (2.0) 
Further preparation of responses and 
objections to Plaintiff's Request for 
Admissions (1.2); Telephone 
conference with City re: Plaintiff's 
request for Certificate of Election ( .1 ); 
Telephone conference with Counsel for 
Defendant Kennedy re: Status of 
Plaintiff's proposed Temporary 
Restraining Order (.1 ); Telephone 
conference with City re: Plaintiff's 
proposed Temporary Restraining Order 
( .1 ); Receipt and review letter from City 
re: Letter from Plaintiff's Attorney to 
Kootenai County re: Temporary 
Restraining Order (.2); Research case 
authority and rules re: Injunction 
against seating elected officials (2.0) 
Preparation of Affidavit of Michael 
Haman in opposition to Plaintiff's 
Motion for Temporary Restraining 
Order (.2) 
Attendance at hearing on Plaintiff's 
Motion for Temporary Restraining 
Order (1.7); Emails to and from City in 
preparation of City's response to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order (.4); Telephone 
conference with City re: City's 
$55.00 
3.70 $100.00 $370.00 
0.20 $55.00 $11.00 
7.10 $100.00 $710.00 
i uetendanrs 
~ Exhibit 
l 
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Haman Law Office 
Page No.: 2 
responses to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Temporary Restraining Order (.3); 
Continued research and review of case 
authority and statutes in preparation of 
City's response to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Temporary Restraining Order (1.0); 
Preparation of response to Plaintiff's 
Motion for Temporary Restraining 
Order and Motion to Strike (3.2); 
Receipt and review submissions by 
Counsel for Defendant Kennedy (.4); 
Preparation of proposed Order (.1) 
1/06/2010 MLH Email from Counsel for Kootenai 0.10 $100.00 $10.00 
County re: Request by Plaintiff's 
Attorney for additional information ( .1) 
1/08/2010 MLH Receipt and review Defendant 0.50 $100.00 $50.00 
Kennedy's amended Notice of Hearing 
and second amended Notice of 
Hearing, and Defendant's Motion to 
Shorten Time with proposed Order (.4); 
Receipt and review letter from Counsel 
for Defendant Kennedy re: Motions (.1) 
1/11/2010 MLH Final preparation of responses to 0.60 $100.00 $60.00 
Plaintiff's Request for Admissions (.1 ); 
Emails to and from City re: Request for 
Admissions (.2); Receipt and review 
Plaintiff's objection to Defendant 
Kennedy's Motion to Shorten Time (.1 ); 
Receipt and review letter from Plaintiff's 
Attorney with attachments (.2) 
1/12/2010 MLH Receipt and review Defendant 0.70 $100.00 $70.00 
Kennedy's Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Motion to Shorten Time, Memorandum 
in response to Plaintiff's objection to 
shorten time, proposed Order, Notices 
of Hearing on Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Motion to Strike, Motion 
to Strike and affidavits of Counsel for 
Defendant Kennedy in support of 
various motions (.7) 
1/13/2010 MLH Receipt and review Plaintiff's Motion for 2.30 $100.00 $230.00 
Reconsideration (.1 ); Receipt and 
review Plaintiff's Motion to Shorten 
Time ( .1 ); Receipt and review Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration (.1 ); Receipt and 
review Plaintiff's Motion to Continue 
(.1); Receipt and review Plaintiff's 
Motion for Scheduling Conference (.1 ); 
Receipt and review Plaintiff's Motion to 
Shorten Time for hearing on scheduling 
conference (.1 ); Receipt and review 
SC 38417-2011 Page 2404 of 2676
1/14/2010 MLH 
1/15/2010 MLH 
1/18/2010 MLH 
1/25/2010 MLH 
Plaintiffs affidavit in Support of Motion 
to Shorten Time for scheduling 
conference (.1 ); Receipt and review 
Plaintiffs Affidavit in Support of Motion 
to Reconsider with attachments and 
exhibits (.5); Receipt and review 
Plaintiffs objection (.1 ); Receipt and 
review Plaintiffs Motion for Scheduling 
Conference (.1 ); Receipt and review 
Plaintiffs supplemental affidavit in 
Support of Motions (.1 ); Receipt and 
review Plaintiffs second supplemental 
affidavit in support of Motions with 
exhibits (.3); Receipt and review 
Plaintiffs Motion to Compel against City 
of Coeur d'Alene (.1 ); Review Idaho 
Code re: Discovery of ballots (.1 ); 
Receipt and review Defendant 
Kennedy's response to Plaintiffs 
Motion to Shorten Time on hearing on 
Plaintiffs Motions (.1 ); Receipt and 
review Plaintiffs proposed Amended 
Order on scheduling ( .1 ); Letter to City 
re: Plaintiffs submissions (.1) 
Receipt and review Order Vacating 
Defendant Kennedy's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and setting 
scheduling conference (.1) 
Telephone conference with Counsel for 
Defendant Kennedy re: Status of case 
(.2); Telephone conference with City 
re: Status (.2); Receipt and review 
case authority from Counsel for 
Defendant Kennedy (.4) 
Email from Counsel for Defendant 
Kennedy re: Deposition of witnesses 
(.1) 
Receipt and review affidavit of Deputy 
Secretary of State Hurst (.2); 
Telephone conference with Counsel for 
Kootenai County re: Plaintiffs 
discovery request (.2); Receipt and 
review Plaintiffs Request for 
Production of Documents to City (.2); 
Letter to City re: Plaintiffs Request for 
Production of Documents (.1 ); Receipt 
and review Plaintiffs notices of 
depositions of four witnesses (.4); 
Letter to Plaintiffs Attorney re: 
depositions (.1 ); Emails to and from 
City re: Plaintiffs Request for 
Production of Documents (.2); Emails 
to and from Council for Kootenai 
Haman Law Office 
Page No.: 3 
0.10 $100.00 $10.00 
0.80 $100.00 $80.00 
0.10 $100.00 $10.00 
1.60 $100.00 $160.00 
' l
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Haman Law Office 
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County re: Discovery (.2) 
1/26/2010 JM Letter to Plaintiffs Attorney re: 0.20 $55.00 $11.00 
Deposition of the City ( .1 ); Email to the 
City re: Notices of Depositions and 
lettei to Plaintiff's Attomey ( .1) 
1/26/2010 MLH Receipt and review letter from Plaintiffs 0.50 $100.00 $50.00 
Attorney re: Depositions (.1 ); Receipt 
and review Motion for expedited trial 
with attachments from Counsel for 
Defendant Kennedy (.4) 
1/27/2010 MLH Conference with City re: Future 1.00 $100.00 $100.00 
handling (.3); Receipt and review from 
Counsel for Defendant Kennedy re: 
Submission of second affidavit in 
support of Motion for Expedited Trial 
(.2); Receipt and review Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Expedited Trial 
with affidavit and exhibits (27 pages) 
(.5) 
1/28/2010 MLH Conference with City Clerk (.5); 2.20 $100.00 $220.00 
Preparation· for hearing ( .1); Attend 
hearing (1.0); Telephone conference 
with Counsel for Kooenai County re: 
Discovery (.1 ); Telephone conference 
with City Attorney re: Status (.2); Email 
to City re: Status (.1 ); Email from City 
Clerk re: Discovery (.1); Email to City 
Clerk re: Discovery (.1) 
1/29/2010 JM Telephone conference with Susan 0.30 $55.00 $16.50 
Harris re: Deposition ( .1 ); Letter to 
Plaintiffs Attorney re: Response to 
Objection of Deposition (.1 ); 
Preparation of Notice of Service of 
Defendants' Interrogatories and 
Requests for Production of Documents 
( .1) 
1/29/2010 MLH Telephone conference with Susan 4.40 $100.00 $440.00 
Harris re: Deposition (.2); Telephone 
conference with City re: Depositions 
( .1); Telephone conference with 
Counsel for Defendant Kennedy re: 
Depositions (.2); Preparation of City's 
First Set of Written Interrogatories and 
Request for Production of Documents 
to Plaintiff (1.7); Receipt and review 
Defendant Kennedy's Objection to 
Depositions (.1 ); Receipt and review 
Plaintiffs responses to Kennedy's 
objection (.1 ); Letter to Plaintiffs 
Attorney re: Depositions (.1 ); 
Telephone conference with Counsel for 
Kootenai County re: Discovery and 
.  
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depositions (.2); Attend depositions of 
Harris and Prior (1.2); Telephone 
conference with City re: Depositions 
(.1 ); Conference with Wes Somerton 
re: Depositions (.1 ); Conference with 
Counsel for Kootenai County re: 
Depositions (.2); Review Rules of 
Procedure re: Deposition ( .1) 
2/01/2010 JM Letter to Plaintiff's Attorney re: Future 0.30 $55.00 $16.50 
depositions (.2); Email correspondence 
to City (.1) 
2/01/2010 MLH Emails to and from Plaintiff's Attorney 0.70 $100.00 $70.00 
re: Discovery (.2); Telephone 
conference with Counsel for Defendant 
Kennedy re: Discovery (.1 ); Telephone 
conference with County Attorney 
re:Depositions (.2); Emails to and from 
Counsel for Defendant Kennedy re: 
Depositions (.2) 
2/02/2010 JM Letter to Counsel for Kootenai County 0.10 $55.00 $5.50 
re: Depositions of Harris and Prior (.1) 
2/02/2010 MLH Emails to and from Plaintiff's Attorney 0.80 $100.00 $80.00 
re: Depositions and discovery (.2); 
Email from City re: File materials (.1 ); 
Review depositions of Harris and Prior 
(.5) 
2/03/2010 MLH Emails to and from County re: 0.20 $100.00 $20.00 
Discovery (.2) 
2/04/2010 MLH Emails to and from Plaintiff's Attorney 0.80 $100.00 $80.00 
re: Discovery, depositions and 
recounting of ballots (.3); Receipt and 
review Plaintiff's Notice of Deposition of 
Witnesses (.2); Email to City re: 
Deposition (.1 ); Emails to and from all 
counsel re: Discovery (.2) 
2/05/2010 MLH Emails to and from County re: 0.60 $100.00 $60.00 
Discovery (.2); Email from Plaintiff's 
Attorney re: Discovery (.1 ); Telephone 
conference with City re: Depositions 
(.2); Telephone conference with 
Counsel for Defendant Kennedy re: 
Depositions ( .1) 
2/08/2010 MLH Conference with Counsel for Defendant 2.10 $100.00 $210.00 
Kennedy re: Status (.1 ); Email from 
Counsel for Defendant Kennedy re: 
Depositions ( .1 ); Email from Plaintiff's 
Attorney re: Depositions (.1 ); Review 
file materials in preparation of 
responses to Plaintiff's Discovery 
Requests (1.0); Receipt and review 
Plaintiff's 60 page Motion to Compel 
(.8) 
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2/09/2010 MLH Receipt and review letter from Plaintiffs 1.30 $100.00 $130.00 
Attorney re: Motion to Compel (.1 ); 
Emails to and from Counsel for 
Defendant Kennedy re: Depositions 
(.2); Continued preparation of 
responses to Plaintiffs Discovery 
Requests (.8); Telephone conference 
with Counsel for Kootenai County re: 
Motion to Compel (.2) 
2/10/2010 MLH Telephone conference with City re: 0.10 $100.00 $10.00 
Depositions (.1) 
2/11/2010 MLH Telephone conference with Counsel for 0.80 $100.00 $80.00 
Defendant Kennedy re: Status (.1 ); 
Receipt and review Memorandum from 
Counsel for Defendant Kennedy re: 
Depositions (.2); Telephone 
conference with Counsel for Kootenai 
County re: Discovery (.2); Telephone 
conference with City re: Depositions 
and discovery (.1 ); Receipt and review 
Notices of Vacating Depositions (.2) 
2/12/2010 KJH Review and preparation of documents 0.50 $55.00 $27.50 
in support City's opposition to Plaintiffs 
Motion to Compel (.5) 
2/12/2010 MLH Conference with Counsel for Defendant 5.40 $100.00 $540.00 
Kennedy re: Motion to Compel (.1); 
Preparation of affidavit in response to 
Plaintiffs Motion to Compel (1.3); 
Conference with City re: Motion to 
Compel (.1 ); Telephone conference 
with City re: Motion to Compel (.1 ); 
Attendance at hearing on Motion to 
Compel (1.5); Review Idaho Code re: 
Motion to Compel (.1 ); Review City's 
file material in preparation for hearing 
on Motion to Compel (2.2) 
2/15/2010 MLH Continued review of file materials in 1.40 $100.00 $140.00 
preparation of responses to Plaintiffs 
Discovery Requests (1.2 ); Preparation 
of Order (.1 ); Review Plaintiffs 
proposed Order (.1) 
2/16/2010 JM Telephone conference with Plaintiffs 3.30 $55.00 $181.50 
Attorney re: Emailing proposed Order 
Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Compel 
( .1); Preparation of Responses to 
Plaintiffs Request for Production of 
Documents (3.0); Email to City re: 
Subpoena of Kootenai County (.1 ); 
Email to City re: Scheduling Order (.1) 
2/16/2010 MLH Review of City's files and continued 2.30 $100.00 $230.00 
preparation of responses and 
objections to Plaintiffs Discovery 
Requests (1.5 ); Emails to and from 
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Plaintiffs Attorney re: Order to Compel 
(.2); Receipt and review Plaintiffs 
Notice of Records deposition of County 
(.1 ); Receipt and review Order (.1 ); 
Review email from City re: Scheduling 
(.1 ); Telephone conference with 
Counsel for Kootenai County re: 
Discovery and procedure (.3) 
2/17/2010 MLH Continued preparation of responses 3.30 $100.00 $330.00 
and objections to Plaintiffs Discovery 
Requests (3.1 ); Emails to and from City 
re: Discovery (.2) 
2/18/2010 MLH Emails to and from City re: Discovery 1.30 $100.00 $130.00 
(.2); Further preparation of City's 
responses to Plaintiff's Request for 
Production of Documents ( 1.1) 
2/19/2010 MLH Email to Counsel for Kootenai County 1.50 $100.00 $150.00 
re: Hearing (.1 ); Telephone conference 
with Counsel for Kootenai County re: 
Hearing ( .1 ); Receipt and review 
Kootenai County's Notice of Hearing, 
Motion to Shorten Time, Motion for 
Protective Order and Memorandum in 
Support of Motion with attachments 
(.8); Receipt and review Defendant 
Kennedy's Motion to Dismiss with 
attachments (.5) 
2/21/2010 MLH Further preparation of City's responses 1.60 $100.00 $160.00 
to Plaintiff's discovery requests (1.6) 
2/22/2010 MLH Conference with City re: Discovery 2.30 $100.00 $230.00 
(1.3); Continued preparation of 
responses to Plaintiff's Discovery 
Requests (1.0) 
2/23/2010 JM Emails to and from City re: Discovery 0.20 $55.00 $11.00 
(.2) 
2/23/2010 MLH Final preparation of City's responses 4.20 $100.00 $420.00 
and objections to Plaintiff's Request for 
Production of Documents (2.8); Further 
review of City file materials in 
preparation of responses to Discovery 
Requests (1.3); Preparation of email to 
Plaintiffs Attorney re: Discovery (.1) 
2/24/2010 JM Telephone conference with Judge's 0.20 $55.00 $11.00 
Clerk re: Change in hearing time (.1 ); 
Email to City re: Change in hearing 
time (.1) 
2/24/2010 MLH Receipt and review letter from Counsel 0.60 $100.00 $60.00 
for Defendant Kennedy re: Motion to 
Dismiss (.1); Emails to and from 
Plaintiffs Attorney re: Discovery (.2); 
Telephone conference with City re: 
Motion to Dismiss and discovery (.2); 
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Review rules re: Motion to Strike (.1) 
2/25/2010 MLH Telephone conference with City re: 0.60 $100.00 $60.00 
Discovery (.2); Receipt and review 
emails and correspondence from City 
re: Disclosures (.2); Receipt and 
review follow up letters from City to 
Plaintiffs Attorney and Plaintiff's 
Attorney to City re: Campaign finance 
disclosures (.2) 
2/26/2010 MLH Receipt and review Plaintiff's 1.80 $100.00 $180.00 
Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant Kennedy's Motion to 
Dismiss (119 pages) (1.8) 
2/27/2010 MLH Further review of Plaintiff's 1.60 $100.00 $160.00 
Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant Kennedy's Motion to 
Dismiss (119 pages), and Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition to City's 
Motion to Dismiss (1.6) 
2/28/2010 MLH Further review of Plaintiff's submissions 4.00 $100.00 $400.00 
in preparation of City's responses to 
Plaintiffs Motion (4.0) 
3/01/2010 JM Preparation of pleadings notebook for 1.00 $55.00 $55.00 
upcoming hearings (1.0) 
3/01/2010 MLH Continued review of Plaintiffs 9.30 $100.00 $930.00 
submissions (2.0); Review Defendant 
Kennedy's submissions in response to 
Plaintiff's submissions (1.0); Review 
Idaho Code and case authority in 
preparation of City's Motion to Strike, 
Motion in Opposition to Plaintiff's 
Motion to Vacate and City's reply to 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to 
City's Motion to Dismiss (1.0); 
Preparation of City's Motion to Strike, 
Motion in Opposition to Plaintiff's 
Motion to Vacate, City's reply and 
City's responses to Plaintiff's Motion to 
Dismiss (5.3) 
3/02/2010 MLH Further review of all pleadings in 7.50 $100.00 $750.00 
preparation for oral argument on City's 
Motion to Dismiss (5.0); Participation in 
City's Motion to Dismiss (2.5) 
3/03/2010 MLH Preparation of Order to Dismiss ( .1) 0.10 $100.00 $10.00 
3/04/2010 JM Telephone conference with Clerk re: 0.20 $55.00 $11.00 
Motion for Fees and Costs ( .1 ); 
Preparation of Notice of Hearing (. 1) 
3/04/2010 MLH Receipt and review Defendant 0.60 $100.00 $60.00 
Kennedy's proposed Order ( .1 ); 
Receipt and review letter from Plaintiff's 
Attorney re: Orders (.1 ); Receipt and 
review statement from Kootenai County 
re: Costs and Order to Quash (.2); 
1 12
i
1 12
1 12
1 12
1 12
1 12
1 12
1 12
1 12
1 12
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Receipt and review email from County 
re: Order (.1 ); Email to County re: 
Order (.1) 
3/05/2010 MLH Receipt and review letter from Plaintiff's 0.30 $100.00 $30.00 
Attomey ie: Contemplated Motions (.1 ); 
Emails to and from City re: Anticipated 
Motions (.2) 
3/08/2010 MLH Preparation of City's Motion for Fees 4.90 $100.00 $490.00 
and Costs, Affidavit of Counsel in 
Support of Motion, and Memorandum in 
Support (4.0); Receipt and review 
submissions from Plaintiff's Attorney re: 
Motion to Disqualify Judge, Motion to 
Reconsider all Orders, Motion for 
Permissive Appeal (.8); Telephone 
conference with City re: Plaintiff's 
submissions (.1) 
3/09/2010 MLH Continued preparation of City's Motion, 6.00 $100.00 $600.00 
Memorandum and Affidavit for Fees 
and Costs (2.2); Continued review of 
Plaintiff's submissions re: 
Reconsideration and appeal (.5); 
Receipt and review letter from Court re: 
Correspondence by non-party witness 
( .1 ); Receipt and review Notice of Filing 
Transcript ( .1 ); Final preparation of 
City's Reply to Plaintiff's Motion to 
Disqualify Judge Simpson (1.4); 
Review Plaintiff's Motion and 
Memorandum for Reconsideration of 
Court's Order to Dismiss (.3); 
Preparation of City's Reply to Plaintiff's 
Motion to Reconsider (1.4) 
3/10/2010 JM Telephone conference with Clerk re: 0.10 $55.00 $5.50 
Motions (.1) 
3/10/2010 MLH Continued review Plaintiff's 5.70 $100.00 $570.00 
submissions, and applicable law and 
statutes in further preparation of Reply 
to Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration 
(1.3); Further preparation of City's 
Reply to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Reconsideration (1.9); Review 
Plaintiff's Motion for Permissive Appeal 
and applicable rules and case authority 
( 1.1 ); Preparation of City's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's 
Motion Permissive Appeal (1.4) 
3/11/2010 MLH Final preparation of City's 0.90 $100.00 $90.00 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's 
Motion for Permissive Appeal (.5); 
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Receipt and review Affidavit of Dan 
English re: Discovery (.1 ); Receipt and 
review letter from City re: Campaign 
finance disclosures (.1 ); Receipt and 
review Plaintiff's supplemental Motion 
re: Hearing on bond (.2) 
3/12/2010 MLH Preparation for Hearing on Plaintiff's 1.00 $100.00 $100.00 
Motions to Disqualify and Reconsider 
Bond (.2); Attend Hearing on Plaintiff's 
Motions (.6); Receipt and review Order 
(.2) 
3/16/2010 MLH Telephone conference with City re: 0.20 $100.00 $20.00 
Status of litigation (.2) 
3/22/2010 MLH Receipt and review Plaintiff's Motion to 1.60 $100.00 $160.00 
Disallow Costs, Plaintiff's Memorandum 
in Support of Motion to Disallow Costs, 
Plaintiff's Memorandum re: Attorney 
fees, Plaintiff's supplemental 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Reconsider Dismissal, and Plaintiff's 
supplemental Memorandum re: Bond 
(1.4); Receipt and review Plaintiff's 
Notice to Court of requested 
documents (.2) 
3/23/2010 JM Telephone conference with Clerk re: 0.20 $55.00 $11.00 
Vacating hearing on Motion for Fees 
and Costs (.1 ); Preparation of Notice to 
Vacate Hearing (.1) 
3/23/2010 MLH Receipt and review Motion in Limine of 1.20 $100.00 $120.00 
Defendant Kennedy, Affidavit of 
Secretary of State in Support of Motion 
in Limine with attachments, and 
Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant's Motion in Limine (1.2) 
3/25/2010 MLH Receipt and review Plaintiff's Motion to 0.50 $100.00 $50.00 
Extend Time to Answer Discovery (.2); 
Telephone conference with City re: 
Status (.3) 
3/26/2010 MLH Receipt and review Kootenai County's 0.10 $100.00 $10.00 
response to Plaintiff's request for 
reduction of bond (.1) 
3/29/2010 MLH Receipt and review Plaintiff's second 0.60 $100.00 $60.00 
supplemental Motion to Reconsider 
Order of Dismissal (.1 ); Receipt and 
review Defendant Kennedy's 
Memorandum re: Bond with 
attachments (.4); Receipt and review 
Defendant Kennedy's statement re: 
Discovery (. 1) 
SC 38417-2011 Page 2412 of 2676
Haman Law Office 
Page No.: 11 
3/30/2010 MLH Telephone conference with City 0.50 $100.00 $50.00 
Councilman re: Status of litigation (.2); 
Receipt and review supplemental 
Memorandum of Defendant Kennedy 
......... o.--...J 1 ,..,,. o ............... :-..&. --...J .......... : ........ 
I C. DUIIU \·£) 1 I>CvCit.JL diiU ICVIO::::W 
Order (.1) 
3/31/2010 MLH Receipt and review Plaintiff's Motion in 0.30 $100.00 $30.00 
Opposition to Defendant Kennedy's 
Motion to Compel (.1 ); Receipt and 
review letter from Counsel for Kootenai 
County re: Discovery (.1 ); Telephone 
conference with County re: Disclosures 
(.1) 
4/01/2010 JM Conference with County re: Documents 0.20 $55.00 $11.00 
(.2) 
4/01/2010 MLH Receipt and review Kootenai County's 1.70 $100.00 $170.00 
proposed disclosures of documents 
and review for privilege (1.5); Receipt 
and review Order on Plaintiff's Motion 
for Bond Reduction (9 pages) (.2) 
4/02/2010 MLH Continued review of Kootenai County's 1.20 $100.00 $120.00 
proposed disclosures with regard to 
privilege (.8); Receipt and review 
Defendant Kennedy's Amended Notice 
of Hearing on Motion to Dismiss (.1 ); 
Telephone conference with Kootenai 
County re: Disclosures of confidential 
information (.3) 
4/04/2010 MLH Email to City re: Protective Order (.1 ); 2.20 $100.00 $220.00 
Research case authority and rules re: 
Protective Order and common interest 
privilege (.9); Preparation of Motion for 
Protective Order ( 1.2) 
4/05/2010 JM Email to City re: Document production 0.10 $55.00 $5.50 
by Kootenai County (.1) 
4/05/2010 MLH Telephone conference with Counsel for 0.30 $100.00 $30.00 
Defendant Kootenai County re: 
Disclosures (.2); Telephone 
conference with City Attorney re: 
Disclosures (.1) 
4/06/2010 MLH Telephone conference with City re: 0.20 $100.00 $20.00 
Status (.1 ); Telephone conference with 
Court re hearing (.1) 
4/07/2010 MLH Receipt and review Motion to Intervene 1.00 $100.00 $100.00 
and attachments by interveners William 
and Elizabeth McCrory (.7); 
Conference with City Councilman 
Edinger re: Status (.2); Receipt and 
review letter from City re: Campaign 
finance disclosures (.1) 
......... 0 __ ..... I 1")\. 0 __ ..... _'" __ ...............  ........ 
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4/08/2010 MLH Conference with Court re: Future 1.70 $100.00 $170.00 
handling (1.5); Receipt and review 
stipulation and proposed order (.2) 
4/09/2010 MLH Receipt and review Notice of Request 0.10 $100.00 $10.00 
for Transcript by Plaintiff's Attorney (.1) 
4/12/2010 MLH Telephone conference with City re: 0.50 $100.00 $50.00 
Status (.2); Email to City re: Status 
( .1 ); Receipt and review Defendant 
Kennedy's Notice of Unavailable Dates 
(.1 ); Telephone conference with 
Defendant Kennedy re: Status (.1) 
4/13/2010 MLH Receipt and review Notice of 0.10 $100.00 $10.00 
Disqualification by Judge (.1) 
4/14/2010 MLH Preparation of Memorandum in 0.80 $100.00 $80.00 
Opposition to interveners Motion (.8) 
4/15/2010 MLH Receipt and review letter from Plaintiffs 0.10 $100.00 $10.00 
Attorney re: Campaign finance 
disclosures (.1) 
4/16/2010 JM Email from Plaintiffs Attorney re: 0.10 $55.00 $5.50 
Disqualification (.1) 
4/16/2010 MLH Receipt and review letter from Plaintiffs 0.10 $100.00 $10.00 
Attorney re: Disqualification (.1) 
4/19/2010 MLH Receipt and review letter from Court re: 0.10 $100.00 $10.00 
Disqualification (.1) 
4/30/2010 MLH Receipt and review Order of 0.10 $100.00 $10.00 
Assignment of District Judge (.1) 
125.70 Total Fees $12,156.00 
Expenses 
Start Date Descri~tion Quantit~ Price Charges 
1/05/2010 Fax to Starr Kelso, Scott Reed, City of 88.00 $0.50 $44.00 
Cda and Judge Simpson Defendant 
City's Memorandum in Opposition of 
Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order/Motion to Strike, 
Affidavit of Michael Haman 
1/05/2010 Fax to Starr Kelso, Scott Reed, City of 12.00 $0.50 $6.00 
Cda and Judge Simpson Defendant 
City's Memorandum in Opposition of 
Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order/Motion to Strike, 
Affidavit of Troy Tymesen 
1/11/2010 Fax to Kootenai County Court Notice of 2.00 $0.50 $1.00 
Service 
1/11/2010 Fax to Starr Kelso, Scott Reed and City 39.00 $0.50 $19.50 
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of Cda Defendants' Response to 
Plaintiff's Request for Admissions 
1/26/2010 Fax to Starr Kelso, Scott Reed and City 3.00 $0.50 $1.50 
of Cda response to Plaintiff's Notice of 
Depositions of the City of Cda and the 
City Cierk Susan \iv'eathers 
1/29/2010 Fax to Kootenai County Court Notice of 2.00 $0.50 $1.00 
Service 
1/29/2010 Fax to Starr Kelso, Scott Reed and City 48.00 $0.50 $24.00 
Defendants' City of CDA, Request for 
Production of Documents to the Plaintiff 
1/29/2010 Fax to Starr Kelso and Scott Reed 2.00 $0.50 $1.00 
answer to Plaintiff's Response to 
Objection to Deposition 
2/02/2010 Shipping USPS to 83816 1.00 $1.73 $1.73 
2/03/2010 Shipping USPS to 83814 0.00 $1.73 $1.73 
2/12/2010 Copies 30.00 $0.10 $3.00 
2/12/2010 Fax to Judge Hosack 7.00 $0.50 $3.50 
2/12/2010 Fax Affidavit of Michael Haman re: 6.00 $0.50 $3.00 
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel 
2/12/2010 Fax to Scott Reed Affidavit of Michael 3.00 $0.50 $1.50 
Haman to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel 
2/16/2010 Fax to Kootenai County Court proposed 3.00 $0.50 $1.50 
Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to 
Compel 
2/16/2010 Fax to Scott Reed proposed Order 3.00 $0.50 $1.50 
Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Compel 
2/16/2010 Fax to Starr Kelso proposed Order 3.00 $0.50 $1.50 
Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Compel 
2/24/2010 Fax to Scott Reed, Starr Kelso and City 72.00 $0.50 $36.00 
of CDA Defendants' Response to 
Plaintiff's Request for 
Production/Examination to City of CDA 
and Susan K. Weathers, Defendants 
2/24/2010 Fax to Kootenai County Court Notice of 2.00 $0.50 $1.00 
Service 
2/26/2010 Fax to Starr Kelso 2009 Campaign 3.00 $0.50 $1.50 
Finance Report and Election Manual for 
City Clerks 
3/01/2010 Fax to Scott Reed Defendants' Motion 7.00 $0.50 $3.50 
to Strike Affidavit of Plaintiff's Counsel 
Filed in Support of Motion to Amend 
Pre-Trail Order and Vacate Trial 
3/01/2010 Fax to Kootenai County Court 4.00 $0.50 $2.00 
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition 
to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Pre-Trial 
Order and Vacate Trial 
3/01/2010 Fax to Kootenai County Court 3.00 $0.50 $1.50 
Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavit of 
Plaintiff's Counsel Filed in Support of 
Motion to Amend Pre-Trial Order and 
Vacate Trial 
3/01/2010 Fax to Starr Kelso Defendants' Motion 16.00 $0.50 $8.00 
i
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to Strike Affidavit of Plaintiff's Counsel 
Filed in Support of Motion to Amend 
Pre-Trial Order and Vacate Trial 
3/01/2010 Fax to Scott Reed Defendants' Reply to 9.00 $0.50 $4.50 
Plaintiff's Response to Motion to 
Dismiss/Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss 
3/01/2010 Fax to Judge Simpson Defendants' 10.00 $0.50 $5.00 
Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Motion 
to Dismiss/Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss 
3/03/2010 Fax to Judge Simpson proposed Order 4.00 $0.50 $2.00 
to Dismiss 
3/04/2010 Fax Notice of Hearing to Kootenai 12.00 $0.50 $6.00 
County Court, Starr Kelso, Scott Reed 
and Paine Hamblin 
3/09/2010 Fax to Kootenai County Court 2.00 $0.50 $1.00 
Defendant City of Coeur d' Alene 
Motion for Costs and Fees 
3/09/2010 Fax to Kootenai County Court Affidavit 21.00 $0.50 $10.50 
of Michael Haman 
3/09/2010 Fax to Kootenai County Court 11.00 $0.50 $5.50 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's 
Motion for Costs and Fees 
3/09/2010 Fax to Kootenai County Court, Starr 15.00 $0.50 $7.50 
Kelso and Scott Reed, Defendant 
Memorandum in Opposition of Plaintiff's 
Motion to Disqualify 
3/10/2010 Fax Defendant's Memorandum in 18.00 $0.50 $9.00 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Reconsideration to Kootenai County 
Court, Starr Kelso and Scott Reed 
3/11/2010 Fax Defendant's Memorandum in 15.00 $0.50 $7.50 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Permission to Appeal to Kootenai 
County Court, Starr Kelso and Scott 
Reed 
3/16/2010 Fax Memorandum Decision on 9.00 $0.50 $4.50 
Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify Judge 
Simpson to City Attorney's Office 
3/23/2010 Fax to Kootenai County Court, Starr 8.00 $0.50 $4.00 
Kelso, Scott Reed 
4/08/2010 Fax to Scott Reed Stipulation to Vacate 2.00 $0.50 $1.00 
Hearing 
Total Expenses $238.46 
Total New Charges $12,394.46 
Staff Name Hours Rate Fees 
JM Jen Myers 8.70 $55.00 $478.50 
KJH Kari J. Henley 0.50 $55.00 $27.50 
MLH Michael L. Haman 116.50 $100.00 $11,650.00 
i
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Time Keepers: (MLH) Michael L. Haman -.Attorney 
(JM) Jen Myers, (KJH) Kari J. Henley - Paralegals 
Rates: Attorney- $100/hour; Paralegal- $55/hour 
Tax ID#: 26-1731118 
Haman Law Office 
Page No.: 15 
r ey 
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City of Coeur d'Alene - 415 
Attn: Mike Gridley 
710 E. Mullan Ave. 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Regarding: Brannon v City- 23962 
cv 09-10010 
Invoice No: 18958 
Services Rendered 
Haman Law Office 
923 N. 3rd Street 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Date: 1 0/06/201 0 
=D=at=e _____ ~S~ta~ff~-------~D~e=sc~r~ip~ti=on~-------------------- Hours 
0.10 
Rate Charges 
$10.00 5/03/2010 MLH Telephone conference with Court re: 
5/06/2010 MLH 
5/10/2010 MLH 
5/11/2010 MLH 
5/13/2010 MLH 
Hearing (.1) 
Participation in informal conference 
with City re: Status and future handling 
(1.0); Receipt and review Defendant 
Kennedy's Memorandum in Opposition 
to McCrory's Motion to Intervene (.3) 
Further review of McCrory's Motion to 
Intervene with attachments, and final 
preparation of City's opposition (1.2) 
Review submissions by Plaintiff's 
Attorney re: Upcoming hearings (.5); 
Email to City re: Hearings ( .1 ); Receipt 
and review Defendant Kennedy's 
response to Plaintiff's objection to 
Kennedy's Motion to Strike (.2); 
Receipt and review letter from Counsel 
for Defendant Kennedy to Court re: 
procedure (.1) 
Receipt and review email from 
Plaintiff's Attorney re: Request for 
public meeting with attachments (.2); 
Telephone conference with City re: 
Plaintiff's Attorney request to address 
City Council (.1 ); Telephone 
conference with City re: Fees (.1) 
$100.00 
1.30 $100.00 $130.00 
1.20 $100.00 $120.00 
0.90 $100.00 $90.00 
0.40 $100.00 $40.00 
a Defendant's 
~ Exhibit 
I 
! g ") 
ity 
CV
/
=D=at=e _____ ~S~ta~ff~ _______ ~D~e=sc~r~ip~ti=on~ __________________ __ 
! t,) 
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5/14/2010 JM Prepare file for hearings (.3) 0.30 $55.00 $16.50 
5/14/2010 MLH Receipt and review letter from Plaintiffs 5.90 $100.00 $590.00 
Attorney re: Hearings (.1 ); Review all 
file materials in preparation for oral 
argument on Plaintiffs Motions (4.1 ); 
A.L.L---...1 L---!-- -- ni-!-J..!Lrl- aa_.a.: ___ 
1-\llt!IJU ll~C:IIIIIY Ull I"'IC:IIIIllll::; IVIULIUII::S 
(1.6); Conference with City re: 
Plaintiffs Motions (.1) 
5/17/2010 MLH Receipt and review proposed Order 0.10 $100.00 $10.00 
(.1) 
5/18/2010 MLH Telephone conference with City re: 0.10 $100.00 $10.00 
Status (.1) 
5/19/2010 MLH Receipt and review proposed Amended 0.10 $100.00 $10.00 
Order (.1) 
5/20/2010 MLH Telephone conference with City re: 0.30 $100.00 $30.00 
Future handling (.3) 
5/21/2010 JM Review file materials re: Outstanding 0.20 $55.00 $11.00 
discovery in preparation of letter to 
Plaintiffs Attorney (.1) Draft letter to 
Plaintiffs Attorney re: Discovery (.1) 
5/21/2010 MLH Further preparation of letter to Plaintiffs 0.40 $100.00 $40.00 
Attorney re: Discovery and Motion to 
Compel (.1 ); Emails to and from 
Counsel for Defendant Kennedy re: 
Order (.2); Telephone conference with 
City re: Discovery ( .1) 
5/24/2010 MLH Receipt and review proposed amended 0.20 $100.00 $20.00 
Order from Counsel for Defendant 
Kennedy (.2) 
5/24/2010 MLH Telephone conference with City re: 0.20 $100.00 $20.00 
Motion to Reconsider Court's Order on 
Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss (.2) 
5/25/2010 MLH Preparation of City's request for Trial 1.40 $100.00 $140.00 
setting (.1 ); Telephone conference with 
City re: Plaintiffs submissions (.2); 
Telephone conference with Counsel for 
Defendant re: Future handling ( .1 ); 
Receipt and review numerous 
submissions by Plaintiffs Attorney re: 
Motions for Permissive Appeal, 
Reconsideration, Amendment to Order, 
Motion to Intervene and letters to Court 
and Counsel (.9); Receipt and review 
letter from Plaintiffs Attorney re: 
Discovery ( .1) 
5/26/2010 MLH Receipt and review Notice of Hearings 0.10 $100.00 $10.00 
A.1...L ___ ...I L ___ ! ____ nl_!_J..:LrI_ .... _.L!  
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by Plaintiff's Attorney (.1) 
5/27/2010 MLH Preparation of email to City re: 1.40 $100.00 $140.00 
Plaintiff's Motions ( .1 ); Preparation of 
letter to Plaintiff's Attorney re: 
Discovery (.1 ); Piepaiation of email to 
City re: Plaintiff's proposed Amended 
Complaint (.1 ); Telephone conference 
with City re: Future handling and 
investigation (.4); Review file in 
preparation of Motion to Compel (.2); 
Preparation of Motion to Compel, 
Notice and Affidavit (.5) 
5/28/2010 JM Letter to the Clerk re: Notice of 0.10 $55.00 $5.50 
Hearing, Motion to Compel and Affidavit 
of Michael Haman (.1) 
5/28/2010 MLH Receipt and review Defendant 0.10 $100.00 $10.00 
Kennedy's request for trial setting (.1) 
6/01/2010 JM Telephone conference with Judge's 0.20 $55.00 $11.00 
Clerk re: Hearing date for Motion to 
Compel (.1 ); Preparation of Amended 
Notice of Hearing (.1) 
6/01/2010 MLH Telephone conference with City re: 1.70 $100.00 $170.00 
Status and response to Scott Reed 
demand (.2); Receipt and review 
demand letter from Reed (.1 ); Attend 
City Council meeting re: Future 
handling and demand letter (1.4) 
6/02/2010 MLH Receipt and review letter from Counsel 0.40 $100.00 $40.00 
for Defendant Kennedy with informal 
responses to discovery (.2); 
Preparation of email to City re: Future 
handling (.2) 
6/03/2010 MLH Receipt and review Amended Notice of 0.10 $100.00 $10.00 
Hearing from Defendant Kennedy (.1) 
6/04/2010 MLH Receipt and review Plaintiff's response 0.20 $100.00 $20.00 
to City's Motion to Compel (.2) 
6/07/2010 MLH Telephone conference with Counsel for 3.50 $100.00 $350.00 
Defendant re: Future handling and 
investigation (.1 ); Preparation of City's 
Memorandums in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's submissions (2.8); Receipt 
and review Defendant Kennedy's 
submissions in opposition to Plaintiff's 
Motions (.6) 
6/08/2010 JM Preparation of exhibits for hearing on 0.70 $55.00 $38.50 
all Motions (.7) 
6/10/2010 MLH Receipt and review Plaintiff's replies to 0.90 $100.00 $90.00 
City's submissions (.9) 
AO
ry'
A
A
OAO
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6/14/2010 MLH Emails to and from City re: Hearings 3.40 $100.00 $340.00 
(.2); Review all pleadings in preparation 
for all motions ( 1.4); Attendance at 
motions (1.8) 
6/15/2010 MLH Receipt and review Pretrial Order (.1) 0.10 $100.00 $10.00 
6/17/2010 MLH Receipt and review letter from Counsel 0.40 $100.00 $40.00 
for Defendant Kennedy re: Orders and 
three proposed orders (.4) 
6/18/2010 MLH Review file materials in preparation for 2.70 $100.00 $270.00 
conference with Counsel for Defendant 
Kennedy (.1 ); Participation in 
conference with Counsel for Defendant 
Kennedy (1.7); Telephone conference 
with investigator Gervais and 
Associates re: Future handling (.5); 
Email to investigator re: Facts and 
future handling (.4) 
6/21/2010 MLH Receipt and review executed Orders 0.30 $100.00 $30.00 
(.3) 
6/23/2010 JM Receipt and review Plaintiffs responses 1.00 $55.00 $55.00 
to City's Request for Production of 
Documents, and preparation of 
discovery notebook for future hearings 
and submission of materials to 
investigator (.9) Telephone conference 
with Plaintiffs Attorney re: Recoreded 
conversations by Confidential 
Investigations (.1) 
6/23/2010 MLH Receipt and review Plaintiffs initial 1.80 $100.00 $180.00 
responses to City's Request for 
Production of Documents (250 + 
pages) (1.8) 
6/24/2010 MLH Further review of Plaintiffs responses 1.10 $100.00 $110.00 
to City's discovery requests (.7); 
Receipt and review letter from Counsel 
for Defendant Kennedy re: Plaintiffs 
responses (.3); Email to City re: 
Plaintiffs responses (.1) 
6/26/2010 MLH Receipt and review additional 1.40 $100.00 $140.00 
supplemental materials from Plaintiffs 
Attorney in responses to discovery 
(1.0); Telephone conference with 
investigator re: Activities and Plaintiffs 
responses to City's discovery requests 
(.4) 
7/06/2010 MLH Follow-up telephone conference with 0.60 $100.00 $60.00 
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7/07/2010 MLH 
7/12/2010 MLH 
7/16/2010 JM 
7/16/2010 MLH 
7/18/2010 MLH 
7/23/2010 MLH 
8/02/2010 MLH 
investigator re: Status and recorded 
conversations ( .4); Telephone 
conference with City re: Discovery and 
investigation (.2) 
Follow-up conference with City re: 
Status of investigation (.1) 
Telephone conference with investigator 
re: Status (.1 ); Receipt and review 
Plaintiffs responses to Defendant 
Kennedy's discovery requests (.2); 
Receipt and review Notice of Service 
(.1) 
Letter to City re: Confidential 
Investigation interviews (.1) 
Receipt and review letter from Counsel 
for Defendant Kennedy re: Plaintiffs 
discovery requests with attachments 
(.2); Telephone conference with 
Counsel for Defendant Kennedy re: 
Meeting (.1 ); Conference with Counsel 
for Defendant Kennedy re: Future 
handling and Summary Judgment, and 
possible contempt issues (1.6); 
Telephone conference with investigator 
(.1 ); Further review of all audio tapes 
provided by Plaintiffs Attorney in 
responses to City's discovery requests 
(1.5) 
Telephone conference with investigator 
re: Audio tapes (.2); Conference with 
investigator re: Scope of work (.8); 
Review Plaintiffs responses to 
discovery in preparation for 
conference with investigator (1.0); 
Continued review of audio tape in 
preparation for conference with 
investigator (.8) 
Receipt and review five confidentiality 
agreements from Plaintiffs Attorney 
(.2) 
Telephone conference with investigator 
re: Status and future activities (.7); 
Receipt and review email from 
investigator re: Identity of questionable 
voters (.2); Telephone conference with 
City re: Status of case and Motion for 
Summary Judgment (.2) 
0.10 
0.40 
0.10 
3.50 
2.80 
0.20 
1.10 
Haman Law Office 
Page No.: 5 
$100.00 
$100.00 
$55.00 
$100.00 
$100.00 
$100.00 
$100.00 
$10.00 
$40.00 
$5.50 
$350.00 
$280.00 
$20.00 
$110.00 
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8/03/2010 MLH Receipt and review Defendant 1.70 $100.00 $170.00 
Kennedy's Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Motion 
for Summary Judgment, and 
supporting affidavits (1.3); Receipt and 
review Defendant Kennedy's Motion to 
Strike (.3); Review Plaintiffs amended 
Complaint re: Issues on Summary 
Judgment (.1) 
8/04/2010 MLH Telephone conference with City 0.40 $100.00 $40.00 
Councilman Kennedy re: Status and 
Summary Judgment (.1 ); Telephone 
conference with investigator re: Status 
(.1 ); Receipt and review Plaintiffs 
submissions to Court re: Motion in 
Limine and Authority (.2) 
8/06/2010 MLH Receipt and review Counsel for 0.50 $100.00 $50.00 
Defendant Kennedy's Motion for 
Contempt with supporting 
correspondence and affidavits (.5) 
8/10/2010 MLH Receipt and review Notice of 0.60 $100.00 $60.00 
Appearance of Counsel for nonparty 
McCary, Motion for Enlargement of 
Time, and Affidavit in Support (.4); 
Receipt and review Notice of Hearing 
and proposed Order (.2) 
8/11/2010 MLH Receipt and review Affidavit of Dan 0.50 $100.00 $50.00 
English (.2); Receipt and review 
Counsel for Defendant Kennedy's reply 
to Counsel for non party McCrory's 
Motion for Extention of Time (.3) 
8/12/2010 MLH Receipt and review Affidavit of Service 0.80 $100.00 $80.00 
and Notice of Hearing (.2); Telephone 
conference with Susan Harris and 
Ronald Prior re: Trial testimony (.6) 
8/13/2010 MLH Receipt and review nonparty McCrory's 0.30 $100.00 $30.00 
reply to Defendant's Motion for 
Contempt (.3) 
8/16/2010 MLH Receipt and review supplemental 0.10 $100.00 $10.00 
affidavit of Dan English in Support of 
Defendant Kennedy's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (.1) 
8/17/2010 MLH Participation in Defendant Kennedy's 4.60 $100.00 $460.00 
Motion for Contempt (.8); Conference 
with City re: Status of case and trial 
(.1); Conference with Counsel for 
o
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Defendant Kennedy re: Trial (.2); 
Receipt and review Affidavit of 
Plaintiffs Attorney in opposition to 
Motion for Summary Judgment, with 
attachments, Plaintiffs Motion to Strike 
affidavits, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel 
attendance of witnesses for trial, reply 
to Motion to Strike McCrory affidavit, 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Notice of 
Hearing, Affidavit of Plaintiffs Attorney 
in Support of Motion to Compel, and 
renewed Motion to Amend Complaint 
(3.3); Emails to and from investigator 
re: Status (.2) 
8/18/2010 MLH Telephone conference with investigator 2.50 $100.00 $250.00 
re: Status (.2); Emails to and from 
investigator re: Status and trial (.2); 
Receipt and review Affidavit of 
witnesses Parker and Jenkins 
associated with Plaintiffs Attorney (.3); 
Telephone conference with City re: 
Status (.1); Telephone conference with 
Counsel for Defendant Kennedy re: 
Future handling (.2); Further review of 
Plaintiffs submissions in opposition to 
Defendant Kennedy's motions (.5); 
Receipt and review memorandum and 
report from investigator (1.0) 
8/19/2010 MLH Receipt and review further 0.50 $100.00 $50.00 
supplemental materials filed by 
Plaintiffs Attorney in opposition to 
summary judgment and in support of 
Plaintiffs motions (.4); Email to 
Counsel for Defendant Kennedy re: 
Investigation report (.1) 
8/20/2010 MLH Emails to and from Counsel for 0.50 $100.00 $50.00 
Defendant Kennedy re: Hearings and 
motions (.3); Receipt and review further 
submissions from Counsel for 
Defendant Kennedy (.2) 
8/23/2010 MLH Telephone conference with Defendant 5.80 $100.00 $580.00 
Kennedy re: Status (.2); Emails to and 
from City re: Status (.2); Review 
Plaintiffs submissions and motions in 
preparation of City's responses (.8); 
Preparation of City's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs renewed Motion 
to Amend (1.2); Preparation of City's 
response to Plaintiffs Motion to Compel 
(.6); Research case authority, rules 
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and statutes re: Power of Court to 
compel attendance by nonparty 
witnesses (.8); Preparation of City's 
response to Plaintiffs Reply to 
Defendant Kennedy's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (.6); Review 
previous orders and pleadings in 
preparation of City's replies to Plaintiffs 
submissions and affidavits (1.4) 
8/24/2010 MLH Receipt and review email from Counsel 6.60 $100.00 $660.00 
for Defendant Kennedy re: Attorney 
General opinion on election law (.1 ); 
Further review and evaluation of file 
materials and pleadings in preparation 
of responses to all of Plaintiffs 
submissions (.9); Research case 
authority, rules and statutes in further 
preparation of responses to Plaintiffs 
submissions (.8); Further preparation 
of responses to Plaintiffs submissions, 
including preparation of Motions to 
Strike Affidavits of Plaintiffs Counsel, 
Motions to Strike Affidavits of Plaintiffs 
witnesses, objections to Plaintiffs 
Motions to Compel, response to 
Plaintiffs repy to Defendant Kennedy's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
Plaintiffs renewed Motion to Amend 
(3.4); Receipt and review Plaintiffs 
objection to Defendant Kennedy's 
statement of facts with attachments 
(.6); Receipt and review additional 
submissions from Plaintiffs counsel 
including Motion to Shorten Time with 
Affidavits (.3); Receipt and review 
amended Notice of Hearings from 
Counsel for Defendant Kennedy (.1 ); I . 
Receipt and review nonparty McCrory's I 
Motion to Dismiss and answer to 
charges of contempt (.3); Preparation 
of Notice of Hearing ( .1) 
8/25/2010 MLH Telephone conference with City re: 0.10 $100.00 $10.00 
Status (.1) 
8/26/2010 MLH Receipt and review letter from Plaintiffs 0.80 $100.00 $80.00 
Attorney re: Supplemental materials 
(.1 ); Receipt and review supplemental 
filings by Defendant Kennedy in 
support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (.7) 
8/27/2010 MLH Receipt and review Plaintiffs reply to 2.50 $100.00 $250.00 
City's Memorandum in Opposition to 
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Defendant's Motion to File Second 
Amended Complaint (.2); Receipt and 
review Affidavit of Hurst (.1 ); Receipt 
and review Affidavit of Kimbrough (.1 ); 
Receipt and review Affidavit of Spencer 
with attachments (.4); Receipt and 
review Affdaivit of English (.1); Receipt 
and review Affdiavit of Phillips with 
attachments (.5); Receipt and review 
Affidavit of Smith with attachments (.2); 
Preparation of Motion to Strike 
Spencer Affidavit (.6); Emails to and 
from investigator re: Status and trial 
(.2); Receipt and review Defendant 
Kennedy's Motion to Strike Untimely 
Pleadings (.1) 
8/30/2010 MLH Receipt and review Defendant 1.80 $100.00 $180.00 
Kennedy's Amended Notice of Hearing 
(.1 ); Receipt and review Plaintiff's 
Notice of Hearing on Motion to Shorten 
Time (.1 ); Receipt and review Plaintiff's 
Motion to Shorten Time (.1 ); Receipt 
and review Plaintiff's Motion to File 3rd 
Amended Complaint (.1 ); Receipt and 
review Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to File 3rd Amended 
Complaint with proposed Complaint and 
supporting exhibits and affidavits (1.4) 
8/31/2010 MLH Preparation of witness list and exhibit 8.30 $100.00 $830.00 
list (.7); Review file in preparation of 
witness and exhibit list (1.8); Review all 
pleadings in preparation for hearings 
on all motions (3.9); Attend Hearing 
(1.6); Receipt and review Defendant 
Kennedy's witness and exhibit list (.1 ); 
Preparation of amended exhibit list and 
witness list (.2) 
9/01/2010 MLH Further review Plaintiff's exhibits in 3.90 $100.00 $390.00 
preparation of Objections and City's 
Motion in Limine (3.5); Receipt and 
review Defendant Kennedy's response 
to nonparty McCrory's Motion to 
Dismiss with attachments (.4) 
9/02/2010 MLH Receipt and review Defendant 0.20 $100.00 $20.00 
Kennedy's proposed Order on 8-31-10 
Motions and Plaintiff's Objection (.2) 
9/05/2010 MLH Receipt and review Defendant 1.20 $100.00 $120.00 
Kennedy's Pre-trial Brief, findings of 
fact and conclusions of law ( 1.2) 
)
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9/06/2010 MLH Review orders and pleadings in 2.80 $100.00 $280.00 
preparation of City's Findings of Fact 
and Conclusion of Law/Trial Brief (1.8); 
Further review of Plaintiffs exhibits in 
preparation of objections (1.0) 
9i07/2010 iviLH Review Notice of Trial Setting and 2.60 $100.00 $260.00 
Pre-trial deadlines (.1 ); Email to 
Counsel for Defendant Kennedy re: 
Hearing (.1 ); Review file materials and 
discovery responses in further 
preparation for trial, Motion in Limine, 
trial notebook, and City's Finding of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law/Trial Brief 
(2.4) 
9/08/2010 MLH Further review of all file materials, 3.10 $100.00 $310.00 
recordings, pleadings and applicable 
statutes in further preparation of City's 
Motion in Limine, Findings of Facts and 
Conclusions/Trial Brief ( 1. 7); Review 
affidavits and depositions in 
preparation for examination of 
witnesses ( 1.4) 
9/09/2010 MLH Additional preparation for trial and of 7.30 $100.00 $730.00 
City's Motion in Limine, and Findings 
and Conclusions/Trial Brief (7.1 ), 
Telephone conference with City re: 
Status and witness participation (.2) 
9/10/2010 MLH Final preparation of Motion in Limine 6.90 $100.00 $690.00 
(.3); Conference with Counsel and 
Witnesses (4.0); Review file materials 
in further preparation for trial and City's 
Motion in Limine (2.5); Telephone 
conference with City re: Trial (.1) 
9/11/2010 MLH Final preparation of City's Findings of 8.00 $100.00 $800.00 
Fact and Conclusions of Law/Trial Brief 
(3.0); Continued review of file materials 
in preparation for Trial including 
opening statement and examination of 
witnesses (5.0) 
9/12/2010 MLH Further review of all file materials, 7.00 $100.00 $700.00 
depositions, affidavits, and orders in 
preparation for trial including 
preparation of opening statement and 
preparation of objections to Plaintiffs 
exhibits and in preparation for 
examination of witnesses (6.6); 
Telephone conference with Mayor (.1); 
Telephone conference with City 
Councilman re: Status (.1 ); Emails to 
and from City re: Trial (.2) 
l
l
l
l
l
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9/13/2010 MLH Attend trial (6.5); Review materials and 7.80 $100.00 $780.00 
notes in continued trial preparations 
(1.0); Receipt and review Plaintiffs 
Motion to Disqualify Judge (.2); 
Receipt and review Plaintiffs renewed 
Motion to Amend ( .1) 
9/14/2010 MLH Attend trial (7.0); Review materials and 7.90 $100.00 $790.00 
notes in continued trial preparations 
(.9) 
9/15/2010 MLH Attend trial (7.0); Conference with 10.10 $100.00 $1,010.00 
Court (.5); Telephone conference with 
Press (.2); Telephone conference with 
City Attorney re: Testimony (.2); 
Further review of rules and case 
authority in preparation for City's 
Motion in Limine (.8); Review motions 
and notes in continued trial 
preparations, preparation for Plaintiffs 
Motion to Amend, and in preparation of 
closing with reference to testimony and 
exhibits (1.4) 
9/16/2010 MLH Attend trial and hearing on City's 10.70 $100.00 $1,070.00 
Motion in Limine and Plaintiffs Motion 
to Amend (8.1 ); Further review of file 
materials, notes and rules in 
preparation for City's Motion in Limine 
(.7); Further review of notes and 
materials in preparation of closing 
argument (1.4); Further review of file 
materials, notes, rules, and past orders 
in preparation for Plaintiffs Motion to 
Amend (.5) 
9/17/2010 MLH Attend trial (7.0); Further preparation of 9.30 $100.00 $930.00 
City's closing argument (2.0); Review 
Defendant Kennedy's Motion in Limine 
and notes in preparation for 
Defendant's Joint Motion for directed 
verdict (.3) 
9/18/2010 MLH Attend trial (3.6); Final preparation of 5.20 $100.00 $520.00 
closing (1.6) 
9/30/2010 MLH Telephone conference with Counsel for 0.40 $100.00 $40.00 
Defendant Kennedy re: Future handling 
(.2); Receipt and review Notices of 
Transcript Orders by Plaintiff (.2) 
176.80 Total Fees $17,563.00 
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Expenses 
Start Date Descri~tion Quanti!Y Price Charges 
5/19/2010 Fax Order on Motion to Scott Reed 1.00 $0.50 $0.50 
5/21/2010 Fax to Starr Kelso 1.00 $0.50 $0.50 
5/21/2010 Fax to Plaintiff's Attorney re: Plaintiff's 1.00 $0.50 $0.50 
responses to Request for Production of 
Documents 
5/25/2010 Fax to Kootenai County Court, Starr 9.00 $0.50 $4.50 
Kelso, and Scott Reed Defendants' 
Request for Trial Setting 
5/27/2010 Fax to Plaintiff's Attorney re: Discovery 1.00 $0.50 $0.50 
5/28/2010 Fax to Plaintiffs Attorney and Scott 48.00 $0.50 $24.00 
Reed Notice of Hearing 
6/01/2010 Fax Amended Notice of Hearing to 6.00 $0.55 $3.30 
Kootenai County Court, Scott Reed and 
Starr Kelson (2 pages x3) 
6/07/2010 Fax Defendant's Memorandum in 28.00 $0.50 $14.00 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Permission to Appeal to Scott Reed and 
Starr Kelso (14 pages x 2) 
6/07/2010 Fax Defendant's Memorandum in 4.00 $0.50 $2.00 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Permission to Appeal to Kootenai 
County Court 
6/07/2010 Fax Defendant's Memorandum in 5.00 $0.50 $2.50 
Opposition to McCrorys' Motion to 
Intervene to Kootenai County Court 
6/07/2010 Fax Defendant's Memorandum in 5.00 $0.50 $2.50 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Reconsideration to Kootenai County 
Court 
6/07/2010 Fax Defendant's Memorandum in 6.00 $0.50 $3.00 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to File 
Second Amended Complaint to Scott 
Reed and Starr Kelso (3 pages x2) 
6/08/2010 Fax Defendant's Memorandum in 3.00 $0.50 $1.50 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to File 
Second Amended Complaint to 
Kootenai County Court 
6/23/2010 . Copies of Plaintiff's Discovery 0.00 $257.39 $257.39 
Responses from FedEx Kinkos 
8/23/2010 Fax Defendant's Motion to Strike 3.00 $0.50 $1.50 
Affidavit of Gibson and Jenkins to 
Kootenai County Court 
8/24/2010 Fax Defendant's Motion to Strike 3.00 $0.50 $1.50 
Affidavit of Starr Kelso filed in Support 
of Motion to Compel Attendance to 
Kootenai County Court 
8/24/2010 Fax Defendant's Motion to Strike 4.00 $0.50 $2.00 
Affidavit of Starr Kelso to Kootenai 
County Court 
8/24/2010 Fax Defendant's Memorandum file in 3.00 $0.50 $1.50 
, ' 
ti!y
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Response to Plaintiff's Reply to 
Defendant Kennedy's Motion for 
Summary Judgment to Kootenai County 
Court 
8/24/2010 Fax Defendant's Memorandum in 44.00 $0.50 $22.00 
Opposition to Piaintiffs "Renewed" 
Motion to File Second Amended 
Complaint to Starr Kelso and Scott 
Reed (22 pages 2) 
8/24/2010 Fax Notice of Hearing to Kootenai 2.00 $0.50 $1.00 
County Court 
8/24/2010 Fax Defendant's Memorandum in 4.00 $0.50 $2.00 
Opposition to Plaintiff's "Renewed" 
Motion to File Second Amended 
Complaint to Kootenai County Court 
8/24/2010 Fax Defendant's Memorandum in 3.00 $0.50 $1.50 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to 
Compel Witness to Attend Trial to 
Kootenai County Court 
8/30/2010 Fax Defendant's Motion to Strike 2.00 $0.50 $1.00 
Affidavit of Lawrence Spencer to 
Kootenai County Court 
8/30/2010 Fax Defendant's Motion to Strike 8.00 $0.50 $4.00 
Affidavit of Lawrence Spencer to Scott 
Reed and Starr Kelson (4 pages x 2) 
8/30/2010 Fax Notice of Hearing to Kootenai 2.00 $0.50 $1.00 
Couny Court 
8/31/2010 Fax to Kootenai County Court 3.00 $0.50 $1.50 
Defendant's Amended Witness List 
8/31/2010 Fax Defendant's Witness List, exhibit 216.00 $0.50 $108.00 
list and exhibits to Starr Kelso, Scott 
Reed and City Attorney's Office (72 
pages x 3) 
8/31/2010 Fax Defendant's Amended Witness List 3.00 $0.50 $1.50 
to Kootenai County Court 
9/10/2010 Fax to Kootenai County Court 5.00 $0.50 $2.50 
Defendant City of CDA's Motion in 
Limine 
9/10/2010 Fax to Scott Reed and Starr Kelso 10.00 $0.50 $5.00 
Defendant City of CDA's Motion in 
Limine 
9/13/2010 Fax Defendants' Findings of Fact and 20.00 $0.50 $10.00 
Conclusion of Law to Kootenai County 
Court, Scott Reed, Starr Kelso and 
Kootenai County (5 pages) 
Total Expenses $484.19 
Total New Charges $18,047.19 
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Previous Balance 
Total Payments and Credits 
Balance Due 
Staff 
JM 
MLH 
Name 
Jen Myers 
Michael L. Haman 
Hours 
2.60 
174.20 
Time Keepers: (MLH) Michael L. Haman - Attorney 
Rate 
$55.00 
$100.00 
(JM) Jen Myers, (KJH) Kari J. Henley- Paralegals 
Rates: Attorney- $100/hour; Paralegal- $55/hour 
TaxiD#:26-1731118 
Fees 
$143.00 
$17,420.00 
Haman Law Office 
Page No.: 14 
$12,394.46 
$-12,394.46 
$18,047.19 
l y 
r ey 
I
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Michael L. Haman 
HAMAN LAW OFFICE, P.C. 
923 North 3rd Street 
P.O. Box 2155 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-2155 
Telephone: (208) 667-6287 
Facsimile: (208) 676-1683 
ISB # 4784 
Attorneys for Defendants 
ZD!D Nrv 16 AH 9: 41 
CLERK Qf<;TniCT COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JIM BRANNON, 
Case No. CV 09-10010 
Plaintiff, 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
vs. D\L 
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, et al, 
Defendants. 
TO: THE ABOVE-ENTITLED PLAINTIFF, and his attorney of record, AND TO THE 
CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on Tuesday, the 7th ofDecember, 2010, at 2:00 
p.m. of said day or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, in the courtroom of said Court, Coeur 
d'Alene, Idaho, Kootenai County, the undersigned will call up for hearing before the Honorable 
Judge Hosack, First Judicial District Judge, Defendant City of Coeur d'Alene's Motion for Costs and 
Fees. 
~· 
Dated this --/-S- day ofNovember, 2010. 
NOTICE OF HEARING - I 
c
rd I M
DI r i
' I
 
 
 
./-  
1 
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HAMAN LAW OFFICE, P.C. 
~ ---------By __ ~~----~~--------------
Michael L. Haman 
Attorneys for Defendant City of Coeur d'Alene 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVING 
----I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~ day ofNovember, 201 0, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing NOTICE OF HEARING by the method described below to: 
Starr Kelso 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 1312 
1621 N. Third Street, Ste. 600 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
Fax: 208 664-6261 
Scott Reed 
Attorney at Law 
POBox A 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
Fax: 765-5117 
Peter Erbland 
Paine Hamblen 
PO Box E 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-0328 
Fax: 664-6338 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 2 
__ /_u.s. First class mail 
Fax 
---
___ Hand Delivery 
v-· U.S. First class mail 
Fax 
---
___ Hand Delivery 
/U.S. First class mail 
Fax 
---
___ Hand Delivery 
L2 ------------------
Michael L. Haman 
e
By ____  ____  ______________ __ 
 
 his ~  
 l
____ U.S.
----
____
V'.
----
____
' U.S.
----
____
- --.. 
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STARR KELSO 
Attomt::y at L:nv if.2445 
P.O. Box 1312 
Cocurd'Aknc, Idaho 8381(1 
Tel: 208-765-3260 
Fax; 208~664-'6261 
Attorney tor Plainli!T Brannon 
KELSO LAW OFFICE ~ 001/002 
STATe UF ION-iG l ~ · 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAJ f SS 
.-,, El"\· ·~ 
?.OIO ~rw IS PM 3= 45 
CLERK DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE DiSTRICT COURT FOR THE FII~ST .IUDJCJAL T.>lSTR.tCl' OF 
THE STATE Or IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTF.:NAI 
JIM URANNON, 
Pluintiff. 
vs. 
CITY O.F COEt II< D'ALENE. 'IDAHO. 
a. municipal corpor:J.Licm. et..nl. 
Det'i:nd an Ls. 
. ...... --..................... ,..~.~---
Cas~o~ No. CV-09-lOOlO 
MOTION TO STRIKE PART 
OF AMENDED AFFTnAVrr OF 
MICHAEL HAMAN 
COMES NOW th.,; Plaintjf]~ by and through his auurney and pursuant to Rule I 2 (1). lc..laho 
Rules of Civil Procedure p:.art of the 1\.mcwded Afndnvit uf Michael Hatmm da!'cd November 15. 
2010. 
Mr. llaman 's affidavit'~ numerou:-:: attempts Lo incorpt)t'atc rmd «'lf'lct· opinions on issues of 
law regarding lh~ ··he$1. interests of justic~", that the contest was brought without legal 
lhundation. that the costs arc exceptional with no hm;is or comparison, !.hal t:hc contest wus 
ft·ivolous. that the (~osts arc consistent with awurds i.n ~wy similar' ca.sc. that in an election contest 
concerning a city ~~kction that the county is the real party in inte.rcst. that no evidence was 
introduced that the board of canvas&:rs erred in "counting votes'' when it was admitted by the 
city lh~u they didn't count any votes. thal the clnimcd cosl'i and fc:.~cs arc consistent with any 
Rulc.s of civil proc\.~durc or st.at:utcs. or similar opinions ~<.:attered through il. arc inappropriate 
opinions offered r~garding i~sucs of Jaw and do no I provide any fhctual nasi~ .. or oth~,.~rwi:re. filr 
con~id<!ration in this maw::r by the Court. 
OraJ argument is requesled. 
·---- ------
PLA.TNTIFF"S 1'v10Tl.ON TO STRIKE MICHAEL !·lAMAN'S AMENDED AFFIDAVrT 
( :>'/.244
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DATE~() is ;1:/~:lay oi"Novembcr. 2010. 
c. L , I "') i..C·j;,.~-· 
................... l .. ;;.r•""' ....... """"' ...... • ................ . 
Slarr Kelso, Attorney fbr PJ(.IintHT 
CERTTflCATE OF SERVICE: A copy was mailed hy reguhu· U.S. Mail with f.'\Ostagc prepaid 
thereon to Defendant City and Wco.lthcrs' attorney M·ichacl Haman and Defendant Kennedy's 
auorneys _s~ott W. Rct.:d and Pctc:r C. Erbland on the J}£ ... dny ol"Novembct. 20 I 0. 
/--;.-::::2 I ---~----~()_,~-~~-·{_·-··· --
S1arr Kelso 
2 PL/\INTlFF"S MOTION ·ro STR1KE MJCJIAEL HAMAN'S AMENDED AFFIDAVI'l' 
! ; 01  e ,
c ' ! ( c.[,.
·'''''''''··" .... ·l,,::.r'''''· """, """". ""-, "'-"'''''''''.,. 
IfI ll' t. ! (\
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STARR KELSO 
Allomcy at Law #2445 
P.O. Box 1312 
Coeur d'Alene. Idaho 83816 
Tel: 208-765-3260 CLERK DISTRICT COURT 
Fax: 208-664~6261 ~4/a,v 
1\ttornt!y l<w Plaintiff Brannon .... . / ' _/;, 
TN 'T'J I.E DISTRICT (.~OURT OF TilE FIRST Jl.Jl)I.CJ.'\L DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JIM BRANNON. CASE NO. CV-09-10010 
Pbinr:iff, 
OBJECTION AND MOTION 
vs. 
ClTY OF COEUR lYALENE, ct. al.. 
'l'() DISALLOW DEFENDANT 
KENNEDY"S CLAIMED COSTS 
PURSUANT TO IHCP RULE 54(d) (6) 
IN PART Defendants. 
""""'''"'''•··~-·---··"'"""'""-""""""""""' " ........................ - ... --
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Jim Brannon. by and through his auorncy and herehy objects 
lo the Cl)Sts clnimed by l)cfcndanl Kennedy in his memorandum tmd moves that' they be 
disallowed in part 
The has is or this objection and motion to disallow in part. is as follows: 
I. C. Costs as of right: 
Paragraph 3. $58.00 f()r service by Steve Kecd. This cost. on its face refers to the 
contempt. procecdjngstiled ogain:o:t William McCrory, a. separate mancr·. 
2. D. Discretionary cosls: 
a. "Transcript., .. : There is no showing ns to why the hearing on F~bmary 12~ 2010 
wa~ complicated and needed to oc t.rnnscribcd other than ~~. general claim that 
then:.~ were ''multiple motions" during tl.w cours(~ of !1R~ cas1..~ and Lran~cripls 
were necessary to ··v,~rify the Court's rulings." Then! i~ no showing why t.ht~rc 
was anyt.hjog particularly, or what wa...; particularly. comp!icf:ltcd with regard to 
<.my motion r':quiring the Court" s ruling that was not cico.rly set fonh by rhc 
Court in its ruling from the l~uch or S\!l f(u1h in u m~momndum decision or 
order. The Cow't's docket do~!; not rcOect a hearing \.vas hdd on June 19. 20 I 0 
OBJECTION J\ND MOTION TO DEFENDANT KENNEDY·s CLA1.tv!ED COSTS 
tt rne
l
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nor Lhal there was a hcarin1! held \lfl October 27. 20 J 0 There is no rcm;on 
... . 
orfercd by Defendant Kennedy why any ruling ·was ''exceptionally'' 
complicated or needed to be transcribed. A Courts ruliug in any given 
proceeding may be complicated or need t<' be tmnscl'ilx:d <~nd l(.H' il to occ.ur is 
not unusual or exceptional in litigation. In this case ths:r~ is no showint? ho, or 
why. such rulings urc claim<.~ to be unusual or exceptional in this case. 
h. ·'invcstigal.ion of Voters"': J.n litc.rally ~very <.~asr~ whethc:.•r it goes to tr.ial or not, 
th,~rl.': is need to contact potential wil.ncsscs. That is routint:. The 
nt.U'l'lher~ location, and diflkulty in contacting these witnesses varie$ from cnsc 
to case. In this case there h;; no showing of who. wh:u. when. or where the 
witnesses were contacted. or why an jnvcstigator was "exceptionally" 
necessary 10 contact witnesses, identified by Plaintiff. Dctendant's own 
\,:Ounsd and Jargt! Jaw tinn ~'tn.ff cmlld htwc routindy pcrHmm:~d all witJlt:SS 
CCHl1.acl. There is no showing how the investigation in thi:-> ~~asc was '"peculiar 
:md unique'' as alh~ged. or how it was "e"ccptiona.L'' M.:~rely saying. so. docs 
not make i1· so. There is no showing why there was an exceptional need to hire 
an investigator locntcd in Spokane and submit h.is biliJ.or travc.:ltimc to. and 
lrom, Coeur d. Alene 1.o attend meetings or obtain documcnL~. As ::;uprx,rtcd 
hv the /\mended Cost Memorandum tiled bv the Citv/Wcathcrs. ust: of an 
• • J 
invesl.igator in this case was not an exception(t! la.<>k undcrwkeo in lbis 
litigation. The City's ::~Horney's and parak~gaJ's it.emizcd 1l~es sought as costs 
document meetings with an investigator used by Defendants City and 
\Vcathers. No costs urc l'C<JUCSt(.-d by lhcm. Also. a-; reflected by the affidavit 
of Kathy Lewis, a representative of the City of Coeur d'Alene, neither· the 
''inv~stigator" hired by Defendant Kennedy. Bill 1\.torlin. nor h.is company, 
··Morlinvc:stigalions,'· arc licensed as a ''detective~· or a ••d<.~tcctivc agl.':ncy" in 
th~ City ufCocur d'AI~~ne as required hy Chuptcr 5.48 ofth~ Cjty':s 
ordinances as attached to Exhibit A 10 the aflidavitof K<tthy L~.~wis lilcd 
.h'~rcwith. The City's <lrdinancc,rcquircs that any person or husincss who 
engages in a priva.te detective bllsincss musl ht.~ licensed by !.he City of Coeur 
2 OBJECTION AND MO'flON TO DEFENDANT KENNEDY'S CLATMED COS'fS 
l l .h enri l ,m e .
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d'Alene. The City"s ordinance c.Jcli.ncs a private dc.tcctivt.~ or detective agency 
as a person or business engaged in ''discovering or revealing the idcrllily. 
whereabouts, characlcr or actions of any pcr:5on or thing'' i"Chaptcr 5.48.0 I 0 
(B) I within the city (ChapleT 5.4R.070 (B)]. Then~ is no ::;howing where Lhe 
·'invcsligatiun·· ofM.r. Morlin took plncc with rc:gard to hi~ bilkd time. Some 
nf the billed time spcci lkally allcg~s that on March l 6 he was in Coeur 
(.rA.Icn,:: March J 8 he was in Coeur d' Aknc~ and on August 14 he was in 
Coeur d' AJcne. Also the October 5, 2010 "bi II .. subrnitt.cd by Bill Morlin 
rdcrs to work done in .. July'' but there '1rc no itemizations providt~ in this 
r~gard and no time spent document~d. 
This O~it:ction and Motion is further supported by th~ Memorandum of l..t~w tiled 
herewith. 
On.tl argum~nl is requested, Md the right. lO t:.Xaminc 'md crosl; examine, or ca11~ any 
witnesses is n.:s~:.~rv~.~d. 
DATED th·i:-: i 't11 day of November~ 2010. 
___ ""_<11_> .. ~.\~:.'(Jt.:~l.._'-";.._··--·-············· •'•' ............ -
Swrr Kd~o, Atrorncy lt>r PlaintitTBrannon 
CERTIFlCATE OF SERVICE: A copy was mail~d l(l Mike Hn.nHm. Scou lh~t~d, and Peter 
Erhland. atr<).mcys f()r Dc1:CodarJts on tht! ...... .l.f_ d...'ly of November, 20 I 0 by rcgutar U.S. Muil. 
/ 
,_..,.,...·< ·'· ' 
·-:r:.f-et/lA..r tj..f -·· ~ .. ·---·-...... ,.,.,.,...... ""'-··---·--········ 
Starr Kdso · 
3 OBJECTION AND MOTION TO DEFENDAN'l' KENNEDY'S C:LAJ.MED COSTS 
11 /
 l ' dc/tne  C· l l t.
" Tlli
l' e 0 ing" rCha te
OR) ler ,() 8)J, c IlO ll l
" llv ~ ali() " f 
o . l e fic "cg 1
d' lcn, rch) <I' ll
 () " itt.cU
" ly" ,l
f l
()~it:ct ll t. I .tlW
.11 guIl1~n rul l ' :mll C , Sl) ll
iTl1c ~c rt.:sl;,~rv\
th c c   
.-<~7)l,'J.. d //,1 (. . 
 --"U'-~· ·t ... ;..:~:.~0::!.,~:,,-,-,.:..-·· _ ..... .......................... _ 
W ~() Il) l U :m
r O tl Hl COH
n ll l l . ,  .IK .'lY c nc  
...-
",/'< .'. , 
·-y.(-o..lI ,r (j..f _ .. 
~ ... ---.-,," ... ,., ... I'''''' ""'-•. _ ,_ ........ " 
.
'r f ... I.
SC 38417-2011 Page 2438 of 2676
11/18/2010 14:51 FAX 208884828J KELSO LAW OFFICE ~001/003 
STAlE; 'i;:: q··.,~ 1·...j 1• . ,...,. •· .,_J, 1U/1 r J 1 ~~ts STARR KELSO Attorney at Lav.' #2445 
P.O.l3ox 1312 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Td: 208-765-3260 
2010~/0V 18 PM 2:56 
F~lX: 208-664-6261 CLERK DISTRICT COURT n~~~--
Attomey for Plaintiff Rrannon ........ v•' \ 
J.N THE DISTRJ.CT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF TDAHO .. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
.IJM BRANNON. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CASE NO. CV-09-10010 
MEMORANDUM SIJPPORTTNG 
OBJECTION AND MOTION 
CITY OF COEtJR n· ALENE. eL al. 
'l'O DlSAI..I.OW DEFENDANT 
KENNEDY'S CLAIMED COSTS IN PART 
PURSUANT TO IRCP RULE 54( d) (6) 
Defendant.~. 
COMES NOW Lhc! PlaintHl~ Jim Bnuu1on, by ~utd through his altorncy am.J in support ul' 
his ObjecLion and Motion to Disallow Defendant Kennedy's claimed costs, in part. pursuant to 
lRCP Rule 54 {d")(6) hereby submits this Mcrnorandutn ni'Law. 
INTRODTTCTlON 
Defendant K.enncdy~~ Cost Mcmom.ndum, ot.hcr than the claimed $5R.OO court filing fee, 
are noL "Costs m:; <'l Mauer of Right. and arc not supported pursuant to IRCP Rule 54 (d) (.I) 
requirements. or c:nsc law. as being necessary <md cxc,:ptiunal, and in the intcre::;t ofju!'ticc. 
·ARGUMENT 
The grant {)i' denial of discretionary costs is committed to the sound di.~crction nf the trial 
court. l.RCP Rule 54 (I) (D) is a two part tc:-:t that requires u shov.ring t:hr.1t (1) the costs wen: 
necessary and exceptional. and then that t.hcy (2) should be t1Warded in the interest' of justjcc. 
City t!Ot1c:Ca/l \'. Seuhert, 142 Idaho 5HO, I 30 P. 2d I 118 (2006), 
The Court is to cons·ider the nature and scope of the case and determine whclht~r the cosLs 
claimed ore ext..:cptional for the nature and scope of the ca-.e. lia.vden l.ak.e Fire Protection 
District v. Alcorn. f -1 I Jdoho 307, 109 P. 3d /61 (2000). This is an dcction contcsl. There is no 
~_3_Ucgation. nor_~hm·~ing. tl~m any o~jcctc~ to cost '1.\'l.lS "exceptional'' in an election contest f()r 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAIN'l'JFF·s OB.IECTJON AND MOTlON 
TO DISALlJJ\V DEFENDANT KENNEDY'S CL.A1MED COSTS 
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Ddtmdant Kennedv as the ··incumbent Defendant to ··check th~~~. or anv. voters with the 
. -· 
election o.mce and/or w interview or investigate" regarding them. DeH~ndtuH Kennedy at JW time 
c.ontested the ~.::k~ction, in any manner, 1.Uld there is no showing nor aHcgation that it was 
·<necessary.. l()r him w lry to lind p!!rsons who voted illegally fl.)r P!ai.nti IT. lcl alone 
"exccpi.ion<.il." Dcf~:ndan.t Kennedy htts, at all times prior to trial. catcgork.nHy dcnic:d thi.lt nny 
illegal voters cost votes. He supported this daim with numcrm.L-> aftidavit~ of Dan English and 
Det~dic !1eard which were procured and prepart~d hy Defendant Kennedy's counsel. Defendant 
Kennedy maintained rhis pus1tion at all times Wlt'il his stipulation. during t1ial. to the entry or t.h~~ 
Alhdtwtt 01' liregory i'•rofc. and the ilh;g<tl 'lut~:. ~,f Mr. Ain91.vorth nnd Mr.. \~/hilt'. Th&'<:r wr.n~ all 
voters identified by Ptaintill 1 There is no good .ta.ith basis for Dl!ltmdant Kt~nn.cdy to argue that 
un itwesligation o( vufers or a search for illegal voters t(lr 13ramwn was rea:-;onahlc lH' ntX:cssary 
given his t~tilurc 10 challenge anything or any aspc::•~l of the election. let alone exceptional. 
Dctcnda.nt Kenn~w~dy"s witne.sst!s. English and 13card, by affidavits that were procured and 
prt~parcd by Kennedy':) counsel claimed thot tht:y hHd reviewed lh~o.~ dccr.ion records and that 
there were no illegal votes c.::ast other tlmn Ms. Zellars. There has been no c.laim bv Defendant 
.,, ~ 
Kennedy that an "!nvc::;tigation'' of vol~rs and pot:.::ntial witnesses is not rouline?~)l done in 
election contest Cn$c-s or that. il was his "bmden" to do so in an election contest that focused nn 
lh~ acthms Mthe C1t.y. s~l.! C'ity t~(McCu/1 v. ,";'eubert, 142/Jc.lho 580. 130 !'. 2d 1118 (2006). 
ln addition fi."Jr tht~ Court to the require Plaint.i.tT to pay any co~t.s tor work done by 
Defendant Kennedy'~ hired investigator. whose work \~ts wholly, or to a significant dctnx.\ 
illegal under the City t)f Coeur d'Alene's ordinance Chapter 5.48 (attuch~:;~d to the anidavit of 
Kathy Lewis) would result in the Court ctfcctively aiding the enlurccmcnt of an illegal contract 
between Defendant Kennedy and hi.::> unlicensed investigator. t'vfc: Shane v. Quillin. 47 Idaho 
542. 547, 277 P. 554. 559 (IY29) An illegal contract is one that rests on illegal consideration 
consisting of ~1ny a~~~ which is contrary to J.:aw. Quirin~"~-'· Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 5Mi. 944 P. 2d 
695. 701 (!997j. The cmltract between Dcfl~ndant Kennedy or his atlom<.~ys on his behalf and 
Bill Morlin is a contract f<.lr an act by Bill Morlin which is contrary to hiw. 
_____ ,, ____ ,_, ___ , 
I Indeed it Is inhen:ntly inconsiste-nt IC.·,r r:>crcmlunt Kennedy's COIIIISl'l to claim that "in u t01.l(:~:T1cd cffi)rf'" 110 
questionable "'''crs w~·rc located who voted ti::tr Plaintiff. Greg Protrs anidavil is clear cvidcncl~ ,,flhc fill~nes~ 111" 
this ~ti'tlerncnt. Defendant Kenncdy"s counsel not only r:tlrnrnu.nic:arcd with Sgt. Mqjor Profl by c:nmrtil btJt he nl.so 
rc,civl~d (I C\'PY ot'the <Jffidttvit filled out by !>rot\. directly from Profl. ast<..' whl) he Vl1ted fi.:Jr in the i:Orll'e!:'lcd 
~cct:ion. rc~arding Seilr:!,-nmnths befim: tti*JI. 
2 MEMORANDUM IN Sl.JPPORT OF J',LAINTIFF"S O~JECTtON AND MOTION 
TO .DlSALL()\V DEFENDANT KENNEDY'S CLAIMED COSTS 
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CONCLUSION 
The only co.-:t awardable w Defendanl Kennedy is the tiling f(..-e required to lite hi~ answer. 
DATED ~his u:;', day ofNovcmber. 2010. 
~r~. iJ [t./~/-
................. '-'··~~ ............................... -... . .... ___ ,........................ ······ 
Sturr Kcl~o. /\Horney J'()r Plainli ff Bnmnon 
CERTIFiCATE OF SEKVlCE: A 'opy was mailed lo Mike Haman. Scott Reed, and Peter 
Erbland. tl~Jorneys !(w Dctcndanrs on th~ ./$: ..... day ofN·.)vembcr. 2010 by rcJl-ular lJ.S. Mail. 
::-{i ,, . 
···----.... ~U. Lk,(l~~·: ... ____ ,_".,. __ 
Slarr Kch~o 
3 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS OHJECTlON AN.D MOTION 
TO DISALLOW DEF.ENDANT' KENNEDY'S CLAIMED COSTS 
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<:·•·\i· 'u':.: liu.·,.,.;f, }~r \.~Ih.C l I 1'\i :V ~ 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI v 
Fi~~~ 
STARR KELSO 
Allc~rn~:y ;-tl L·1W .ii) ... !4S 
P .0. nox I ·; 12 
Coeur d'Alene. ldaho 83816 
Tel: 208-76:;-32()0 
I-' ax: 20g-664-626! 
Atwrm~y fi·1r Plaintiff Brannon 
2010 ~mv 18 PM 3: 31 
IN TlW DISTRICT COURT FOR TilE FIRST JllDICJAL n.tSTR.l('T OF 
ll!E S'T':\TE OF ID/\llO, rN /\NO FOR THF COUNTY OF KOOT~N/\l 
.liM riRANNON .. 
Plaintiff. 
CT'{ OF COEUR fYM . .EM::, IDi\110 
a municipll corpc:r:uion, et.al. 
Deftmdant:;. 
STArr:: OF lDi\ l ro ) 
:-;:;, 
COUNTY 01-' 1-:00TF:Ni\1) 
Case No. CV -09-100 I 0 
AFFIDAVIT OF K.ATllY LEW!S 
K/\TI IY LEWIS. being til'.!>! duly s\ovorn upon oath. testilies .:~r. follows: 
I. l :1m O\\~r the ag:e of 18. c.ompt!\cnl to testify, and make this stat,:mcnt upon pt~rsonal 
knowhlg~ HI which I 'vill. if called l(l I,') (I .)c), will h~.~;t i l"y; 
2. I iHTl (!D {:rnploy(:C l,f lh~: City IJf co~.ur d' ;\knt:. My job dutit:s ~,.:r;taiL in f.llir.l. lh~: 
llVCrseeing of the licensing of indi vidU~1iS and businesses required to 1.!'.:. Jic.en:.;cd lO 
Wl.lrk within the t:ity limits of Coeur tt"/\icnc and I have custody and contrc.1l (.lver the. 
records identifying pt.:rsons who are licensed in Coeul' d'Alene; 
.>. AI the reque:>t of Starr Kelso. I reviewed the docuntt~nts 1m lilc with the City of Cneur 
J'Aiene pertaining 10 detective and dete~:rivt: ;·lgcm~y li~:.:tl.Sing in tlu . .: C:ity of<.\,eur 
d'Akn;:; :o cktc::nnine whc:tht:r Hill Morlin and o.r Morlinvc$tiga1ion~;. L.T. .. C. is, or \VII~'> • 
.'\rFID/\ VIT OF 1\./\TIIY U··:WJS 
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I ic,~nst~d as a dcreetive and or detectivt: agency in the City of C0e.11r d. A lent~ at any 
time in the. year 2010 through the dat,~ (.1( this ;~ffid:lvil. 
4. !;lased t!p011 my review of the dnl~llnll:.nls per1aining tO dctc~:liVC and d~.:tc;ctivc ~ll-!C11CY 
lic.cn:-;ing in the City of Coeur d'Alene, neither Hi II Morl in nor MQr! i nvcstii~<Hions, 
l .. I .. C. we-re li<.~~nsed as a derectlve I'll' detect I vt: agcJH~Y by the City nf Coeur d' A len.: 
during any time in the ye~r 20 I 0 through th~ date of this affidavit. 
5. :\ true and .;.om~cl copy or th..: City of Coeur (L\Icnc's ordinam:e(s) regarding the 
requirement th:ll detectives <HHI detective agcnt:ics be liccn:.-cd in Cot'Ur d'Ak:nc is 
attach,·d hereto a~ Exhibit ;\. 
Furtl-w.r t\ffiant saycrh nol. 
11/\' !hi~; , dav of November. 20 I 0. 
·-'"' ....
··-., . 
...... ~-~··--................................... : __ :::· .. ::.. ', .. : .. · .... , 
NOTARY P IDA110 
2 AFFIDAVIT OF K.:\TIIY l .EWIS 
!gj 002/008 
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Chapter 5.48 
> f).R.JVATE Dt::TECTJVES 
> 5.4R.010: DEF!.NITIONS: 
::.-
....... "'1'"&-. .... '\'!.1-'"'-J'JJ., i\ ....... t _, ... _11oi~o'h'" I'H'I.,'•#J :ft tlat.; .. ., (''t&....· .... f..:.Or ul.. ... ll 1..1~'1.,•11o fk.t~ .., ... L!UI-;'r'ti ... L"'• 
....... 1 &t\,; vY'IIU:"t ~f\\.t l111JU..""~.:')o \.l:l\:..U Ul llll~ '-··ll..apu:.l ""11011 IIUV~ ... 11\,.. lll~t.UIIIIi:?•") .. 
>DETECTIVE AGENCY: Means and inc!.udcs any person who as prindpul or 
>·employer engages in. or who advenises or holds himself out as being 
:.:· engaged in, the private detective business. 
> PRl VATE DETECTIVE: Mean:-> and includes any n<tl.ur:tl pcr.sun or l'ithcr 
> sex who cng:;lf:tcs in, or who advcrt.is~s or holds himsdf oul w:; being 
~ . .,. engaged in. the private detective business as agent or employe\:~ oC a 
>duly licensed detective agency. 
>· 
>PRIVATE DETECTIVE BUSINESS: Me::u1s and includc$Ule business of. or 
: . .., the representation of being engaged jn Lhc busim.·ss uL making for 
:>hire or reward. investigations with rderencc to any of the 
·,-,, following rm.tt1crs: 
.> .!\. Detecting. discovering or revealing crime or crimin~tls, or 
> securing se~..:ret inlhnnatinn or evidence relating thereto; 
> B. Discovering or rcvc.::~1Jing the idc.::ntity, wh~~rcabouts. charnctcr o.r 
> actions of ::my pcrsun or thing; 
> C. The hahils, conduct~ rmwcmcnts. whereabouts, associations, 
> transactions. r~pulations or character of I.Uly person; 
> D. The credibility of witnesses or other persons~ 
> E. Tht: location or recovery of lost or stolen prop~rty; 
·.::-F. The causes, (~rigin or responsibility l(>r fires, accidents or 
.> injuric~ to n:ul or pcn>onal property: 
>G. The affiliation, connection or relation of any person with any 
> union or nonunion organizntions. with any otTicial member or 
> reprc:~cntativ(~ tht.~reot: or wit.h any person seeking cmploym~nl in th~..~ 
:.-.· place of any person who has quit work by reason of strike.~ 
>H. ·rhc tmth or falsity of any statement or representation~ 
> L 'fhe busin.es~ of~ccuring fbr hire or reward evidence to be used 
> h~fhrc authnrizt~d invt~:o::tiga1ing committees. hi)nrds of award or 
> arbitration. or in th~ trial of civil or criminal cases~ 
> J. The busin~:ss of furnishing tor hire or reward. guards or other 
> p~rsons to pro!'ccl: persons 01· prc.)pcrl.y, prevent then. or unl<.swful 
::.· taking of goods. -.varcs and mcrchaJlClisc, or the misappropriation or 
·::-- cnm:ealmer.t of goods. wares and merchandise. money. bonds. stocks, 
> dtoscs in a~lioo. notes or other v"•luablc documents ()r f.laf.X~rs; (II' 
>the bu::;in~ss ofperrurming the service of such g·uard or other person 
u :· .... for any oJ tfiii:- silid purposes. (pnor cooc §§5-12-1 (a)~ (c). (d)) 
> 5.4S.O:W: A.P.PLlCAl3lL1TY OF Cl1APTER: 
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>Nothing in thi~ chapter shall apply to any otlicer nr employee or 
> any state. county. city or town, appointed or ck~clcd by due 
>authority of bvv: lo any person whose business is the furnishing of 
.> information u.s to the husine:;s and tinancial standing und crt:dil or 
·-._ -J.'Il"' .. -"1'""' ..... ,~· t.· .. 1".11'\I.J ·..-..~ ......... ,_ ;1'\l'lll;n-"'' •u. .. • ln. as .. ~ .. I"U'._. ........... n~:sl hl.lhitt.• l':.t'll~ 
-· 1'~ ...... ,. ·-~ ,,,,, \'i,l I(.UI] I·''"'·"'·'IJ '''"I"'' '''5 , .. , L'V ····~ ... ,. .... '"'''UI IU.ol''''"' ..... ,,. 
> financi::1l r.espon.~ibilitics of applicants t~>r insurance, indemnity 
>- bonds. or commercial credit, or of cJajmants under insur:mcc 
::>policies. (prior code §5-12-l(b)) 
> 5.48.030: LI.CF::NSE: 1\PPLICATJON~ ISSUANCE CONDl'flONS: 
>A. It .~hall bl;': unlawfi1l to opcn.'tlc, maintain, or othen.vi.o;e hnve n 
> d~lt:ctive agency or be t::mploycd thereby without first being liccm>txl 
..._., pursuant to ;.hi~ ehaplcr. 
>B. The liccn~c fi:~es provided tor in section 5.60.020 ol'ihis title 
>shall be paid yearly. All applicaliuns f(lr a license shall be made 
> in writing and filed wit11 the city clerk. The city ~o.·lcrk may seck 
> advice from the poli.cc dep(lrt.mcnt rcg<U"ding the qualiflcations of 
·.:-- th~ applicant. If t:hc city clerk flnds the applicant. qualifi~.xJ under 
> th(~· pmvi.siom:; of this chapter th.: city clerk may is~uc the licl.!nse. 
>If the ci1.y ck:rk Jinds that the applicant does not. meet. with such 
.> qualiiications. he/she shall deny the applicati<m and give notice 
>thereof to tht:: npplicanl. N,., license required by this chapter .shall 
·> he grunted to any person who, within Len (I 0) years of the dntc of 
> such •-tpplicution for a license. has been convicted or a lt:lony nor 
> unless the appiicant is" citizen of t.hc United Stat.es of good mnml 
·:.-• character. In !h(~ case of an application for a d'~'e':tivc agcnt~y. "') 
>detective agency license shall be issued to any applic.arH unlcs:-; he 
>or she i::; a citi~.:,\.:n of the Unitt:d States, of good moral character. 
>and .shall hnve ar.least tive (5) ycnrs' prior cx.pcricncc as Hrl 
> empll)ycc or a rcgulurly constituted poJicc tore~ or the equivalent 
>experience as ml employee of a bona t1de detective agency. In order 
.>to determine ~uitability of prospective applicants for licensing 
> with the city of Coeur d'Alene. t.he Coeur d'Alene city clerk or his/ 
>her design~e shall require each specified applicant to provide 
> inform~llion and tingcrp1·in1.s necessary to obtain criminal history 
> .infonmuion !rom the Tdaho stnt.c police and the ft.~dern( bureau of 
> invcstigatiot~. Pursuantlo section 67-300~, Idaho Code <.md 
> congre~siomtl ~~nactmcnl public law 92-544. the city t)fCocur d'Alene 
> $h;·lll submit :1 set nf tingerprint~ obt.1.incd From the applicant and 
> the required fees to the ldaJlO stale pi) lice, bureau of criminal 
> iden.tilication. l{)f a criminal r~cords check or stale und national 
> database&. Th~-.~ submission of tingerprinto; and intonm~tion required 
> by this sccuon ~~hall he on f6rms prcscritx..-d by the ·Idaho state 
> polil:C. The ~ity of Coeur d'Alene is authorized ltl receive crimim1l 
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> history infimm)tion from tl1c lda.ho stale police and from tJ1c l~deml 
> bureau ur investigation for the purpose of evaluating the fitness of 
>applicants tor licensing. A~ required by state and lcd'-T<lllaw, 
> further disst:m.i.naljou or other u.o;e of the criminal histN)' 
.> into.rrnarion is prohihite.d. As required by :-;cction 5.60.020, 
>criminal hi:-::tory check sh:.1tl be tcndc.rcd at such time as the 
> applicHtion is made. No license fbr a det.ectivc ag~o.~ncy shalt be 
> issued to tl C(;rporation not authorized to do busines~ in the state. 
>Private detective and detective agency licenses shall expire on 
:::.• Decemhct· :; I nf each year. 
:: ... 
>C. Upon nK~eipl of an application for private detective, the city 
>clerk may issue a provisional license to an applicant if the city 
.> dcrk d~termines that !;Uch person is in suhst<1ntial compliance with 
>the provisions oflhis chapter. A pmvisionallicensc shall expire 
>one hundred twenty ( 120) days from th!:! date of issuo.ncc or n.t such 
> ~:.arlicr time. as tht: city clerk may designate. A private uctcctivc 
> with a provisional license must ~ under the supt·rvision of a 
>· lic,~nscd private detective agency owner until completion of aJI 
>criminal history checks and issuance ofn license which i:s not 
> provi~iunaL (01.'d. 3309 *5, 2007: Ord. 3034 §4, :wo I: Ord. 2639 §3, 
> I 994: Ord. 2630 §6, 1994: Ord. 2045 § 11. 1987: Ord. I 702 §3, 1982: 
·::- prior code §5- i 2-2) 
> 5.48.()40: LlCENSE: FEE: 
:-,. The lic~"!nsc l'tx~ f()r a dct~:ctivc agency shaH be SCI. by r~solution of 
>the city counc~l as set fi.)rth in s~;..-ction 5.60.020 of this title, 
> which fee shaH he paid ro the treasurer ~md the receipt thcH.{or 
>!:>hall be prcs~~nt~:d to the clerk with the application. (Ord. 2630 §7, 
> 1994: prior code §5~ 12· 7) 
>· 5.48.050: TNS\ H~ANCE RJ.::QUJRED: 
·.:: .. 
. > (Rep. by Ord. i 949 §4, I 986: Ord. 176 7 §6, 1982: prior <:ode §5~ J 2~6) 
> 5.48.060: EMPLOYMENl' RECORDS: 
>Every pers(ln !iccnscd under 1·hc provisions ofthjs chapter shall 
> keep a book containing the full nmne, place of rc!->idence, address, 
> l:omplete and :J.(:cumtc description and history or r~cord or each 
:> person cmploy(:~d regularly or occasionally as a private or special 
; . .,. detective within the city. Each employee shall also be dc~igmJh.::d in 
> the hook by a separate number. Upon the request of the city ck."rk 
>and/or the chief ()r P~'licc or of any pcrson(s) dc:-;ignatcd by them, 
>the hook hcrei£1 required to be kept, shall he cxhil'litcd lt)r Lht: 
> in~peCtl<)n ol !.he-city clerk ~'tlliJTt)r lhe diu~l ofpoltCC or of any ___ _ 
>· p..:.~rson(s) designated hy them to inspect the same, and the .n:tilur<.~ or 
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> refusal to c~Hnply with th~ rC(lUCSl shall constilult:! cause for Lhc 
> rl~vocation ofhis/h~r lict:nse. (Ord. :H09 §<l, 2007: prior code 
> §5-12-3) 
> 5.48.070: IDENTIFICATION CARDS~ ISSUANCE~ CONTENTS; CARRYING 
.. RCQ'(IJRI''j) "'llt'N ..... r.. ... ~~ .... vv .:· .~ : 
:::--
>A. Every applir.:anl obi.::J.in.ing a license under the provisions of this 
> chapter shal i f"umish every pcr.son in the employ of such lice;:nscc 
>with an identification card, which shall be issued and signed by the 
> licensee, and contain the nnme. general description. signature and 
>photograph of the person employed oy such l.iccoscc. together with 
> tht: number hy which he i~ designated upon lhe books or the licensee, 
> in <.~ccor.dan<.;c ''~-'ith the provisions of lhis chapter. The chief of 
::.· police shall he notif1cd in writing by the licensee itnmcdiatdy upon 
> the issuance or revocation or any idcnti licat.ion card. 
> B. 11. i:, unlawful for <UlY person to act a...;; a priv:.~t~ detective for 
::-·hire within th<:.· city, unless such person crrrrics an idcntilicat.ion 
·_:,. card provichxl in subsection A of this section upo.o his JX.'TSOn while 
> so acting.. ::lnd it is tmbwfl.ll Jhr any per!'on to refuse tn cxhihit 
> his idemj_licntion card upon demand of any rcgulHr p(lli':~ onict.'f of 
>the city. (priol' (:(ld~ §5 8 J2w4) 
> 5.4l:':.mW: EMP.LOYEES NOT TO DJVULGE INFORMATION: EXCEPTIONS: 
.. :~ 
> ft is unlawful f()r any person who js or has beer\ an employee or :1 
> dct..:c.tive agency Lo divulge lo any pe~on, other than his employer. 
> except as his employer may dir~o.-ct and except as ma.y be r~quircd by 
> law. any inf()l"nl.alion acquired by him during such employment with 
> rcspccr to any of I he work to which he, or any olhcr employee uf 
.>such ddccli\-\.' agency, has o~;;~n assigned by such detective agency. 
>or with resp<:~ct to any of the work, business or amtirs of such 
> detective ag~.::ncy. (_prior code §:5-12-5) 
> 5.4lU)90: A'l'TORNEYS EXEMPTED: 
>·The prnvi$ions of this chaplcr ~haJJ not apply Lo auorncys while 
> engaged in the pract:ice of law. (Ord. 1.438 §I, 1976: priM code 
> §5·12-R) 
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STARR KI.:.LSO 
AUorncy ~•l 'I .:n,.· ff:.A45 
P.O. Box: 1312 
Co~lll' d · Ak~rw. Jdabo 83 R I() 
T~..~l: 20~-765-32()0 
F;lX.: 20X-(,(14M6.26l 
i\U.or·r11.:y !'or Plointill Brannon. 
KELSO LAW OFFICE 
IN Tl.IE DISTRICT COl !RT FOR THE FII{Sl Jl J()ICIAL DISTRICT OF 
lii.E STAfF OF IDAHO, IN AND fOR THE COUNTY or: KOOT!~Ni\1 
JIM BRANNON. 
Plaintil'f: 
V,';, 
CITY OF COEI.!R D'ALENE. IDAliO. 
:1 nmnic:ipal COJ'POr~1Lioi1. ~r.al. 
f)l~lt:ndanls. 
C:tsc No. CV -09-100 I 0 
OB.JFCTION TO ANI> MOT'lON 
TO DISAI.I.OW lN PART DEFENDANT 
CITY/WEATHERS Cl.l\HvTF.D COSTS 
AND ALL (W CI.AIMFD .t\'.i."TORNPY 
ANI> P!\Ri\Lb:OAL FEES 
~001/002 
COM t:S NOW I he Plainti rt~ .lim Brannon. by nnd through his atwrm.•y and hct\~by obj~cl.~ 
to nnd mov~:.s lO disallow in purl l.kl\.'ndant CiLy/Wc:t1hcrs clainwd l.~lisls ~md all nfth~~ d~sim~.:d 
attnr·n(~y and para.k.!;!al fe~s pmsuw11 to IRCP Ruk 54 (d) (6). 
Th~,.~ only Cl.i:;ts thul these l>cli~nd;rnls urc cmitlcd Lo as "Cnsts ~·sa Mat\.~~r of Ri!:!hC arc Lh~:: 
court filing fl:.:l~ und th~· ~O)I;IS for one t~()py or th~:.~ r~:.·sp~~TiVl~ dt~pnsif'ions Pi' Ronald P1·ior M)d 
Susan llarri~. Th~..~ olht~r claimed cosl. an: JWL "exceptional.'' Th~y !11\~ routine \:o::;ts involved in 
litigrnion. 
Thl~ daim f()r att.orm~y und paralegal Ji:c!' is nnt nwun.J:.JI."lk under TRC'l'J l<ulc 54 (d) ( 1) 
r~.quircmcnts. ~,.:<.1St~ 1;;1\.v. Jd~rho Code s~.~~:li<lll 34-2020, s~cli,)n l:!MJ 17, S('dit.ln !1-121. or secrion 
6-91 ~ A. Th~: d.:ction c.ontcsl was not bwughl. pur.-:ucd. or defended frivolously. U!lrt.:!~1son~hly. 
11r wit.lwut fnundtlli(.lrJ and LC. sc::ct.ion J4-2020 docs no1 pr·<.wid(: l()r attnm~y l.<..~cs. 
This ol~ic~~tion ~md motion to disallow i:s supponccl by the i'vkrnoramlum in Support fikd 
h~:.~rt:v,:i 1'h. 
Oral mgwru:nt is r~qtwstcd. 
_ _t_~PJAlNJ"tEil'$_ill3.JEC'l'lON TO AND MOTION l'(~)--1-)fS-A-b-bOW Dl.:n::NDI\NTS 
CJTY/WE/\THl--'.1\S" CI..AJ.M FOR COSTS, IN PART. AND /\TTORNFY 
FFFS/Pt\K/\1 .FCrAL FEES 'J'N TOT/\ I. 
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DA'f~":D ... ·'!'~ .f{~by oCNovc.mber. 2010 . 
. · J.utl 0. . ' •' . <.. • L--··~ ........... ,,,_, __ ... -....................................... . 
Stall" Kelso. t\lll)rn~~Y for PlaintifT 
CERTIFK'Ail·: OF SERVICJ..·:: t\ copy \Vas nwikd hy r~g.ular lJ.S. !VlHil with postagt.: prt!paid 
thert.~on hJ Dcft.~ndant. City ~md Wcall.l(~rs' allomcy Mich<~cl llamau tmd l")ef'endanr KcrHwl.ly'8 
attorneys SC()tt W. R~.:~t:d and Pc.:t~o:r C. Erbbnd onlh!.! ...... ../.~:··day ol'Nnvcmhcr. 2010 . 
... .-···.'t j ( 
.... "{)../\).(0/! C#:.L~-=-··-·"· 
St(ll'f Kdso 
___ l____J_lLi\J.NJ'If·FS OBJEC'J'ION ·ro .... Am)-MOTION T0-1->1~/\-hbOW-DEI":LND/\NTS 
CITY/WF::'\TI IU~S CLAIM FOR COSl'S. IN P/\RT, t\ND ATTORNFY 
F'FFSIPAR/\LEG/\1. Fl:l~S IN TOTAl. 
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STARR KI.:LSO 
AUorney [tt Lav.,. #21~45 
P.O. Box lJ 12 
Co~ur d ·Alene, Idaho 83 X I o 
Tel: 208-765-3260 
Fax: 208-664-626! 
Attorney Jor PlaintifTBrannon 
KELSO LAW OFFICE lg)001/004 
CL2J/~STRICT COURT rHt,~iY~, 
J ' ~lp 
IN THE D!STRICT COURT OF Tl-fE FIRST .IUDIC1AL L>lSTRIC'l' OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JIM BRANNON. 
Plain tin: 
vs. 
CASE N()_ CV-09-10010 
MEMORANDUM SUPI·10RTtNG 
OB.IECTlON AND MOTION 
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE. ct. al. 
: TO DISALLOW IN PART DEFENDANTS 
CITY/WEATHERS CLAJM.ED COSTS AND FEES 
PURSUANT TO IRCP RULE 54{d) (6) 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW tht: PJaint.iff, Jim Brannon. by and through his attorney 'lnd in support of 
his Ob_je;:ction and Motion to Disallow Defendant. Cily/Wcathcrs daim~d costs. in part, pursuant 
t.o IRCP Rule .54 (d)(6). and allorne.y and paralegal .fi.~es in total, hereby submits thi.s 
McmorJndum of Lnw. 
INTRODUCTION 
Dcfend~mt~ City/Weathers Cost M~mumndum, ot.her than the ch1imed court filing fcc and 
tht! costs fm one <~opy M the re~pccrlvc depositions of Ronald Prior and Susan Harris, are not 
"Cost$ as a Mauer of Righ1.:· The claimed attorne-y l·e~::s/ paralegal f~cs arc not awurd;,1ble in this 
matter ::~s discretionary C0$15, or under general applico.tion statutes. An award ()r rhc o~i~ct~o~d to 
costs and fees is !1(>t .supported pursuanl tn lRCP Rule 54 (d) (1) requirements. case law. Idaho 
Cndc section 34-202.0, sect.ion 12·1 J 7, section 12-121. or sccl'ion 6-918 A. 
.1\RGt.JMEN'f 
Tht! grant or denial nf discretionary costs is commil1e.d t.o the sound discretion of the trial 
court In election contests attorney fees me not aJiowt!d by lh~ spccilic wording uf the ~tatutc. 
I.C. s~cl.ion 34-2020. Discretionary "cost-.'' under IRCP Rul~ 54 (1) (D) rt;quirc a two part test 
that requires a showing that ( J) the costs were nccc~sary and exceptionaL and only then t.hat they 
MEMORANDUM I.N SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S OB.IEC'fJON AND M(}fiON 
TO DTSALLO\V DEFENDANTS ClTY!WE/\THERS CLAIMED COSTS AND fEES 
,
u I "  .. '
O~ll ' l   0 
; 1
19J0 /
:~~TR~T COURT .'4  EPU, ~/J
J ~/P
r I I· l I I r
i
VS.
). IOOIO
I')ORTl
f I
1
I
e!: l l
je;:cti !vt js~l low t e e , .
1.0 ep 5 , , u Ii.~e... l i
ci
I)cfe Ult . il,i
Ol' ( r  l C US.1tl
i,:" Llome. ,'(;:!!8 <lwurdi,l .hi
:IS O$lS Q, I e ()~i~ctl.
cc 'i, , t o C,lSC
l SCCl'i Jl
,I\ U r
m 1.0
rt. ( c Ol l .~ iL tllt
e l,i() ,,'" ep I) u
, J  YfI
1TYf A
SC 38417-2011 Page 2450 of 2676
11/18/2010 15:28 FAX 2088848281 KELSO LAW OFFICE 141002/004 
(2) ~hould he awarded in the interest· of justice. f.'ily t.!( McCallv. Seubert. 142 Idaho 580. I 30 r. 
2d 1118 (2006). 
Ch1im~d fax. <.:opy, ~md postal costs: 
The Court I~; (o consider lh~ nature and scope of the Ct&S~ <.md dctcrmint; whether the costs 
claimed ~trc "cxc.~ptionar' lbr the nature ~nd scope of the case. Ha;rden Lake Fire J>rolt:Ciion 
District~~- Alcorn, l..fl Idaho 307. 109 P. 3d 161 (2UO~~. Then.: is no ullcgation~ nor showing, that 
it was ''l!xct!ptinnni"· in this election contest, <JS opposed to any other election contest. nr lhr that 
matter ::my litig.::Jtion, to incur these claimed costs. These costs are routine!y incurred in any 
litigalion. 
/\ttomcy Fee.-::: 
Attorney fer::.s arc not "costs" under l.C. :scclion 34-2020. The legislature is aware thut 
"costs" arc not "a Homey fees." When the legislature has intended thnt. the term ''costs .. cover 
allomey tees it has specifically so provided. Attorney n~es arc not awardable under LC. 34-2020. 
Nohlc v. Ada Cmmty f:lections Board. 135 Idaho 495, 20 f'. 3d 679 (2000). 
Attnn1cy fees are not awardable under l.C. 12~ 1 I 7 or I. C. J 2-121. For al.lnmey fees to be 
awardable in an dection cont.cl:>i. th(.~ Court must he left with the abiding bdicr that the suit wa-:; 
brought, pursued. or defended frivoJou .. ~ly. unreasonably, Ol' without. foundation. Noble v. Ada 
County Elections Board, 135 Idaho 495. 20 P.3d 679 {2000). In its Mem~H·~mdum Decision, the 
Court speci.Hcally i1nmd that "'the parties and counsel did thdr best in l.it.igating a diffi.cult case." 
(Mt~morandum Decision p. 13). The Court in its n1Jing of August 31.. 20 l 0, denying bot11 
Defendants' Motion~ l<'1r Summmy Judgment. held that ··we still have the issues here as w 
iJJcg.al votes cnst. that were sutlicicnt to change the result and we also have the allegation here of 
counting votes rcsultin~ in an error that could change the result. That was there in December 
2009. It's still there." Hr. T. p. 6~ 1.4-9. It is i.rrcconcilable f(,r a case in which s:Jmmary judgment 
-.-vas nol granted two weeks prior l<.) the st<lfl of trial be held to fbund Lo h~1.ve been bmught. 
pur:::ucd. ''r defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without l'cmndution. As the Court noted. nt 
page 13 of its Novcrnbcr 4, 20 I 0 Memorandum Decision. the dctcmlination of the merits of the 
contc~t could onJv be made alter six davs of trial. 
. . ' 
While these Defcndm11s argue Lhattheir daim for attomcy and paralegal f.ce~ is supported by Lhe 
"interests of ju~tk:e·· that' argument is unfilunded. That issue c..lm:s not arise under ehhcr stalue 
2 MEMORANDUM IN SUPT'OR'l' OF PLAfNTIFF'~ ()H.IECTION AND l\'l0TION 
TO DJSALLO\V DEFENDANTS CITY/\VEATllERS CLAIMED COSTS AND FEES 
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until aflcr it is found the '"c<.,sts .. were .. necessary and exccptit>nal. Additionally. nothing can be 
more sacr·cd to our f(mn of govcmment. that is based upon elections and elected rcprcs~ntation. 
than dcctions. Even ta.king into com>idcral'ion the Court~s Memorandum Decision and uJtimatc 
clctenninatiou, lht~ fllcL that the Court spccilic<JIIy U(ll~s in its Memorandum Dc~ision thai. lh~ 
lcgnlity and validity of the electinn could only be dct,;,:rmincd after six day;; of trial underscores 
the !1·1ct that th~ election cofll(..>st wm· brought in the .. interest of justice:' The Memorandum 
Dec.isi.on or the Court, although it upheld the dcct.ion, underscores area:) of kgitimmc c.onccm 
rcgar·ding municipal, n...;; well as counly and slate. elections such a,.; residency, compliance with 
statutory requircm.cnts regarding absenll-'t! ballot records. and UOCA VA. But f.or the five vote 
diflercnce in tlw election contested in this ca..o;c these i~sues would have continued on 
unaddress~d and l.Hl!\:solvcd indcl1nit.cly. The l"~tilure of dcction officials t<.1 maintain statutorily 
required rccoJ'd~ and f~lllow their own procedures in hl>lding elections is critically important .. I Jad 
the record~ been h:pl as r~quircd and the procedures foJiowcd this election ~,;.ontcst would never 
occurred. 
These Ddend:mts' argument that attorney ices ~hnuld be awarded h:J.sed upon t.hc pursuit 
nf the lcmporary n~straining order by Pluintif1' arc likewise unfounded. The Supreme Court's 
holding on this issue is unchallenged by these DcJl..>ndants. The law is clear !hat in the absence or 
the issuing of an injunction, there is no husis for tJ1c award or lees hecausc: the pru1.y ha:-; not been 
·wrongfully enjoined. Brady v. City of Homedale~ 130 Idaho 569. 573, 944 P. 2d 704, 708 ( 1997). 
J.C. 6-91.8 A by its specific wording making it s.rx-cifically applicahle only ••in nctions 
under this ace (Tille () Chapter 9) does not apply. This election contest i~; not a •tort claim." 
Additionally. for all the reasons stated above regarding the other gtmcral application statutes 
providing 1hr attorney fees lor liivulou..-; suitg, there c~!rtainly was no ••bad faith"' on the part of 
Plaintiff in bring tmd put·suing any of this litigation. 
CONCLUSJON 
The nnly costs awan.J::tbk~ to Defendants City/\Vcat.hcr arc the J.iling lee required to file 
their Answer and the costs of tht• tw·o respective dcposilion transcripts. No attorney or (Jarnlegal 
fees arc awardabk. 
DATED this .. lL day of November. 2010. 
( ")"i'cvvl.l eel--·· 
, "' ,.,.,.,.n __ .,to:' __ ,,,., ''"'""'''VI"•'•U·'---'--"~-~--•••-"""'""'""'"""'•, • "''' 
StaJ'r Kelso. Attorney tor P~ainliiT Br.mnon 
3 MEMO.RANDL!M TN SUPPORT OF PLAINTI.FFS OBJECTION AND MOTrON 
TO DISAU,OW DEFENDANTS CITY/WEATIIERS Cl.AfMED COSTS AND FJ.~ES 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: A copy w~ptailcd to Mike Haman, Scott. Kcc:d. and Peter 
Erhland, at.t.t:.rncys f(lr Defendants on the .... /1.:~~.day of November. 2010 by rt~gular U.S. Mail. 
..::.·:~:.~.=j . .~ 
·'/ L.t I .( ./ i} (ij,..,.-- ... 
........................ ~.~~ .. ::c,.. .. l..("'~t:-~.--
Starr Kelso 
,, _____________ _ 
4 MEMORANDUM IN SUP.PORT OF PLAJNT'JFF'S OBJECTION AND .MOTION 
TO DISALLOW DEFENDANTS CfTY/WEATHERS CLAIMED COSTS ANI) FEES 
141004/004 
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STARR KELSO 
Attorney at Law #2445 
P.O. Box 1312 
Coeur d'Alene, fdaho 83 ~ 16 
Tel: 208-765-3260 
CLERK DISTRICT COURT ~Fa.x: 20S-664-626 I - ,.., 
Att.orney f(Jr Plaintiff Brmmon 
IN THl~ 'OlSTRJCT COURT OF THE FIRST .ITJDICIAL DISTR~CT OF THE 
STATE OF II>AHO, I.N A.NO FOR TIU: COlJNTY Oft KOOTENAI. 
JIM BRANNON~ 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE. IDAHO. ET.AL. 
Defendants. 
Case N.-J. CV-09-10010 
NOTICE OF HE.I\RJNG 
ON PL'\INTIFF'S 
MOTIONS 
DATE= D~cembcr 7. 20 J 0 
TIME: 2:00P.M. 
NOTICE fS HEREBY GIVEN, that a hearing shall he held on Tuesday 
llcccmhcr 7, 20W at 2:00 o'clock p.m., hefore the Honmahlt: Charles W. Hos~ack, 
Senior District Judge in the courthouse in Coeur d'Alene. Idaho upon the f{.'illowing; 
1. PLAINTJJ'IF'S 013JECTJON TO MO'I'ION TO DISALLOW TN PART 
DEFENDANT' CITY/WEATHERS CLAIMED COSTS AND ALL OF CLAIMED 
ATTORNEY AND PARALEGAL .FEES 
2. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE PART OF AMENDED 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL HAMAN 
3. PLAINTIFF'S OB.IEC''JlON AND MOTION TO DISALLOW 
DEFENDANT KENNEDY'S CLAIMED COSTS 
l)ATI ... l ..... loTild t"N' be '?010 .. :.~ ):tms ~ ay o ovcm r .... . 
-~----···~~-
NOTICE OF HEARING 
.. ··:?f)u~J ul~ .... .,~· 
__ c--.:;__: __ ,, ____ ,, .................. _ .... --.. 
Starr Kelso ---
Attorney for PlaintifT 
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CERTJFlCATE OF SERVJCE 
I certify that a lru"~ copy of' the ahove and foregoing wa..; mailt:d on lhc lS·nJ day 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRit:fFOF ;ft l S'U 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOftit.WN!'d 2 2 AM IQ: 21 
JIM BRANNON ~ ,c~i: ~~~~R :~~:fur 1M~ 
Plaintiffs/ Appellant, ) 
v. 
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 
A municipal corporation, etaL 
Defendants/Respondents . 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Appeal from: First Judicial District, Kootenai County. 
Honorable: Charles Hosack 
Case Number from Court or Agency: CV-09-1 0010 
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Attorney at Law #2445 
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Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
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Attorney for Plaintiff Brannon 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST WDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JIM BRANNON, 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. CV-09-10010 
AFFIDAVIT OF KATHY LEWIS 
vs. 
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 
a municipal corporation, et.al. 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI) 
KATHY LEWIS, being first duly sworn upon oath, testifies as follows: 
1. I am over the age of 18, competent to testify, and make this statement upon personal 
knowledge to which I will, if called to do so, will testify; 
2. I am an employee of the City of Coeur d'Alene. My job duties entail, in part, the 
overseeing of the licensing of individuals and businesses required to be licensed to 
work within the city limits of Coeur d'Alene and I have custody and control over the 
records identifying persons who are licensed in Coeur d'Alene; 
3. At the request of Starr Kelso, I reviewed the documents on file with the City of Coeur 
d'Alene pertaining to detective and detective agency licensing in the City of Coeur 
d'Alene to determine whether Bill Morlin and or Morlinvestigations, L.L.C. is, or was, 
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licensed as a detective and or detective agency in the City of Coeur d'Alene at any 
time in the year 201 0 through the date of this affidavit. 
4. Based upon my review of the documents pertaining to detective and detective agency 
licensing in the City of Coeur d'Alene, neither Bill Morlin nor Morlinvestigations, 
L.L.C. were licensed as a detective or detective agency by the City of Coeur d'Alene 
during any time in the year 2010 through the date of trris affidavit. 
5. A true and correct copy ofthe City of Coeur d'Alene's ordinance(s) regarding the 
requirement that detectives and detective agencies be licensed in Coeur d'Alene is 
attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
Further Affiant sayeth not. 
DA!E.U D. j lliyfb day ofN_~ember, 2010. 
~a;(;/~~ 
Kathy Lewis 
'),~ 
SWORN to the undersigned Notary Public on the~ay ofNovember, 
\\IIIII 111111!/0; 
,\\\\, c ... ~~~G,% ~'$··· ... v~ ~· 
UBLIC FOR I \ ·~ ~··'NOTAR}>-.~. 
Residing at-eoem d'Ale~e= --. oc-1-~l <; 22 f .._..., \ ~ 
MyCommissionexpires:\0 -3o ~\ ~ :::;.: '"'\Pusuc / ~ 
-v·~· . 0 ~ 
- ,.. . 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: I certify that a copy of th~~ijj;·~~d on the_day of 
November, 2010, to: Michael L. Haman; Scott Reed; and P"~!.IUftbllruia 
Starr Kelso 
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STARR KELSO 
. OUfiT .. J ~~ Auorney at Law # 2445 P.O. Box 1312 
Coeur d'Alene. Idaho 83816 
Telephone: 208~ 765-3260 
Frtx: 20R-664"·6261 
Attomcy f(lr Plr~i nti ff Brannon 
lN THE DiSTRICT COURT OF THE FlRS'l' JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDi\110, IN ANO FOR THE COUNTY OF KO<JT'ENAT 
JIM BRANNC>N. 
Plaintiff~ 
v::;. 
CITY or COUER 0' ALENE. lDAl·.IO, 
(;;t. al., 
Defendants. 
---·············--········-······--· .. ·········---···········-·-
CASE NO. CV-09-·lOOiO 
SUPPLEMENTAl. MEM<)RANDUM 
IN Sl JPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL OR IN Tl·.IE ALTt::l~NATJVE TO 
AL'll~R OR AMEND THE JUJ.KiMENT 
COMES NOW Plaint ill hy and through his attorney. and pursuant lo IRCP Rule 
59 (a) (6) and (7) and "IRCP Rule 59 (e) submits this supplemental memorandum in 
·support of his motion. 
UNIFORMED AND OVERSEAS ClTIZENS ABSENTEE VOTERS ACT 
PlaintiiThas argued continuously and regularly that the Unif(mned and Overseas 
Citizens Absentee Voters Act ( UOCAV A) did not apply to the Novcmlx~i 3, 2009 City of 
Coeur d' A len':~ General Election and that the mere Jilin!!. of a UOCAVA fhm1 docs not in 
... 
and of itsdr cs;tablish a person to be qualified t() vole .in the City's election. The Court"s 
Memorandum D~cision at pages 4 through 6 discussed this issue. The Court utili7..ed 
••l.JOCA VA c:riwria'' to cva.luaLe the i:>:-;uc. (Mem. D~.c. p. 5) The Court l<.m.nd that there 
was no obligation to verify residence lor City voting digibility. The Court recognized 
Utal the municipaltcsidcncyrcquin.mcnt-i!;-ditTen:nt than tor feaerul or slatc-clcct.J4.io .... n""'s~.-~~­
Noncthcle:s$, it held that. since it cou]d Hnd '"no applicable case law" limiting UOCA VA 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL OR TO AI.:rt~R OR AMEND JUDGMJ:.·:NT 
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(except lbr the .specific voter n.:,-quirctnt:nL"' of Idaho statulcs r~garding rnunicipal elections 
nnd residt::ncy requirements) that UOCAVA applied to a person·~ right to vote i.n tt 
federal election. :-:;tate election, ;.md city dcctio.n, equally. 
The (\mrfs holding regarding lJOCA VA and it~ interpretation ort..iOCA VA a<; 
supplanting the requirement to investigate accul'acy of residency. under LC. 50-445, 
when a lJOCA v A ahsentcc ballot.l·(mn is submitted, specilically r<.::garding Paquin, 
Friend, Gagnon and Farkes was 'Ul error of law. 
In 200 I tht~ applicability of UOCA VA to elections. including locnl eJections, was 
uddrcsscd hy the Second Circuit in Rom<!U v. Colwn. 265 F 3d /IX (2"11 (.'ir. 1001). 
As the N.omeu Court held, 
1. UOCA v 1\",- .extend~ l'cdcral Vt)ting rights to u.s. citizens lhrrncrly citi~cns or 
a Stale who r~-sidc outside lhe United Stat~.~s. 5ie'~ 41U.S.C. .... ·ection /97Hl~ I lo 
197.YF-6." 
2. UOCA V 1\ "" ... requires State$ to accept and process ... any othenv1sc valid voter 
registration npplication from an abs\!nt.. .oversea~ voter .. :• 
3. lobe an "overseas voter" the person must reside outside of the United States 
and h(: (otherwise:) quali.ticd to vole in the last plac~ in which the pcr.son was 
domiciled before leaving the United States. 
4. Congress "acted in accordance with t.hc requirements of the Equal Protection 
Claus<:: in requiring States and t.enitorir::s to extend voting rights inji:.·deral 
dec:tions to foJ'mer residcnrcitizcns residing outside the United State~ .. but not 
to f()mlcr re:::ident citil:tms rc::;iding in eith~r a State or a territor)' of the l.initcd 
St.ak~s." (emphasis added) 
5. Romeu was a former rc~idcnt ofNew York State. ''New Yorl~ m"y 
com;til.utionally require that New York vott:rs re.,·ide in New Y(lrk~ su~jcct of 
course to th\~ provisions of the UOCA VA :.md the Supremacy Cbusc." 
(crnpha.sis added) 
6. "A cili::en 's decision to move crway.from her State c~j"resitknce will i.nc.::vitnbly 
involve certain loses. She will lose the right to participate in that Slate's local 
elections ... " (emphasis added) 
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1\ person who changes his or her rcsidcnc~ frl..)m one St<lt.c 1.0 <mutlK~r Stat~ or to a 
Ji:d~n:tl territory, not to a. !()reign country, loses his or h~r right to vote in federal elections 
from the for·mer residence State. This is particularly true in the case of Gagnon been use 
the uncontcf.ted tcstim.ony at trinl .. hy her molhcr·in-l:lw. csl:ablishcd that she had never 
lived in Coeur d' /\]cne. 1-lcr UOCA VA absentee ballot request is void on its face. 
A perSM'! who changes his M her residence from a Stale to a fbrcign country is 
eligible under UOCAVA to vote in afecJeral eleclion from Lhc.t(lrmcr residence State. 
This person, however. is .not. gr.mted any rights by UOCAVA to vote in her 1brmcr 
residence State's general or local elections. Th.i~ i:-) particularly lntc to Paquin. Friend~ and 
F::srkc:.:. T'hc Cou.rt. 's refusal to enter it-> Order rcqui1ing these persons to appear at the erial 
and t:csti.fy. givc.n the election ollicials complete lui lure to und,~rtak.e any !:li:atutorily 
rc~,uired invcst.\!.!iltion into "rcsidcncv" as required bv I.C. section 50·445 was additional ~, ... ., tl 
crri:'lr. The show·ing of the residcm~y of these voters. as dcJin~o'!d at l.C. s~~cl.ion 50~402. as 
being in a t{)rdgn country establishes a prima facie case ofthe invalidity of the vote and 
required that the Defendants come f()rth with, and Introduce, evidence eslablishing that 
the City, through its conlnlctor, had complied with it~ obligation to verify rcsidcney of 
these UOCA VA abscnt~~c ballot applicants .. No such evidc.ctcc was introduce-d, and the 
testimony cst.ahlishcd that no attempt was made to make any investigation. 
While tht.~SC ::>pecilic UOCAV 1\ voters were the focus or the evidence. lx.--causc of 
their obvious lack of ''residency" lhr the purposes of a tn\.J.nicipal clccti<m. there wen~, as 
lestilicd to hy elections onida Is~ numenJus other such persons who voted by UOCA VA 
absentee ballot applications and whose n:sidcncy .lbr rmrposes ofthe City·~ General 
Flection was n!)t invcstigat~d or veri lied. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should rccogni~t: the strict application or UOCA VA tmder Lh<.~ 
Supremacy Clm1s~ to only t~dcml elections and nnt to stat.c or municipal. dect.ions. The 
Court, given these 4 additionally illegal ballots, and Lht: many other lJOCA. VA absentee 
ballot applicam:s, ft.lr which there was no residency investigation. should (>rdcr a new trial 
or amend nr alter its Judgment and grant Plaintiff's request f(lr a new elel~tion. 
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./ D~P]this 261h day ofNov~.~mbt:r, 2010. 
7) ·fC£,;.J,. Gz./J.Jr./""''' 
__ ,!..<• ..... _,,, ...... __ ,_, ....... -................ .. ..... 
Starr K~lso, ALLorncy for Plaintiff Mr. Bnmnon 
CERTJ FICATE OF SERVlCE: A copy was faxed Lo Michael Hmnan auorncy fC.)r 
Defendant City ~.md Clerk. and Scott Rt.'Cd and l"eLcr Erbland attorney$ for Defendant. 
K~nncdy on Novembc•· 26, 2010. 
c:-::.:::;,>7 ,1 . If, _,.,-· · 
() ~.(A.)~ CtZ.(.v 
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Sll!rr Kebo 
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265 F.3cl118 (2001) 
Xavier ROMEU, Plaintitf-Appeiiant, 
Pedro Rossell6, lntervenor-Piaintiff'~Appellant, in his official capacity as 
Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 
v. 
WilliamS. COHEN, Secretary of Defense ofthe United States of America, 
William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States of America, 
George Pataki, Governor of the State of New York & Carol Lee 
Sunderland, Commissioner of the Westchester County Board of 
Elections, Defendants·Appellees. 
Docket Nos. 00-6303, 00-6287. 
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit 
Argued October 30. 2000. 
Decided September 6, 2001. 
i 20 • 119 '120 Xavier Romeu, Isla Verde, CA, Puerto Rico, plaintiff-appellant, prose. 
Angel E. Rotger Sabat, Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Gustavo A. 
Gelpi, Solicitoi General. Rosa N. Russe Garcia. Deputy Solicitor General. and Irene S. 
Soroeta-Kodesh. Assistant Solicitor General, for inte!Wnor--plaintiff'-appellant Go\emor Pedro 
Rossell6. 
Mary Jo White. United Slates Attorney for the Southern District of New York {by DanielS. Alter 
and Gideon A. Schor. Assistant United States Attorneys). for defendan1s-appeUees Secretary 
of Defense WilliamS. Cohen and President William ,lefk..'fSon Clinton. 
Alan D. Scheink.man, Westchester County Attorney {by Stacey Dolgin Kmetz, Chief Deputy 
County Attorney, and Deborah A. Porder, Senior Assistant County Attorney), \Or defendant-
appellee Carol Lee Sunderland, Commissioner of the Westchester County So.ard of Elections. 
Eliot Spitzer. Attorney General of the State of New York (by Joel Graber. Assistant Attorney 
General), for d~'}fendant-appellee George Pataki, Go\<~rnor of the State of N~:w York. 
Gregorio lgartua de Ia Rosa, amicus curiae in support of plaintiff-appellant. 
Before WALKER. Chief Judge, OAKES. and LEVAL. Circuit Judges. 
LEVAL, Circuit Judge: 
Plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for thF! Southern District 
of New Yofk-(Shlra A;:-Seheindtifl;-J:-);-dismissing his-complaint for failure to state_.._.a_..c ...... la ...,imcu...... _____ _ 
Plaintiff, a U.S. citizen residing in Puerto Rico who was fonnerly a resident of New York:, 
asserts the tight to 'v1Jte for New York's presidential electors in the election 11eld Nowmber 7. 
2000. One theory of his complaint is that the Uniformed and 0\.erseas Citizens Absentee 
Voting Act ("UOCAVA") and ttle New York Election Law ("NYEL") violate the U.S. Constitution 
by extending the right to l.()te in a presidential election to U.S. citiZetlS form0rly domiciled in 
New York and now residing outside the United States, but not to U.S. citiz~ns formerly 
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11/26/2010 ,,omeu v. Cohen, 265 F. 3d 118 -Court. .. 
domiciled in New York and now residing in a U.S. territory. See 42 U.S. C. §§ i973ff-1 & 1973ff-
6; N.Y. Elec. Law§ 11-200(1) (McKinney 1998). Plaintiff contends also that these statutes 
ha~.e infringed his constitutional rights to \Klte and trawl. and his rights under the Pri\lileges and 
Immunities and Due Process Clauses. Finding no such 'lliolations. we affirm the judgment of the 
district court. 
Background 
Plaintiff-appellant xavier' Romeu. a natural born United States citizen. Ji~ in Westchester 
County in New York State from 1994 through May 16. 1999. Romeu registered to wte and did 
\Ote in New York in the 1996 presidential elections, casting a ballot in Westchester County. On 
May 17, 1999, Romeu mo-ved to and became a resident of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
On July 9, 1999, Romeu registered to wte in Puerto Rico. U.S. territories, including Puerto 
Rico. do not participate in presidential elections. Subsequently. Romeu requested an absentee 
ballot from the State of New York to ~te in the 2000 presidential election. 
State absentef; ballot laws are go~rned, in part, by the Federal Uniformed and Owrsf'...as 
Citizens Absentee Voting Act ("UOCAVA"). which extends federal \Oting rights to U.S. citizens 
formerly citiums of a State who reside outside the United States. See 42 U.S. C. § 1973ff-1 to 
i ? l 1973ff-6. The Act presen.es for a citizen • 1 2 1 formerly resident in a State who mows outside 
the United Stat0s the right to ~te in federal elections held in the citizen's pre\Aous State of 
residence. In relevant part, the UOCAVA pro\Ades that each "State" (a term defined under the 
Act to include U.S. territories) shall permit absentee "owrseas" wters "to use absentee 
registration procedures and to wte by absentee ballot in general, special, primary, and runoff 
elections for Federal office" and requires States to "accept and process ... any otherwise valid 
'-()ter registratit)n application from an absent , .. owrseas '-()ter, if the application is received by 
the appropriat~~ State election official not less than 30 days before the election." 42 U .S.C.§ 
1973ff-1. The Act defines "owrseas ~ter," in rele~A':tnt part. as "a person who resides outside 
the United St&es and is qualified to wte in the las1 place in which the person was domiciled 
before lea'll1ng the United States" or "a person who resides outside the United States and (but 
for such residence) would be qualified to wte in the last place in which the ~rson was 
domiciled befor~ iea\Ang the United States." 4Z U.S.C. § 1973ff-6(5)(B) & (C}. Under the 
statute's definition, a person who, like the plaintiff. rEffiides in a U.S. territory does not qualify as 
an "o~rseas 'IIO~er'' because such a person does not reside "outside the Uni1.ed States." The 
UOCAVA further defines the term "State" to mean "a State of the United States, the District of 
Columbia, th1;1 Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Guam, the Virgin Islands, and American 
Samoa." so that a U.S. citizen li\ling in a U.S. territory such as Puerto Rico who mo~s outside 
the United Statas retains wllatewr right to wte in elections for federal omce that the citizen 
could haw exercised had he or she continued to reside in that U.S. territory. 42 U.S. C. § 
1973ff~(6). 
Carrying out t11e mandate of the UOCAVA, the New York Election Law ("NYE:~L") provides that a 
U.S. citizen "now residing outside the United States" whose most recent U.S. domicile was 
New York is Emtitled to l,(lte as a "special federal loOter," so long as "such c!tizen does not 
maintain a place of abode or domicile, is not registered to 1o0te and is not liUting in any other 
election district. state, territory or possession ofthe United States.'' N.Y. Elec. Law§ 11-200(1) 
(McKinney 1998).l!J 
Romeu received a standard form New York State absentee ballot application on September 27. 
1999. from the Westchester County Board of Elections. Pursuant to the NYEL and the 
UOCAVA, Section 8 of the absentee ballot application form required Romeu to swear or affirm 
that-he-was "not ... -wtif'lg..in any other US State, territory or possession or subdi\lision thereof 
in the coming eiection(s)." Seclion 6 of the absentee ballot application form required that 
Romeu swear or affirm that he was in one of sewral categories of U.S. citizen~• living outside 
the United States. none of which included a U.S. citizen residing in a U.S. territory. As a U.S. 
·1n citizen residing in a U.S. territory, Romeu · 122 was unable to swear or affirm either that he was 
not a wter ink'! U.S. territory, or that he was a U.S. citizen residing outside tho United States. 
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Romeu brought this suit on March 24. 2000. seeking an order compelling th~) Westchester 
Cv'"'uly ~::le\..li~l't ~MM to i~!luc him o b.."lllot ::md .aa d9clarato"J jurlomt=-nt thr~t thR UOCAVA ~nQ 
the NYEL violate his constitutional rights. In particular, Romeu claimed violations of his 
constitutional rights to wte and to tmwl. his rights under the Pri'llileges and Immunities Clause 
of Article N. his Fourteenth and Fifth Amendment Due Proce.ss rights. and his rights to equal 
protection of the laws under the Fourteenth and Filth Amendments. Pedro Rossoll6, the th<. .. ·n-
Go"~emor of Puerto Rico. interwned in support of Romeu's claims. 
On cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings. the district court dismissed Romeu's claim. 
Aithough expmssing the \lie-,·o~ that Rcmeu. as a citizen of the United States resrding in Puerto 
Rico and denied the right to \()te for the President of the United States, "is sullering a grave 
injustice." Judge Scheindlin found no ~olation ofRomeu's constitutional rights primarily 
because the deprivation of which he complains is created by the Constitution. 
Romeu filed ao expedited appeal in this court. Because of the importance of speedy resolution 
of Romeu's appeal before the Nowmber 2000 presidential election, we summarily affirmed the 
order of the district court on October 31, 2000. noting that we would issue an opinion in due 
course setting out our reasoning. We now issue that •Jpinion. 
Discussion 
In the Jones Act of 1917. also known as the Organic Act of 1917, Congress extended U.S. 
citizenship to persons then li\Ang in Puerto Rico. and to persons bom in Puerto Rico thereafter. 
See Jones Act, 39 Stat. 951 (1917). Far voting rights, hawe~r, the status of a U.S. citizen 
li\Ang In the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico is not identical to that of a U.S. citizen living in a State. 
Article N of t11e Constitution empowers Congress "to dispose of and mak.e all needful Rules 
and Regulations respecting the Territory ... belonging to the United States." U.S. Const. art. 4. 
§ 3. In the Insular Cases. decided in 1901.0 and in a series of subsequent decisions, the 
Supreme Court has held that because territories such as Puerto Rico belong to the United 
States but are not "incorporated into the United States as a body politic," C-orr v. Unit eel 
Stet~§.~ll:§.;. 138, 143~..N~4 S.Ct. 898. 49 L.Ed. 1f8 (19~; see a/so §.f!/?Jtr,: ~E,eopte of 
forto Rico, 258J.I.S. 298,,)04-05, 42 S.Ct. 343. 66 LEd. 627.~1922), Congress's regulation of 
the territories under Article N is not "subject to all the restrictions which are. impos~ upon 
[Congress] when passing laws for the United States." Dorr; 195 U.S. at 142: see also Jose A. 
Cabranes. Citiumship and the Amencan Empire 45-51 (1979); Juan R. Tom.tella. The Supreme 
Court and Puerto Rico: The Doctrine of Separate anc} lJnequal40·74 (1985}. Congress's power 
in the territories is not unlimited; territorial regulations must comport with those basic principles 
"so fundamental [in] nature" that they fom, "the basis. of all free gowmment." :f2E.IMies v. 
BidtMJI/, 1~?J-!., .. $, 244.~"~91, 21 S.Ct. 770, 4§_~Ed. 1088 (1~9.~-~~· J,, conc,~~ng). But 
i ~2 3 such principles · 123 of fundamental justice do not incorporate all the mand(:ltes of the Bill of 
Rights. See _$plzac,"_?,~8 U.S. at .~g4.05, ~~§..Ct. 34~; !29!!· 195 U.;;S. at 149,; ?4 S.Ct. .. ?08; 
Territory_pf Ht)l•w!:lii v. }!&:mkiC11i, 1.90 U.S. 19L?11. 217-J8, 23 S.C!,;_J87, 4~vk Ed. 1016l1903). 
Citizens li\Ang in Puerto Rico, like all U.S. citizens li\4ng in U.S. territories, possess more 
limited 'o()ting rights than U.S. citizens li-..ng in a State. Puerto Rico does not elect wting 
representati~Kls to the U.S. Congress. It is represented in the House of Representatiws by a 
Resident Commissioner who is "entitled to recei~ official recognition ... by all of the 
departments of the Gowmment or the United States," but who is not granted full wting rights. 
See 48 U.S.C. § 891: see also Juan R. Torruella, Hacia Donde vas Puerto Rico?. 107 Yale L.J. 
1503. 151g..20 & n. 105 (1998) (re\iiewing Jose Trias Monge, Puerto Rico: Thf) Trials of the 
Oldest Colony in tl,e World (1997)). In addition, citizens residing in Puerto Rica do not l,()te for 
the-President and Vice-Rresident of the United States. Indeed, the Constitution does not 
Ill 008/020 
--~~~-----------directly confer on any citizens the right to l,()te in a presidential election. Article II, section 1 
pro~des inslt!:'!;!ld that ''[e)ach state shall appoint. in such manner as the legislature thereof may 
direct. a numb•.}r of electors." whose function is to s~:lect the President. l11e Constitution thus 
confers the rigllt to "vOte in presidential elections on electors designated by thF.J States. not on 
indi\. dual citizens. See Au.c:h v Goff;, 531 U.S. 96. 121 S.Ct. 525. 529. 148 L.Ed.2d 388 
(2000). AcCOI'fJingly. no u.s. citizen. whether" residing in'a'state or'territory Ol: ~iS'(;i'Where·, has 
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an expressly declared constitutional right to vote for electors in presidential elec~ions. See 
McPherson v; .9lackf]_T: 146 U.~w· 1, 25, 13 S.Ct. 3, 3§.J.Ed. 8.€.9 (1892) ("The clause under 
consideration does not read that the people or the citizens shall appoint. but that 'each state 
shall.. . ."'). 
Despite the fact that the Constitution confers the power to appoint electors on States rather 
than on indhlidua! citizens. most U.S. citizens ha\e a limited. constitutionally enforceable light 
to wte in presidt"!ntial elections as those elections are currently configured. The States haw 
uniformly exercised their Article II authority by delegating the power to appoint presidential (and 
vice-piesidentiai} slectors to U.S. citizens residing in l.he State to be exercised in democratic 
elections. In so delegating tho power to appoint electors. States are barred under the 
Constitution from delegating that power in any way that "...;olates other specific pro...;sions of the 
Constitution." JfYilli,':lms v. ~hodes,~93 u.s .. ~?.;}. 29, ~~~S.Ct. 5, 21J-.Ed.2.!L?4 (196~,1; see also 
Anderson v. ,r;;?'iel>re?.,ze, 460 U.§.;. 780, 7.94-95 n, 18.__1Q3 S.CtJ564, 75 ~.,:.E,_d.~_9 547 (1983). 
U.S. citizens who are residents of Puerto Rico and the other U.S. territories ha~ not recei~ 
similar rights to \Qte for presidential electors because the process set out in A:ticle II for the 
appointment of electors is limited to "States" and does not include terri1ories. U.S. territories 
(including Puerto Rico) are not States, and therefore those Courts of Appeals that haw decided 
the issue ha~~ all held that the absence of presidential and vice-presidential '!!Oting rights for 
U.S. citizens living in U.S. territories does not ~olate the Constitution. See lfL~~~tua De~~a Rosc:1 
~fJpd StAt~.E/ ... 32 F. 3d~-' 9·10 (1~t Cir.1994L(~uri?..ml ("lgartua f'): ~-~(qrrwy Gengral of 
!!!f Territory of Gi.L~United States, 738 F.;.2d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir.1984) ("Since Guam ... is 
not a state, it Gan haw no electors, and plaintiffs cannot exercise indi\ridual \('lti;)S in a 
~ :1 ~ prcoidontiol oloction. "): i""' f!l<:nl.a!")!ttt.<r ()P.J.fl Ra:m v. ~il~d States. 229 F.:'$(~ aq,~,ll~' '124 
(1st Cir.2qQ.Q2J2.':7r curi.~ (" lgartua lr) (reaffirming the holding of lgartua /). 
The question INf:J face here is a slightly different one -- not whether Puerto Ricans haw a 
constitutional right to \n)te for the President, but rather whether Equal Protection is violated by 
the UOCAVA, !n. that it provides presidential wting rights to former residents of States residing 
outside the United States but not to former residents of States residing in .Puerto Rico. Like the 
First Circuit, we answer this question in the negati~. See !flJutuel, 32 F.3d at 10·11. 
Plaintiff contends that because of the distinctions it draws among wrious categories of U.S. 
citizens, the UOCAVA is subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. 
Defendants argll~ in response that application of strict scrutiny is lnappropriat0, and that the 
application of s1rict scrutiny is precluded by the Supreme Court's decision In H,".Jfris X~ Rosart_g._ 
446 U.S .. §§~L_?51·5.2, 100 s.qL1929, ~~~.Ed.2d 5~?. (19801.(per curiam). (holding that under 
Article IV. section 3, Congress "may treat Puerto Rico differently from States. so long as there 
is a rational basis for it.s actions"); see also Calffary,g_ v. Gautier Torres .• 1.35 t.J§,; 1, 3 n. 4,,.,.98 
S.Ct. 906, 55 L.Eq.2d 65 (1978) (per curiam) (sugge~;ting that ''Congress has the power to treat 
Puerto Rico dilffJrently and that ewry federal program does not ha\oe to be extended to it"). But 
see Loe~z Lopez :.£__~ron. 844 F.2d 898, 913 (1st G!£.1988)J...1grruella, .~·· concur~ing in part and 
dissent~l}9 in pa~. 
Giwn the deference owed to Congress in making "all needful Rules and Regulations respecting 
the Territor{' of the United States, U.S. Const. art. r-1 § 3, we conclude that 1he UOCAVA's 
distinction between former residents of Stales now living outside the United States and fonner 
residents of States now living in the U.S. territories is not subject to strict scrutiny. As then· 
Judge Ginsburg obseMd in 9!:.!iban v. Vetf!p.ms Adn"!J.nistratlon. 9?~8 F.2.dJ_:l54, 116Q 
(D.C.Cir. !~2D.:. ''[t]o require the go\emment ... to meet the most exacting standard ofre\liew ... 
would be inconsistent with Congress's '(l]arge powers' (under Article IV] to 'make all needful 
Rules-and-RegulationSJeS~- bejonging to the United States."' /d. (cjtations 
omitted). We need not decide, howewr, the precise standard go~.erning the limits of Congress's 
authority to confer wting rights in federal elections on former residents of Stffies now living 
out$ ide the United States while not conferring such lights on former residents of States now 
li\ling in a U.S. i"erritory. F'or we conclude that regardless whether this distinction is 
appropriately ;;malyzed under rational basis reiAew or intennediate scrutiny. or under some 
alternati~ analytic framework independent of the three .. tier standard that has been (~stablis hed 
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in Equal Protectitio cases. see Guutlf!!' Torres~.,_~35 U.~~-.D-~ 98 .§.Ct 900 ("Puerto Rico 
has a relationship with the United States 'that has no parallel in our history.·· (quoting 
F.xarnining, r;,_q;.,~~:,_•:::lores.fle Oterq __ 4J6 u.s. S~?.J 596,96 §.:.9t. ?..264.1_~ L.E~1SL65 (1976))). 
Congress may distinguish between those U.S. citizens formerly residing in;,~ State who liw 
outside the U.S .. and those who li..e in the U.S. territories. 
The distinction drawn by the UOCAVA betwoon U.S. citizens moving from a State to a foreign 
country and U.S. citizens mo'lo1ng from a State to a U.S. territory is supported by strong 
considerations. and the statute is well tailored to ser.e these considerations. For one thing, 
citizens -wtlo move outside the United States. many of whom are United States military service 
·! ~!;·; personnel, might be completely excluded from participating in the election of go~.~ernmental ··12s 
officials in the United States but for the UOCAVA. In contrast. citizens of a State who mow to 
Puerto Rico may wte in local elections for officials of Puerto Rico's go~emment {as well as for 
the federal post of Resident Commissioner). In this regard. it is significant to note that in 
excluding citizens who mow from a State to Puerto Rico from the statute's benefits. the 
UOCAVA trerus tMm in the same manner as it treats citizens of a State who iea'oe that State 
to establish residence in another State. Had Romeu left New York to become a resident of 
Florida, he would similarly not haw been permitted to exercise the right create(i by the 
UOCAVA to \Ote in the federal elections conducted in New York. And if a citiz,~~n of Puerto Rico 
took up residence outside the United States. the UOCAVA would entitle that citizen to 
continue. despih;J her foreign residence, to participate in Puerto Rico's elections for the federal 
office of Resident Commissioner. Congress thus extended '-<>ting rights in the prior place of 
residence to those U.S. citizens who by reason of their mo~ outside the United States would 
otherwise ha~.e lacked any U.S. \Oting rights, without similarly extending such rights to U.S. 
citizens who. having mo\ed to another political subdio,.ision of the United Stet.es. possess wting 
rights in their new place of residence. See McDonald v. Board o[ Election Q!zmm'rs. 394 U.S. 
?02. 807, 80~,~w.§.~_s.ct. 1~.04. 22 L.E.~.:.?d 739 {.!_9.§~1 (upholding absentee \!Oting statutes that 
were "designed to make wting more available to some groups who cannot ~:-:.asily get to the 
polls." without making wting more available to all such groups, on the ground that legislatures 
may "take rerom1 'one step at a time"' (quoting Williamson v. Lef! Optical o~ .. .9ktahoma. Inc., 
348 U:S. 483, 489. 75 S.Ct. 461.: 99 L.Ed. 561._(1955!)); see also §y~h v. EigrE}. 531 U.§: 98, 
121 S.Ct. 52~..;, 550. 148 L.Ed.2d 388 (2000) ~insburg, J., dissent!!!92 (531 U.S. at_, 121 
.§.:...CL at 53@) (citing and quoting McDonald and Williamsor1); Ketzenbqs;,h v. f.l&roan, 384 Y.·.~ 
641. 657, 86 ~.~.P· 1717. '6 L.Ed.2d 828 (1966} (applying to l.()ting rights reform legislation the 
rule that "a statute is not in\Qiid under the Constitution because it might ha...e gone farther than 
it did" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Moreowr. ifthe UOCAVA had done what plaintiff contends it should haw done~ namely, 
extended the vote in federal elections to U.S. citizens formerly citizens of a State now residing 
in Puerto Rico while not extending it to U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico who ha~ newr 
resided in a State- the UOCAVA would haw created a distinction of questionable faimess 
among Puerto Rican U.S. citizens. some of whom would be able to wte for President and 
others not. depending whether they had previously resided in a State. 'The arguable unfairness 
and potential dillisi..eness of this distinction might be exacerbated by the fact that access to 
the wte might effecti~ly tum on wealth. Puerto Rican wters who could establish a residence 
for a time in a State would retain the right to '-<>te for the President after their return to Puerto 
Rico. while Pm~rto Rican wters who could not arrange to reside for a time in a State would be 
permanently excluded. 
In sum, the considerations underlying the UOCAVA's distinction are not insubstantial. As a 
result. we hold that Congress acted in accordance with the requirements of the Equal 
Protection Clause in requiring States and territories to extend wting rights in rederal elections 
~010/020 
to fonnet resident citizens-residing-outside the United-States, but not to fonneues .... ic1e,......n1..__ ____ _ 
citizens residing in either a State or a territory of the United States. 
·1 ;26 • ·126 Nor do we. find merit in plaintiffs other constitutional theories. TI1e district court proper1y 
held that lhe constitutional right to \Ote is not violated by the statutes in question. New York 
may constitutionally require that New York \Olers re~;ide in New York, subj~!lct of course to the 
provisions of tM lJOCA v A and the Supremacy Clause. See Can"inrJ.!.g,tJ..)(, R::~.::f.!.~,,..,~~O u. ~.§~,! 
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91, ~§,_S. Ct. n~.:..-.1..3 L. E(?,g 675 (196~J ("Texas has unquestioned power to impose 
reasonable resi.dence restrictions [on} the availability C•f the ballot."). Romeu therefore has no 
claim to a constitutional right to "'te in New York. And while the UOCAVA failed to extend to 
him the right h' 1..0te in New York. it did not deprive him of an existing right to \Qte. As explained 
abo~.e, Romeu cannot \Ote for the President in Puerto Rico because the existing laws do not 
confer such a \iOting right on U.S. citizens domiciled in Puerto Rico. 
Nor is the right ~o travel ~elated by the UOCAVA and the NYEL. The Supreme Court has 
recently asserted that the right to tra\el is made up of "at least three different components. It 
protects (i] the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to lea\e another State. [2] the right to 
be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the 
st.'Cond State, ;.ii,nd [3] for those trawlers who elect to become pennanent residents. the right to 
be tl'eated like ott1ercitizens of that State." _§.@enz v. 8_~, 526 U.§;. 489, SQ.Q. 119 S .. f.:t.. 1518, 
143 L.Ed . .fgJ?.89 M~.ID- E\en assuming for purposes of this opinion that Saenz's references to 
States were int~Med to encompass also territories and that the reference to tl'le right to enter 
and lea~ a St<;lte includes also the right to change one's residence from one ~X)litical 
subdi\lision of the United States to another, we find no violation of any of the components of the 
right to tra\ellisted in Saenz. As to the first. New Yorlc; has not impaired Rom~u·s right to tra~l 
to Puerto Rico. tl is tl'ue that the UOCAVA and the Naw York statute ha\e placed a cost on his 
becoming a permanent residerlt of Puerto Rico. On abandoning his residence in New York, he 
would ha\e retained the right to \Ote in the presidentiel election had he mo\ed to any place 
other than a U.S. territory. Had hemmed outside the United States, he could haw continued to 
wte in New York's presidential election. Had he moved to another State. he could have wted 
as a citizen of that State. His mow to a U.S. territory, in contrast, required that he give up 
wting for the office or President. Howe\er, neither the NYEL nor the UOCAVA caused that loss. 
His loss of the right to wte for President is the consequence of his decision to become a 
citizen of a tenitory in a constitutional scheme that allocates the right to appoint electors to 
Slates but not to territories. His situation is not mate1ially different from that of a New York 
citizen. prior to the passage of the UOCAVA. who decided to lea~ New York to reside in 
France. His doing so would inwlw giving up the right to \Ote in New York because participation 
in New York's elections was reserved to citiZens of New York. New York's f.~Hure to offer 
Romeu the opportunity to continue to wte in its elections after his taking up residence in 
Puerto Rico no mom ~olated his righ~ to tra\el than did New York's failure under the pre-
UOCAVA law t.o offer continued wting rights to its citizens who mo~oed to Fra.nce. A citizen's 
decision to move away from her State of residence will inevitably inwl~.e certain losses. She will 
lose the right to participate in that State's local elections. as well as its fedeta! elections. the 
right to recei\k-1 that State's police protection at her place of residence. the right to benefit from 
127 the State's welfare programs. and the ··127 right to the full benefits or the S!at.e's public 
education system. Such consequences of the citizen's choice do not constitute an 
unconstitutional interference with the right to trawl. Cf. §puticr Torrp§_, 435 ~,,.$. at- 4-.S, ~~ 
S.Ct. 906 (holdif'lg that a federal cash benefit program for the aged. blind, and disabled did not 
v;olate the right to trawl by applying only to U.S. citizens li\ling in the fifty states and the 
District of Columbia, and thus excluding U.S. citizens li~ng in Puerto Rico). 
The second an<i third components or the trawl right are not implicated at all. Neither the 
UOCAVA nof the NYEL in any way impair Romeu's opportunity to be welcomed in Puerto Rico 
as a \Asitor or to be treated like other U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico upon his 
establishing residence there. Indeed. Romeu complains not that he is being ireated differently 
from other U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico. but rather that he is being treated identically to 
them. By virtue of his former residence in New York, he seeks to be allowed !o wte in the 
presidential election in a manner denied to other citizens of Puerto Rico. The denial of that 
special treatment does not constitute an unconstitutional burden on his right to tra-.EI. 
Finally, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. which pro\lides that ''[t]he Citizens of 
each State shaH be entitled to all PriiJileges and lmmuniti~s of Citizens in th€-) several States." 
prov;des no a..enue of redress. The Court in Saenz explained that the Pri\Aieges and Immunities 
Clause of Article IV establishes ''the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an 
unfriendly alien when temporarily present in [a] second State." Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500. 119 
-~""'M'\"ft ~ ............. M--·01·\- -
S.Ct. 1St~- Assuming that the clause may apply to tra\.131 to territories.l~ the Privileges and 
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lmmuniti•~s Clause does not haw the effect of allowing citizens to carry over to their new 
residence the privileges and immunities of their prior State of residence. but rather limits the 
capacity of other States (and perhaps territories) to tre!at such citizens differently than they 
treat their own citizens. 
We conclude tl'iat Romeu has failed to plead a constitutional depriwtion resulting from the 
failure of the UOCAVA and the NYEL to permit him to continue to 'IIDte in New York's federal 
election after his abandonment of his New York residence in fawr of a Puerto Rico residence. 
We therefOre affirm the judgment of the district court. 
*** 
The writer. speaking for himself alone and not for the court. adds a few observations on the 
problem of ext~;-mding presidential wtes to U.S. citizens residing in the territories, These. of 
course, do not constitute either a holding or obserwtions of the Court. 
The exclusion ot U.S. citizens residing in the territories from participating in t~:e wte for the 
President of the United States is the cause of immense resentment in those territories -
resentment that has been especially weal in Puerto Rico. See lgartua, II. 229 ~ ... Jd at 85~9Q 
(Tor:r!-l~lla, ,1., CO!J9Uning}. In addition. this exclusion fi.Jels annual attacks on tt)(;) United States 
in hearings in the United Nations, at which the United States is described as hypocritically 
1 ?8 preaching democracy to the world · ·1 ~!e. while practicing nineteenth-century colonialism at 
home. See. e. g ... Special Committee on Decolonizalion Hears Petitioners on the Question of 
Puerto Rico. United Nations Press Release GAICOL/2970, 19 June 1997. These problems of 
fairness. resentment. and impaired reputation in the community of nations arf> serious ones. 
It has been widely assumed, because of the peculiar stnJCture of the constitutional dictates 
relating to the election of the President. that U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico cannot be 
gi..en a \Ote in the presidential election without either making Puerto Rico a State, or amending 
the Constitution in the manner of the Twenty-Third Amendment, which ga-ve the District of 
Columbia the power to appoint presidential electors in the same manner as if rt were a State. 
See, e.g., 192!!.~~<!.11, 229 F.~.1 at 83-84,: fgartua /<-~?.J=.3d a_!J.Q (stating that "[o]nly a ... 
constitutional amendment or a grant of statehood to Puerto Rico. therefore. can pro~de [U.S. 
citizens residing in Puerto Rico) the right to ~te in the presidential election '.lvhich they seek"): 
Attorney Gencrel of Guam .. 738 F.2d ~(stating that a "constitutional amendment would 
be required to permit (U.S. citizens ti..nng in Guam] to wte in a presidential election"): !JE~. 
£Qf·ten. 121 L9upp.2d 251.285 (S..;D.N,Y.2000) ("(O]nly statehood ora constitutional 
amendment can pro..nde relief to the people of Puerto Rico.''): H, R. No. 1698 p 960), 86th 
Cong., 2d Sess .. reprinted in 1-1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1459, 1460-61. 
This assumption may be only partially correct. It is of course true that. absent either statehood 
or a constitutional amendment, Puerto Rican \Oters cannot have either a constitutionally 
guaranteed \(')te for the President, or a wte that !Unctions identically with the \IOtes of citizens 
residing in a State - for the electjon of a Puerto Rico delegation to the Electoral College. 
Nonetheless, the subject matter of this case and our focus on the UOCAVA suggest that 
statehood or a constitutional amendment may not bEl necessary prerequisites. to permitting 
U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico or other territories to \Ole for the office or President. 
It is true Article iL section 1 provides tha1 "[e]ach StE,te shall appoint [its slate of electors] in 
such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct." Nonetheless, it has long been clear that 
State legislatures do not ha~ unfettered authority o1.9r the appointment of electors. The 
Fourteenth and Fift.eenth Amendments prohibit States from adopting a process of appointing 
~012/020 
electors that violates the Equal Protectton Clause orabridges the right tcnote "on~accottnt-t fiiOfr-------
race, color, or prellious condition of senntude." The Nineteenth and Twenty-Sl>!th Amendments 
prohibit abridgments of the right to 'IIDte "on account of sex" or, for citizens ·t 8 years of age or 
older, ''on account of age." Each or these amendments empowers Congress 1.o enforce their 
mandates agaiMt the States. See U.S. Const. amends. 14, 15. 19, & 26. 
Pursuant to its authority to regulate the States' powor 1o appoint electors, Congress has 
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enacted voting tights legislation that suspends the use of literacy tests, see 42 lJ.S.C. §§ 
1973b & 1973aa.l11 and strictly limits States' power to deny -.<:~ting rights to U.S. citizens on the 
12~1 basis of their inability to read English when those citizens are · ·129 educated in U.S. schools in 
which the predominant language is not English. see 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e).llil Congress has 
also required Stcrtes and political subdivisions to provide bilingual \OI:ing rnatE~rials. See 42 
U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a. 
Most important, Congress has required States to provide absentee ballot eligibility to former 
citizens of a State who leaw the State and establish residence in another State within thirty 
days of a presidential election. see 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1(e). and has barred the States from 
establishing durational residency requirements for eligibility to ~te in a Presidential election. 
see 42 U.S. C. §§ 1973aa-1(c). In gregon v. Mif'cry§dl. 400 U.S. 112~,..91 S.Ct. ?.§.9.1..,?7 L.Ed.2d 
272 (197Q).l. the. Supreme Court upheld Congress's power to ban State durational residency 
requirements G~nd to require uniform absentee ballot eligibility, with eight justices concurring in 
the result. thOLIQi, split owr the precise source or the authority in question JEll Finally. the 
UOCAVA has imposed on States the obligation to accept the \Otes of their former citizens now 
residing abroad. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-1. In both tha requirement of manda1t~lY absentee 
ballot eligibility for residents who ha>oe recently abandoned their residence, and the UOCAVA. 
Congress has compelled States in thejr elections for presidential electors t() accept ~ters who 
are not residents of the State. 
If, notwithstanding the command of Article II, section 1 that electors be appointed in the manner 
that the State legislature directs. Congress may nonetheless impose on the States a 
requirement that eact) accept the -.otes of certain U.S. citizens who are not residents of the 
State but reside outside the United States or in other States. I can see no reason why 
Congress might not also with respect to the presidential election require the State to accept 
the prcsidentil!l! 'IIOtes of certain U.S. citizens who are nonresidents of the Stt:lt(~ residing in the 
U.S. territories. At minimum. Congress might do so on the model of the UOCAVA by requiring 
States to accept the \tltes of U.S. citizens now residing in the territories who were rormerly 
residents of the State. Indeed, e\K!n without congressional mandate. a St.ate would no doubt 
ha\e the power to pass statutes similar to the NYEL allowing its former resrct;;:nts now residing 
in a territory !o participate in its federal elections. Furthermore, ifthe Constitution authorizes 
1 3 o the UOCAVA (;}t1d the other Congressional limitations outlined abo~ on the ' ·;. ::w power of the 
States to determine who may l.()te in its presidential elections. I see no reason in the 
Constitution why Congress might not impose a furthe:r requirement: Congress might permit 
every ~ting citizen residing in a territory to \IOte for the office of President by requiring ewry 
State that chr.)o~:;es its electors by popular ~te (which all States do) to include in that State's 
popular ~te the Stale's pro rata share of the votes c.:'lst by U.S. citizens in th~~ territories.!.?.l 
To be sure, Congress rnay legislate extended -.oting rights only in ways thet are consistent with 
its enumerated constitutional powers. But if the UOCAVA is constitutional, zanct if Congress is 
within its powers in requiring a State to accept the ~tes of nonresidents in orcJer to cure the 
problems of disqualifying former residents of a State who mow outside the United States or 
who mow their residence to another State without time to qualify to 1.0te in that State's 
elections. I c<:m see no reason why Congress would r:)xceed i1s powers in requiring States to 
accept a proportionate share of the presidential 1.0tes of citizens of the territories to cure the 
presidential disenfranchisement of a substantial segment of the citizenry of the United 
States.lm lndeect, giwn that Article N. Section 3 of the Constitution gi"~~es Congress the power 
to "make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territor(ies]." Con9ress's source of 
constitutional authority to extend the presidential 'l()te to citizens residing in the territories is 
clearer than its power to enact the UOCAVA or the uurational residency rules discussed in 
Orogon.fm 
• ·1 3 ·i Conclusion 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
-- IL~l.._~LI ... _ ....... ___ ... -:~~ ___ _ 
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JOHN M. WAU<ER. ,Jr .. Chief Judge, concurring: 
I fully concur in Judge Leval's opinion for the court. but I write separately to take issue with his 
suggestion thrn ''statehood or a constitutional amendment may not be necessary prerequisites 
to permitting U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico or [the) other territoriesill to vote for the office 
of President." Anr.e at 128 (level. J .. writing separately). See a/so Amber L. Cottle. Comment. 
Silent Citizens: United States Territorial Residents and the Right to Vote in Pmsidential 
Elections. 19~J5 U. Chi. Legal. F. 315, pt. II.B. (1995). Judge Leval adwnce~. the following 
proposal: "Congress might permit every \Uting citizen residing in a territory to lfi)te for the office 
of President by requiring e~Ery state that chooses its electors by popular ~te (which all States 
do) to include in that State's popular wte the State's pro rata share of the ~tes cast by U.S. 
citizens in the tE!rritories'' (''the Pro Rata Proposal"), ld. at 129-30 (Leval, J., \f;triting separately). 
Respectfully. l cannot agree with my colleague: I find no authority in the Constitution for the 
Congress (ewn with the states' consent) to enact such a provision. 
"'The Constitution creates a Federal Go~.ernment of enumerated powers," Unit<Kl States v. 
1.32 Lopez, 514 U.§ ... _?-49, ~g,.,.,115 '1 ~~2 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (199§1: SOt.l ~-;regory v. 
Ashcroft, so·1 u.s. 452. 45~Lc;.ct. 2395, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991). and it is on these 
enumerated p~1wers that every congressional enactment having the force of law must rest. I can 
identifY only fot.Jr constitutionally enumerated powers that could arguably be candidates to 
support enactment of the Pro Rata Proposal: the Commerce Cl~use. § 5 of t11e Fourteenth 
Amendment. § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, and the Spending Clause.~ Howewr. as I shall 
explain, none of these pro\ftsions can support the Pro Rata Proposal. 
As recent jurisprudence has made clear, the Commerce Clause is wholly deficient as a 
potential source of authority for Congress to mandate that the states accept the ~tes of U.S. 
citizens residing in the territories. First of all, a reasonable nexus to interstatf::! commerce is 
lacking. See United States v._/'f!Q!!LS'2f1 529 U.S. 598, 609, 120 S.Ct. 1740:...11.?...bEd.2d 658 
(2000) (holding ~hat. at a minimum, regulated acti~ty must "substantially affect" interstate 
commerce); UnittJd States v. LopetL-~14 u.s. 549, 558-59, 115 S.Ct 1624, 131 L.Ed.2ct§~6 
(1995) (same). s--~cond, ewn assuming an interstate commerce nexus Ctluld be adwnced. the 
Commerce Clause does not afford Congress the authority to ''issue directi~s requiring the 
States to address particular problems, (or to] command the States' officers, or those of their 
political subdi\Rsions. to administer or enforce a federnl regulatory program." E.!i.!!.tz v .. UnittJd 
States, 521 u.s.: . ..§.98:Jl~., 117 S.Ct. 2365, 138 L.Ed.2d 914 (1997). ''[S]uch commands are 
fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual so\ereignty, ·· fd.: see a/so 
('low York v. Upito(i States. 505 U.S. 144, 162, 112 S.Ct. 2~~. 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992} ("While 
Congress has substantial powers to govern the Nation directly, including in areas of intimate 
concern to th€! States. the Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the 
ability to require the States to go\.ern according to Congress' intentions."); ;d. at 166. 112 S.Ct. 
240~ ("We have always understood that even where Congress has the authority under the 
Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to 
compel the States to require or prohibit those acts."), I see no distinction be~»en the Pro Rata 
i :l3 Proposal's • ·! :l :;, mandate that state officials tabulate a share of the \rUtes of the territories in 
federal elections and other constitutionally infirm federal mandates command(t~ering the states. 
The Pro Rata Proposal would fare no better as an encactment under either§ 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment or § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment Congress's authority under § 5. and 
presumably under§ 2 as welt.@l is limited to (1) prohibiting conduct that itself\'lolatcs the 
amendments' substantive guarantees and (2) remedying or deterring violations of these 
guarantees by "prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct" than is othefWise 
unconstitutional, §3d. of Trusl~§~gLJhe Univ. of A/'1. v. Garret(', 531 U.S, 35$. 1.::2::1=S~-~C~1:w--;.2:.;;;§:;:;.§::_!. _____ _ 
963, 148 L.Ecf2r) 866 (200·1). subJect to the requ1rement th,lt there be a "congruence and 
proportionality bfJtween the [~olation] to be prewnted or remedied and the means adopted to 
that end." CitY. q,LBoeP,!f._l(.;flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520, 117 S.Ct. 2157. 13~_bJ:d.2d 624 
(1997); see Cot/e:~q~l SM. BCJnk v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondaty £due. EXP.E.£1.£.E! .... §.c:t."~·~.?ZJ,J~ 
666,673. 119 S.Ct. .2219, 144 L.Ed.2d 605 {1~~99.} ("(T]heterm 'enforce' [in§ 51 is to be taken 
seriously - ... the object of valid § 5 legislation must be the carefully delimited remediation or 
........... ~•-..- - .... Jo. ........... ---1--&...-•-- _.,,.N-'1 .............. _ Q/14 
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pre\ention of constitutional ~elations."). 
lt could be argt1ed that because a large segment of the population of the territories is Latino. 
black. or of Pacific Islander or Asian extraction, the exclusion of U.S. citizens r<:}Siding in the 
territories from the ~te for electors to the electoral college therefore has a disproportionately 
discriminatory eflect. Cf. Jamin B. Raskin. Is This Amen'ca? The Distn'ct of Columbia and the 
Rigl7t to Vote, 34. Harv. C.R. . ...C.L. L.Rev. 39, 65-70 (1999). Of course. this does not make the 
enfranchisement of U.S. citizens residing in the territories a proper subject of congressional 
action under§ 5 or§ 2 because neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Fifteenth 
,;mendment pros(:iibes "discriminatory effects." Only intentional discrimination is barred by 
these amendments.~ See pAobile v. Bolden. 446 U.S.2_?~3-64, 100 S.:..9· 1490. 64 ~Ed.2d 
47 (1980).; .Wc!§.!Jington v. Qgyis, 426 U.S~"~29, 239-4~ .. -~.Ct. 2040.~ .. 48 U:7.d 2d ~@.? (1976}: 
1~~~1 see, e.g., Yfd.~!OVtCil v. Quilter. 507 U.S.146.158,11:~ :?.Ct. 1149, '13L1122.l.Ed:~ 
~~: .'!Jias/1ingron v. S.£!.!Jl.tfe Sch. Qj§J. No. 1. 458 U .. : . ..§.~ 457. 484-§.?. 102 S.Ct. 31§J, 73 
L.E.d.2d 896 {1982); see also Garrett, 5_31 U.S. 356, j21 S.Ct. 955, 96?,.!. 148 ~d.2d 866 
@Q1). (''Although disparate impact may be relewnt e\lidence of racial discrimination, such 
evidence alon(;: is insufficient e~.en where the Fourteenth Amendment subjects state action to 
strict scrutiny,., (internal citation omitted)): see generolly Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional 
Discrimination: The Re~iliiY of Supreme COutt Rhetoric, 86 Geo. L.J. 279. 309-'!7 (1997}. 
More significantly, the inability of U.S. citizens residing in the territories to wte for presidential 
electors is simply not a ~alation of either amendment, and therefore cannot be "remedied" 
under either§ t~ or§ 2.1§1 To the contrary. the exclusi·~ of the terrjlories from the presidential-
selection process is a deliberate product of our Constitution.l§l As our decision today states. 
lhe Constitution ... confers the right to wle in presidential elections on electors 
desigm•t~1d by the States. not on individual citizens .... The states haWt1.miformly 
exercised their Article II authOrity by delegating the power to appoint presidential 
(and vice-presidential) electors to U.S. citizen~: residing in the states to be 
exercised in democratic elections .... U.S. citizens who are residents of Puerto 
Rico and the other U.S. territories haw not recei\ed similar rights to llfJte for 
presidential electors because the process set out in Article II for the appointment 
of electors is limited to "states" and does not include territories. U.S. territories 
(including Puerto Rico) are not states, and therefore ... the absence of 
presidential and vice-presidential ~ting rights for U.S. citizens li~ng In U.S. 
territori!-)S does not violate the Constitution. 
Ante at 123-24 (paragraph breaks omitted). 
The Spending Clause of Article I does not pro..nde congressional authority to enact Judge 
1 :l5 Le~l's Pro Rata Proposal either.LZ.l While "the power of' Congress to *1 :!.s authorize expenditure 
of public moneys for public purposes is not limited br the direct grants of legis!ati~ power 
round In the Constitution," the spend;ng power is "not unlimited." South DE.ft.Qf:? v. Dole, 183 
u.~..:..~Q~. 207 ,__"!..07 S~fl:.}793, 97 L.E_~_; .. ~d 171 (198i1 (internal quotation mmks and citations 
omitted). 
Under the Spending Clause. Congress may pro..nde ft..:>deral funds to a state in exchange ror that 
state's acceptance of an attached condition. In this way. Congress and the state are 
essentially contracting parties. with the federal funds simply sel'\ling as consideration for 1he 
state's adherence to the condil.ion. In so far as the Pro R.ata Proposal might simply ''require" a 
state to accept a share of the wtes from the territories without l.he state's consent, it could not 
be supported under the Spending Clause. 
E\en if the Pro Rata Proposal were conditioned on state consent as the Spending Clause 
requires. it could Still not be sustained under Conart:l:::r::>'~ :31Jtllluit't9 ~uth..:.t·ity. r <)r Congress to 
exercise its spending authority ~lidly, the state QO\A:)rnment must ha..e the <alltllority. both 
under the Fed~xal Constitution and the state's constitution, to agree to the p;;!rticular condition. 
See .Qplf!. 483 __ V_._§.: . .?~ 207-08. !QZ".§~.9t. 2793 (noting that "other constitutional provisions may 
pro..nde an inclependent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds"). It is pl:ilin that the Federal 
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Constitution does not afford a state go"~.ernment the authority to "accept a proportionate share 
of the presidential '-Otes of citizens of the territories." Ante. at 130 (Leval, J., writing separately): 
cf. Now York, 5.Q§J}.S. <3t 181, .1,12 S.Ct. 2408 (stating that the states cannot consent to 
"depart(ures] from the constitutional plan"). 
To fully underst~md why. one need simply consider th(:! structural effect of \1~) Pro Rata 
Proposal: under it, a state would in essence "share" with the territories (albeit on a pro rata 
basis) its authority to select electors. Yet. Article II, § 1 of the Federal Constitution prol.'ides 
that the "State ~'>hall appoint" "a Number of Electors, E->qual to the whole Nurnb\~f of Senators 
and Representq1tives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress." U.S. Consl. art. II. § 
1 (emphasis ~1dded). The text is both clear and obligatory: the selection of a state's electors is 
to rest with th0 "State," either through the people directly or through the sta1e legislature. Thus, 
this power mr.ly not be shared. pooled, or otherwise diluted e"ven with a state'$ consent 
The Constitution ha\ling assigned the authority to select electors to the states ~~xclusiwly. 
neither the Congress nor the officials of the states may. consistent with the Sllpremacy 
i ~~6 Clause, alter that scheme.ll?l '1 ~:6 See generally 1 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional 
Law§ 6-1, at 1024 (3d ed. 2000) ("(l]here are Union-reinforcing restrictions tMt flow from the 
Constitution's structure alone, without any reliance upon grants or power to Congress. and that 
are clearly as binding on Congress as on the states. Such restrictions include ... the principle 
that neither the states nor Congress may reshape the relationships specified in the Constitution 
between citizE:ns of the nation and their federal representati\es."); id. § 6·35, a\ 1246 ("[S]ome 
federalism-based limits on state action reflect stnJctural considerations so basic to the nature 
and cohesion of the Union that Congress should be no more empowered to wah~ those limits 
than the states are authorized to transgress them."). 
My belief1hat judge Laval's proposal would be constitutionally infirm does not undermine the 
concern I share with him that the U.S. citizens residing in the territories are n<.lt being afforded a 
meaningful ~ice in national gowmance.lQJ. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff. Puerto Rico 
and the Constttution: Conundntms and Prospects, 11 Const Comment. 15, 43 (1994). 
Howe~er, I see only two remedies afforded by the Constitution: (1) statehood for each of the 
territories. Sef: U.S. Const. art. IV. § 3, or (2) a constitutional amendment pro\liding the 
territories with voting representati~s to Congress and the electoral college.U.ill 
W The St.."ltute provide~~ as follows: 
Evc4ry citiZen of the United Stales now residing outside ltlr> Unitt:ld Statel'i whose las! domtcii~J 1n the Unrte(l Slates 
i~diately prior to his departure from the lJnited States was in the ~tare of New York. shell oo entitled to vote 
from StiCh last domicile. as a special federal voter in an primary. SP'-'CL~I and general ~~tections for the public 
offices or party positiOns ot president ond vice-president of thfl lJnited States. lJnijed Stmteg .:-enator, 
representative in congress and delegates and alternate delega1es to a natJor-al convention. provided ... that such 
citizen does not n-;aw•tain a place or abode or domicile. is not registered to vote and is not voting in any other 
election district. stat~";}. territory or possession of the United St1ltes .... 
N.Y. Bee. Law§ "1"1··200(1) (McKinney 1998). 
8J See Downe$ v_:.§J2.~11. 182 US. 2441J}_S.Ct. 770. 45 bf!l.;~'!.988 (19(1"1); ~r!,!.;!flrona v. C!f.!i!.r!/J S~1:1l~~, 182. U.~; 
~43, 21 S.CL (~27. "L~~.Ed. 1086 (.1§.9~1,1; Dooll:w v. Utltl.od Sf~los, 182 US. ?Jl2. 21 S ('..t. 762~,.15 LEd. 1074 
(1901); Do Li_!1~!:!."~)3id!M311, 182 U.§~ .. 1.,__21 S.Ct. 71l,,i§J-.Ed. 1041 (19011-
EJJ At the very leasl it is clear that Co"gress has extended the Privileges and lrrmmities Clcluse to PUerto Rico by 
statute. See-!(~ U.S C. § 73'/ ("The right~. privilegeS, and inm.mities of citizens of the ~iWJ States shan be 
respected in PI.J•ilr(o Rico to the s<Jn"E extent as though Plrorto PJco wel'e a St.ate of the Union and ~ubjectto the 
provisions of pmagrl:lph 1 of section 2 ot (~rti<:ll=! r.J of the Constitution of the united Statas."). 
l~.l Sao &JitllL~;~1~0.!.f}!L .. I(....J5£'....f?_fJll_Mtch ::$.~ Y.-$..;_301. 333-34, 8§JL9L!i03, 15 L. 8:1.2d .I~~-(!~ (upholdirlg 
t;uspension ot lit.!:lracy tests in Voting Rights Act or 1965); §.g,e,ton CormiY..,:!.".iJmtod Sl<~t6·s,_;~~!LY.·S. 2"'8;.,5-. 8"'9~ .. ,~"."'0". ------
illQ..1)J~,.,~ .:?(.! 309 ( 1969) (saroo); Oregon v. ~iJ..f.hett, 400 u.s. 112, ·11,8.,.~1 S.Ct. 2GCtX.l.1-·Ed.2d 272 (19'ZQ), 
(opinion of Ju~tice Black <Jnnouncing JUdgrrent of Court uphOlding expanded pt'Ohibition of iiteracy tests in 1970 
amendments ro tM VQ~ing Rights Act). 
L?J Sec:1 KagQ~.~IJ/i.t71J v. Morq<m. 3.§:1.:,,\LlL~1, 658. ~-~.~.!.:,}_717, 16l Fd2d,,?.,?~-L1966) (11pholdin_q th  
"Anl?~rican-flag t\ChClOis" provision ot the Voting l~ghts Act). 
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[.Ql Only .Justice H1riM dissented from the Court's decision to uphold the duralional residerlcy provssions of the 
1970 am:mdm::mt::. \o \he Voting Rights Act. Sea MIIC/le/1, 400 U.S. at 213-16, ~;LS.Cl. 26tt(t~?_~~'1n. J. disSfJQl\1,)_9).. 
,h)Sticn Black locat\"l\.1 Congress's authority to bar dt.wational res~:lenc.:y requirorrents cUld to cr0ato uniform 
absentee ballot 9uarantees in Congress's inherent ''broad aut!lor1ty to t;rcatc .and n-aint~;~in a national governrrent." 
Stw id. at 134, g·t S.Gl. 2l~O (opinion of Justice Black). Justice ll:luglas rooted uw, authority u' ~~:!Ction Five of th<:~ 
Founa~:nth Arrendrrer)t and Congress'g power to enforce w hal JustJCe Douglas styled "the r~;Jilt to vote for 
national officers." S~:o id. ot 147-60. 91 S.£h1QQ (c;Jpu1ion of Ju~.tice Oougtas). Justic(\ Bf'E;)rman. with whom 
Justice V¥hite ancl ,lvstice Mars halt joinr..-d, found Congress's authority in Congress's Section fNe pow ~~r to 
enforce the tight to unhindered interstate travel. See td. at 236<19, 91 S Ct:...260 (opinion of Justice Brennan). 
Justice Stew art with w horn Cttief Justice Burger and Justice Blackrmn joined, found it unnecessary to rP.sort to 
Seclion Five of tM Fourteenth Arnendrreni and instead located Q.)ng;e;ss's power in its gcnt~r"<11 authority under 
the Necessary am:! Proper Clause of Article N to "protect and fncil~a1a" tho right to int!'!rst2te t;avel. Sl>oe id . .11t 
285-87, g, ~ . .9.;2?~9 (opinion of Justice Stewart) 
l?J For oxan'f.)le: llll s. citizen$ ir1 the t.erritorieS cast 1.3 mnion presidential votes, 54 percent for candidate X, and 
46 percent f·ot· candidate Y. a State the size of 1\k=:w Vork (which has roughly 18 milton residents as cOJ'Tl)ured to 
273 million residentr, "' t~) fifty States contlined (or 6.6'~. of the total populatiOn of t.he fifty S1<'!t·es), sao United 
States Census Bt1roar.1, Str:Jfisticaf Abstroct of trte United StettQs: 2000. at 23} would be altoc;;~ted 65.800 vot~s 
from the territor~~. 46,332 for X and 39,468 for V, addtng a net total of 68611 votes in I avor of X. This is but one of 
<~ nurrt>er of different ways in which tne votes of citizens dom(:iled in the terntor~s might be allocated an"YJng tM 
Stataa. (Another w i:'Y would be to allocate tE:rritor~l votes according to <l State's proportion >1f the total electoral 
votes ratht;lr !.han acr.~ording to a Stt'lte's proportion of me total population.) 
Bll Unlike the UOCAVA, of course. which 3J>PIIes to elections for oil federal offices. set~ 4:~ U. S.C. § 1973H-1. any 
such stiltute w ot.Jid necessarily be limited to the presidential ele•:tion. 
lliJ I offer thrEM:l rt~sponses to U1e views expri'.."Ssad by Judge Walker. First, JudgfJ WEJikcr suggests Ulat the 
<1llocation of territot'1i.'ll votes to the States Ms no basis in tht:! Cl•nstitutiol\. \Miile 1 do not Cl<11m lll<lt the 
constitutiOnal aut1·1ority is clear, 1 rrake two points: (a) if the l.JO('AVA <:lnO the durational ro~;id'imcy requirwrrant 
ctattrtes havt• suppo1i in the ('.onstitution- e.c1ch obligating St<'ltes to accept votes or nonrf.Jsidt'!nts -I can see no 
reason why ttte ~il<•tlrte I envision providing 1or proportiOMte allocation hs~• fJnY loss con~·tiM!Onal baslt'; (b) 
Congross's authQrity rnay well res~ie in Article N. § 3. which grves Congress the power to n'l<;lkc ··on needful 
Rules and ReguiFJtions respecting the lertitor[ies]." While Judge Walkf.!r argues against lhe GJl(;stence of such 
auttwity, stabng thr"i Congress's power under Article N, § 3 is "not w ithoutrlmill:ttu:ms," he offers no very 
persuasive reAson why thost~ linitotions stop st\Ort: of such a statute, passed for the purpost~ of curing the 
disertFranchiserront of the citizens of the Territories. 
Second, Judge Wa~(E!r asserts lhat· because (in his view) a .stF~tute providing for proportior'latt:) allocation is not 
authorized by th~'l Constitution. it follows that u.s. crtizens residing in the Territories cannot constitutionally be 
authorized to vot~) r-or the president w ithoot eijher ''constitutional arrendo-ent akin 1o the Twfmty-Third 
Ai'Y'endn~nt, or tho Territory OO<::omnQ a State. This is a non sequitur. I have suggesred two different ways in 
which resident:; of trte Territories could be eof ranchised to vot·~ for presidential E.'leetors. The second is that the 
UOCAVA. enfr~nchising forrrer residenrs of the States residinn in fore~gn ~~ountries. could ~~l.!foly be 
constitutionally c~x1ended to apply to forrrer resident..<; of the States w t10 ro$ide in the Territories. Judge Walker's 
only answer to thi5 is to suggest that the IJOCAVA is also unconstitutional. But the durational resiclency statutes 
(w hir;h have the s;~me potenli<JI intiriTity io that they also requiro the States to acc~)pt too voles of nonresidents) 
were expressly upheld by the Supren~ Court in Oregan v. Mil<~l1fJif1 _1,Q.Q._l).S. 112.J.!.,;:L.yt. 260, 27 LEd.?,.~. 272 
(1~70J Judge Walker seeks to distinguish Mitchell and the durational residency ruk=~s as involv~"l9 a congressional 
f€!1T(ldy for violatiOn~; of the right to travel by tha States. The Sli.~tulfil upheld in Milcholl. how <Ner. doos more Ulan 
ll'f!.lrely prohibit dun;ltiooat residency requirermnts oo violations of the right 10 u·av01. ft a~so ptovides that Stt:~tes 
must occept the voh~s ot certain forrmr residents. notw rthstancling that a State docs not vic)lcl\e the right to travol 
by requitinQ vot~Jrs t.o be bona fide residents of the Stale. Sao Dunn v. 8/omslr.Jin. 405 U.S. 3:)0, 34&-49, 92 S Cl. 
995. 31 L.R:I.?.s.2I4 (1972!. · m• ~ 
Thtrd. Judge Wa!kr~r SU9QP..Sts that, even if the UOCA VA is unconstitutiOnal, a smtar provk;10n rright be author~~ed 
relating SOIIi!ly to !:he votes of rrermers of the arrrecJ services by virtue of those clauses trl Article I,§ 8 Ulal 
autMri7,:C Congn:ms to tn~kE"l rules with r-espect to the arrred torcel>. Per11ap:; so. In any t;lvcnt. Article rv, § 3, 
which giv0s Con~Jress the power to make "a~ noodful Rules and Regulations respecting lhe h:nril.or{ies]," would 
provide no tess (:\)nslitutional auU1ority to ensct tl'le statutes I envision. 
ill In Mdrtton l.crtM Comrronwe<Jnh~o~erto-Rico-;-tl'le1cffltor~lS-of the United-States-with-pcrrronentpopulatloru:------
include the Territory of Guam. lllfl Territory of U1e U.S. Virgin Islands. t~~e C'..orrm:mwealttl of thEI Northern Mariana 
lslandr:s, and the f'Nritory of Arrerican Sarros. Through legislation. Congr!ilss has conferred U.S. citizenship on 
those born in R.n?.r-tl.l Rico, see 8 U.S. C.§ 1402, Guam. see ict. § 1407, the U.S. Virgin !$land:~. sae id § 1406, and 
tho Northern l'rori;,llla Islands, se~! 48 tJ.S.C. § 1801 (approving the "Covenant to Es~blist1 <l CommnweF:Jtth of me 
Northern 1\11arian8 Islands,"§ 301 of which provid~JS for U.S. cHiZenship). Thos<P born in Am;)ric<Jn Samo:J, on tile 
(l\hor hand, are not Citizens bui rather "Art);.!riean nationals." a U.S. C. § 1101(a)(21), (22) Sr;;o (]Cnl.lfcJ!Iy .JonBthan 
C. Dri~r. tM NtJphews or ()ncle SiJm: T/1£:1 History, Evohttioo. and tim AppfiC<lti<>n of Birtt1riglrt Citizonsl1ip in 
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ll/26/2010 ("(.omeu v. Cohen, 265 F. 3d 11A- C:nurt ... 
the Unitecl Sletes. 9 Gco. lmnigr. U. 667,700 (1995) (cnticizing the fact that the Fourteenth l,n'l:lndn-ent's 
CitiZenship guarnn1ee, w tlietl provides that "(alii persons bom ... in tt1c Unitf:d Stntoo ... ore citi:?.ens of the united 
States." has not ooen extended to the territories). 
L~ In his separatvr. vil>;w s. JudgE! Leval suggt.'SlS that the Territor~al Clause o1 Article N. § ~~- GL 2, which provides 
thilJt C'.ongress ht;Js the powt!r to "rreke au needful Rules and RosJulalion...'> respecting the Territortics],'' could also 
serve as a source ot constitutional authority for Congress to require me states to accept a pro rata share of the 
votes or the terntories. 
While 11 is tnl+;l thm the Territorial Clause <lffords Congress substantialleew ay to govern the t~1rritories, .§imms v. 
Simms. 175 lJ.S. 112._~; 20 S.Ct 58, 44 L.~; 115 (1899), that. pow ens r101 without !irritatiOns. ;:.(.)e, e.g .. Dorr v 
UnifElCI Stl:llc~s.Ji!.~ .... ~l;,§). 138. 2<1 S.g..:._§Q§~_/19 L.Ed. 12JU~?:~f.i; :>of:l aiso Unifop_~J,qips v. Vec~!!!!lE::.Y£.g'!£ct.~ 
U.S. 250. 26B-69,,JJ_O S.Ct. 105{\ 10~ .. hJd.2d 222 (199Q) ("Only fur\darTfmtal constitutional nghls are guaranteed 
to inh<lbitants ot thOrSe territories."); :~ve generally Jon M Van D1ke. Tho Evolvin~J L~JDI R'.~'I!Hionships &~cweon 
1110 Unilod State~= <m<ii(S Affiliated u.S.-FifJflls/ands, 14 U. Haw. L.Rov. 445. 453-71 (1992). 1he provision by 1ts 
terms does not i3ft::-Jrd Congress t.he authority to ~se requimrrents on the st.:ltor:. in CongrBs~•·s regulation of the 
terr~ories. Set;~ a/,\;o u.S. Const a~mnd. X (non-delegated powers are res\<rved to the state~~): U.S. Coost art N, 
§ 3 (terrrtory of •• state cannot be changed w ithout the consent of the concerned state's teg1s !<Jture); Tox '!? ...'!::. 
While, i Wall. 700. 725,.,2.~~~-&J 227 ( 1 !}.§PJ (holding uMonstitutional Tex::Js's attorrpted seceS5JOn from the 
Union: "[Tjhe pre~<i>rvaiJOn of tr'e States, and Ule maintenance ol' the~r governrmnts, are liS nM::h within the design 
aM care of \he C'Alnstitution as th(l preservation of the Union and the r~t:1intenancc of the Ncltionat governn-ent The 
Constitution, in <.Jll of its provisions. looks to an indestructible union, corrposoo of irteleslrtJI~fiblo SttJtos." 
(Elrlllhasis addod}). 
Q) Althou!)h the Sllprema C'..ourt has not yet articulated the stanctard tor accessing the scope of Congress's 
authority under § :.~ (~f the Fifteenth An-endrrent, the tact that both § 5 and§ 2 by tl1eir term:; provide C"..ongres!l 
with only the "pow t:;:r to enforce" the substantive provisions of I he Amendrrents strongly ~;l1ggests that the 
limitaticms on Congress's ~lulhority under§ 2 3re similar to those under § 5. See Bd of 7'm.<::trw.o;; of the Un,.v. of -1!~ 
':'.:Jat:trrr.tl, 531 U.S :l56, 12t,;?,;._Q. 955, 957 ~, ..• !!· 148 l.Ed.2d 066 G_QQ.U (diSCussing the Voting Rig~1ts Act of 
1965, which w <J~; f<nacted by Congr~~.;s under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendrrer1t, fJS a model of "congru€lnt and 
pr·oportionar legisli!ltton). But seo £UY of Rome v tlni!!!!J.:.~.'£!.~. 4Ati uS. ·1 ~: 176·· 77 1 oo s.s:L~"?-48. 64 L. Ed. 2~ 
2.!QJ.l?.§.Q). (sug(,Jesting li;lgislativc enactrrents under OJngress's §::! authority need only IX: ''ralionaUy" related to 
"attacking the per~:rtuation of (;.larticr, purposef~JI racial discnmiMtion"). 
[~j To be sure. Cl)ngress may strike at discrirrinatory effects w ~h its § 2 autMrity as a mt;lc;ns of deterring or 
rcmedytng h~tonc pat1erns or intentional state discrimination in lhe denial of the vote. See.~) g., City!:( Rome. 44~ 
U.S. ::Jt 177. 100 S Ct. 1548 ("Congress could rationally have conclUded th<-lt. because etectorCll changes by 
j'w:;sdictiont:> w nt.;·;·;;-;;monstrable history of intentional racial discriJ1'1ination in voting create! lflf} risk of 'purposeful 
discrin'inatiOn, ~was proper to prohibit ch3nges Ulat havo a discrimnatory irtllact."). This is of no moment here. 
however, becour.~) the denial of me vote to the territonos, regardless ot the diSparate efff~><:ts it rrey havl.'}, is not 
an intontional dEHW~I of tho vote by the states. and therefore r'l\-'lY not be deterred or rerredied by C'.ongress under· 
§2 
~This differs fr<lr~l the situation where a U.S. citizen is actuaUy residing in the state, but is cton!E!d lh€! right lo vote 
due to a duration:;:~! residency tequirermnt. In this latter instanca. the Fou!lr,.'Elfllh Arrendrrent'~, ~xwal protection 
guarantee is o1'1ended if the period is significant because statE! resideniS are being treated c.lifferently in their 
access to the b;:lllot box without a COfll)elling state interest for the dispar<lle lreatrront. Sr:tt.'i' Ql!!'!.f2.'!.)?1tJmsfuirr 
405 us. 330, 3~.s::F, 92 S.ct. 995,)1 L.Ed.2d 274 ( 1972}. lhcrerore. Congress rroy rerTll:>dy thLS constitutional 
violation through ttr, author-ity ~mder § 5. Soo Oregon":· ~i!.r?.!'P!!· 400 US. 112 .• ~"~.Ct. 2600,ZJ:.:Jf-:l.2d 2'1"2 
Qgi,O).. 
l?J Significantly. Bt tl1r;. tirro the Constitution was draftc'd, the Continental Congres~; in New Y ark was in control of 
the Northwest. Tt.~ITitories. Sue geMmlly Denis P. l)uffey, Note, Tha Nortflwesl Ordimmco c.1s l:l Constilulional 
Docum~;~n/, 95 Cnlum. L.Rev. 929, 929, 934-40 (1995). Yet. the Fmrrers did not provide tl'li:l territory with 
representation to ll'1e new federal governrrerrt. This, I believe. suggests that the exclul-lion ot territorial lands 
generaUy fr()ll'l thEl !:'lif:ctoral college was not sirrp!y a historicalt>versight. but rather a conscious pro<lt.ICt or the 
constitutional dr;.sigr.. 
lZl For the sam:! r~)Bsons tMt I believe Judge Levars proposalw ould exceed Congress's ~uthority under the 
C'..onm:Jrce C!aus~:t <lnd the enforcerrent clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth ArrendJmnts. UOCA VA 's 
directive to the &JO.t!)S to extend the franchi$0 in federal elections to non-resident U.S. cf!iz1ms liv1ng overseas, 
:;;c:e 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ff-1, 1973ff-6(5)(C). appears constitutionally infirm. \M11Ie Congre~ds authoriiy-:-;u~nd;J.e::;;rCOjtho~· ~~~~~~­
Spending Clau~•!'; rr;~ght support UOCAVA's requirenent that thE! st.at.es accept the votes of no:Nesidenl U.S. 
citizens living abrocld, it aoes not appear to me that at present. state adherence to 1his rec;LIIrement is conditioned 
()() lhe acceptance or federal monies. 
It is possible, how ever. that those provisions of UOCA VA gov£:rning mJrtary voting, soe 42 U.S. C. § 1973ff-1( 1) & 
(2). mJy well b0 cz "rw,c;essary and propf:.r" e.lCercise of Congress'5 <llJih()fity to provide r or an army and navy. se~ 
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r<.omeu v_ Cohen, 265 F. 3d 118- Court... 
~018/020 
11/26/20.10 
u. 6. ~Anst. ar r. I, §e. d·L 12" 14, 113. Ly 'l'"'uo•;,,9 u·.~.t.• ... lil.&~ ~!>~~Hl~IMI oro not dinonfr;lnCht(:"rJCt ~y virtu(i) of th'ilir 
''<.iCtiVe duty" service aw t~y from their "place of residence.'' see 42 U.S C. § 1973ff·-6(1)(A}. 
@jlfl !.fE:.~.':!.!!f!...fJ!U7!J. h.'oS<~ v, f.!!!!!..od Stiilf:>'S. 3?.1.:;.~ 8, 10 n. 1 ('19~~! curiam). the p~">intifh;, whO werfJ U.S. 
citizens residing in F1.Jt)rto Rico. argweClthat their right to vote in the presi<Jenti.al e!Qction is S''!<:uroo by Article 2.5 of 
the lntern<~tion<rl C<\vf.mant on Civil and Ftl6ticat Rights. 6 l.t.M. 368 ( 1967). which the Unite(1 St<JtE;)s has ratified. 
Article 25 provides in pertinent part 
Every citizon sh<\!ll·tave the right and the opportunity .... w ithoulunroosonoble r~trictionl] ... to vote ... at genuine 
periodic electiOn:>. which shall be universal and equal suHra~.· .. 
Aesenlly. Articll;l 2.5 is not sc~ii-executing, se(t Cong. Rec. S478-l (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992.}. ~nd thereforo cannot be 
pr-iv<Jtt~ly ~mforcoo. S(•'t.! lg<Jit!_.!Q Do La Rosa. 3/. ~ m 10 n. '1. 
Assuming for the sake ol discu!'sion that the voting status of tht~ terrrtories docs violate Ar-tide 25, the qiJestion 
arrses whether, ifl order to corrply with our treaty obligations under Article 25. Cor1gress could ~len~mt the A'o 
Raw Proposal undtll' 1t'le Treaty aause of Article H, § 2. t believe the answer is plainly "no." While l.tle scope of 
C'.ongress's authority under the Tre~ty Clause is separate and independent of rts other enunie-rated powers. see. 
e.g., Missouri v. 1-io/J;;md. 2?,.? U.S. 416. 433-,14, 40 S.Ct. 382., 64~~~641 (1920) {t_lolmec .. .!.z. it (lik~ Congress's 
spending power) (~<;u1not be used to alter the structural relatinnshrps er,shrined in the Consttl\iUOn. sorrething lhe 
Pro Rata Pl·opo(;cll would plainly do. See u.S. Coost art VI (providing that the Constitution i$ 1!1~~ "Suprem·.:J Law of 
rl'le !..and"); f3.cid ~·. Covert. 3fi.11J.S. 1 16-1?, 77 S 9· 1222. 1 l.Ecl2(J l!!!iH1PJJ6) (pltJrality.,.~(Jinion): lqwlrm .9£ 
b!.B.~?..,Ud m 1 o f'l. t 
~Notably. the DC. Circuit has held tMt the House of Representatives' rn~y perrm thO temtori<~l delegates to the 
HOuSf~ limited voling authority. Sec £ollictro/ v. Aot1erson, 14_E_;¥l623, 632 {.Q.g.Cir.19tJ4). But sao gollet'i)l/y Jamn 
B. Raskin. I.e; Thera <·1 ConstiiiJiiqnol Right to Voto and Be Ropr6'Sented?: Tile Caso oftho Disrrict of Columh~:J, 
48 Am U.L.Rev. 589. 597. (1999) (argurng that the "Constitution Fully protects the right to vole Md be represented 
in natioMI goverr~r'l'ltlr'll. for every corrm.mity of A!"l'erican cit.~ ens taxed. drafted. and governet:J by our 
institutions"). 
(lQ1 This view was <)fsO €!)(pressed by the First Circurt in lg<~rlua Do 1:;9 Rosa, 32 F .3d 1;!1 ·~9: 
lhe only jurisdictirm. not a srate, w 11rch participates in the presidential election is 1he District of Colun"t>ia. which 
obtained that right through the IW enty-third arrendrrcnt to the ConslitutiQn ... Only <~ simiL-':lr constitutional 
am:mdrrent or ;:1 grant of statehood to F\Jerto l«o. therefore, Ctln provide appellants the rig!1t to vote in f.h() 
presidsntial election w hieh they seek. 
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United Stt\lcs Code: Till~:. 42.19~ · I. State re!-t-p<>nsibilit1c:s l LH I Leg:.• ··,nm~!.~on lnsL. Page ! of 7 
LI I 1 Lf!9f.ll Information Institute 
U.S. Code 
Tll"LE ·~2 ::• CHAPTER ~0 ::- SU601APTER f·G:;. § 191'~~ff-·1 
§ 1973ff-1. State responsibilities 
(a) In genera~ 
Each State s1·1all··"· 
(1) permit absent uniformed services voters and ovcrscils voters to use absentee registratio 
ballot i;'\ 91.-~neral, special, primary, and runoff elections for Federal office; 
(2) lftCC(:~pt and process, with respect to any election for Federal office. anv otherwise vi.llid v· 
ballot ~;1pplication from an absent uniform1~d services voter or overst>as voter, if the applicatior 
clcctior: official not l<~ss ttMn 30 days before l:he elec:.tion; 
(3) permit absent uniformed services vote~; and overseas voters to use Feder<ll write-in abs 
1973ff<:! of this title) in general elections for Federal office; 
(4) use the official post card form (prescribc:d under ~~ection 1973ff of this title) for simultc:m• 
absent~~c ballot application; 
{S) if th~~ State requires an oath or affirmation to accompany any d\lCutnent under this subcl 
by the Presidential designee under section l9"73ff (b)(7) of this title; 
(G) in addition to any other method of registering to vote or applyinq for an absentee ballot 
(A) for absent uniformed services voters and overseas voters to request by rnail and ~ 
()pplications and absentee ballot applications with respect to general, special, primary, ; 
oKcordance with subsection (c); 
(S.) for States to send by mail ;!lnd electronically (in ~ccordanc.e witl1 the preferred me· 
ab~;ent uniformed services voter or overseas voter under subp;;~rl.'lgraph (C)) voter regis 
applications requested under subpara!;vaph (A) in accordancE: with subsection (~'!); and 
(C) by which the absent uniformed services voter or overseas voter can designate wh• 
registration application or abs~ntee ballot ~pplication Ill~ transmitted by mail or electror 
(7) in addition tO_iillY._Q!:hcr mqthod of transmitting bl;;mk ab$cnte<:. ballots in the State, estal 
and ele.ctronically blank Clbsentcr. ballots to absent uniformed service~~; voters and overseas vc 
pmmlry, ;;lnd runoff elections for Federal office in accordance with subs~ction (f); 
(8) tr<Jri:>rnit a validly requested absentee ballot to an absent uniforrncd services voter or ov 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JIM BRANNON, 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
Vs. ) 
) 
SUSAN K. WEATHERS, in her capacity ) 
as the City of Coeur d'Alene City Clerk; ) 
MIKE KENNEDY, in his capacity as the ) 
incumbent candidate for the City of ) 
Coeur d'Alene Council Seat #2; ) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
Case No. CV-09-10010 
OPPOSITION OF DEFENDANT 
KENNEDY TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL 
Plaintiff Brannon's Motion for New Trial and supporting Memorandum consists 
entirely of a rehash of old arguments made repeatedly before and during trial. The pattern 
followed by plaintiff counsel seems once again an effort to either evade or, on appeal, 
overturn Noble v. Ada County Elections Board, 135 Idaho 495, 20 P.3d 679, (2001). The 
facts in Noble have many similar ties. 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
1 
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Procedurally, plaintiff repeats one identical argument. Here plaintiff alleges error 
in the failure of defendants to offer evidence or present witnesses after the close of 
plaintiffs case. Here, as in Noble, all of the witnesses who would affirm the validity of 
the election process were called by plaintiff, testified and were cross examined by 
counsel for defendant. On occasion, identified exhibits for defendant were introduced 
into evidence during plaintiffs case in chief. 
Noble rested his case" ... and the interested parties chose not to present any 
evidence at the hearing." 135 Idaho at 498. The solid holding of a unanimous Idaho 
Supreme Court was that Noble did not meet his burden of proof. That is what this 
Court has decided. Part of the efforts of defendant was to show that plaintiff did not 
carry that burden. 
Plaintiffs motion does not rely on paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 of I.R.Civ.P., Rule 59 
(a). The rehash alleges (6) insufficiency of evidence and (7) error in law. 
This Court reluctantly gave the widest imaginable scope to plaintiffs presentation 
in examination of witnesses, exploring of dead ends (number of computers in the 
county's election office) and argument unsupported by evidence. Plaintiff fails to 
identify a single instance in which during trial there was an error of law that was adverse 
to plaintiffs case. 
This Court's twenty page Memorandum Decision fully covers, analyzes and 
disposes of all the contentions raised by plaintiffs motion and memorandum. 
This Court had the opportunity to hear and view the witnesses. Most of the 
reported cases in Idaho are upon motions for a new trial following a jury verdict. 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 2 
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In a jury verdict case, the trial court must ask these two questions described in 
Schwan's Sales Enterprises v. Idaho Transportation Department, 142 Idaho 826, 136 
P.3d 297 (2006): 
". . .motion for new trial calls the trial judge to weigh the evidence and 
determine (1) whether the verdict is against his or her view of the clear 
weight of the evidence; and (2) whether a new trial would produce a 
different result. 
142 Idaho at 833. 
The challenge to the loser in moving for a new trial made after an adverse 
judgment in a case tried before the court, is clearly more difficult. The trial judge has 
already weighed the evidence and made its decision based upon its determination. 
After being burdened with multiple briefs upon the law, this Court endured 5% full days 
of trial granting great latitude to plaintiff. 
Although it is a case involving motion for new trial after jury verdict, the Idaho 
Supreme Court in Carlson v. Stanger, 146 Idaho 642, 200 P.3d 1191 (2009), laid out 
the criteria to be used in determining whether to grant a new trial. 
When a motion for a new trial is based on the ground of insufficient 
evidence to justify the verdict, the trial court must weigh the evidence 
presented at trial and grant the motion only where the verdict is not in 
accord with its assessment of the clear weight of the evidence. Lanham, 
130 Idaho at 498, 943 P .2d at 9234; Pocatello Auto Color, Inc. v. Akzo 
Coatings, Inc., 127 Idaho 41, 45, 896 P.2d 949, 953 (1995). In ruling on the 
motion, the trial court must independently assess the credibility of the 
witnesses. Lanham, 130 Idaho at 498, 943 P.2d at 924; Quick, 111 Idaho at 
766, 727 P .2d at 1194. 
146 Idaho at 647-648. 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 3 
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The Memorandum Decision of this Court decided, based upon credible 
evidence, against every single one of plaintiff's itemization in his memorandum and 
motion: 
1. Faiiure to investigate residences and failure to keep a record are not proof 
of illegal votes. p. 6. 
2. The physical absentee ballots were accurately counted by Judge Marano. 
p. 8. 
3. The statistical data of the absentee ballot recount does not produce any 
information as to for whom the ballots could be counted. p. 9. 
4. There was no evidence that the stack of 2050 returned envelopes did not 
include all 2041 valid names in the November 6, 2009 data base report. 
p. 12. 
5. There was no fault regarding Section 34-1411; the election process is 
complex and the county ran the election well. p. 13. 
6. Alleged election irregularities do not provide the Court with discretion to 
set aside an election under Idaho case law. p. 17. 
The motion for new trial must be denied. 
~ t~J-1 
-------=--~~~--~--~~--
Scott W. Reed, One of the 
Attorneys for Defendant Kennedy 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 4 
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Dated this 29th day of November, 2010. 
~-..... 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certi~ that a true copy of the above and foregoing was served by fax or first class 
mail, this 29 day of November, 2010 to: 
Starr Kelso 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box 1312 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
FAX {208) 664-6261 
Michael L. Haman 
Haman Law Office 
P. 0. Box 2155 
Coeur d'Alene, ld 
FAX (208) 67 68 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JIM BRANNON, 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
~- ) 
) 
SUSAN K. WEATHERS, in her capacity ) 
as the City of Coeur d'Alene City Clerk; ) 
MIKE KENNEDY, in his capacity as the ) 
incumbent candidate for the City of ) 
Coeur d'Alene Council Seat #2; ) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
Case No. CV-09-10010 
RESPONSE OF DEFENDANT 
KENNEDY TO PLAINTIFF'S 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO 
ALTER TO AMEND THE JUDGMENT 
DATED NOVEMBER 26,2010 
Counsel for plaintiff on Friday filed a Supplemental Memorandum citing Romeu v. 
Cohen, 265 F.3d 118 (2nd Cir. 2001) in support of plaintiffs argument that the Uniformed 
and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOVACA), 42 U.S.C. §§1973 ff-1 and 1973 
ff-6, does not allow the absentee votes of Paquin, Friend, Gagnon and Farkes to be 
counted. 
RESPONSE TO SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
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The reported Court of Appeals opinion as provided to this Court and counsel does 
not support plaintiffs argument and is clearly distinguishable. 
Xavier Romeu brought suit alleging a constitutional right to vote for president in New 
York. He had been a resident of V'v'estchester County in New York State from 1994 
through 1999 and had voted for president in the 1996 presidential election. On May 17, 
1999, Romeu moved to and became a resident of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. p. 
2/14.(1) These are distinguishing facts upon which the opinion is based: 
On July 9, 1999, Romeu registered to vote in Puerto Rico. U.S. territories, 
including Puerto Rico, do not participate in presidential elections. 
Subsequently, Romeu requested an absentee ballot from the State of New 
York to vote in the 2000 presidential election. (Emphasis supplied). p. 2/14 
New York State had an election law relating to voters registered within the state 
who are absent from the state but intend to maintain a voting residence within the state. 
The Court of Appeals observed that U. S. citizen residing outside of the United States 
may rely upon UOCAVA to vote: 
. . .so long as "such citizen does not maintain a place of abode or 
domicile, is not registered to vote and is not voting in any other election 
district, state, territory or possession of the United States." N.Y. Elec. Law 
§11-200(1) (McKinney 1996). 
p. 2/14 
1 The faxed opinion does not have page citations to 265 F.3d. Reference here is to page numbers at the 
bottom of the 14 page opinion. 
RESPONSE TO SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 2 
. /
SC 38417-2011 Page 2485 of 2676
The fact that Romeu became a permanent resident of Puerto Rico and 
registered to vote in Puerto Rico barred him under the New York statute and under 
UOVACA from voting absentee for president in New York: 
In this regard, it is significant to note that in excluding citizens who move 
from a State to Puerto Rico from the statute's benefits, the UOCAVA treats 
them in the same manner as it treats citizens of a State who leave that 
State to establish residence in another State. Had Romeu left New York to 
become a resident of Florida, he would similarly not have been permitted to 
exercise the right created by a the UOCAVA to vote in the federal elections 
conducted in New York. And if a citizen of Puerto Rico took up residence 
outside the United States, the UOCAVA would entitle that citizen to 
continue, despite her foreign residence, to participate in Puerto Rico's 
elections for the federal office of Resident Commissioner. Congress thus 
extended voting rights in the prior place of residence to those U.S. citizens 
who by reason of their move outside the United States would otherwise 
have lacked any U .S. voting rights, without similarly extending such rights 
to U.S. citizens who, having moved to another political subdivision of the 
United States, possess voting rights in their new place of residence. 
(Citations) 
p.5/14 
The opinion concludes as follows: 
In sum, the considerations underlying the UOCAVA's distinction are not 
insubstantial. As a result, we hold that Congress acted in accordance with 
the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause in requiring States and 
territories to extend voting rights in federal elections to former resident 
citizens residing outside of the United States, but not to former resident 
citizens residing in either a State or a territory of the United States. 
p. 5/14. 
Paquin, Friend and Farkas are residents of Canada and Gagnon is in the 
military. These are the relevant portions of the Idaho statutes: 
RESPONSE TO SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 3 
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Idaho Code §50-416. . . 
If a person is absent from this state but intends to maintain his residence 
for voting purposes here, he shall not register to vote in any other city 
during his absence. 
idaho Code §34-405 ... 
If a person is absent from this state but intends to maintain his residence 
for voting purposes here, he shall not register to vote in any other state 
during his absence. 
Attached as Exhibit A is a copy of the Monica Paquin application which is 
identical to the other three. Printed paragraph 4 as sworn to by the applicant states: 
4. I am not registering, requesting a ballot, or voting in any other 
jurisdiction in the U.S., except the jurisdiction cited in this voting 
form. 
Romeu could not have signed such an oath being a full-time resident of Puerto 
Rico and having registered to vote there. The opinion lends no support to plaintiffs 
claim of illegality. 
The applications of all four, while giving a Coeur d'Alene address, state that each 
currently lives in either Canada or is in California and is qualified as military service 
related. 
As of 8:00 o'clock p.m. on November 3, 2007, the Kootenai County Election 
Office had complied with every federal, state and municipal law relating to absentee 
votes from persons who had a residence in Coeur d'Alene and who were living out-of-
state/out-of-country but with an intention to return. A copy of the December 18, 2009 
RESPONSE TO SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 4 
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letter from Chief Deputy Timothy A. Hurst to Dan English confirming the acceptance of 
absentee ballots from the Canadian voters is attached as Exhibit B. 
Respectfully submitted, this~y of 
Nove~ r } -=~ ~v..-1·; 
Scott W. Ree'd, One of the 
Attorneys for Defendant Kennedy 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true copy of the above and foregoing was served by fax or first class 
mail, this 30th day of November, 2010 to: 
Starr Kelso 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box 1312 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
FAX (208) 664-6261 
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U/lli/ZOOU 10:20 F'A,X a:i..: .;;'282. 
Dan English 
Kootenai County Clerk 
POBoX, 9000 
Coeutd'Alene, Idaho 83fil6 
Dear Dan: 
KOOTENAI C'" . 1TY 
\. ..... e 
lD Secre~ary of State 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE SE.C~I::TARY OF STATE 
. BEN VSURSA . 
December 18,2009 
.... 
-• KOOTENAI 
EXHIBIT B 
~002/003 
I run in receipt of your letter dated December 16, 2009. regarding the eligibility of a 
certain oversea~ citizen and military personnel to vote in the City of Coeur d'Alene election . 
.. 
• 
It appears from th.c information that was entered int.o the statewide voter registration 
sysc.ern that TammyFarkes, Monica Pacquin, Gregory Proft and Alan Friend re,gl~tered to vote in 
accordan.cc with state law. 
A person Jiving outside the sc.ate tempoJ:"arily doe~ not lose his or her right to vote ~imply 
by being nbsent from the state. Article VI. Section 5 of tbe Idaho Constitution says: 
'"For purposes of voting, no per.son shall be deemed to have gained ·or lost a. 
residence by reason of his presence or absence while employed in the setvice of 
this stare. or of the United States~ nor while engaged in the. nalljgation c,f the 
waters of this state or of the United States, nor while"' student of any ir.,sti.tution 
. of lcariring. not while .kept at any alms bouse or other asylum at t.he public 
expense." 
Idaho Cod" Section 34-107(3) also says: 
"A quaUficd elector who has. left his home ~nd gone into another state or territory 
or county of thiR state for a temporary pufpo:ie only shall not be conside:red to 
have. lost his residence." 
Jd~o Code Section ~4-1 07( 4) also says: 
. P.O •. Boll 83720. IJol!la, ldnho 113720..0080 
Telapltone: (206) 334·2300, FAX: (206) 334"2282 
Loeo\\ted at 700 West .lefferson Street. Suite 203 
, 0
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Ud ~.01 "~HI~ lll: :i:.l. f"tl...t 3; .282 
KOOTENAI ( 'fY 
rn Secretar::v of 5\. ..• e -~ KOOt'ENAT 
"A qualified elector shall not be considered to have gained a res.idence in any 
county or city of this state into which.be comes for tempol:'ary purposes only, 
without dte intention of making it hls home but with the intention of leaving it 
when he has accomplished the purpose t.'iat brought him there." 
PAGE 02/03 
~003/003 
If a pcl"Son ha~ gained residency in the State and is registered to vote, that regi~tralion is 
valid os tong ~ the pers~n continues to vote and ha" the i.nlention of relurning to Idaho to make 
it the persons borne as long a.c; the person does not establish another permanent home outside the 
· State (I.C. 34·107(5)). 
TAH/bek 
Sincerely, 
TIMOTIIT A HURST 
Chief Deputy 
Secretary of State . 
Ol / 1":;':.1 F/L  T retary S . 001'
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I l
.'i
oo
C(8 b
'\ ; l t Lo
ll c
.
l
TI- Y
l
SC 38417-2011 Page 2492 of 2676
Peter C. Erbland, ISB #2456 
Paine, Hamblen, Coffin, Brooke & Miller, LLP 
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101 
Post Office Box E 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0328 
Phone (208) 664-81 15 
FAX (208) 664-6338 
Scott W. Reed, ISB#818 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box A 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
Phone (208) 664-2161 
FAX (208) 765-5117 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JIM BRANNON, Case No. CV-09-10010 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
~- ) 
) 
SUSAN K. WEATHERS, in her capacity ) AFFIDAVIT OF BILL MORLIN 
as the City of Coeur d'Alene City Clerk; ) 
MIKE KENNEDY, in his capacity as the ) 
incumbent candidate for the City of ) 
Coeur d'Alene Council Seat #2; ) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI ) 
Bill Marlin, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
I have personal knowledge of all the facts set forth hereafter. I formed a 
Washington State local limited company. I have a license with the State of Washington 
as Marlin Investigations, LLC. A copy is attached. 
AFFIDAVIT OF BILL MORLIN 
1 
O
.  
o
o
SC 38417-2011 Page 2493 of 2676
I reside in Spokane County. I do much of my work out of my home. 
I was retained by attorney Scott W. Reed to make inquiry concerning names of 
questioned voters identified by the attorney for plaintiff Jim Brannon. 
I did go to the election office of Kootenai County on occasion, but almost all my work 
was by phone or computer from my home in Spokane County, Washington. 
I have looked at the copy of the Coeur d'Alene City Ordinance Chapter 5.48 
attached to the affidavit of Kathy Lewis. 
In the definition in Section 58.48.010 Private Detective Business, is a list A through 
J, of the activities which constitute the actions that make a person a Private Detective in 
Coeur d'Alene. My computer investigation and telephone calls were not in the category 
of any of those listed actions. 
I was simply attempting to determine if any of the persons named by Brannon were 
non-residents of Coeur d'Alene and therefor possi~ 
Bill Marlin 
c(5'~ SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, this c day of November, 2010. 
~-0(~ 
AFFIDAVIT OF BILL MORLIN 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Coeur d'Alene 
My Commission Expires: 7/13/15 
2 
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o
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certi!M_ t~t a true copy of the above and foregoing was served by fax or first class 
mail. this 'f'o dav of November. 2010 to: 
. ---r--- - . 
Starr Kelso 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box 1312 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
FAX (208) 664-6261 
Michael L. Haman 
Haman Law Office 
P. 0. Box 2155 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 FAX;;;r 
~'~ 
AFFIDAVIT OF BILL MORLIN 3 
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MO~LitNE'tl~/\TlONS ~. L,LC 
SPOKANE WA 99208 
Domestic limited Liability Company 
Renewed by Authority of Secretary of Stat• 
REGISTERED TRADE NAMES: 
HDRLINVESTIGATIDNS LLC 
··-···-········-······----···-···----------------~--~--~ 
(J~LItNE,n~i\n6  . 
Olll
i .
...... -., .. , .......... ,,'", ... -,---------________ --1 
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Chapter 5.48 
>PRIVATE DETECTIVES 
> 5.48.010: DEFINITIONS: 
> 
> The words and phrases used in thJs Chapter shall 'have the meat-lings: 
> 
>DETECTIVE AGENCY: Means and includes any person who as principal or 
> employer engages in, or who advertises or holds himself out as being 
> engaged in, the private detective business. 
> 
>PRIVATE DETECTIVE: Means and includes any natural person of either 
> sex who engages in, or who advertises or holds himself out as being 
> engaged in, the private detective business as agent or employee of a 
>duly licensed detective agency. 
> 
>PRIVATE DETECTNE BUSINESS: Means and includes the business of, or 
> the representation of being engaged in the business of, making for 
> hire or reward, investigations with reference to any of the 
> following matters: 
> A. Detecting, discovering or revealing crime or criminals, or 
> securing secret information or evidence relating thereto; 
>B. Discovering or revealing the identity, whereabouts, character or 
> actions of any person or thing; 
> C. The habits, conduct, movements, whereabouts, associations, 
> transactions, reputations or character of any person; 
> D. The credibility of witnesses or other persons; 
> E. The location or recovery of lost or stolen property; 
> F. The causes, origin or responsibility for fires, accidents or 
> injuries to real or personal property; 
> <;. The affiliation, connection or relation of any person with any 
>union or nonunion organizations, with any official member or 
> representative thereof, or with any person seeking employment in the 
> place of any person who has quit work by reason of strike; 
> H. The truth or falsity of any statement or representation; 
> I. The business of securing for hire or reward evidence to be used 
> before authorized investigating committees, boards of award or 
> arbitration, or in the trial of civil or criminal cases; 
>-J. The business of furnishing for hire or reward, guards or other 
> persons to protect persons or property, prevent theft or unlawful 
> taking of goods, wares and merchandise, or the misappropriation or 
> concealment of goods, wares and merchandise, money, bonds, stocks, 
> choses in action, notes or other valuable documents or papers; or 
> the business of performing the service of such guard or other person 
>for any of the said purposes. (prior code §§5-12-l(a), (c), (d)) 
> 5.48.020: APPLICABll..ITY OF CHAPTER: 
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Michael L. Haman 
HAMAN LAW OFFICE 
923 N. 3n1 Street 
P.O. Box 2155 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-2155 
Telephone: (208) 667-6287 
Facsimile: (208) 676-1683 
ISB #4784 
Attorneys for Defendant City ofCoeut· d'Alene, Clerk 
No. 5791 P. 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JIM BRANNON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, et al, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2009=10010 
DEFENDANTS CITY/CLERK'S 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
NEW TRIAL AND/OR AMEND OR 
ALTER JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW Defendants City of Coeur d'Alene and its Clerk, in her official capacity, by 
and through their counsel of record, and hereby submit their Memorandum in Opposition of 
Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial and/or Amend the Judgment for the reason that the Court's October 
5, 2010, Memorandum Decision and the subsequent November 4, 2010, Judgment are supp011ed by 
sufficient evidence, nor was there an error of law supporting the Court's findings. As such, for the 
reasons set forth below, the Court should deny !}le Plaintiffs' Motion under Rules 59(a)(6) and (7), 
and 59( e), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
A. Motion for New Trial per IRCP 59(a). 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR NEW 
TRIAL OR ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO AMEND/ALTER • 1 
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Regardless of whether the Motion is brought under Rules 59(a)(6) or (7), the standard 
I I L. I Ill I. f •1 I I RR 1 11 
occUlTed at trial; that the ends of justice would be served by vacating the decision; and, that a 
I'll .11 .111'11 
App. 1992). For purposes of this response, the emphasis is on the word, "would;., That is, the 
Plaintiff must show that the verdict was so contrary to the evidence or that there was an error in law 
such that a different result would occur, as opposed to could occur. 
Befot·e addressing whethet· a different result would occur, the Defendants take issue with the 
contention that the burden of proof somehow shifted to the Defendants, and that Defendants failed 
to satisfy the same. The basis of his contention is a mistaken reliance on the Secretary of State's 
database that was generated 3 days after the election which did not, in itself shift the burden of proof. 
This is especially uue in light of the testimony of Tim Hut·st stating that the subject database was not 
an accurate accounting. More importantly, the Plaintiff's contention does not establish thatthere was 
insufficient evidence to support the findings of the Court. 
However, even if the Plaintiff is somehow conect and the burden shifted~ the Defendants 
established through the testimony of County officials and Judge Marano the accuracy and validity 
of the election results. This testimony was not refuted. Rather, the Plamtiff simply tried to create 
confusion through mistaken math during closing argument. Nonetheless, for whatever reason the 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR NEW 
TRIAL OR ALTERNATNE MOTION TO AMEND/ALTER ~ 2 
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Plaintiff chooses to ignore and hide from the testimony and evidence presented by the County 
officials and Judge Marano. 
It should also be noted that contraly to the Plaintiff's assertion in the Memorandum ofLaw 
in Support of his Motion, the Record does not establish that 12 illegal votes were received and 
counted, and thus this did not shift the burden. Also~ the Court did not consider the November 6'h 
ever changing database to the exclusion of all other testimony, including the testimony of Judge 
Marano and the County officials. One can go on and on with the blatant misstatements contajned 
in the Plaintifrs submissions, but the point is clear. The Plaintiff engaged in an attempt to 
overthrow a valid election based on the supposition of a few supporters relying on an unreliable, 
daily changing database. The Court recognized that this fact was not enough to change the results. 
In other words, the Court's findings are supported by the evidence as opposed to the suppositions 
offered by the Plaintiff. 
Second, there was not error in law, as argued by the Plaintiff in the supplemental 
memorandum. Initially, the case cited, Romeu v. Cohen~ 265 F.3d 118 (2nd Cir. 2001), is not 
applicable, whatsoever. That case regarded one's right to vote in a federal election as opposed to 
state and local elections; and, it regarded whether UOCAVA applied to a f01mer resident of New 
York now a citizen of Puerto Rico. These are different issues than what face the Court in the instant 
matter. As such, Romeu is inapplicable. In fact, the 200 Circuit never said that UOCA VA cannot 
apply to state and local elections. To the contrary, most states have laws allowing citizens covered 
by UOCA VA to register and vote absentee in state and local elections. 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR NEW 
TRIAL OR ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO AMEND/ALTER • 3 
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With that, there was substantial evidence regarding the qualifications for one to vote in a 
local election that supports the Court's findings. See, e.g., Idaho Code § 50-402. This CoUlt 
considered the applicable statutes, reviewed UOCA VA, considered the testimony of the County 
officials, and considered the testimony of Tim Hurst in deciding voter qualifications. There was no 
error in the Court's detenninations; and, there has been no showing that the Court was in error for 
considering UOCAV A. 
Setting the aforementioned aside, the crux of the Defendants' Reply is whether the results 
on a re·trial would change. In other words, taking everything the Plaintiff contends as being true, 
would the results of the election change? The answer is simple, no. The 1-eason is just as-simple and 
clear, to most. That is, there is no evidence regarding how certain individuals, including Paquin, 
Friend, Farkes and Gagnon, voted; and, moreover, even if one adopted the Plaintiff's perverse logic 
in counting there is no evidence that would show or even tend to show that the results of the election 
would be such that the Plaintiff actually prevailed over Kennedy. Moreover, there is no evidence 
regarding selection made by the alleged "12 illegal voters.'' In sum, there has not been a showing 
that the results would change. Absent such a showing, the Plaintiff's Motion must be denied. 
B. Motion to Alter or Amend per Rule 59( e). 
As the Court knows, a Rule 59( e) Motion raised after final judgment is to "correct en·ors both 
of fact or law that had occurred in its proceedings; it thereby provides a mechanism for corrective 
action short of an appeal. Such proceedings must of necessity, therefore, be directed to the status of 
the case as it existed when the cout1 rendered the decision upon which the judgment is based.'' Lowe 
v. Lym, 103 Idaho 259,263, 646 P.2d 1030, 1034 (Ct. App. 1982). Implicit in this language is that 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TOPLAINT1FF'S MOTIONS FOR NEW 
TRIAL OR ALTERNATNE MOTION TO AMEND/ALTER • 4 
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the error must be substantial as opposed to clerical enors. See Silsby v. Kepner, 140 Idaho 410, 411, 
95 P.3d 28, 29 (2004). 
For the reasons set forth above, the Plaintiffhas made an insufficient showing that there was 
a substantial error made during the proceedings that would compel an amendment to the Judgment. 
Simply put. the Plaintiff bas failed to show that Judge Marano and County officials erred when 
offering evidence regard to the hand recount, the void ballots, the meaning behind the void ballots, 
the duplicate ballots. and the meaning behind duplicate ballots, and the total count. Rather, the 
Plaintiff simply confuses the issue by using faulty math, just as he did during closing argument. 
FUlther. the Plaintiffhas not made a showing that some error occurred in the Court's assessment of 
legal versus illegal voters. In sum, there is no showing at all that the Comt erred in fmding that 
Kennedy lawfully prevailed. 
Jn sum, the Court should denythe Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial or in the Alternative 
Motion to Amend/Alter Judgment on the basis that the Plaintiff has failed to present evidence 
showing either a factual or legal error that would change the outcome of the Court's findings. 
DATED this )0 dayofNovember, 2010. 
HAMAN LAW OFFICE 
By: Michael L. Haman. of the Firm 
Counsel for Defendants City/Clerk 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR NEW 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thi&-.:?0 day ofNovember, 2010, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTIONS FORNEWTRIALORALTERNATIVEMOTIONTO AMEND/ALTER by the method 
described below to: 
Starr Kelso 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1312 
1621 N. Third Street, Ste. 600 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Fax: 208 664-6261 
Scott Reed 
P.O.BoxA 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Fax (208) 765-5117 
Peter Erbland 
Paine Hamblen 
P.O.BoxE 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Fax (208) 6646338 
__ u.s. First class mail 
\/""Fax 
__ Hand Delivery 
-....,..--U.S. First class mail 
7 Fax 
__ Hand Delivery 
__ u.s. First class mail 
.,/Fax 
__ Hand Delivery 
____ .. ,. ' ...__ ____ 
Michael L. Haman 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR NEW 
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STARR KELSO 
Attorney at Law #2445 
P.O. Box 1312 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Tel: 208-765-3260 
Fax: 208-664-6261 
Attorney for Plaintiff Brannon 
2010 DCC -6 PM 3: IS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JIM BRANNON, 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. CV-09-10010 
NOTICE OF FILING OF TRANSCRIPT 
vs. OF TESTIMONY OF EUGENE A. MARANO 
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 
a municipal corporation, et.al. 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff Jim Brannon, by and through his attorney, and gives notice 
that a transcribed copy of the testimony of Eugene A. Marano at the trial in this matter has been 
filed with the Court. 
The particular relevance of this filing is with regards to: 
1. The Court's finding that "the sum for ballots cast is 2,051." Memorandum Decision p. 
8; 
2. The Court's finding "Judge Marano's ballot count of2,051 for physically existing 
absentee ballots to be accurate" Memorandum Decision p. 8; 
3. The Court's finding that "The sum for ballots cast is 2,051." Memorandum Decision p. 
8; 
4. The Court's holding that "the County did in fact count 2,051 valid absentee ballots sent 
in by 2051 valid absentee voters." Memorandum Decision p. 14. 
1 NOTICE OF FILING OF TRANSCRIPT OF TESTIMONY OF EUGENE A. MARANO 
 l
O 15
01O
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Judge Marano confirmed, in his affidavit signed in open court and in his testimony as 
reflected by the transcription: 
"I arrived at a total of2027 absentee ballots counted in the 2009 City of Coeur d'Alene 
general election." T. p. 40. 
Starr K so, Attorney for Plaintiff Brannon 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: A copy was served by hand delivery Defendants City and 
Weathers attorney Michael Haman and Defendant Kennedy's attorneys Scott Reed and Peter Erblandi5L_6L:r:=ber, 2010. 
Starr Kelso 
2 NOTICE OF FILING OF TRANSCRIPT OF TESTIMONY OF EUGENE A. MARANO 
I
a6L:cember,2010.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
--oOo--
Plaintiff, 
vs. Case No. CV 09-10010 
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, et 
al., 
AT: 
ON: 
Defendants. 
TESTIMONY OF EUGENE MARANO 
Kootenai County Courthouse 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 
September 15, 2010 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE CHARLES W. HOSACK 
APPEARANCES: 
Ill 
For the Plaintiff: 
STARR KELSO 
LAW OFFICE OF STARR KELSO 
Post Office Box 1312 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
For the Defendant Mike Kennedy: 
PETER C. ERBLAND 
PAINE HAMBLEN, LLP 
Post Office Box E 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
000
 ,
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1 
2 
3 
SCOTT W. REED 
LAW OFFICE OF SCOTT W. REED 
Post Office Box A 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
For the Defendant City of Coeur d'Alene: 
4 MICHAEL L. HAMAN 
HAMAN LAW OFFICE 
5 Post Office Box 2155 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
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1 
2 
3 September 15, 2010 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
WITI~SS 
Eugene Marano 
11 Plaintiff's 
12 
13 
14 
Exhibit 77 
Exhibit 97 
15 Defendants' 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Exhibit J 
I N D E X 
DIRECT CROSS 
4 16 
EXHIBITS 
Marked 
31 
29 
3 
REDIRECT 
29 
Admitted 
11 
31 
29 
RECROSS 
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1 9/15/10 - 9:29 a.m. 
2 --ooo--
3 
4 
MR. KELSO: Yes. Call Eugene Marano. 
THE COURT: All right. If you would come up 
5 to the witness stand and stop there and be sworn by the 
6 clerk and be seated, please. 
7 (Witness sworn.) 
8 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY 
9 MR. KELSO: 
10 
11 
12 it. 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Good morning. 
This view is much better. I'm more used to 
Would you state your name, please. 
Eugene Marano. 
And you currently reside at? 
Kootenai County. 
And your position? Retired or 
I'm a senior magistrate judge. That means I 
19 work when I feel like it or somebody tells me to. 
20 Q. Now, pursuant to the order of the court in 
21 this matter, did you participate, undertake any 
22 activities with regards to any matter? 
23 A. Well, at the request of the prosecuting 
24 attorney and yourself, Mr. Kelso, I agreed at great 
25 great discomfort to myself to count a bunch of ballots. 
4 
000
OW
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1 The discomfort being that my math is not great. And I 
2 did that on the 22nd of June at the election office. 
3 Q. And was that pursuant to the order of Judge 
4 Hosack? 
5 Yes. Yes. I was a volunteer. Paid 
6 accordingly. 
7 Q. All right. Okay. So what did you do on the 
8 22nd of June, if you could explain to the court? 
9 A. I went to the elections office. Was seated 
10 behind a desk. There was a video, which I reviewed. 
11 Trained on myself at the desk and proceeded to count the 
12 ballots that were handed to me -- ballots and envelopes 
13 that were handed to me with the help of your son Matt 
14 who basically helped me. And the reason he did such a 
15 good job is my wife was his third grade teacher. 
16 Q. That's right. Now, when you were seated at 
17 the table what was provided to you first? 
18 A. Let's see, the envelopes. Absentee return 
19 envelopes. 
20 Q. And what were those represented to be? The 
21 absentee envelopes. 
22 A. From the 2009 City of Coeur d'Alene general 
23 election. 
24 Q. Were they represented by anyone to be all of 
25 the absentee return envelopes for the 2009 city 
5 
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1 election? 
2 A. As far as I remember they were, yes. 
3 Q. Okay. Would that have been Carrie Phillips? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 n 
"'" 
Kootenai County 
6 A. I assume so. 
7 Q. Yeah, okay. 
8 A. She acted like she was in charge. 
9 Q. And you proceeded to count those absentee 
10 return envelopes that she provided you, correct? 
11 A. I did. Came out of a couple of blue tubs and 
12 she put them all in front of me and Matt and I separated 
13 them and proceeded to count. 
14 Q. And what was the total number of absentee 
15 envelopes that you counted on that day? 
16 A. 2086. 
17 Q. Okay. You counted 2086 absentee return 
18 envelopes? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. Now, of those four I believe there was some 
21 question. Four of them were of question? 
22 A. Yeah, whether they were city or county 
23 election. 
24 Q. From those 2086 envelopes, it could not be 
25 determined or told to you whether they were city 
6 
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1 election or county election? 
2 A. Yeah, again, I wasn't there to draw 
3 conclusions. 
4 Q. Right. Right. 
5 A. Just to do the counting. &~d she said what 
6 she said and whatever. 
7 
8 
Q. 
A. 
Okay. She said they were ... 
They were -- she couldn't -- they -- the 
9 ubiquitous "they" -- could not determine whether they 
10 were city or county elections. 
11 
12 
13 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Okay. 
I just counted them. 
So did your records reflect then 2082 
14 confirmed city? 
15 A. No, I don't think I did it that way. 
16 
17 
Q. 
A. 
18 the file. 
19 
20 
21 
Q. 
A. 
Okay. 
My notes are in the file. I sealed them in 
Sure. 
And I can't remember. I forgot to bring that. 
MR. KELSO: It's sealed, I believe, in the 
22 court case. Could he look at his notes to refresh his 
23 memory, your Honor? 
24 THE COURT: Well, there's about 12 to 14 
25 files. Which file did you put it in? 
7 
k
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1 THE WITNESS: The one that your clerk gave me. 
2 THE COURT: You never have been much help. 
3 THE WITNESS: I know. 
4 THE COURT: All right. Let's take a -- it's 
5 locked up in the -- so it's 1n a sealed -= I +-h-:T"\l.r T '-.1..1...1...1.~ ..1.. 
6 have seen it. I'll go look for it. 
7 (Off the record.) 
8 THE WITNESS: As Judge Perocell (phonetic) 
9 once said, "I'm going to take the stapler away from all 
10 the clerks." 
11 Actually to answer your question, Mr. Kelso, 
12 at the top of my notes it says, "Absentee clerk 
13 ballots" -- "first batch," excuse me, "envelopes. 107 
14 extra blue. And then "Four unable to determine if these 
15 envelopes are City of Coeur d'Alene or County." 
16 Q. Okay. 
17 A. And when I go to a total to get to the 2086, I 
18 don't distinguish those four out. 
19 Q. Okay. Okay. So without distinguishing out 
20 those, the county election official provided you with 
21 absentee ballot envelopes to count that were in the City 
22 of Coeur d'Alene election of 2009 and you came up with 
23 2086 and four of them you really couldn't -- nobody 
24 seemed to know, correct? 
25 A. Well, I didn't know. Let's put it that way. 
8 
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1 Q. Right. 
2 A. I just counted them. 
3 Q. You were provided and counted 2086 absentee 
4 return envelopes? 
5 
6 
7 
8 
7\ 
.M.. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
9 correct? 
10 A. 
11 Q. 
12 A. 
13 envelopes. 
14 Q. 
Correct. 
Now, you also counted something else? 
Yes, I counted the absentee ballots. 
The actual ballots themselves; is that 
Correct. 
Okay. And when did you do that? 
The same time -- as soon as I finished the 
Okay. And how many absentee actual touch, 
15 wrinkled, ballots did you count? 
16 A. 2027 and that does not include 17 duplicate 
17 ballots. 
18 Q. And what is your understanding of a duplicate 
19 ballot? 
20 A. Quite frankly she told me what it was and I 
21 quickly forgot. Again, I was meticulous in being there 
22 to count only and not draw any conclusions. Basically, 
23 you could have hired a trained monkey to do what I did. 
24 Q. Okay. So on that day, as I understand it, you 
25 arrived at a total of 2027 absentee ballots that were 
9 
. • 
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1 counted in the 2009 City of Coeur d'Alene general 
2 election; is that correct? 
3 
4 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Now, it's my understanding that you were 
5 called back once aga1n to count some other ballots that 
6 had been located later? 
7 
8 
9 
10 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
When did that count occur? 
That occurred on the 2nd of July. 
Okay. And were those, those ballots presented 
11 to you in any sort of form or envelope? 
12 A. Let me try and recollect here. Okay. A 
13 ballot box labeled Coeur d'Alene write-in ballots 
14 11/3/09 were given to me and that was by Deedie Beard. 
15 Q. Okay. And on the cover of the envelope, did 
16 it indicate -- let me show you what's been marked as 
17 Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 77 and see if that was what was 
18 on the information you provided. 
19 
20 
21 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes. 
And what does that information --
Just read it. 11/3/09 write-in absentee. 
22 Valid seven. Invalid -- valid is zero -- I told you the 
23 monkey could have done better. The valid is zero and 
24 invalid seven. 
25 Q. So in that group that you counted. There were 
10 
l
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1 zero valid and seven invalid? 
2 A. Again, I didn't --
3 Q. Right. 
4 A. I didn't say what was valid or invalid, I just 
5 counted seven. 
6 Q. Okay. That's a -- that Exhibit 77 is, is that 
7 a correct copy of what your --
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
A. 
15 you did? 
16 A. 
As far as I recollect. 
MR. KELSO: Move to admit 77. 
MR. ERBLAND: No objection. 
MR. HAMAN: No objection. 
THE COURT: Exhibit 77 is admitted. 
(Exhibit 77 admitted.) 
MR. KELSO: Q. Any other counting or anything 
And I remember now that we counted some on the 
17 14th of July. 
18 Q. Okay. And what did you do on the 14th of 
19 July? 
20 A. I was handed ballots by Carrie Phillips again, 
21 and I counted --
22 
23 
24 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
25 ballots? 
That was July? 
14th. 
Okay. And July 14th you counted some more 
11 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
be? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes. 
And what 
To tell 
Okay. 
I didn't 
were -- what were they represented to 
you the truth I can't remember. 
put it in my notes. I just counted 
7 the ballots that were given to me by Ms. Phillips and it 
8 doesn't show what they were. Although at the very 
9 beginning there were 17 ballots -- hold on just a second 
10 here. Here it is here. They were duplicate ballots 
11 labeled 1 through 16, but there was no No. 2, so there 
12 were 15 duplicate absentee ballots. 
13 
14 
Q. 
A. 
So ... 
Then I was also handed ballots to count by 
15 Sherri Van Palin (phonetic) and there were two of those. 
16 Q. Okay. That's what I was -- and those were 
17 indicated as being what? 
18 A. That I don't remember. I'm going to -- you 
19 want me to guess so I'll guess. 
20 Q. Well, we had 17 duplicates and we had 15 and 
21 we had two, so there were 
22 
23 
A. 
Q. 
Seventeen duplicates. 
seventeen duplicates. And on 7/14 you were 
24 handed what, you don't know -- you were handed some 
25 documents to count? 
12 
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1 A. Correct. They were ballots 1 through --
2 numbered 1 through 16. 
3 
4 
Q. 
A. 
Sixteen ballots? 
Numbered 1 through 16 of which there were only 
5 15 because there was no No. 2. They were nurr~ered 
6 1 through 16, but it went 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, et cetera. 
7 
8 
9 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
10 occasions? 
11 
12 
A. 
Q. 
But you don't know what they represented? 
No. 
Okay. So on -- you were there on three 
Yes. 
6/22. And on that occasion you counted 2086 
13 absentee ballot return envelopes? 
14 
15 
A. 
Q. 
16 ballots? 
17 
18 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
So then on that same day you counted 2027 
Correct. 
Then you were called back because the county 
19 apparently discovered some other documents a week or so 
20 later? 
21 A. Apparently so. Anyway, I was called I think 
22 by Mr. McHugh to come back and count seven more ballots. 
23 Q. And of those, the documentation provided to 
24 you reflected that zero of those ballots were valid and 
25 seven were invalid? 
13 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
Okay. 
That's what -- I drew no conclusion from that. 
Right. That's what was represented to you? 
Exactly. 
Okay. 
MR. ERBLAND: I'll object to that. He was 
8 handed an envelope and it made the statement and it's on 
9 the envelope, the meaning of it is subject to further 
10 proof and the representation is solely in the exhibit. 
11 I don't believe the witness testified that anybody said 
12 anything to him about that. 
13 
14 
15 
16 
THE COURT: The exhibit? 
THE WITNESS: Say again. 
MR. KELSO: This exhibit I just put in. 
MR. ERBLAND: If that's what he was referring 
17 to, I don't have an objection. No. 77. 
18 
19 
20 
THE COURT: Is that what we're referring to? 
MR. KELSO: 77, is the --
THE COURT: Okay. Well, that would be the 
21 best evidence, I guess. 
22 
23 
24 
A. 
Q. 
MR. KELSO: Q. And that reflects what? 
Valid zero and invalid seven. 
Okay. And then you were summoned once again 
25 to -- another couple weeks later to count something, 
14 
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1 ballots, but you don't know what they represented? 
2 A. I can't say for sure. 
3 Q. Okay. 
4 A. I have no remembrance. 
5 And your charge by this was it not, to 
6 go and count the absentee ballot return envelopes? 
7 A. I'd have to look at a copy of the order to 
8 tell you that. I took it as to count whatever was put 
9 in front of me. 
10 Q. Okay. If we could -- I don't have that order 
11 handy, your Honor, but it would be about end of June --
12 MR. ERBLAND: We'd stipulate he was ordered to 
13 count. 
14 MR. KELSO: Well --
15 MR. ERBLAND: The order is the order. It's in 
16 the file. 
17 MR. HAMAN: Yeah. 
18 MR. KELSO: That's what we'd like to see so 
19 the judge can remember exactly what he was ordered to 
20 do. 
21 THE COURT: Well, I am not going to keep going 
22 and getting the clerk file and pulling out documents for 
23 you, so the objection will be sustained. I don't see 
24 any relevance of this at all. 
25 MR. KELSO: Well, it's very relevant, your 
15 
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1 Honor, because if you'll remember it's been testified 
2 that if there were 2084 absentee envelope ballots there 
3 has to be 2084 absentee ballots. 
4 THE COURT: There's no real reason to argue 
5 with the ruling of the court, Mr. Kelso. His testimony 
6 is what he counted. 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
your 
MR. KELSO: 
THE COURT: 
MR. KELSO: 
THE COURT: 
problem. 
MR. KELSO: 
THE COURT: 
Okay. 
What my order said is irrelevant. 
Okay. 
If you think it's relevant, that's 
Okay. 
It's what he did and what he can 
14 testify to as to what he did that's important. 
15 MR. KELSO: Okay. And I think that's been 
16 established, your Honor. I'm done with this witness. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
THE COURT: I think it has. 
MR. ERBLAND: May I approach the witness? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY 
MR. ERBLAND: 
Q. 
A. 
Judge Marano can I see your notes, please. 
Yes. 
MR. ERBLAND: What's good for the goose. 
MR. KELSO: I won't even object to you using 
16 
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1 them and slowing it down, Counsel. 
2 MR. ERBLAND: Q. Judge Marano, I'm going to 
3 ask you some questions about your notes and by the way, 
4 did you -- were you asked to sign an affidavit in this 
5 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. And did you? 
8 A. I haven't yet. 
9 Q. Are you willing to? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. Have you seen the affidavit? 
12 A. I have it here. 
13 Q. Is it accurate? 
14 A. The part about that at the very end where it 
15 says after July 2nd I didn't count any others, okay, is 
16 probably not entirely correct. 
17 Q. All right. But the other parts of it --
18 A. The other parts. 
19 Q. Could you use that to refresh your memory if 
20 necessary? 
21 A. In fact, I have been. 
22 Q. Have you? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. Okay. Let's take a look -- I have a copy of 
25 it also and just so that we're clear, there was an order 
17 
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1 issued by this court and you respond to that order, 
2 correct? 
3 
4 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
And then on June 22nd, I'm looking at 
5 paragraph 2 of your affidavit. 
6 
7 
A. 
Q. 
Okay. 
You met at the Kootenai County Elections 
8 Office at 1803 North Third Street. 
9 
10 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
Representatives of Kootenai County and Jim 
11 Brannon gathered in a conference room, correct? 
12 
13 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
You were seated at a table. Matt Kelso was 
14 there and -- to observe the counting, correct? 
15 
16 
A. 
Q. 
Yeah, he just sort of helped out. 
All right. And Carrie Phillips with the 
17 Kootenai County Elections Office opened tubs, placed 
18 what she represented were absentee ballot return 
19 envelopes, correct? 
20 
21 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
And you began to count those and you counted 
22 them, correct? 
23 
24 
A. 
Q. 
25 envelopes? 
Yes. 
You counted 2086 absentee ballot return 
18 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
5 right? 
6 
7 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
Four of which were undetermined, correct? 
Correct. 
Now, I understand you were there to count, 
Yes. 
You were not there to determine which were 
8 city and which were county, correct? 
9 A. I just counted what they gave me. 
10 Q. All right. As you sit here today then, you do 
11 not know whether any of the additional 2082 are solely 
12 for the county election, do you? 
13 
14 
15 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
I don't have a clue. 
All right. 
I will confess to looking at some of them and 
16 wondering how people actually vote when they put the 
17 name in twice, but who am I to ... 
18 Q. Okay. Then I understand that after counting 
19 and tabulating the absentee return envelopes that were 
20 given to you, not knowing which the split is between 
21 city, county, if there is one, you then began counting 
22 the absentee ballots themselves, right? 
23 
24 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
Carrie Phillips unsealed the ballot box 
25 counted by machine 3A, correct? 
19 
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1 A. Correct. 
2 Q. And in machine -- from machine 3A, how many 
3 ballots did you count? 
4 A. 977. 
5 And then you were asked to 1s that right? 
6 A. I was asked to what? 
7 Q. Excuse me. Is 977 what you counted? 
8 A. Correct 
9 Q. And then did Carrie Phillips unseal a ballot 
10 box from machine 3B and have you count those ballots? 
11 A. Correct. 
12 Q. And that was -- you were advised that these 
13 were duplicate ballots, correct? 
14 A. Some of them were duplicate ballots. 
15 Q. Okay. 
16 A. Fifteen duplicates marked 1 through 16, No. 2 
17 missing. 
18 Q. So you verified there were 15 duplicate 
19 ballots then? 
20 A. That was represented to me they were duplicate 
21 ballots. Whether they were or not was not my charge. 
22 Q. By the way, do you know what a duplicate 
23 ballot is? 
24 A. County clerk explained it to me and Deedie 
25 Beard explained it to me. 
20 
8
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1 Q. And they can explain that to the court. 
2 A. I'll take their word for it, but I'll leave it 
3 up to Judge Hosack to take what he does. 
4 Q. Sure. And then how many other ballots did you 
5 couilt from that 
6 A. Let's see, 640 not counting the 15 duplicates. 
7 Q. Okay. Not counting the 15 duplicates so you 
8 had 640 there. 
9 A. Hold on just a second. Yes. 
10 Q. All right. Now, did Carrie Phillips then 
11 unseal the ballot box of absentee ballots counted by 
12 machine No. 4? 
13 A. Correct. 
14 Q. And she placed those absentee ballots on the 
15 table at which you were seated? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. Mr. Kelso's son was there, he observed all 
18 this? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. Okay. Were you advised that any of those were 
21 duplicate ballots? 
22 A. She advised that there were two duplicate 
23 ballots. 
24 Q. Okay. And then how many other ballots were 
25 there? 
21 
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1 A. 410 not including the two duplicates. 
2 Q. Okay. Now, I understand that you were asked 
3 to add these things up. 
4 A. That's correct. 
5 A..""ld you 
6 A. I did. 
7 Q. And if you look --
8 A. Without a calculator by the way. 
9 Q. And if you look at page 8 of 8 of your notes. 
10 A. Page 8 of 8, yes. 
11 Q. Does that show your addition of these three 
12 columns? 
13 A. Yes, 2027. 
14 Q. 2027? 
15 A. Correct. 
16 Q. You don't know what a duplicate ballot is, but 
17 I want you to assume, for a hypothetical --
18 A. Okay. 
19 Q. -- that a duplicate ballot is one that comes 
20 in and for some reason, I don't know whether it's got a 
21 hanging chad or they didn't -- it's ripped or torn, 
22 another ballot has to be prepared to get it to run 
23 through a machine, and so it's just like a legal 
24 description you recall back when you practiced law, one 
25 person reads the legal description, the other one reads 
22 
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1 the -- traces it, correct? 
2 
3 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
All right. So if you add the 17 duplicate 
4 ballots, what is the number that you come up with? And 
5 I think you did it on your 
6 
7 
A. 
Q. 
2044. 
2044. All right. Now, you dated and signed 
8 your written accounting and then you were contacted 
9 if I look at page 8 of your draft affidavit of 
10 paragraph 8. On July 1, you were contacted by plaintiff 
11 Jim Brannon's attorney Starr Kelso and Barry McHugh; is 
12 that correct? 
13 
14 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
And it was agreed that you would meet with the 
15 representatives of Mr. Brannon at the Kootenai County 
16 and the Kootenai County representatives on July 2, 
17 correct 
18 
19 
20 
21 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
-- to count the discovered ballots? 
Yes. 
I wasn't invited, but then again there's lots 
22 of parties I haven't been invited to. 
23 MR. KELSO: I'll object to that representation 
24 your Honor, I can produce the email from Mr. Reed 
25 indicating that he's not interested in attending. It's 
23 
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1 my understanding that both Mr. Reed and he 
2 
3 
MR. ERBLAND: It's not relevant. 
THE COURT: Hold it. Hold it. Hold it. 
4 Let's maintain a degree of professionalism. That just 
5 doesn't get us anywhere, particularly in a court trial. 
6 MR. ERBLAND: I withdraw the comment. It's 
7 not relevant. 
8 
9 
THE COURT: Let's ... 
MR. ERBLAND: Q. On July 2, did you go to the 
10 elections office meeting with Dan English and Deedie 
11 Beard? 
12 
13 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
And on July 2 was Starr Kelso, Matt Kelso, 
14 William McCrory there? 
15 
16 
17 
18 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And plaintiff, Jim Brannon? 
I think he was there, but I'm not sure. 
Okay. And when you arrived, were you seated 
19 at the same table as you were on June 22, 2010? 
20 
21 
A. 
Q. 
Sure looked liked it. 
And a ballot labeled "Coeur d'Alene write-in 
22 ballots 11/3/09" was placed in front of you? 
23 A. Correct. 
24 Q. And is that the one where you have the cover 
25 of the envelope that had the words "11/3/09 write-in 
24 
E
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1 Absentee Valid 0, Invalid 7, 11 written on it? 
2 A. Correct. 
3 Q. Okay. Did you open the envelope and then 
4 count those ballots? 
5 
6 
7 
8 
7\ 
.M.. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
And there were seven of them? 
Seven was the number. 
Okay. Now what I want you to assume as a 
9 hypothetical because I know you don't know, when they 
10 talk about invalid it is somebody can go in and 
11 actually write in a vote and that write-in itself is 
12 invalid, but it is a ballot that has other races in it 
13 and while the write-in is invalid, the ballot itself is 
14 still run through the machine because there are other 
15 races, okay, will you assume that? 
16 MR. KELSO: You know, your Honor, I'll object 
17 to that. This witness is called strictly for the 
18 purpose pursuant to the court order to count what was 
19 presented to him, not to render opinions on 
20 hypotheticals. 
21 MR. ERBLAND: I'm not asking him to, I'm 
22 asking him to assume that. 
23 THE COURT: Well, he has testified what he was 
24 here to do was to count, but I'll trust this witness 
25 will be able to focus on what he's here to testify 
25 
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1 about. So I'll let him go ahead and ask the question. 
2 MR. ERBLAND: Q. Thank you. Assume that 
3 that's the case, all right? 
4 A. Okay. 
5 Now, would you add 2044 and seven, please? 
6 A. 2051. 
7 Q. 2051. 
8 May I approach the witness? 
9 THE COURT: Yes . 
10 MR. ERBLAND: I want to look at your notes 
11 again, Judge Marano, because while I have a copy of your 
12 notes up to the well, prior to the 14th. I don't 
13 have the 14th. So I'd like to look at that for a 
14 minute. 
15 A. Sure. 
16 Q. I recall you testifying that when the 15 
17 duplicate ballots, that's the one with the -- I gave you 
18 the example of the legal description. When those were 
19 counted that they were out of -- there was one out of 
20 sequence, correct? 
21 A. Correct. 
22 Q. Do you remember which one was out of sequence? 
23 A. Two. 
24 Q. On your notes? 
25 A. There was no No. 2. 
26 
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1 Q. On your notes of July 14, 2010, the first 
2 ballots that you were handed by Carrie Phillips there's 
3 a sequence number on your notes, correct? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 And how many -- how many nuw~ered -~ how many 
6 numbers do you have down there on that first line? 
7 A. Fifteen. 
8 Q. Fifteen. And is there one -- is there a 16 on 
9 that line? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. And so is there one number out of sequence? 
12 A. Two is missing. 
13 Q. Two is missing. Okay. So do you know -- and 
14 if you don't, fine. Do you know whether or not at that 
15 very time you were handed the 15 duplicates? 
16 A. At this time? 
17 Q. Yes. 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. Okay. And then on --
20 A. Same day. 
21 Q. Go ahead. 
22 A. Same day. 
23 Q. Okay. Same day you were handed ballots to 
24 count by Sherri Van Patten? 
25 A. That's Palin (phonetic) 
27 
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1 Q. Palin, okay. 
2 A. I think. Whatever her name was, her name was 
3 Sherri. 
4 Q. Well, if Palin was there I will support that. 
5 7\ .M.. Okay. 
6 Q. How many duplicate ballots were handed to you 
7 then? 
8 A. Two. 
9 Q. And how many duplicate ballots did Carrie 
10 Phillips hand you from machine -- from box 4, machine 4 
11 earlier? 
12 A. Machine 4 had 410 not counting two duplicates. 
13 MR. ERBLAND: Okay. That's all the questions 
14 I have. Thank you. 
15 THE COURT: Any cross by the city? 
16 MR. ERBLAND: Excuse me, my counsel's got a --
17 sure. 
18 Your Honor, may we have the judge's notes 
19 marked as an exhibit? 
20 MR. HAMAN: No objection. 
21 THE COURT: You certainly may have them 
22 marked. Are you going to offer them? 
23 MR. ERBLAND: Yes. 
24 THE COURT: Any objection? 
25 MR. KELSO: No objection. 
28 
. • 
SC 38417-2011 Page 2533 of 2676
1 THE COURT: So it will be marked as 
2 Defendants' -- I don't know if we have a list from 
3 defendant Kennedy, so I guess make it Exhibit 
4 MR. HAMAN: You can make it part of the City. 
5 THE COL~T: Make it Defendants' Exhibit J 
6 then, I guess. 
7 MR. HAMAN: That's fine. 
8 MR. ERBLAND: Thank you, Mr. Haman. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. Defendants' Exhibit J are 
10 Judge Marano's notes. All right. And those are 
11 admitted. 
12 (Exhibit J identified and admitted.) 
13 
14 questions. 
MR. ERBLAND: Thank you. I have no further 
THE COURT: Any by the City? 
MR. HAMAN: No questions. 
THE COURT: All right then. Redirect. 
MR. KELSO: Thank you. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
MR. KELSO: 
Q. Judge Marano, you indicated you had a copy of 
22 a proposed affidavit for you? 
23 
24 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
That you were referring to during your 
25 testimony today? 
29 
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1 
2 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And, in fact, you said that it was accurate up 
3 until when it ended, but there was this other meeting 
4 that took place on whatever day it was, the 14th, it 
5 wasn't documented. 
6 
7 
8 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
The 14th? 
July 14th. 
The -- actually the affidavit says that no 
9 further absentee ballot return envelopes, so that would 
10 be correct. 
11 
12 
Q. 
A. 
Oh, okay. 
Yeah, I didn't count any more absentee 
13 ballots, so that is correct. That is correct, yes. 
14 Q. But then there was another meeting that you 
15 testified to? 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
A. 
Q. 
Two more. 
Two more. Okay. Can I see that? 
MR. ERBLAND: No objection. 
MR. HAMAN: No objection. 
THE COURT: So it's marked as --
MR. KELSO: Ninety-seven. 
THE COURT: All right. And Plaintiff's 
23 Exhibit 97 is offered and being no objection I guess 
24 that's an unsigned affidavit. Is that what you're 
25 talking about? 
30 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
THE WITNESS: An unsigned affidavit. 
THE COURT: All right. So 97's admitted. 
(Exhibit 97 identified and admitted.) 
MR. KELSO: Let's warm that up and I'll ask 
5 the judge a question. 
6 Q. It's unsigned, but your testimony here today 
7 is that 
8 A. If it helps, I'll just sign it now. How about 
9 that? Can I borrow a pen from someone? 
10 Q. I've got a pen right here. 
11 THE COURT: Well, then we're going to have 
12 swear you in ... 
13 
14 
THE WITNESS: I've already been sworn in. 
MR. KELSO: Let the record reflect that you 
15 signed Exhibit 97. 
16 THE WITNESS: I didn't have a notary available 
17 at the time. 
18 MR. KELSO: Any objection to his signature on 
19 Exhibit No. 97? 
20 
21 
22 
MR. ERBLAND: No objection. 
MR. HAMAN: No objection. 
MR. KELSO: Q. So that's just the same as if 
23 the notary had been there and you sworn to her as 
24 opposed to being under oath today, correct? 
25 A. Correct. 
31 
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1 
2 
Q. All right. 
Matt, you got that up there ready to go? Just 
3 straighten it a little bit. Good. That's good. Go 
4 down to number -- let's see, No. 2, please. 
5 All right. Perhaps that clarifies what the 
6 Judge's order was. It indicates in paragraph 2 that you 
7 met with representatives of Kootenai County, Starr Kelso 
8 attorney for plaintiff Brannon at 9:00 o'clock --
9 9:00a.m. on June 22nd, 2(a). 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
(a) 
A. 
Q. 
II 
A. 
Q. 
2(a) the number of okay. 
Okay. No, I can't see -- okay. "To count: 
Yes. 
II the number of absentee ballots counted in 
15 the 2009 City of Coeur d'Alene general election," 
16 correct? 
17 
18 
19 
20 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
That's what you were there to do, correct? 
Correct. 
And "(b) The number of absentee ballot return 
21 envelopes received regarding the 2009 City of Coeur 
22 d'Alene general election," correct? 
23 
24 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
That's what you were there to count? Those 
25 two things? 
32 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. Okay. Let's go down to 4. Can you tweak it a 
3 little bit there. Just that way so I don't have to read 
4 uphill. The words are slanted. Okay. That's fine. 
5 That;s good. 
6 Now, is it true, your Honor, it says, "Once I 
7 was seated at the table, Carrie Phillips, Kootenai 
8 County Elections Office supervisor," who Mr. English has 
9 testified is now the supervisor in place of Deedie 
10 Beard, "opened two blue tubs and placed what she 
11 represented to me were the absentee ballot return 
12 envelopes received regarding the 2009 City of Coeur 
13 d'Alene general election," correct? 
14 
15 
A. 
Q. 
That's what she said. 
That's what she said. That's what she 
16 represented to you, correct? 
17 
18 
A. 
Q. 
That's what she said. 
"I then proceeded to count the return absentee 
19 return envelopes," blah-blah-blah, and then down below 
20 it says, "I add the totals from the written, the 
21 counting, and I arrived at a total of 2086 absentee 
22 ballot return envelopes handed to me regarding the 2009 
23 City of Coeur d'Alene general election," correct? 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
"Of that total of 2086, I was informed by 
33 
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1 Carrie Phillips that in the case of four of the said 
2 absentee ballot return envelopes counted, it was not 
3 able to be determined whether they were regarding the 
4 2009 City of Coeur d'Alene or whether they pertained to 
5 some other election," correct? 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
A. Correct. 
Can I have the exhibit? 
THE COURT: Your notes? 
THE WITNESS: Yeah. Correct. 
MR. KELSO: Q. Okay. Okay. Let's go to 5. 
Okay. "After completion of the counting and 
12 tabulation of the absentee return envelopes, as above 
13 stated, I commenced counting the actual absentee ballots 
14 received. Actual absentee ballots received and counted 
15 in the 2009 City of Coeur d'Alene general election. The 
16 process was as follows." Is that true? 
17 A. That's true. That's what was represented to 
18 me. I make -- I draw no conclusion as to whether 
19 they as to what Ms. Phillips said. 
20 
21 
22 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
That's what was represented to you? 
Yes. 
That those were the actual absentee ballots 
23 received and counted in the 2009 City of Coeur d'Alene 
24 election? 
25 A. That's what she said. 
34 
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1 Q. Okay. So Carrie Phillips unsealed the ballot 
2 box containing absentee ballots counted by machine 3A, 
3 placed the absentee ballots --
4 (Reporter interruption.) 
5 THE CODKT: I'll just mention this. I'm only 
6 one person and I'm trying to understand what's going on 
7 and there's an awful lot of repetition here, at least as 
8 far as I'm getting. And I keep listening and it's just 
9 the same stuff and it's being presented as if it's 
10 extremely important and very, very new. And it's 
11 confusing to me because I keep hearing the same thing 
12 over and over again and it's -- it's wearing on me. 
13 I mean, I'm not being irritated, I just want 
14 Counsel to know that their audience is kind of getting 
15 worn out by sitting on the edge of my chair and hearing 
16 this testimony come in as if it's new and startling. 
17 And I'm straining, straining, and it's the same thing 
18 I've heard three or four times before, and I'm -- I'm 
19 just getting a little tired. I just mention that to 
20 Counsel, that you try the case the way you want, but ... 
21 MR. KELSO: Thank you. The only thing I'm 
22 responding to is the cross where Mr. Erbland presented 
23 some other figures. I'm just verifying exactly what the 
24 judge did in counting. 
25 THE COURT: Well, why don't we move to the 
35 
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1 other figures because that's -- I'm listening for it. 
2 It should be, all right, it's not 977 it's 2014. 
3 There's something 
4 MR. KELSO: Q. Okay. Let's take 5. These 
5 were the envelopes that you counted that were 
6 represented to you to be the actual absentee ballots 
7 received and counted in the 2009 election, correct? 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
The actual ballots, you said "envelopes." 
Actual ballots. 
Correct. 
So, okay, so let's go down to where --
Again, when I say that was represented to me, 
13 that's my best remembrance of it. 
14 Q. Right. Let's go down to the -- B, go a little 
15 bit further. Okay. Next page. 
16 It indicates, "I was informed that duplicate 
17 absentee ballots are ballots that for one reason or 
18 another would not run through the counting machine and 
19 thus a duplicate was made from the original and then run 
20 through the counting machine." 
21 Is that what was represented to you by Carrie 
22 Phillips? 
23 A. It probably better described as would not run 
24 through, they kicked them out or something like that, I 
25 think is what she said. The machine kicks them out for 
36 
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1 whatever reason. Again, I draw no conclusion from that. 
2 Q. Okay. And down at C we're just -- briefly, 
3 you mention two more duplicate ballots, those were 
4 ballots that were kicked out, wouldn't run through the 
5 machine. 
6 
7 
A. 
Q. 
Whatever, yeah. 
Okay. And that's where this 17 number comes 
8 from. Seventeen, if we have 
9 A. Fifteen and two. 
10 Q. 17 duplicate ballots that were kicked out 
11 and couldn't be run through the machine, correct? 
12 A. Correct. And, again, Deedie or Carrie can 
13 explain -- Ms. Beard or Ms. Phillips can explain that to 
14 you much better. 
15 Q. I'm only asking you what you were told. You 
16 were there to count ballots and absentee ballot return 
17 envelopes. 
18 Now, let's go to 6. 
19 After my completion of counting of the counted 
20 absentee ballots, I was advised by Carrie Phillips that 
21 those absentee ballots constituted all of the absentee 
22 ballots counted in the 2009 City of Coeur d'Alene 
23 general election, correct? 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
That's the best of my remembrance. 
And you arrive at a total by adding up your 
37 
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1 figures of the absentee ballots counted in the 2009 City 
2 of Coeur d'Alene general election as 2027? 
3 
4 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
And that number does not include the 17 
5 duplicate ballots, correct? 
6 
7 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
Because they were kicked out and wouldn't run 
8 through the machine, correct? 
9 A. Correct. 
10 Q. So on the day that you went over there you 
11 went let's see -- and you thought you were done? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. So let's see, so that was the 22nd of June, so 
14 on July 1st you get a phone call and you're informed by 
15 Mr. McHugh and myself that the county elections, 
16 Kootenai County Elections Office had discovered that 
17 there were actually more absentee ballots that should be 
18 counted, correct? 
19 
20 
21 
22 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
That's it was in an e-mail by the way. 
Okay. 
Not a telephone call. 
Okay. So you agreed to go back over there and 
23 see what was there, correct? 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
Okay. We'll go to 9. 
38 
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1 And you counted those ballots that had the 
2 information on the cover? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. And there were seven? 
s A. 
6 Q. So -- and then no further absentee ballots 
7 were counted? 
8 A. No further absentee ballot envelopes were 
9 counted. 
10 Q. Envelopes, excuse me. Correct. So as the 
11 court designated counter, tell me to the best of your 
12 knowledge and information how many absentee ballots that 
13 were counted in the 2009 City of Coeur d'Alene election 
14 did you come up with? 
15 A. I missed the question. 
16 Q. Okay. Let's go to paragraph 
17 MR. ERBLAND: I'm going to object. This is 
18 cumulative and it is simply a repeat of the direct 
19 examination. 
20 THE COURT: There's been an awful lot of that 
21 in this case so far. But Mr. Kelso, I guess still 
22 thinks this is new information, so ... 
23 MR. ERBLAND: It's in the affidavit. It's in 
24 the notes. It's in the testimony. 
25 THE COURT: I'm painfully aware of all that. 
39 
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1 
2 
MR. KELSO: Well, okay. 
MR. ERBLAND: Can't we wait until argument to 
3 make these swashbuckling points? This is -- the point's 
4 been driven home again and again. Why use six nails 
5 when one will do? 
6 
7 
THE COURT: I don't know. I don't know. 
MR. KELSO: Paragraph 7 -- or 6, excuse me. 
8 Paragraph six. 
9 Q. Paragraph 6. "I arrived at a total of 2027 
10 absentee ballots counted in the 2009 City of Coeur 
11 d'Alene general election," correct? 
12 A. Are you asking me again if that was -- if I 
13 was correct the last time? 
14 
15 
16 
Q. 
A. 
17 Honor. 
Yep. 
Yes. 
MR. KELSO: Okay. That's all I've got, your 
18 {End of Eugene Marano's examination.) 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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September 15, 2010. Brannon v. City "'f Coeur d"Aiene, et al, 
Page 41 
1 STATE OF IDAHO 
2 SS: REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
3 
4 I, Valerie Nunemacher, a notary public and 
5 duly certified court reporter in and for the State of 
6 Idaho, DO HEREBY CERTIFY: 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
That the foregoing 
the date and at the time and 
That the foregoing 
transcription, to the best of 
shorthand notes taken down at 
12 above-entitled litigation; 
proceedings was taken on 
place herein stated; 
is a true and correct 
my ability, of my 
said time and place in the 
13 I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not related to any of 
14 the parties or attorneys to this litigation and have no 
15 interest in the outcome of said litigation. 
16 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my 
17 hand this 5th day of December 2010. 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
" ; UtL lt<AL i luJlU\V)Iel~u 
VALERIE NUNEMACHER, CSR, CCR, RPR 
, l i
 
 
 
 
f U l' \l)le
SC 38417-2011 Page 2546 of 2676
STARR KELSO 
Attorney at Law #2445 
P.O. Box 1312 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 816 
Tel: 208-765-3260 
Fax: 208-664-6261 
Attorney for Plaintiff Brannon 
ZO!GO~t: -6 PH 3: 15 
CLERK DIS fR~ ~T it/&-tJ 
vv. J \ CJ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JIM BRANNON, 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. CV-09-10010 
vs. 
NOTICE OF FILING OF TRANSCRIPT 
OF TESTIMONY OF TIMOTHY HURST 
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 
a municipal corporation, et.al. 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff Jim Brannon, by and through his attorney, and gives notice 
that a transcribed copy of the testimony of Timothy Hurst at the trial in this matter has been filed 
with the Court. 
The particular relevance of this filing is with regards to the Court's holdings: 
There is "no evidence that nine (9) of the envelopes in the stack of 2,050 bear names 
of people other than qualified voters who actually voted." (Memorandum Decision p. 
14). 
Chief Deputy Timothy Hurst's testimony is filed in its entirety for the Court's review and, 
preliminarily at this time, reference is made to the following: 
1. The November 6, 2009 Absentee Ballot Report, Exhibit 5, is the only evidence as to 
the total number of absentee ballots that were legally received. p. 18 
2. No absentee ballot voters would have been added to Exhibit 5, but some absentee 
ballot voters could have been removed from it. p. 20, 21 
1 NOTICE OF FILING OF TRANSCRIPT OF TESTIMONY OF TIMOTHY HURST 
 
20 aD r
 SfR~t:T!
·
 
2
,  
SC 38417-2011 Page 2547 of 2676
3. Absentee ballot return envelopes would only tell a person how many were received 
because if a return envelope does not have a date and time of receipt stamp on it there 
is no proof that it was received on or before the close of the polls. p. 22, 23, 38, 39 
4. If daily reports had been kept (as testified to by Deedie Beard but which were not 
offered or introduced into evidence) those daily report totals would add up to the 
figures on Exhibit 5. p. 40, 41 
5. The Secretary of State's Office researched its database to determine whether any 
persons who voted, either in person or by absentee, had been removed (see number 2 
above) from the Secretary of State's database from which Exhibit 5 was compiled. The 
Secretary of State's Office did determine the number of people who voted in the 2009 
election, either in person or by absentee, who were removed from the Secretary of 
State's database as reflected by Exhibit 5. The total number of persons removed from 
the database was four (4). If it is presumed that all four (4) ofthese persons who were 
removed from the database voted by absentee ballot and if it is presumed that all four 
(4) absentee ballots were validly received on or before the close of the election, it 
would add four (4) more absentee ballots to the totals reflected on Exhibit 5. This 
would change the number of validly received absentee ballots to 2045 which reflects 
that there is a six ( 6) vote difference between the 2051 absentee ballots that the 
machine co ted and the total validly received absentee ballot number of2045. 
·s 6th day of December, 2010. 
Starr Kelso, Attorney for Plaintiff Brannon 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: A copy was served by hand delivery Defendants City and 
Weathers attorney Michael Haman and Defendant Kennedy's attorneys Scott Reed and Peter 
Erbland o~6th day ~f. December, 2010. 
Dl--[~~ 
Starr Kelso 
2 NOTICE OF FILING OF TRANSCRIPT OF TESTIMONY OF TIMOTHY HURST 
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1 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
2 OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
3 --ooo--
4 
5 JIM BRA...NNON, 
6 Plaintiff, 
7 vs. Case No. CV 09-10010 
8 CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, et 
al., 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
AT: 
Defendants. 
TESTIMONY OF TIMOTHY HURST 
Kootenai County Courthouse 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 
ON: September 15, 2010 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE CHARLES W. HOSACK 
18 APPEARANCES: 
For the Plaintiff: 
19 STARR KELSO 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 /// 
LAW OFFICE OF STARR KELSO 
Post Office Box 1312 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
For the Defendant Mike Kennedy: 
PETER C. ERBLAND 
PAINE HAMBLEN, LLP 
Post Office Box E 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
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1 
2 
3 
SCOTT W. REED 
LAW OFFICE OF SCOTT W. REED 
Post Office Box A 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
For the Defendant City of Coeur d'Alene: 
4 MICHAEL L. HAMAN 
HAMAN LAW OFFICE 
5 Post Office Box 2155. 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
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1 
2 
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1 9/15/10 - 1:50 p.m. 
2 --ooo--
3 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY 
4 MR. KELSO: 
5 
6 
Q. 
A. 
State your name for the record, please. 
Timothy A. Hurst. I'm the chief deputy for 
7 the Secretary of State's office. 
8 
9 
10 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
For the State of Idaho, correct? 
Yes. 
And you were the chief deputy, Secretary of 
11 State's office in year 2009, correct? 
12 
13 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And your professional responsibilities include 
14 carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the 
15 Office of the Secretary of State related to federal, 
16 state and local election, correct? 
17 
18 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And in that capacity as a chief deputy to the 
19 Secretary of State with regards to elections, state and 
20 county elections and -- federal, state and local 
21 elections in the State of Idaho, your -- basically what 
22 are your duties as far as interacting with election 
23 officials around the state? 
24 A. Our responsibility is to make sure that 
25 election laws are interpreted and elections are 
4 
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1 conducted consistently. 
2 Q. Consistent with laws? 
3 A. And we've done training on that. Yes. 
4 Q. Okay. Now, are you familiar then with the 
5 Idaho Code Section 34-1011 with regards to COlL~ty 
6 clerk's record of application for absent elector 
7 ballots? 
8 A. Yes, I am. 
9 Q. Can we have that one on the screen? 
10 I'm going to ask you some more questions while 
11 we're going. And also are you familiar with Idaho Code 
12 Section 50-451 with regards to record of applications 
13 for absentee ballots? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. As they were in effect in 2009? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. Generally, what -- generally are those two i ~ 
' 
18 statutes, 30-1011 and 50-451, basically the same? 
19 A. Yes, they are. 
20 Q. And there we have 11 on there. 
21 Now, the -- indicates the county clerk shall 
22 keep a record in his office concerning these -- all 
23 these things we've gone through. Now, you're familiar 
24 with that? 
25 A. Yes. 
5 
co si
O
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1 Q. Okay. There's been a lot of testimony over 
2 the past couple days about the Secretary of State's 
3 database, and can you explain basically what that is? 
4 A. The database is a voter registration system 
5 for the State of Idaho and it's -- it's a dynamic 
6 database. Whenever somebody registers in one state or 
7 one -- one county in the state, if they're registered in 
8 another county then it notifies the other county that 
9 they've registered in the new one. So the data can be 
10 cleaned, so it's only current registrants in the state. 
11 Plus it helps to eliminate duplicates -- duplicate 
12 registrations. 
13 Q. And as part of your duties with the Secretary 
14 of State's office, chief deputy, with regards to 
15 elections, is to issue directives, instructions, and 
16 information to various election officials across the 
17 state, correct? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. At any time in -- let's just stay with, at any 
20 time in 2009 did you and/or anyone in the Secretary of 
21 State's office to your knowledge issue any directive or 
22 instruction to any State of Idaho county clerk that 
23 compliance with Idaho Code Section 34-1011 is not 
24 required? 
25 A. No. 
6 
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1 Q. Does the Secretary of State's database 
2 effectuate the re~irement of 34-1011? 
3 
4 
A. 
Q. 
No. 
With regards to Idaho Code 50-451, which is 
5 under the municipal code, did you or anyone to your 
6 knowledge as Idaho Secretary of State's office issue 
7 directive, instruction to any city or county clerk that 
8 compliance with 50-451 was not required? 
9 
10 
A. 
Q. 
No. 
Is the Secretary of State's database with 
11 regards to elections and voters, does it effectuate the 
12 purpose of 50-451? 
13 
14 
A. 
Q. 
No. 
Now, with regards to 50-451, which really in a 
15 sense -- it's up on the screen -- and it's basically the 
16 same as the requirements as far as record keeping as 
17 50-451, correct? 
18 
19 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Okay. So we'll just use it, it's there. 
20 Record of application for absentee ballots. Is that 
21 election specific? 
22 
23 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, it is. 
So for each election, a record of the 
24 applications for absentee ballots and all the other 
25 information is required under law to be kept? 
7 
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1 
2 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And if a record is kept for a specific 
3 election, it would start at a certain date, I suppose, 
4 maybe the date that absentee ballots are mailed out, 
5 Septe~ber 15th, or something like that. ~~d then at 
6 8:00 o'clock p.m. on election night, correct? 
7 A. No, because they still keep track of the 
8 number of the ballots that are received after the 
9 8:00 o'clock on election night. 
10 
11 
Q. 
A. 
Okay. 
They have to be kept in -- and marked as being 
12 voided or indicated that they weren't counted. 
13 Q. Okay. So the record would be open, but if 
14 there was a record under 50-451 or the other one, 
15 34-1011, that record would reflect all absentee ballots 
16 that were applied for, the date the application was 
17 made, the date when it was returned, and if it wasn't 
18 returned it would be so noted, correct? 
19 
20 
A. 
Q. 
It should, yes. 
It should. And by looking at that, then a 
21 person would be able to go in and say, Okay, from first 
22 day of absentee ballots to 8:00 o'clock on election day, 
23 November 3rd, 2009, these are the absentee ballots that 
24 were validly received, correct? 
25 A. If that was kept, yes. 
8 
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1 
2 
3 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
If it was kept according to statute? 
Yes. 
Okay. Now, I'll represent to you that the 
4 testimony in this matter has been to date that no such 
5 record other -- no such 50-451 record has been kept, 
6 okay? 
7 
8 
A. 
Q. 
Okay. 
I'll represent to you that the testimony to 
9 date is that reliance and use -- total reliance and use 
10 is with the Secretary of State's database, okay? 
11 MR. HAMAN: Object to the question. That 
12 misstates the testimony in this case, your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: I'll -- I'll note the objection 
14 but overrule it. You can go ahead. 
15 MR. KELSO: Q. So what is -- what are the 
16 purposes of these records, 50-451 and 34-1011? 
17 A. The main purpose of them is to make sure that 
18 people don't vote twice. There's a record that someone 
19 has if they have received an absentee ballot, they're 
20 not allowed to vote at the polls. 
21 
22 
Q. 
A. 
Any other purposes? 
It's also used to excuse me. It's also 
23 used to validate the number of -- or absentee ballots 
24 that are tabulated match the number of ballots that were 
25 received. 
9 
O 
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1 Q. So this record was required to be kept by 
2 state law as used to validate the number of absentee 
3 ballots received compared to the number of absentee 
4 ballots counted? 
5 7\ 
-'""'-· 
Yes. 
6 Q. Without such a record that reflects the end at 
7 8:00 o'clock p.m. on election night -- well, let's 
8 strike that. 
9 Can I see Exhibit 5, please. 
10 This is what's been admitted into Exhibit 5, 
11 Mr. Hurst. It's been identified as the Kootenai -- the 
12 absentee ballot report Kootenai and for the election 
13 date of November 3, 2009, City of Coeur d'Alene, City 
14 Precincts. And this document, Exhibit 5, the testimony 
15 reflects is the record that was developed, printed out 
16 from the Secretary of State's database on that date, 
17 November 6th, 2009. Okay? 
18 A. Okay. 
19 Q. Based upon this record, which has been 
20 authenticated and identified and we've established that 
21 ballots equal votes. It shows that 2047 absentee ballot 
22 applications were received, 2047 application ballots 
23 were issued, 2047 absentee ballots were returned, and 
24 five were voided. 
25 So based upon that information, is there any 
10 
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1 way that you're aware of that without this record 
2 50-451, City of Coeur d'Alene election officials, 
3 Kootenai County election officials could verify that any 
4 number of absentee ballots in excess of that 2047 were 
5 validly received? 
6 A. Unless they have a different report, no, 
7 there's not. 
8 Q. If you can show the witness Plaintiff's 
9 Exhibit 85, please. 
10 Showing you what's been admitted as 
11 Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 85, and this is a document that 
12 was generated at 11/4/09 at 9:58 a.m. and it reflects 
13 the number of ballots that were run through the ballot 
14 counting machine, okay, that reflects 2051. 
15 
16 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Okay. Does this document in and of itself, 
17 Exhibit No. 85, establish that all 2051 of those ballots 
18 that were counted were legally and validly received by 
19 8:00 a.m. on November 3rd, 2009? 
20 A. In and of itself, no. That tells how many 
21 ballots were counted. 
22 Q. If Exhibit 5, which is the report run on 
23 November 6th, 2009, reflects that a grand total of 2047 
24 absentee ballots were issued and there were no other 
25 reports such as Exhibit 5 prepared until after the 
11 
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1 canvas, based upon Exhibit 5 what would be -- just based 
2 on 5 without even getting into minutia, but based on 5, 
3 what would be the total number of absentee ballots that 
4 were legally and validly received for the November 3rd, 
5 2009, City of Coeur d'Alene election? 
6 MR. ERBLAND: Object to the form of the 
7 question. He's already testified that this is a dynamic 
8 database. 
9 THE COURT: Well, I'll let the witness presume 
10 he'll know what he's talking about, so I'll let him 
11 answer the question. 
12 THE WITNESS: If all of the -- if all of the 
13 information was entered when the ballot was received, it 
14 would indicate there was 2047. 
15 
16 A. 
17 entered. 
18 
19 
Q. 
A. 
MR. KELSO: Q. Received? 
If that's what was -- if they were all 
Okay. 
The system is only as good as the people who 
20 are entering the data. 
21 Q. Right. Would you agree that the only other 
22 document that would be of more significance or value in 
23 establishing how many legal, valid absentee ballots were 
24 received by 8:00p.m. on election night would be 
25 documented under 50-451? 
12 
0 p.
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1 
2 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
May I see Exhibit 8, please. I'm showing you 
3 what's been marked and admitted-- there's also an 8A 
4 and 8B. 
5 Why don't you just take a moment and take a 
6 look at that document. I don't know if you've seen it 
7 before or not, but just take a moment and read through 
8 it. 
9 
10 
A. 
Q. 
Okay. 
Now, with regards to Exhibit 8A, that's just a 
11 photocopy of the last page of 175 of Exhibit 5, correct? 
12 A. Apparently -- yes. 
13 Q. Okay. And I'll represent to you that as 
14 reflected by this exhibit, which is an affidavit of the 
15 chief election official for the City of Coeur d'Alene, 
16 that this 8B is the last page of an absentee ballot 
17 report Kootenai printed on 11/16/2009. Okay. 
18 
19 
A. 
Q. 
Okay. 
And it reflects that a total requested of 
20 2049, total issued 2049, total returned 2049, correct? 
21 
22 
A. 
Q. 
23 correct? 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And now that total it reflects seven voided, 
Yes. 
So if we look at those two, is there any way 
13 
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1 or is there a way -- not I suppose any way -- on the 
2 Secretary of State's database the number of 2047 in 8A 
3 would fluctuate to 8B's 2049? 
4 A. It would because on the 16th the way the 
5 report runs -- and I don't have the search criteria on 
6 these two reports. 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
It's right here. 
We have what Mr. English says it was. 
Well, that's what we have to believe. 
If, in fact, that's what it is. It's 
11 everything having to do with the November 3rd election 
12 that was received. And that would be the date is on the 
13 6th, it would be all the absentee ballots returned as of 
14 the 6th instead of as of the 3rd. So it would include 
15 additional ballots that were received after the election 
16 that were not counted. 
17 The same thing with the 16th. That would 
18 indicate additional ballots were also received after the 
19 election, and then it should say somewhere on the report 
20 whether or not they were counted. 
21 
22 
23 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Well 
Whether they were voided or not. 
Okay. And we've already gone through the 
24 testimony and established that on the 11/16, 8A, it 
25 reflects that five were voided out of the 2047. We've 
14 
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1 gone through and identified those five void ballots. 
2 
3 
A. 
Q. 
Okay. 
And then we also identified at page 66 a 
4 person by the name of Harris Patricia L., same voter ID 
5 number that reflects two votes for her, one of which 
6 should have been voided, okay. That's been established. 
7 Okay. 
8 
9 
10 
Okay. A. 
Q. So if we look at this which is the November --
November 6th report, it would reflect based upon that 
11 information I just told you, based upon your knowledge, 
12 what would be the total number of absentee ballots 
13 received for the November 3rd, 2006 -- November 3rd, 
14 2009, City of Coeur d'Alene general election that were 
15 valid? 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
2047. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
That were valid. It would be the ones on the 
Well, minus the voided? 
Minus the voided ones, yes. 
And minus the double vote, correct? 
Well, one of those. 
One of those, so ... 
It wasn't necessarily a double vote. It was 
24 issued two ballots. May not have been a consolidated 
25 ballot. 
15 
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1 Q. So without getting into the minutia of Harris 
2 Patricia L. or either of them were voided. This shows 
3 five votes, ballots were voided and that's the 
4 November 6th. So based upon the Secretary of State's 
5 database, how many absentee ballots were legally 
6 received that weren't voided on or before 8:00 p.m. on 
7 November 3rd, 2009? 
8 A. Again, I'd have to go back to say if all of 
9 the information was entered into the machine as they 
10 were received, it would have been that the 2057 minus 
11 the five. 
12 Q. 2047? 
13 A. 2047 minus the five, yes. 
14 Q. And you say now if all the information 
15 received was being entered, we know that the report done 
16 on 11/16, which is B, reflects that the total number of 
17 absentee ballots requested, issued and returned 
18 increased by two, correct? 
19 A. That's what it shows, yes. 
20 Q. But it also shows the same number, 2041, as 
' i . 
21 being validly issued and received, correct? 
22 A. That's what it shows, yes. 
23 Q. Now, looking at Plaintiff's Exhibit 85, which 
24 is the November 4th, '09, canvas that I've mentioned to 
25 you before. Based upon these documentations here, 
16 
, 
SC 38417-2011 Page 2564 of 2676
1 Exhibit 5 and Exhibit 8A and B, does the number 2051 
2 accurately reflect the total number of absentee ballots 
3 legally received and returned on or before 8~00 p.m. on 
4 November 3rd, 2009? 
5 A. It doesn't show doesn't match the nuwber 
6 that was entered as having been received. 
7 Q. So just the fact that there's a computer 
8 printout showing that 2051 ballots, absentee ballots 
9 were counted, that doesn't mean that they were legally 
10 received on or before 8~00 p.m. on November 3rd, 2009, 
11 correct? 
12 A. That's right. That alone doesn't show that. 
13 Q. So if we look at the Secretary of State's 
14 database, which is the only database that we apparently 
15 have available to us, it shows how many absentee ballots 
16 were legally received and returned on or before 
17 8~oo p.m. on November 3rd, 2009. 
18 A. It shows 2042 -- 2047, sorry. 
19 Q. And then you deduct from that five, for what? 
20 A. Five were voided. 
21 Q. So the total of legally received nonvoided 
22 absentee ballots that were received on or before 
23 8~00 p.m. on November 3rd, 2009, was 2042 according to 
24 that document, correct? 
25 A. According to the document, yes. 
17 
OO
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1 Q. And since we know that there is no document 
2 kept and prepared as required by state law under 34-1011 
3 or under 50-451 and the November 6th report, which is 
4 the 5th -- or excuse me, the 6th of November, is in 
5 existence, what is the only evidence available as to the 
6 total number of absentee ballots that were legally 
7 received on or before 8:00 p.m. on November 3rd, 2009? 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
14 correct? 
15 
16 
A. 
Q. 
The only evidence that I have seen is this. 
Is which exhibit? 
Exhibit 5. 
Okay. Exhibit 5? 
Yes. 
That's the -- okay. And that reflects 2042, 
Yes. 
And how many -- what's the difference in 
17 number between 2051 and 2042? 
18 
19 out. 
20 
21 
22 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Give me a calculator. I can't figure that 
Oh, come on. You want a pen? 
Nine. 
Should the election officials for the City of 
23 Coeur d'Alene maintain the record required under 50-451 
24 and 34-1011? 
25 A. We don't have -- Secretary of State's office 
18 
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1 doesn't have jurisdiction over Title 50 of the code. My 
2 opinion is since it says it in the code, they should 
3 maintain it. 
4 Q. And Mr. English testified that he felt the 
5 Secretary of State's office did have jurisdiction over 
6 municipal elections, but that aside, and let's pretend 
7 we're going under Title 34-1011, should a record 
8 required under 34-1011 be kept as required by statute? 
9 A. Yes, it should. 
10 Q. Is it improper for a record as required under 
11 34-1011 to not be kept? 
12 
13 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Is it improper for a record required under 
14 50-451 to not be kept? 
15 
16 
A. Yes. 
MR. KELSO: If I could have just a moment, 
17 your Honor, I think I'm finished with this witness. 
18 
19 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. KELSO: Q. Do you have an opinion as the 
20 chief deputy for the Secretary of State's office 
21 regarding elections as to whether or not it would be a 
22 failure of an official's duty, the clerk, to keep those 
23 two records, 50-451 and 34-1011? 
24 A. Apparently not doing his duty if he doesn't 
25 keep them. 
19 
r
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1 MR. KELSO: That's all the questions I have, 
2 your Honor. 
3 
4 
5 
THE COURT: Any cross-examination? 
MR. ERBLAND: Yes, sir. 
CROSS-EXM4INATION BY 
6 
7 
8 
9 
MR. ERBLAND: 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Good morning, Mr. Hurst. 
Hello. 
You testified that the -- first of all, I 
10 think we've heard it a number of times and I'll just 
11 verify it, the Secretary of State's database is dynamic 
12 and it changes, correct? 
13 
14 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, it is. 
So even Exhibit No. 5 that shows 2047, isn't 
15 necessarily accurate because there could have been data 
16 entries inputted by another county removing voters from 
17 that list, correct? 
18 
19 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
So even to say that it's 2047 or 2042 isn't 
20 necessarily accurate, is it? 
21 
22 
A. 
Q. 
That's true. 
All right. And that is because of the dynamic 
23 nature of the list and because of data entry that could 
24 remove or add voters at the time that that list was 
25 created? 
20 
E
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1 
2 
3 
A. It wouldn't add any, but it might remove them. 
MR. KELSO: I'm sorry, what was that? 
THE WITNESS: It wouldn't add any, but it 
4 might remove them. 
5 MR. ERBLAND: Q. Okay. And so that could 
6 explain the reduction in the numbers, correct? 
7 
8 
9 you? 
10 
11 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Exhibit No. 85, do you have that in front of 
Yes. 
That shows how many -- how many ballots, 
12 absentee ballots were counted for this election. 
13 
14 
15 
16 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
It shows there were 2051. 
2051? 
Yes. 
And you said -- you haven't seen all the 
17 evidence in this case, correct? 
18 
19 
A. 
Q. 
That's correct. 
The Secretary of State handles recounts for 
20 certain elections, correct? 
21 
22 
23 
24 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, well, the attorney general does --
Okay. 
-- with our assistance. 
Okay. If you wanted to know -- if you wanted 
25 to look at the original evidence, the real evidence of 
21 
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1 what was run, wouldn't you look at the ballots? 
2 A. That's the purpose of the recount is to count 
3 the ballots, yes. 
4 Q. So even a report pursuant to Idaho Code 
5 Section 34-1011, isn't itself necessarily accurate, is 
6 it? 
7 
8 
A. 
Q. 
State that again. 
Sure. Reports, a report pursuant to Idaho 
9 Code Section 34-1011 is dependent upon the accuracy of 
10 the person who's creating the entry, correct? 
11 
12 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, that's correct. 
All right. So when there is a recount or 
13 there's an inquiry as to what really happened, isn't the 
14 best thing to do -- and I know you haven't seen this 
15 evidence -- but isn't the best evidence of that is the 
16 ballots themselves? 
17 
18 
A. 
Q. 
As far as the count, it's the ballots itself. 
Yes. So if you wanted to know whether or not 
19 in fact there were 2051 absentee ballots, you could -- a 
20 person could actually count those ballots, correct? 
21 A. Yes, that would that's right. 
22 Q. All right. And if you wanted to know how many 
23 ballots were actually returned, received, you could look 
24 at the envelopes, correct? 
25 A. Yes. 
22 
SC 38417-2011 Page 2570 of 2676
1 
2 
3 
4 it? 
5 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
And count them? 
Yes. 
And that would be the best evidence, wouldn't 
That would tell you how many were received. 
6 It would not necessarily tell you -- I mean, there's a 
7 number of things you need to look at. 
8 Q. Okay. What else would you look at? 
9 A. Well, if it was -- if you look at the 
10 envelope -- you need to look at the poll book also to 
11 compare that to see if it was in fact counted 
12 
13 
Q. 
A. 
Okay. 
-- if it was valid or not valid. To look at 
14 the date on the envelope and then an envelope should 
15 specify when it was received 
16 
17 
18 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Right. 
-- and counted. 
Right. And then are there also sometimes --
19 in your experience, are there daily reports that clerks 
20 make when they get absentee ballots in, saying going 
21 through that step, looking at the signature, verifying 
22 that there's a registration, comparing the signature on 
23 the registration with the return envelope? 
24 A. Yes. In fact, that's what generates this 
25 report. 
23 
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1 Q. Okay. 
2 A. Those should be maintained and they would 
3 have that would have a daily transaction of 
4 everything that happened. 
5 Q. Okay. So you could take those daily reports 
6 and compile those and then you would know how many came 
7 in, right? 
8 A. Yes, yes. If they were -- again, if they were 
9 all entered correctly. 
10 Q. Sure. And it's dependent upon the entry, 
11 correct? 
12 A. Yes, it is. 
13 Q. Any report is. The Secretary's database, the 
14 54-1011, the daily reports, it's all dependent upon the 
15 accuracy of the clerk doing the job; is that correct? 
16 
17 
A. 
Q. 
That's right. 
But when it's all said and done, if we want to 
18 know how many ballots were actually run through the 
19 machine we count them, don't we? 
20 
21 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And it's -- I think I may have asked this 
22 question, but I'll just ask anyway. But was your office 
23 asked to get involved at all in examining any of this 
24 original evidence existing of the ballots or the return 
25 envelopes? 
24 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
No. 
Or the applications? 
No. 
Or the registrations? 
No. 
Okay. Just a couple of other points I want to 
7 ask you about. 
8 There have been a number of affidavits that 
9 have been submitted. I understand that you've -- see if 
10 this refreshes your memory that you -- it's your 
11 affidavit to the effect that while municipal elections 
12 are governed by Idaho Code Title 50, Chapter 4, these 
13 elections are also governed by applicable provisions in 
14 Title 34? 
15 
16 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
All right. Mr. Hurst, on a different topic, I 
17 understand that you've also given opinions on whether or 
18 not certain questioned voters were lawfully registered 
19 to vote in accordance with state law? 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
A. Yes. 
MR. 
THE 
THE 
MR. 
ERBLAND: 
COURT: 
WITNESS: 
ERBLAND: 
May I approach the witness? 
Certainly. 
Okay. 
Q. Have you had a chance to 
25 look at the document I've just handed you? 
25 
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1 
2 
3 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes. 
And could you identify it, please, sir. 
It's a letter that I wrote to Dan English, 
4 Kootenai County Clerk, regarding the eligibility or 
5 the -- for four people to be registered to vote in 
6 Idaho. 
7 
8 
9 
10 
MR. ERBLAND: Have that marked, please. 
MR. KELSO: I think it's already in. 
MR. ERBLAND: What number is it? 
MR. KELSO: I was just checking. Might be 
11 90 -- 94. No, not it? 
12 MR. ERBLAND: No, it's a letter. That's an 
13 affidavit. Was it attached? 
14 
15 
MR. KELSO: It's attached to the affidavit. 
MR. ERBLAND: Ah, let me check that. Could 
16 you hand me 94? It's not ... 
17 
18 
MR. KELSO: Go ahead. 
MR. ERBLAND: Then we'll just go ahead and 
19 have this marked as next consecutive exhibit. 
20 (Exhibit K identified.) 
21 MR. ERBLAND: Q. Mr. Hurst, now what is 
22 marked as Exhibit A -- and I'll move for its admission. 
23 
24 
25 
MR. KELSO: Exhibit K. 
MR. ERBLAND: K, excuse me. 
MR. KELSO: No objection. 
26 
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1 THE COURT: Okay. Defendant's K is admitted, 
2 but why don't we identify it for purposes of the record. 
3 (Exhibit K admitted.) 
4 
5 
6 
Q. 
A. 
MR. ERBLAND: Okay. 
Go ahead. 
It's a letter from me, Timothy Hurst, to Dan 
7 English, Kootenai County Clerk, regarding the 
8 qualifications of Tammy Farkes, Monica Pacquin, Gregory 
9 Profft, and Alan Friend to be registered to vote in 
10 Idaho -- qualified to register. 
11 
12 
13 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
14 opinion? 
15 
16 
17 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
And was that your opinion? 
Yes, it is. 
And does the letter state the basis for your 
Yes, it does. 
And what is the basis of your opinion? 
The -- when someone is outside of the United 
18 States or outside of Kootenai County and they're away 
19 for temporary purposes with the intent of making 
20 Kootenai County their home, that they're still allowed 
21 to vote absentee ballots, is roughly it. 
22 Q. And you cited the Constitution and the 
23 applicable statute, correct? 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And the judge can read that and actually 
27 
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1 that's part of the judge's job here, so --however, you 
2 are the -- you are representing the Secretary of State, 
3 correct? 
4 
5 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And it is your -- part of your duties to offer 
6 opinions on this kind of matter, correct? 
7 
8 
9 
10 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
You do it on a regular basis? 
Yes. 
And based upon your review of the 
11 registration, it's your opinion that Tammy Farkes, 
12 Monica Pacquin, Gregory Profft and Alan Friend were 
13 registered to vote in accordance with state law? 
14 
15 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And they were entitled to vote by absentee 
16 ballots in this election? 
17 
18 had. 
19 
A. Yes. And that was based on the information I 
MR. ERBLAND: I understand. That's all the 
20 questions I have. Thank you, sir. 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 Exhibit K. 
THE COURT: Anything by the city? 
MR. HAMAN: No questions. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Any redirect? 
MR. KELSO: Thank you. Can we have that last 
28 
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RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION BY 1 
2 
3 
MR. KELSO: 
Q. Now, you qualified your statement to 
4 Mr. Erbland based upon the information you had 
5 available. What information was provided to you? 
6 A. Actually had a copy of voter registration 
7 records, as I recall. 
8 Q. So you had a copy of the voter registration 
9 card for each one of those persons, correct? 
10 A. As I recall, I had a copy of that from 
11 Kootenai County, yes. 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Okay. That was it? 
Yes. 
Okay. Can we see 50? 
While we're waiting. Looking at your letter, 
16 you're looking at -- excuse me, Mr. Reed, I'm talking. 
17 Your letter, Exhibit K, states -- refers to 
18 Idaho Code 34-1075, correct --
19 
20 
A. 
Q. 
21 correct? 
22 
23 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
-- as the basis of your opinion; is that 
Based on the residency, yes. 
Based upon the residency. And I don't think I 
24 have 34-307 on the slide, we'll talk about this one in 
25 just a minute, but will you take a look at that for a 
29 
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1 second. I'm sure you're familiar with it. 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. And the code section that you cite, 34-1075, 
4 specifically provides for residency in the state or 
5 county, correct? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. It doesn't apply to municipalities -- it 
8 doesn't mention municipalities, does it? 
9 A. Because there's only one voter registration 
10 system and one method to vote, to register, and that's 
11 only with the county. 
12 Q. But it doesn't mention that, does it, 
13 municipal? 
14 A. No, it doesn't mention that. 
15 Q. Are you familiar with the requirements of the 
16 Idaho Code Section 50-402 as to who is a qualified 
17 elector for a municipal election? 
18 
19 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Now, when you say you're familiar with it, as 
20 you sit here without looking at it, and I'll do that, 
21 but can you tell us what the residency requirements are 
22 for a person to be qualified to vote in a municipal 
23 election as opposed to a county or state election? 
24 A. You have to be 18 years of age. The same as 
25 in a county election, 18 years of age. 
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1 
2 
Q. 
A. 
No, as a city. 
Eighteen years of age. A citizen of the 
3 United States. Resident of the city for 30 days prior 
4 to the election. 
5 
6 
7 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Okay. 
Or annexed in. 
So the difference between state and county is 
8 that you only have to be a resident of the state or the 
9 county and all those requirements, correct? 
10 
11 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
To be a resident lawfully entitled to vote in 
12 a municipal election you just testified you have to be a 
13 resident of the city for 30 days prior to the election, 
14 correct? 
15 
16 
A. 
Q. 
That's right. 
So just because a person is a resident for 
17 county voting purposes or state purposes or national 
18 purposes, if they're not a resident of the City of Coeur 
19 d'Alene, they don't qualify under that statute, do they? 
20 
21 
A. 
Q. 
Under the statute, no. 
I'm thinking maybe 92B, it's the voter 
22 registration form. Yeah, that's it. Great. 
23 Showing you what's been admitted into evidence 
24 as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 95. It's been testified here 
25 previously that this is the voter registration card that 
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1 is used by Kootenai County and was used in 2009 and it's 
2 one approved by Secretary of State's office. 
3 
4 
5 
6 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
So would you agree with all those things? 
Yes. 
Okay. Now, under penalty of perjury, when a 
7 person comes to register, does that document ask them 
8 whether they are a resident of the city in which they're 
9 seeking, in this case, a resident of the City of Coeur 
10 d'Alene? 
11 
12 
A. 
Q. 
No, it doesn't. 
It only says a resident of the State of Idaho 
13 or the county for 30 days, correct? 
14 
15 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And I believe we just established that in 
16 order to be a lawfully registered voter entitled to vote 
17 lawfully, the person has to be a resident of the City of 
18 Coeur d'Alene for at least 30 days prior to the 
19 election, correct? 
20 
21 
22 
A. 
Q. 
According to that statute. 
Well, that's the law we have, isn't it? 
MR. ERBLAND: Your Honor, I think we can save 
23 some time. We agree that the person has to be a 
24 resident of the City of Coeur d'Alene for voting 
25 purposes 30 days before the election. We don't disagree 
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1 with that. 
2 
3 Q. 
MR. KELSO: Well, great. Then let's move on. 
Were you provided any information that 
4 established to you -- do I have your letter? Did I 
5 steal it? 
6 
7 
A. 
Q. 
I gave it back. 
Let me see that Exhibit K, again. Here it is. 
8 I knew I had it somewhere. Too many papers. 
9 Now, this Defense Exhibit K, and you indicated 
10 that you were provided with the voter registration cards 
11 for those voters, correct? 
12 
13 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Okay. And those voter registration cards that 
14 you were provided, would have been the same as or 
15 similar to Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 95, correct? 
16 
17 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And they would have said that under penalty of 
18 law they're certifying that they're a resident of Idaho 
19 and the county for 30 days, correct? 
20 
21 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And it doesn't say they're a resident of Coeur 
22 d'Alene, correct? 
23 
24 
A. 
Q. 
That's right. 
So were you provided any information when you 
25 wrote that letter that showed you or you reviewed that 
33 
SC 38417-2011 Page 2581 of 2676
1 reflected that each and every one of those persons 
2 identified, Tammy Farkes, Monica Pacquin, Gregory Profft 
3 and Alan Friend, were residents of the City of Coeur 
4 d'Alene prior to November 3rd, 2009? 
5 A. According to the addresses that were on the 
6 card, as I recall, the address said that they were. Had 
7 a Coeur d'Alene address. 
8 
9 
Q. 
A. 
Okay. 
With a different mailing address. I'm 
10 speaking from memory, so I don•t know for sure. 
11 Q. And we can -- we can talk about some of that, 
12 but let's take -- let's take just one of those. 
13 
14 
15 Profft. 
16 
17 
MR. ERBLAND: How about Monica Pacquin? 
MR. KELSO: I think we'll start with Gregory 
MR. ERBLAND: Okay. 
MR. KELSO: Q. Gregory Profft is a person --
18 and Defendant Kennedy has offered his affidavit, is a 
19 soldier overseas. He lived in Post Falls, Idaho. Okay. 
20 At no time did he ever live in the City of Coeur 
21 d'Alene. None. How could Mr. Profft be a considered 
22 under any law a resident of the City of Coeur d'Alene? 
23 
24 
A. He should not have been. 
MR. ERBLAND: We'll stipulate to that. Of who 
25 he voted for. 
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1 MR. KELSO: You want to stipulate to Pacquin 
2 and Friend? 
3 THE COURT: Actually, the Court's not going to 
4 accept stipulations by counsel. Counsel really can't 
5 even get along where they act professionally in open 
6 court, so the Court is not going to do stipulations 
7 unless the Court adopts the stipulation precisely. 
8 Because people are saying, "I'm stipulating to that," 
9 and making a snide remark and then it's accepted. So 
10 the Court is accepting no stipulations by counsel 
11 without the Court affirmatively accepting it on the 
12 record because I'm not going to buy into anything 
13 counsel are saying back and forth between each other 
14 because of the nature of the way this proceeding is 
15 being handled by counsel. 
16 So stipulations are meaningless unless you get 
17 the Court to expressly buy into it, unless all counsel 
18 begin to change their behavior, which I don't foresee. 
19 MR. KELSO: Let's roll down to a residence 
20 definition. Keep going. I want to go down to three, 
21 four. Just down to where it defines how you determine 
22 residency. It's right under "C. Qualified Elector." D 
23 is "Residence." 
24 Now, I'll represent to you that we've had 
25 testimony already with regards to this Idaho Code 
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1 section and you can see that residence for voting 
2 purposes "shall be the principal or primary home or 
3 place of abode of a person," correct? You agree with 
4 that? 
5 A. Yes. No. 2 also says they don't lose their 
6 residence if they're out of the city for temporary 
7 purposes. 
8 Q. Right. Let me go further. "Principal or 
9 primary home or place of abode is that home or place in 
10 which his habitation is fixed." And in the testimony 
11 that means a house or apartment or something of that 
12 nature. They're planning on Teturning. 
13 
14 A. 
Would you agree with that? 
It depends on the situation. There are other 
15 situations you go through for residency. It's not 
16 clear-cut. In fact, if you look at the Constitution, if 
17 someone's out of the country in military service, he's 
18 not considered lost of residency. 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Let's take out military. 
Okay. 
Just citizen. 
THE COURT: Well, soldiers are a citizen, so 
23 you're going to have to take soldiers out. 
24 
25 
MR. KELSO: I limited it to just 
THE COURT: What good is this going to do me? 
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1 Are we going to have such a person testify in open 
2 court, and if so how are we going to know the specifics 
3 asking this witness, who's very knowledgeable and whose 
4 opinion I certainly respect, academic questions about 
5 somebody who has different situations isn't getting me 
6 anywhere because nobody's testified to anything 
7 specifically that gives us any evidence that anybody can 
8 talk about. 
9 And so it's no disrespect for this -- to this 
10 witness, but he's being asked to give opinions on 
11 something that just flat doesn't matter. So let's go on 
12 to something -- until we get some evidence that we can 
13 work with maybe we shouldn't be asking these questions. 
14 
15 Q. 
MR. KELSO: Okay. 
What is the best evidence that you have seen 
16 by either myself, Mr. Erbland or anything else, the best 
17 evidence of the number of valid absentee ballots that 
18 were received by City of Coeur d'Alene on or before 
19 November 3rd, 2009? 
20 MR. ERBLAND: Objection. Asked and answered. 
21 Cumulative. 
22 THE COURT: Well, also best evidence is a 
23 decision made by the Court and so it's hard for me to 
24 imagine how this has any relevance to anything. 
25 Assuming you're just using it in a lay person version 
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1 I'll overrule the objection and let the witness answer 
2 the question if he can. 
3 THE WITNESS: Based upon the evidence I've 
4 seen today in court, it's the absentee ballot report. 
5 
6 
7 
A. 
Q. 
iviR. KELSO: Q. Of what date? 
The 6th. 
November 6th, 2009. You mentioned when an 
8 absentee ballot comes back it should be stamped with 
9 some information, date and time? 
10 A. When it was received in the mail it should be 
11 stamped with date and time. 
12 Q. When an absentee ballot is received in the 
13 mail it should 
14 
15 
A. 
Q. 
The envelope is. 
The envelope containing it should be stamped 
16 date and time received, correct? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. If you have -- if you don't have an absentee 
19 ballot envelope with -- and they usually contain the 
20 person's name and a signature on the back, correct? 
21 A. Yes. The -- if it doesn't have a signature 
22 it's not counted. 
23 Q. Right. But what I'm saying is that, okay, 
24 it's got the person's name and then a signature on it, 
25 usually on the back of the envelope, correct? 
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1 
2 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Okay. If that return envelope is -- does not 
3 have a date and time of receipt stamp on it, what proof 
4 is there of when it was received? 
5 
6 
A. 
Q. 
There isn't any proof on that. 
There is no proof. The only possible proof 
7 that maybe I'm aware of is that somebody can look at the 
8 Secretary of State's database and see what it says, 
9 correct? 
10 MR. ERBLAND: I hesitate to object, but I 
11 think he's asking for speculation of this witness 
12 because a clerk could make an independent daily report 
13 or log. It's not -- it's not relevant to what the Court 
14 needs to decide. 
15 THE COURT: Well, I'll certainly agree it's 
16 not relevant. But I'll go ahead and let him ask the 
17 question. 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
THE WITNESS: You'll have to ask it again. 
MR. KELSO: Go ahead and read it back, please. 
(Whereupon, the record was read as follows: 
"Question: The only possible proof that maybe 
I'm aware of is that somebody can look at the 
Secretary of State's database and see what it 
says, correct?" ) 
THE WITNESS: I'm not sure it's the only 
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1 possible thing I've seen to date. 
2 MR. KELSO: Q. Okay. And we know that stuff 
3 can be entered into and taken out of that database 
4 pretty much anytime, correct, by county officials or 
5 city officials? 
6 MR. HAMAN: Objection. There's no evidence 
7 city officials had any way to access it. 
8 THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection. 
9 THE WITNESS: I'd qualify what do you mean by 
10 taking away? 
11 MR. KELSO: Q. Let's just say added to. 
12 A. To be added to or if it's moved to -- if they 
13 register at a different location, then the information 
14 as far as their absentee voting history is then taken 
15 away. 
16 Q. Okay. 
17 A. But the system also does not allow you to 
18 enter new absentee voter information after the date of 
19 the election as far as issuing any ballots. 
20 Q. As far as issuing new ballots? l i . 
21 A. Yeah. 
22 Q. Okay. That's fine. Okay. I think you 
23 testified that if daily reports are kept, those daily 
24 reports should because of the input process, add up to 
25 the figure on Exhibit 5; is that correct? 
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1 
2 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Now, you also testified that if people -- you 
3 can turn that off now, Matt, I'm sorry. 
4 If people change their residence, just take an 
5 example, somebody who was a resident of the City of 
6 Coeur d'Alene votes in the City of Coeur d'Alene 
7 election, whether absentee or whether in person. If 
8 that person moves and establishes a residence someplace 
9 else, like in Ada County, then that person's information 
10 would be deleted from Kootenai County and would show up 
11 in the other county, correct? 
12 A. If he registered to vote in Ada County then 
13 the information moves to Ada County. 
14 Q. Okay. Did you or anyone in the Secretary of 
15 State's office conduct any search or inquiry as to 
16 whether or not anybody who voted was reflected as having 
17 voted in the 2009 election, whether it was in person at 
18 the poll or absentee in person or by the mail, had moved 
19 and established a voting presence at another location? 
20 
21 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And how many people -- did you determine how 
22 many people had done that? 
23 A. We did determine the number of people who 
24 moved outside of and registered outside of Kootenai 
25 County. 
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1 Q. Outside of Kootenai County, not necessarily 
2 Coeur d'Alene, but Kootenai County as a whole? 
3 A. The people -- we looked at the number of 
4 people who voted in the city election. 
Q. 
A. 
Okay. 
Who had voter history for that city election 
5 
6 
7 that moved that registered outside of Kootenai 
8 County. 
9 
10 
11 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Okay. And what was that number? 
There were four. 
Four. So we know that since this since 
12 this is an absentee ballot report, were you able to 
13 determine whether they had voted absentee or at the 
14 polling precinct? 
15 
16 
A. 
Q. 
No. 
Okay. Perhaps you -- I don't know where my 
17 markers went -- I'll represent to you that if we presume 
18 that all four of those people that are documented as 
19 having moved out of the City of Coeur d'Alene voted by 
20 absentee, okay, ask you to presume that, in the 
21 election. And ask you to presume that based upon the 
22 testimony of what Exhibit 5 reflects that the actual 
23 valid number of absentee ballots based upon Exhibit 5 
24 was 2041. If we presume that all those people were 
25 absentee that moved, just for the sake of argument, and 
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1 we add four to 2041, that's 2045, correct? 
2 
3 
A. 
Q. 
Under your assumptions, yes. 
So even if we assume all that's as high as we 
4 want, there's still a six vote difference between the 
5 2051 counted and the information reflected on Exhibit 5, 
6 yes? 
7 
8 
A. 
Q. 
Under your assumption, yes. 
If we have a returned absentee ballot 
9 envelope, okay, and let's presume that the returned 
10 absentee ballot envelope has a ballot in it, okay. If 
11 there's isn't a date and time of receipt stamp on there, 
12 on that ballot, can that information be added into the 
13 Secretary of State's database after November 3, 2009, 
14 8:00p.m.? 
15 A. As having been received? Is that what you're 
16 asking? 
17 Q. As having been received. Let's just say it 
18 was received on the 4th, okay. Would it automatically 
19 show that that was entered in on the 4th or would it 
20 just indicate received -- I'm talking about anyone that 
21 you can look at the date and time and verify? 
22 A. And if a copy of the envelope isn't in the 
23 database, it's whatever the clerk enters. 
24 Q. Okay. So the -- since the in our example, 
25 an envelope that doesn't have a date or time stamp on 
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1 it, the clerk can enter any date or time into the state 
2 database; is that correct? 
3 A. No, the database doesn't hold the time. They 
4 enter the date, not the time. 
5 Q. Okay. So they just put the date in. So I 
6 guess what --
7 A. Actually, when they scan it -- for example, if 
8 they're using the bar code and scan it in, it 
9 automatically puts it in. 
10 Q. Okay. So take an absentee ballot that doesn't 
11 have a bar code and doesn't have a date or time stamp on 
12 it. That -- and it was received after the 3rd, it was 
13 received on or after November 4th, 2009, a person with 
14 access to the City of Coeur d'Alene, Kootenai County 
15 terminals and the Secretary of State's database, could 
16 enter in that ballot as having been received sometime 
17 before November 3rd, correct? 
18 A. I don't believe so, but I don't know the 
19 answer to that. I think it limits. I don't know. 
20 
21 
Q. Okay. Susan Smith's disk reflecting the 
9/24 run -- or 11/24. I just want to clarify if a 
22 person's putting information into the Secretary of 
23 State's database, they would add information, correct, 
24 they wouldn't remove information? 
25 A. Yes. 
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1 Q. Okay. Let's scroll down all the way to the 
2 bottom and over to the side and showing the dates of 
3 receipts. Is that all the way at the bottom there? 
4 You can see, Mr. Hurst, based upon this, this 
5 report prints out -- and we can scroll back up if you 
6 want, but it prints out by date received. 
7 A. That's an Excel spreadsheet that didn't come 
8 out of the database. It was exported and put into an 
9 Excel spreadsheet. The database itself didn't generate 
10 that. 
11 Q. Oh, okay. 
12 A. They may have used an extract file from a 
13 database to generate it. 
14 Q. The only reason I'm -- the testimony was that 
15 this information came off the Secretary of State's 
16 database on November 24th. 
17 A. An extract of the file that was then put into 
18 that format, yes. 
19 Q. So the format they used reflected a running 
20 chronology, timeframe of votes, we go clear up to the 
21 very first date and come down. Alls I was trying to 
22 point out, and apparently it doesn't mean anything, is 
23 the 11/4s and 5s counting 7 are at the bottom. I 
24 just that doesn't mean anything? 
25 A. Apparently it was sorted by the date it was 
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1 received and those were received after the election. 
2 Q. Okay. And date received is the date in the 
3 case of the absentee ballots that doesn't have a date 
4 or -- a date at all on the return envelope, is whatever 
5 date the person inputs into the database, correct? 
6 
7 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
So as I'm understanding your testimony, the --
8 a ballot, an absentee ballot conceivably could be 
9 received on 11/4 and that absentee ballot return 
10 envelope not have any sort of stamp on it indicated that 
11 it was received at all, but let's say it was received on 
12 the 4th. Your testimony is that a person operating one 
13 of these database computers could take that ballot and 
14 indicate that it had been received on or before 
15 November 3rd? 
16 A. I don't -- I don't believe it could do that. 
17 I don't know for sure on that. 
18 Q. Okay. Okay. Now, we talked -- we didn't. 
19 Mr. Erbland talked about a recount, correct, mentioned 
20 about a recount? 
21 
22 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Okay. I want to talk about a recount. Isn't 
23 it true that under the Idaho state law in existence in 
24 2009 that a recount merely consists of taking the ballot 
25 stack and -- from the election on the 3rd, that stack of 
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1 ballots and then running them through the computer again 
2 to count and see if the number's correct? 
3 
4 
A. 
Q. 
Basically it does, yes. 
Yeah. That recount, assuming that a recount 
5 had been done and the machine operated properly, the 
6 only thing that that recount would have done was reflect 
7 whether or not the number of counted absentee ballots 
8 that were put through the machine on election night was 
9 2051, correct? 
Yes. 10 
11 
A. 
Q. It wouldn't have changed any of this 
12 information in Exhibit 5, which shows which absentee 
13 ballots were legally received on or before November 3rd, 
14 would it? 
15 A. No. That's for the election contest statute 
16 under Chapter 20. 
17 Q. That's what -- that's what election contests 
18 are for, right? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. That's what these are for. Oh, I'm just 
21 looking here. Exhibit 47, please. 
22 Showing you what's been marked and admitted 
23 into evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 7 and take a 
24 moment and read through it and we will talk about it in 
25 just a second. 
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1 
2 
A. 
Q. 
Okay. 
Mr. McHugh, the prosecuting attorney for 
3 Kootenai County, testified with regards to that. Said 
4 he got an inquiry on November 16th saying there's a 
5 difference between the EY~ibit 85, 2051, and the 
6 Exhibit 5, 2047, reflecting 2042 valid votes. Do you 
7 see that? 
8 
9 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Okay. So there was a little discussion. 
10 Ultimately, Mr. McHugh wrote back to Mr. Spencer and 
11 said, Well, in this case, if you're concerned about it 
12 you ought to file an election contest, right? 
13 
14 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And that's just exactly the same advice that 
15 you would have given, correct? 
16 
17 
A. Yes. 
MR. ERBLAND: I -- I have to object on the 
18 basis of relevance. I think that's why we're here. 
19 THE COURT: Court and counsel is -- I've lost 
20 control of this trial. And counsel are not taking any 
21 attention to the Court's comments as to how we need to 
22 proceed, and so at the close of evidence today we will 
23 meet with counsel and we will start talking about time 
24 limits. It's very artificial, but I've got to regain 
25 control of this trial and I can't apparently influence 
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1 the attorneys by comments. 
2 So we are going to go with time limits and 
3 counsel better be prepared to address that issue because 
4 it's clear that, at least right at this point, the 
5 Court's having to conclude that nothing else is going to 
6 work. 
7 MR. KELSO: Your Honor, I would respond to 
8 that defendants have filed documents claiming that 
9 THE COURT: You will have plenty of time to 
10 respond about it. 
11 MR. KELSO: -- it's a frivolous election 
12 contest. 
13 THE COURT: When I'm imposing time limits, I'm 
14 certain you will be objecting strenuously, but there's 
15 just no other way to get this case going at this point 
16 as far as I can tell. 
17 At any rate, the objection will be overruled 
18 and we're going to deal with this by the only tool the 
19 Court knows it has, so go ahead. 
20 
21 
MR. KELSO: That's all I have. 
THE COURT: All right. Well, I believe that 
22 was redirect and so I think you may step down. 
23 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
24 (End of Timothy Hurst's examination.) 
25 
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1 STATE OF IDAHO 
2 SS: REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
3 
4 I, Valerie Nunemacher, a notary public and 
5 duly certified court reporter in and for the State of 
6 Idaho, DO HEREBY CERTIFY: 
7 That the foregoing proceedings was taken on 
8 the date and at the time and place herein stated; 
9 That the foregoing is a true and correct 
10 transcription, to the best of my ability, of my 
11 shorthand notes taken down at said time and place in the 
12 above-entitled litigation; 
13 I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not related to any of 
14 the parties or attorneys to this litigation and have no 
15 interest in the outcome of said litigation. 
16 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my 
17 hand this 5th day of December 2010. 
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STARR KELSO 
Attorney at Law #2445 
P.O. Box 1312 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Tel: 208-765-3260 
Fax: 208-664-6261 
Attorney for Plaintiff Brannon 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JIM BRANNON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 
a municipal corporation, et.al. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-09-10010 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
REGARDING UOCAV A 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff Jim Brannon, by and through his attorney, and hereby submits 
for the Court's review and consideration a portion of a paper being prepared by MatthewS. 
Kelso in fulfillment of one requirement of his Whitworth University constitutional law class. It 
addresses relevant case law on UOCA VA. 
The particular relevance of this filing is with regards to the Court's comment at it could 
:fmd no applicable case law, held that it held UOCA VA was meant to be applied equally to a 
citizen's right to vote absentee, and that therefore this Court would not differentiate the right to 
vote absentee based upon whether an election was federal, state or municipal. 
DA1Ert'~ecember, 2010. 
Starr Kelso, Attorney for Plaintiff Brannon 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: A copy was served by hand delivery to Defendants City and 
Weathers attorney Michael Haman and Defendant Kennedy's attorneys Scott Reed and Peter 
Erbland on e 6th day of December, 2010. 
lcLG--
Starr Kelso 
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UOCAVA NOT APPLICABLE 10 A STATE'S STATUTES GOVERNING MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS 
THE UNIFORMED AND OVERSEAS CITIZENS ABSENTEE VOTING ACT 
Congress extended federal voting rights to American citizens living abroad-persons 
formerly citizens of a state who reside outside of the U.S.-through the passage of the 
Uniformed and Overseas Absentee Voting Act in 1986 (hereafter referred to as ''the Act" or 
"UOCAVA"). The Act replaced the Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955, which extended the 
right to vote to armed service members and their families, and the Overseas Citizens Voting 
Rights Act of 1975, which further extended federal voting rights to private citizens living outside 
of the United States. UOCAVA mandates that states allow for a citizen formerly a resident state, 
who moves outside the U.S., the right to vote by absentee ballot in federal elections held in the 
citizen's previous state of residence. 1 Citizens protected by the Act include 
(1) members of the uniformed services on active duty who, because of their membership 
in the service, are absent from their place of residence, and are otherwise qualified to 
vote; (2) the spouses and dependents of these uniformed services voters who are absent 
with them; and (3) qualified voters who are absent from the United States, whether they 
are civilians or in the uniformed servicei (emphasis added). 
The Act broadly defmes "overseas voters" to include any person ''who resides outside the United 
States and (but for such residence) would be qualified to vote in the last place in which the 
person was domiciled before leaving the United States."3 
Apart from the power to prevent unconstitutional discriminatory conduct, the 
Constitution leaves Congress little room to interfere in the States' conduct of their elections. 
1 Romeu v. Cohen, 121 F.Supp.2d 264 (S.D.N. Y. 2000) 
2 UOCAVA statute 
3 lbid 
1 
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UOCAVA NOT APPLICABLE 10 A STATE'S STATUTES GOVERNING MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS 
Congress may regulate the times, places and manner of congressional elections and set both the 
time of choosing presidential electors and the day for counting the Electoral but otherwise the 
electoral process is a state matter. The Constitution specifically grants States the power to set 
qualifications for voting, and the Supreme Cou..rt has long approved residency requirements: 
In the U.S. District Court case Igartua De La Rosa v. United States the Court emphasized 
that the Constitution does not by its terms grant citizens the right to vote, but instead leaves the 
matter entirely to the States.4 The Rosa Court addressed UOCAVA, and said that the Act does 
not establish the sole criteria for absentee voting, but rather grants states the ability to allow 
additional classes of people to vote by absentee ballot. Furthermore, the Court said that "the Act 
recognizes that states may impose additional requirements on absentee voters as long as these are 
not inconsistent with federal law ... the issue of whether they are qualified voters would be one to 
be determined by the states where they previously resided. "5 Rosa also differentiates between 
what kinds of elections are provided for by UOCA VA, and says that the Act "grants U.S. 
Citizens living abroad the right to vote in federal elections-whether for president or other 
federal offices-as though they were present in their last place of residence in the United 
States ... the Act simply ensures that overseas citizens can continue voting in federal 
elections ... "6 
In the U.S. Supreme Court case Holt Civic Club v. City ofTuscaloosa, the Court said the 
following: 
"No decision of this Court has extended the "one man, one vote" principle to individuals 
residing beyond the geographic confmes of the governmental entity concerned, be it State 
4 /gartua De La Rosa v. United States, 824 F.Supp.607 (D. Puerto Rico 1994) 
5 ibid 
6 ibid 
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UOCAVA NOT APPLICABLE 10 A STATE'S STATUTES GOVERNING MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS 
UOCAVA standards and the state's residency requirements are valid legislation. The Court in 
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections emphasized the State's powers by saying, "the right to 
suffrage is subject to the imposition of state standards which are not discriminatory and which do 
not contravene any restriction that Congress, acting pursuant to its constitutional powers, has 
imposed."ll 
The Supreme Court has a long precedent of acknowledging the State's powers in 
conducting and regulating State and local elections. In Dunn v. Blumstein, the Court said the 
following: 
"In decision after decision, this Court has made clear that a citizen has a constitutionally 
protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the 
jurisdiction. This "equal right to vote," is not absolute; the States have the power to 
impose voter qualifications, and to regulate access to the franchise in other ways" 
(emphasis added).12 
"We have in the past noted approvingly that the States have the power to require that 
voters be bona fide residents ofthe relevant political subdivision (Evans v. Cornman, 398 
US. 422; Kramer v. Union Free School District, supra, at 625; Carrington v. Rash, 380 
US., at 91; Pope v. Williams, 193 US. 621). An appropriately defined and uniformely 
applied requirement of bona fide residence may be necessary to preserve the basic 
conception of a political community, and therefore could withstand close constitutional 
scrutiny."13 
11 Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.ss. 663 (1966) 
12 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) 
13 ibid 
4 
lO
a/Ele t
te, 
).12 
us
us s
 13 
11 S
12 s
13 i i  
SC 38417-2011 Page 2602 of 2676
UOCAVA NOT APPLICABLE 1u A STATE'S STATUTES GOVERNING MUNit1PAL ELECTIONS 
UOCAVA does not mandate residency restrictions for municipal elections adopted by a State be 
compliant with a federal perspective. It is a State issue. UOCAVA affords citizens abroad the 
right to vote in federal elections from their previous state of residence. In this case, Idaho's duly 
adopted statutes for conducting municipal elections is t..he deterrrri11ate legislation for bona fide 
residency requirements. Legal UOCAVA voters are granted to vote in federal elections from 
Idaho, but they are not extended the same right in municipal elections, under UOCA VA. 
5 
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405 u.s. 330 (1972) 
92 S.Ct. 995,31 L.Ed.2d 274 
Dunn 
v. 
Blumstein 
No. 70-13 
United States Supreme Court 
March 21, 1972 
Argued November 16, 1971 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
Syllabus 
Tennessee closes its registration books 30 days 
before an election, but requires residence in the State for 
one year and in the county for three months as 
prerequisites for registration to vote. Appellee challenged 
the constitutionality of the durational residence 
requirements, and a three-judge District Court held 
(92 S.Ct. 997] them unconstitutional on the grounds that 
tfiey impermissibly interfered with the right to vote and 
created a "suspect" classification penalizing some 
Tennessee residents because of recent interstate 
movement. Tennessee asserts that the requirements are 
needed to insure the purity of the ballot box and to have 
knowledgeable voters. 
Held: The durational residence requirements are 
violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
.Amendment, as they are not necessary to further a 
compelling state interest. Pp. 335-360. 
(a) Since the requirements deny some citizens the 
right to vote, "the Court must determine whether the 
exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state 
interest." Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 
621,627 (emphasis added). Pp. 336-337. 
(b) Absent a compelling state interest, Tennessee 
may not burden the right to travel by penalizing those 
bonafide residents who have recently traveled from one 
jurisdiction to another. Pp. 338-342. 
(c) A period of 30 days appears to be ample to 
complete whatever administrative tasks are needed to 
prevent fraud and insure the purity of the ballot box. Pp. 
345-349. 
(d) Since there are adequate means of ascertaining 
bonafide residence on an individualized basis, the State 
may not conclusively presume nonresidence from failure 
to satisfy the waiting period requirements of durational 
residence laws. Pp. 349-354. 
(e) Tennessee has not established a sufficient 
relationship between its interest in an informed electorate 
and the fixed durational residence requirements. Pp. 
354-360. 
337 F.Supp. 323, affirmed. 
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MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, 
in which DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, STEWART, and 
WHITE, JJ.,joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion 
concurring in the result, post, p. 360. BURGER, C.J.; 
filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 363. POWELL and 
REHNQUIST, JJ., took no part in the consideration or 
decision of the case. 
MARSHALL, J., lead opinion 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion 
of the Court. 
Various Tennessee public officials (hereinafter 
Tennessee) appeal from a decision by a three-judge 
federal court holding that Tennessee's durational 
residence requirements for voting violate the Equal 
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The 
issue arises in a class action for declaratory and 
injunctive reliefbrought by appellee James Blumstein. 
Blumstein moved to Tennessee on June 12, 1970, to 
begin employment as an assistant professor of law at 
Vanderbilt University in Nashville. With an eye toward 
voting in the upcoming August and November elections, 
he attempted to register to vote on July I, I970. The 
county registrar refused to register him, on the ground 
that Tennessee law authorizes the registration of only 
those persons who, at the time of the next election, will 
have been residents of the State for a year and residents 
of the county for three months. 
After exhausting state administrative remedies, 
Blumstein brought this action challenging these residence 
requirements 
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on federal constitutional grounds. [I] A three-judge court, 
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convened pursuant to 28 
192 S.Ct. 9981 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284, concluded that 
Tennessee's durational residence 
Page 333 
requirements were unconstitutional (I) because they 
impermissibly interfered \Vith the right to vote and (2) 
because they created a "suspect" classification penalizing 
some Tennessee residents because of recent interstate 
movement.[2] 337 F.Supp. 323 (MD Tenn.l970). We 
noted probable jurisdiction, 40 I U.S. 934 (1971 ). For the 
reasons that follow, we affirm the decision below.[3] 
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The subject of this lawsuit is the durational 
residence requirement. Appellee does not challenge 
Tennessee's power to restrict the vote to bona fide 
Tennessee residents. Nor has Tennessee ever disputed 
that appellee was a bona fide resident of the State and 
county when he attempted to register.[4] But Tennessee 
insists that, in addition to being a resident, a would-be 
voter must have been a resident for a year in the State and 
tfiree months in the county. It is this additional durational 
residence requirement that appellee challenges. 
Durational residence laws penalize those persons 
who have traveled from one place to another to establish 
a new residence during the qualifYing period. Such laws 
divide residents into two classes, old residents and new 
residents, and discriminate against the latter to the extent 
J'age 335 
of totally denying them the opportunity to vote.[5] The 
constitutional question presented is whether the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permits 
a State to discriminate in this way among its citizens. 
To decide whether a law violates the Equal 
Protection Clause, we look, in essence, to three things: 
the character of the classification in question; the 
individual interests affected by the classification; and the 
governmental interests asserted in support of the 
classification. Cf Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 
(1968). In considering laws challenged under the Equal 
Protection Clause, this Court has evolved more than one 
test, depending upon the interest affected or the 
classification involved.[6] First, then, we must determine 
what standard of review is appropriate. In the present 
case, whether we look to the benefit withheld by the 
classification (the opportunity to vote) or the basis for the 
classification (recent interstate travel), we conclude that 
the State must show a substantial and compelling reason 
for imposing durational residence requirements. 
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A 
Durational residence requirements completely bar 
from voting all residents not meeting the fixed durational 
standards. By denying some citizens the right to vote, 
such laws deprive them of"' a fundamental political right, 
... preservative of all rights."! Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 
533, 562 (1964). There is no need to repeat now the 
labors 
192 S.Ct. 1000] undertaken in earlier cases to analyze this 
right to vote and to explain in detail the judicial role in 
reviewing state statutes that selectively distribute the 
franchise. In decision after decision, this Court has made 
clear that a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to 
participate in elections on an equal basis with other 
citizens in the jurisdiction. See, e.g., Evans v. Cornman, 
398 U.S. 419,421-422, 426(1970); Kramer v. Union 
Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 626-628 (1969); 
Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969); 
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 
(1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 93-94 (1965); 
Reynolds v. Sims, supra. This "equal right to vote," Evans 
v. Cornman, supra, at 426, is not absolute; the States 
have the power to impose voter qualifications, and to 
regulate access to the franchise in other ways. See, e.g., 
Carrington v. Rash, supra, at 91; Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 
U.S. 112, 144 (opinion of DOUGLAS, J.), 241 (separate 
opinion ofBRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ.), 
294 (opinion of STEWART, J., concurring and 
dissenting, with whom BURGER, C.J., and 
BLACKMUN, J.,joined). But, as a general matter, 
before that right [to vote] can be restricted, the purpose of 
the restriction and the assertedly overriding interests 
served by it must meet close constitutional scrutiny. 
Evans v. Cornman, supra, at 422; see Bullock v. 
Carter, ante, p. 134, at 143. 
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Tennessee urges that this case is controlled by 
Drueding v. Devlin, 380 U.S. 125 (1965). Drueding was a 
decision upholding Maryland's durational residence 
requirements. The District Court tested those 
requirements by the equal protection standard applied to 
ordinary state regulations: whether the exclusions are 
reasonably related to a permissible state interest. 234 
F.Supp. 721, 724-725 (Md.l964). We summarily 
affirmed per curiam without the benefit of argument. But 
if it was not clear then, it is certainly clear now that a 
more exacting test is required for any statute that 
"place[ s] a condition on the exercise of the right to vote." 
Bullock v. Carter, supra, at 143. This development in the 
law culminated in Kramer v. Union Free School District 
supra. There, we canvassed in detail the reasons for stric~ 
review ofstatutes distributing the franchise, 395 U.S. at 
626-630, noting, inter alia, that such statutes "constitute 
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the foundation of our representative society." We 
_concluded that, if a challenged statute grants the right to 
vote to some citizens and denies the franchise to others, 
"the Court must determine whether the exclusions are 
necessary to promote a compelling state interest." I d. at 
627 (emphasis added); Cipriano v. City of Houma, supra, 
at 704; City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 
205, 209 (!970). Cf. Harper v. Virginia Board of 
Elections. supra, at 670. This is the test we apply here. [7] 
Page 338 
B 
This exacting test is appropriate for another reason, 
never considered in Drueding: Tennessee's durational 
residence laws classifY bonafide residents on the basis of 
r.:cent travel, penalizing those persons, and only those 
persons, who have gone from one jurisdiction to another 
during the qualifYing period. Thus, the durational 
residence requirement directly impinges on the exercise 
of a second fundamental personal right, the right to 
travel. 
"[F]reedom to travel throughout the United States 
has long been recognized as a basic right under the 
Constitution." United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 
(!966). See Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 492 ( 1849) 
(Taney, C.J.); Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 43-44 
(1868); Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180 (1869); 
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Kent v. 
Dulles, 357 U.S. I 16, 126 (1958); Shapiro v. Thompson, 
394 U.S. 618,629-631, 634 (1969); Oregonv. Mitchell, 
400 U.S. at 237 (separate opinion of BRENNAN, 
WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ.), 285-286 (STEWART, 
J., concurring and dissenting, with whom BURGER, C.J., 
and BLACKMUN, J.,joined). And it is clear that the 
freedom to travel includes the "freedom to enter and 
abide in any State in the Union," id. at 285. Obviously, 
durational residence laws single out the class of bonafide 
state and county residents who have recently exercised 
this constitutionally protected right, and penalize such 
tt11Veiers directly. We considered such a durational 
residence requirement in Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, 
where the pertinent statutes imposed a one-year waiting 
period for interstate migrants as a condition to receiving 
welfare benefits. Although, in Shapiro, we specifically 
did not decide whether durational residence requirements 
could be used to determine voting eligibility, 
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.fd. at 638 n. 2 I, we concluded that, since the right to 
travel was a constitutionally protected right, 
any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of 
that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a 
compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional. 
ld. at 634. This compelling state interest test was 
also adopted in the separate concurrence of MR. 
JUSTICE STEWART. Preceded by a long line of cases 
recognizing the constitutional right to travel, and 
repeatedly reaffirmed in the face of attempts to disregard 
it, see Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U.S. 49 (1970), and 
Wyman v. Lopez, 404 U.S. 1055 (1972), Shap1i·o and the 
compelling state interest test it articulates control this 
case. 
Tennessee attempts to distinguish Shapiro by urging 
that "the vice of the welfare statute in Shapiro .. . was its 
objective to deter interstate travel." Brief for Appellants 
13. In Tennessee's view, the compelling state interest test 
is appropriate only where there is "some evidence to 
indicate a deterrence of or infringement on the right to 
travel. ... " Ibid. Thus, Tennessee seeks to avoid the clear 
command of Shapiro by arguing that durational residence 
requirements for voting neither seek to nor actually do 
deter such travel. In essence, Tennessee argues that the 
right to travel is not abridged here in any constitutionally 
relevant sense. 
This view represents a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the law. [8] It is irrelevant whether 
disenfranchisement or 
(92 S.Ct. 1002( denial of welfare is the more potent 
deterrent to travel. Shapiro did not rest upon a finding 
that denial of welfare actually deterred travel. Nor have 
other "right to travel" 
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cases in this Court always relied on the presence of actual 
deterrence.[9] In Shapiro, we explicitly stated that the 
compelling state interest test would be triggered by "any 
classification which serves to penalize the exercise ofthat 
right [to travel] .... " Id. at 634 (emphasis added); see id. 
at 638 n. 21.[10] While noting the frank legislative 
purpose to deter migration by the poor, and speculating 
that "[a]n indigent who desires to migrate ... will 
doubtless hesitate if he knows that he must risk" the loss 
of benefits, id. at 629, the majority found no need to 
dispute the "evidence that few welfare recipients have in 
fact, been deterred [from moving] by residence 
requirements." Id. at 650 (Warren, C.J., dissenting); see 
also id. at 671-672 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Indeed, none 
of the litigants had themselves been deterred. Only last 
Term, it was specifically noted that, because a durational 
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residence requirement for voting 
operates to penalize those persons, and only those 
persons, who have exercised their constitutional right of 
interstate migration ... , [it] may withstand constitutional 
scrutiny only upon a clear showing that the burden 
imposed is necessary to protect a compelling and 
substantial governmental interest. 
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 238 (separate 
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opinion of BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ.) 
(emphasis added). 
Of course, it is true that the two individual interest 
affected by Tennessee's durational residence 
requirements are affected in different ways. Travel is 
permitted, but only at a price; voting is prohibited. The 
right to travel is merely penalized, while the right to vote 
is absolutely denied. But these differences are irrelevant 
for present purposes. Shapiro implicitly realized what this 
Court has made explicit elsewhere: 
It has long been established that a State may not impose a 
·penalty upon those who exercise a right guaranteed by 
the Constitution. . .. "Constitutional rights would be of 
little value if they could be ... indirectly denied." ... 
Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 540 
(1965).[1 I] See also Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 
(1967), and cases cited therein; Spevack v. Klein, 385 
U.S. 51 I, 515 (1967). The right to travel is an 
"unconditional personal right," a right whose exercise 
may not be conditioned. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 
at 643 (STEWART, J., concurring) (emphasis added); 
Oregon v. Mitchell, supra, at 292 (STEWART, J., 
concurring and dissenting, 
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with whom BURGER, C.J., and BLACKMUN, J., 
joined). Durational residence laws impermissibly 
condition and penalize the right to travel by imposing 
their prohibitions on only those persons who have 
recently exercised that right.[12] In the present case, such 
laws force a person who wishes to travel and change 
residences to choose between travel and the basic right to 
vote. Cf United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582-583 
(1968). Absent a compelling state interest, a State may 
not burden the right to travel in this way.[l3] 
c 
In sum, durational residence laws must be measured 
by a strict equal protection test: they are unconstitutional 
unless the State can demonstrate that such laws are 
"necessary to promote a compelling governmental 
interest." Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, at 634 (first 
emphasis added); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 
395 U.S. at 627. Thus phrased, the constitutional question 
may sound like a mathematical formula. But legal "tests" 
do not have the precision of mathematical 
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formulas. The key words emphasize a matter of degree: 
that a heavy burden of justification is on the State, and 
that the statute will be closely scrutinized in light of its 
asserted purposes. 
It is not sufficient for the State to show that 
durational residence requirements further a very 
substantial state interest. In pursuing that important 
interest, the State cannot choose means that unnecessarily 
burden or restrict constitutionally protected activity. 
Statutes affecting constitutional rights must be drawn 
with "precision," NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 
(I 963); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 (1967), 
and must be "tailored" to serve their legitimate objectives. 
Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, at 63 1. And if there are 
other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a 
lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity, a 
State may not choose the way of greater interference. If it 
acts at all, it must choose "less drastic means." Shelton v. 
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). 
II 
We tum, then, to the question of whether the State 
has shown that durational residence requirements are 
needed to further a sufficiently substantial state interest. 
We emphasize again the difference between bona fide 
residence requirements and durational residence 
requirements. 
(92 S.Ct. 1004) We have in the past noted approvingly 
that the States have the power to require that voters be 
bonafide residents ofthe relevant political subdivision. 
E.g., Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. at 422; Kramer v. 
Union Free School District, supra, at 625; Carrington v. 
Rash, 380 U.S. at 91; Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 
(1904).[14] An appropriately defined and uniformly 
applied requirement 
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of bonafide residence may be necessary to preserve the 
basic conception of a political community, and therefore 
could withstand close constitutional scrutiny.[l5] But 
durational residence requirements, representing a separate 
voting qualification imposed on bonafide residents, must 
be separately tested by the stringent standard. Cf Shapiro 
v. Thompson, supra, at 636. 
It is worth noting at the outset that Congress has, in 
a somewhat different context, addressed the question 
whether durational residence laws further compelling 
state interests. In§ 202 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
added by the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, 
Congress outlawed state durational residence 
requirements for presidential and vice-presidential 
elections, and prohibited the States from closing 
registration more than 30 days before such elections. 42 
U.S.C. § 1973aa-l. In doing so, it made a specific finding 
that durational residence requirements and more 
restrictive registration practices do "not bear a reasonable 
relationship to any compelling State interest in the 
conduct of presidential elections." 42 U.S.C. § 
1973aa-l(a)(6). We upheld this portion of the Voting 
Rights Act in Oregon v. Mitchell, supra. In our present 
case, of course, we deal with congressional, state, and 
local elections, in which the State's interests are arguably 
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somewhat different; and, in addition, our function is not 
·merely to determine whether there was a reasonable basis 
for Congress' findings. However, the congressional 
finding which forms the basis for the Federal Act is a 
useful background for the discussion that follows. 
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Tennessee tenders "two basic purposes" ser;ed by 
its durational residence requirements: 
(I) INSURE PURITY OF BALLOT BOX --Protection 
against fraud through colonization and inability to 
identifY persons offering to vote, and 
(2) KNOWLEDGEABLE VOTER --Afford some surety 
that the voter has, in fact, become a member of the 
community, and that, as such, he has a common interest 
in all matters pertaining to its government and is, 
therefore, more likely to exercise his right more 
intelligently. 
Brief for Appellants 15, citing 18 Am.Jur., 
Elections, § 56, p. 217. We consider each in tum. 
A 
Preservation of the "purity of the ballot box" is a 
formidable-sounding state interest. The impurities feared, 
variously called "dual voting" and "colonization," all 
involve voting by nonresidents, either singly or in groups. 
The main concern is that nonresidents will temporarily 
invade the State or county, falsely swear that they are 
residents to become eligible to vote, and, by voting, allow 
a candidate to win by fraud. Surely the prevention of such 
fraud is a legitimate and compelling government goal. 
But it is impossible to view durational residence 
requirements as necessary to achieve that state interest. 
Preventing fraud, the asserted evil that justifies state 
lawmaking, means keeping nonresidents from voting. 
But, by definition, a durational residence law 
(92 S.Ct. 1005( bars newly arrived residents from the 
franchise along with nonresidents. The State argues that 
such sweeping laws are necessary to prevent fraud 
because they are needed to identifY bonafide residents. 
This contention is particularly 
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unconvmcmg m light of Tennessee's total statutory 
·scheme for regulating the franchise. 
Durational residence laws may once have been 
necessary to prevent a fraudulent evasion of state voter 
standards, but today in Tennessee, as in most other 
States,[ 16] this purpose is served by a system of voter 
registration. Tenn.Code Ann. § 30 I et seq. (1955 and 
Supp. 1970); see State v. Weaver, 122 Tenn.l98, 122 
S.W. 465 (1909). Given this system, the record is totally 
devoid of any evidence that durational residence 
requirements are, in fact, necessary to identifY bonafide 
residents. The qualifications of the would-be voter in 
Tennessee are determined when he registers to vote, 
which he may do until 30 days before the election. 
Tenn.Code Ann. § 304. His qualifications --including 
bona fide residence -- are established then by oath. 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 309. There is no indication in the 
record that Tennessee routinely goes behind the would-be 
voter's oath to determine his qualifications. Since false 
swearing is no obstacle to one intent on fraud, the 
existence of burdensome voting qualifications like 
durational residence requirements cannot prevent corrupt 
nonresidents from fraudulently registering and voting. As 
long as the State relies on the oath-swearing system to 
establish qualifications, a durational residence 
requirement adds nothing to a simple residence 
requirement in the effort to stop fraud. The nonresident 
intent on committing election fraud will as quickly and 
effectively swear that he has been a resident for the 
requisite period of time as he would swear that he was 
simply a resident. Indeed, the durational residence 
requirement becomes an effective voting obstacle 
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only to residents who tell the truth and have no fraudulent 
purposes. 
Moreover, to the extent that the State makes an 
enforcement effort after the oath is sworn, it is not clear 
what role the durational residence requirement could play 
in protecting against fraud. The State closes the 
registration books 30 days before an election to give 
officials an opportunity to prepare for the election. Before 
the books close, anyone may register who claims that he 
will meet the durational residence requirement at the time 
of the next election. Although Tennessee argues that this 
30-day period between registration and election does not 
give the State enough time to verifY this claim of bona 
fide residence, we do not see the relevance of that 
position to this case. As long as the State permits 
registration up to 30 days before an election, a lengthy 
durational residence requirement does not increase the 
amount of time the State has in which to carry out an 
investigation into the sworn claim by the would-be voter 
that he is in fact, a resident. 
Even if durational residence requirements imposed, 
in practice, a pre-election waiting period that gave voting 
officials three months or a year in which to confirm the 
bona fides of residence, Tennessee would not have 
demonstrated that these waiting periods were necessary. 
At the outset, the State is faced with the fact that it must 
defend two separate waiting periods of different lengths. 
It is impossible to see how both could be "necessary" to 
fulfill the pertinent state objective. If the State itself has 
determined that a three-month period is enough time in 
which to confirm bona fide residence in the State and 
county, obviously a one-year period cannot also be 
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justified as "necessary" to achieve the same purpose.[l7] 
Page 348 
Beyond 
(92 S.Ct. 1006) that, the job of detecting nonresidents 
from among persons who have registered is a relative] y 
simple om:. ii hardly justifies prohibiting all newcomers 
from voting for even three months. To prevent dual 
voting, state voting officials simply have to cross-check 
lists of new registrants with their former jurisdictions. See 
Comment, Residence Requirements for Voting in 
Presidential Elections, 37 U.Chi.L.Rev. 359, 364 and n. 
.34, 374 (1970); cf Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 637. 
Objective information tendered as relevant to the 
question of bonafide residence under Tennessee law --
places of dwelling, occupation, car registration, driver's 
license, property owned, etc.[l8] -- is easy to 
double-check, especially in light of modem 
communications. Tennessee itself concedes that "[i]t 
might well be that these purposes can be achieved under 
requirements of shorter duration than that imposed by the 
State of Tennessee .... "Brief for Appellants 10. Fixing a 
constitutionally acceptable period is surely a matter of 
degree. It is sufficient to note here that 30 days appears to 
be an ample period of time for the State to complete 
whatever administrative tasks are necessary to prevent 
fraud -- and a year, or three months, too much. This was 
the judgment of Congress in the context of presidential 
~lections.[l9] And, on the basis of the statutory 
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scheme before us, it is almost surely the judgment of the 
Tennessee lawmakers as well. As the court below 
concluded, the cut-off point for registration 30 days 
before an election 
_n:flects the judgment of the Tennessee Legislature that 
thirty days is an adequate period in which Tennessee's 
election officials can effect whatever measures may be 
necessary, in each particular case confronting them, to 
insure purity of the ballot and prevent dual registration 
and dual voting. 
337 F.Supp. at 330. 
It has been argued that durational residence 
requirements are permissible because a person who has 
satisfied the waiting period requirements is conclusively 
presumed to be a bona fide resident. In other words, 
durational residence requirements are justified because 
they create an administratively useful conclusive 
presumption that recent arrivals are not residents, and are 
(92 S.Ct. 1 007( therefore properly 
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barred from the franchise.[20] This presumption, so the 
argument runs, also prevents fraud, for few candidates 
will be able to induce migration for the purpose of voting 
if fraudulent voters are required to remain in the false 
locale for three months or a year in order to vote on 
election day .(21] 
In Carrington v. Rash. 380 U.S. 89, this Court 
considered and rejected a similar kind of argument in 
support of a similar kind of conclusive presumption. 
There, the State argued that it was difficult to tell whether 
persons moving to Texas while in the military service 
were, in fact, bonafide residents. Thus, the State said, the 
administrative convenience of avoiding difficult factual 
determinations justified a blanket exclusion of all 
servicemen stationed in Texas. The presumption created 
there was conclusive -- "'incapable of being overcome by 
proof of the most positive character.'" Id at 96, citing 
Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312,324 (1932). The 
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Court rejected this "conclusive presumption" approach as 
violative of the Equal Protection Clause. While many 
servicemen in Texas were not bona fide residents, and 
therefore properly ineligible to vote, many servicemen 
clearly were bona fide residents. Since "more precise 
tests" were available "to winnow successfully from the 
ranks ... those whose residence in the State is bona fide," 
conclusive presumptions were impermissible in light of 
the individual interests affected. Id at 95. "States may not 
casually deprive a class of individuals ofthe vote because 
of some remote administrative benefit to the State." !d. at 
96. 
Carrington sufficiently disposes of this defense of 
durational residence requirements. The State's legitimate 
purpose is to determine whether certain persons in the 
community are bona fide residents. A durational 
residence requirement creates a classification that may, in 
a crude way, exclude nonresidents from that group. But it 
also excludes many residents. Given the State's legitimate 
purpose and the individual interests that are affected, the 
classification is ali too imprecise. See supra at 343. In 
general, it is not very difficult for Tennessee to determine 
on an individualized basis whether one recently arrived in 
the community is in fact, a resident, although of course 
there will always be difficult cases. Tennessee has 
defined a test for bona fide residence, and appears 
prepared to apply it on an individualized basis in various 
legal contexts. [22] That test 
Page 352 
could easily be 
(92 S.Ct. 1008) applied to new arrivals. Furthermore, if it 
is unlikely that would-be fraudulent voters would remain 
in a false locale for the lengthy period imposed by 
durational residence requirements, it is just as unlikely 
that they would collect such objective indicia of bona fide 
residence as a dwelling, car registration, or driver's 
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license. In spite of these things, the question of bonafide 
residence is settled for new arrivals by conclusive 
_presumption, not by individualized inquiry. Cf 
Carrington v. Rash, supra, at 95-96. Thus, it has always 
been undisputed that appellee Blumstein is himself a 
bonafide resident ofTennessee within the ordinary state 
definition of residence. But since Tennessee's 
presumption from failure to meet the durational residence 
requirements is conclusive, a showing of actual bonafide 
residence is irrelevant, even though such a showing 
would fully serve the State's purposes embodied in the 
presumption and would achieve those purposes with far 
less drastic impact on constitutionally protected 
interests.[23] The Equal Protection Clause places a limit 
on government by classification, and that limit has been 
exceeded here. Cf Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 636; 
Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. at 542-543; Carrington 
v,_Rash, supra, at 95-96; Skinnerv. Oklahoma,316 U.S. 
535 (1942). 
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Our conclusion that the waiting period is not the 
least restrictive means necessary for preventing fraud is 
bolstered by the recognition that Tennessee has at its 
disposal a variety of criminal laws that are more than 
adequate to detect and deter whatever fraud may be 
.fuared.[24] At least six separate sections of the Tennessee 
Code define offenses to deal with voter fraud. For 
example, Tenn. Code Ann. § 324 makes it a crime 
for any person to register or to have his name registered 
as a qualified voter ... when he is not entitled to be so 
registered ... or to procure or induce any other person to 
register or be registered . . when such person is not 
legally qualified to be registered as such .... [25] 
In addition to the various 
192 S.Ct. 10091 criminal penalties, Tennessee permits the 
bona fides of a voter to be challenged on election day. 
Tenn.Code Ann. § 1309 et seq. (1955 and Supp. 1970). 
Where a State has available such remedial action 
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to supplement its voter registration system, it can hardly 
argue that broadly imposed political disabilities such as 
durational residence requirements are needed to deal with 
the evils of fraud. Now that the Federal Voting Rights 
Act abolishes those residence requirements as a 
precondition for voting in presidential and 
vice-presidential elections, 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-l, it is 
·clear that the States will have to resort to other devices 
available to prevent nonresidents from voting. Especially 
since every State must live with this new federal statute, 
it is impossible to believe that durational residence 
requirements are necessary to meet the State's goal of 
stopping fraud. [26] 
B 
The argument that durational residence requirements 
further the goal of having "knowledgeable voters" 
appears to involve three separate claims. The first is that 
such requirements "afford some surety that the voter has, 
in fact, become a member ofthe community." But here 
the State appears to confuse a bona fide residence 
requirement with a durational residence requirement. As 
already noted, a State does have an interest in limiting the 
franchise to bona fide members of the community. But 
this does not justif'y or explain the exclusion from the 
franchise of persons not because their bonafide residence 
is questioned, but because they are recent, rather than 
long-time, residents. 
The second branch of the "knowledgeable voters" 
justification is that durational residence requirements 
assure that the voter "has a common interest in all matters 
pertaining to [the community's] government. ... "By this, 
presumably, the State means that it may require a period 
of residence sufficiently lengthy to impress upon 
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its voters the local viewpoint. This is precisely the sort of 
argument this Court has repeatedly rejected. In 
Carrington v. Rash, for example, the State argued that 
military men newly moved into Texas might not have 
local interests sufficiently in mind, and therefore could be 
excluded from voting in state elections. This Court 
replied: 
But if they are, in fact, residents, ... they, as all other 
qualified residents, have a right to an equal opportunity 
for political representation. . .. "Fencing out" from the 
franchise a sector of the population because of the way 
they may vote is constitutionally impermissible. 
380 U.S. at 94. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-l(a)(4). 
Similarly, here, Tennessee's hopes for voters with a 
"common interest in all matters pertaining to [the 
community's] government" is impermissible.[27] To 
paraphrase what we said elsewhere, "All too often, lack 
of a ['common interest'] might mean no more than a 
different interest." Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. at 423. 
"[D]ifferences of opinion" may not be the basis for 
excluding any group or person from the franchise. 
Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. at 705-706. 
[T]he fact that newly arrived [Tennesseeans] may have a 
more national outlook than long-time residents, or even 
may retain a viewpoint characteristic of the region from 
which they have come, is a constitutionally impermissible 
reason for depriving them of their chance to influence the 
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electoral vote of their new home State. 
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Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1969) (dissenting 
opinion).[28] 
Finally, the State urges that a long-time resident is 
"more likely to exercise his right [to vote] more 
intelligently." To the extent that this is different from the 
previous argument, the State is apparently asserting an 
interest in limiting the franchise to voters who are 
knowiedgeabie about the issues. In this case, Tennessee 
argues that people who have been in the State less than a 
year and the county less than three months are likely to 
be unaware of the issues involved in the congressional, 
state, and local elections, and therefore can be barred 
from the franchise. We note that the criterion of 
"intelligent" voting is an elusive one, and susceptible of 
abuse. But without deciding as a general matter the extent 
.. to which a State can bar less knowledgeable or intelligent 
citizens from the franchise, cf Evans v. Cornman, 398 
U.S. at 422; Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 
U.S. at 632; Cipriano v. City 
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of Houma, 395 U.S. at 705,[29] we conclude that 
durational residence requirements cannot be justified on 
this basis. 
In Kramer v. Union Free School District, supra, we 
held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited New 
York State from limiting the vote in school district 
elections to parents of school children and to property 
owners. The State claimed that, since nonparents would 
be "less informed" about school affairs than parents, id at 
631, the State could properly exclude the class of 
nonparents in order to limit the franchise to the more 
"interested" group of residents. We rejected that position, 
concluding that a "close scrutiny of [the classification] 
demonstrates that [it does] not accomplish this purpose 
with sufficient precision. . .. " !d at 632. That scrutiny 
revealed that the classification excluding nonparents from 
the franchise kept many persons from voting who were 
in S.Ct. 10111 as substantially interested.as those 
allowed to vote; given this, the classification was 
insufficiently "tailored" to achieve the articulated state 
goal. JbidSee also Cipriano v. City of Houma, supra, at 
706. 
Similarly, the durational residence requirements in 
this case founder because of their crudeness as a device 
for 
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achieving the articulated state goal of assuring the 
knowledgeable exercise of the franchise. The 
classifications created by durational residence 
requirements obviously permit any long-time resident to 
vote regardless of his knowledge of the issues -- and 
obviously many long-time residents do not have any. On 
the other hand, the classifications bar from the franchise 
many other, admittedly new, residents who have become 
at least minimally, and often fully, informed about the 
issues. Indeed, recent migrants who take the time to 
register and vote shortly after moving are likely to be 
those citizens, such as appellee, who make it a point to be 
informed and knowledgeable about the issues. Given 
modern communications, and given the clear indication 
that campaign spending and voter education occur largely 
during the month before an election,[30] the State cannot 
seriously maintain that it is "necessary" to reside for a 
year in the State and three months in the county in order 
to be knowledgeable about congressional, state, or even 
purely local elections. There is simply nothing in the 
record to support the conclusive presumption that 
residents who have lived in the State for less than a year 
and their county for less than three months are 
uninformed about elections. Cf Shapiro v. Thompson, 
394 U.S. at 631. These durational residence requirements 
crudely exclude large numbers of fully qualified people. 
Especially since Tennessee creates a waiting period by 
closing registration books 30 days before an election, 
there can be no basis for arguing that any durational 
residence requirement is also needed to assure 
knowledgeability. It is pertinent to note that Tennessee 
has never made an attempt to further its alleged interest in 
an informed electorate in a universally applicable way. 
Knowledge 
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or competence has never been a criterion for participation 
in Tennessee's electoral process for long-time residents. 
Indeed, the State specifically provides for voting by 
various types of absentee persons.[31] These provisions 
permit many long-time residents who leave the county or 
State to participate in a constituency in which they have 
only the slightest political interest, and from whose 
political debates they are likely to be cut off That the 
State specifically permits such voting is not consistent 
with its claimed compelling interest in intelligent, 
informed use of the ballot. If the State seeks to assure 
intelligent 
(92 S.Ct. 10121 use of the ballot, it may not try to serve 
this interest only with respect to new arrivals. Cf Shapiro 
v. Thompson, supra, at 637-638. 
It may well be true that new residents as a group 
know less about state and local issues than older 
residents; and it is surely true that durational residence 
requirements will exclude some people from voting who 
are totally uninformed 
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about election matters. But as devices to limit the 
franchise to knowledgeable residents, the conclusive 
presumptions of durational residence requirements are 
much too crude. They exclude too many people who 
should not, and need not, be excluded. They represent a 
I
 
I
  I
1
 
SC 38417-2011 Page 2611 of 2676
requirement of knowledge unfairly imposed on only 
some citizens. We are aware that classifications are 
always imprecise. By requiring classifications to be 
tailored to their purpose, we do not secretly require the 
impossible. Here, there is simply too attenuated a 
relationship between the state interest in an informed 
electorate and the fixed requirement that voters must have 
·been residents in the State for a year and the county for 
three months. Given the exacting standard of precision 
we require of statutes affecting constitutional rights, we 
cannot say that durational residence requirements are 
necessary to further a compelling state interest. 
lll 
Concluding that Tennessee has not offered an 
adequate justification for its durational residence laws, 
we affirm the judgment of the court below. 
Affirmed. 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL and MR. JUSTICE 
REHNQUIST took no part in the consideration or 
decision of this case. 
BLACKMUN, J., concurring 
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in the 
result. 
Professor Blumstein obviously could hardly wait to 
register to vote in his new home State of Tennessee. He 
_11rrived in Nashville on June 12, 1970. He moved into his 
apartment on June 19. He presented himself to the 
registrar on July I. He instituted his lawsuit on July 17. 
Thus, his litigation was begun 35 days after his arrival on 
Tennessee soil, and less than 30 days after he moved into 
his apartment. But a primary was coming up on August 6. 
Usually, such zeal to exercise 
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the franchise is commendable. The professor, however, 
encountered -- and, I assume, knowingly so -- the barrier 
of the Tennessee durational residence requirement and, 
because he did, he instituted his test suit. 
I have little quarrel with much ofthe content ofthe 
C-ourt's long opinion. I concur in the result, with these 
few added comments, because I do not wish to be 
described on a later day as having taken a position 
broader than I think necessary for the disposition of this 
case. 
I. In Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (194), Mr. 
Justice Peckham, in speaking for a unanimous Court that 
included the first Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice 
Holmes, said: 
The simple matter to be herein determined is whether, 
with reference to the exercise of the privilege of voting in 
Maryland, the legislature ofthat State had the legal right 
to provide that a person coming into the State to reside 
should make the declaration of intent a year before he 
should have the right to be registered as a voter of the 
State. 
* * * * 
... The right of a State to legislate upon the subject of 
the elective franchise as to it may seem good, subject to 
the conditions already stated, being, as we believe, 
unassailable, we think it plain that the statute in question 
violates no right protected by the Federal Constitution. 
The reasons which may have impelled the state 
legislature to enact the statute in question were matters 
entirely for its consideration, and this court has no 
concern with them. 
193 U.S. at 632, 633-634. I cannot so blithely explain 
Pope v. Williams away, as does the Court, ante at 337 n. 
7, 
(92 S.Ct. 1013] by asserting that, if that 
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opinion is "[c]arefully read," one sees that the case was 
concerned simply with a requirement that the new arrival 
declare his intention. The requirement was that he make 
the declaration a year before he registered to vote; time, 
as well as intent, was involved. For me, therefore, the 
Court today really overrules the holding in Pope v. 
Williams, and does not restrict itself, as footnote 7 says, 
to rejecting what it says are mere dicta. 
2. The compelling state interest test, as applied to a 
State's denial of the vote, seems to have come into full 
flower with Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 
U.S. 621,627 (1969). The only supporting authority cited 
is in the "See" context to Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 
89, 96 ( 1965). But as I read Carrington, the standard 
there employed was that the voting requirements be 
reasonable. Indeed, in that opinion, MR. JUSTICE 
STEWART observed, at 91, that the State has 
"unquestioned power to impose reasonable residence 
restrictions on the availability of the ballot." A like 
approach was taken in McDonald v. Board of Election 
Commissioners, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969), where the 
Court referred to the necessity of "some rational 
relationship to a legitimate state end" and to a statute's 
being set aside "only if based on reasons totally unrelated 
to the pursuit of that goal." I mention this only to 
emphasize that Kramer appears to have elevated the 
standard. And this was only three years ago. Whether 
Carrington and McDonald are now frowned upon, at 
least in part, the Court does not say. Cf Bullock v. Carter, 
ante, p. 134. 
3. Clearly, for me, the State does have a profound 
interest in the purity of the ballot box and in an informed 
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electorate, and is entitled to take appropriate steps to 
assure those ends. Except where federal intervention 
Page363 
properly prescribes otherwise, see Oregon v. Mitchell, 
400 U.S. 112 (1970), I see no constitutional imperative 
that voting requirements be the same in each State, or 
even thai a State's time requirement rei ate to the 30-day 
measure imposed by Congress by 42 U.S.C. § 
1973aa-l(d) for presidential elections. I assume that the 
Court, by its decision today, does not depart from either 
of these propositions. I cannot be sure of this, however, 
for much of the opinion seems to be couched in absolute 
terms. 
4. The Tennessee plan, based both in statute and in 
the State's constitution, is not ideal. I am content that the 
one-year and three-month requirements be struck down 
.. for want of something more closely related to the State's 
interest. It is, of course, a matter of line drawing, as the 
Court concedes, ante at 348. But if 30 days pas 
constitutional muster, what of 35 or 45 or 75? The 
resolution of these longer measures, less than those today 
struck down, the Court leaves, I suspect, to the future. 
BURGER, J., dissenting 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting. 
The holding of the Court in Pope v. Williams, 193 
U.S. 621 (1904), is as valid today as it was at the turn of 
the century. It is no more a denial of equal protection for 
a State to require newcomers to be exposed to state and 
lo.cal problems for a reasonable period such as one year 
before voting, than it is to require children to wait 18 
years before voting. Cf Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 
( 1970). In both cases, some informed and responsible 
persons are denied the vote, while others less informed 
and less responsible are permitted to vote. Some lines 
must be drawn. To challenge such lines by the 
"compelling state interest" standard is to condemn them 
all. So far as I am aware, no state law has ever satisfied 
this seemingly 
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insurmountable standard, and I doubt one ever will, for it 
demands nothing less than perfection. 
(92 S.Ct. 10141 The existence of a constitutional "right to 
travel" does not persuade me to the contrary. l f the 
imposition of a durational residency requirement for 
voting abridges the right to travel, surely the imposition 
of an age qualification penalizes the young for being 
young, a status l assume the Constitution also protects. 
Notes: 
[I] Involved here are provisions of the Tennessee 
Constitution, as well as portions ofthe Tennessee Code. 
Article IV,§ I, ofthe Tennessee Constitution, provides in 
pertinent part: 
Right to vote -- Election precincts .... -- Every person of 
the age of twenty-one years, being a citizen ofthe United 
States, and a resident of this State for twelve months, and 
of the county wherein such person may offer to vote for 
three months next preceding the day of election, shall be 
entitled to vote for electors for President and 
Vice-President of the United States, members of the 
General Assembly and other civil officers for the county 
or district in which such person resides; and there shall be 
no other qualification attached to the right of suffrage. 
The General Assembly shall have power to enact laws 
requiring voters to vote in the election precincts in which 
they may reside, and laws to secure the freedom of 
elections and the purity ofthe ballot box. 
Section 2-201, Tenn. Code Ann. (Supp. 1970) provides: 
Qualifications of voters. -- Every person of the age of 
twenty-one (21) years, being a citizen of the United 
States and a resident of this state for twelve (12) months, 
and of the county wherein he may offer his vote for three 
(3) months next preceding the day of election, shall be 
entitled to vote for members of the general assembly and 
other civil officers for the county or district in which he 
may reside. 
Section 2-304, Tenn.Code Ann. (Supp. 1970) provides: 
Persons entitled to permanently register -- Required time 
for registration to be in effect prior to election. -- All 
persons qualified to vote under existing laws at the date 
of application for registration, including those who will 
arrive at the legal voting age by the date of the next 
succeeding primary or general election established by 
statute following the date oftheir application to register 
(those who become of! ega! voting age before the date of 
a general election shall be entitled to register and vote in 
a legal primary election selecting nominees for such 
general election), who will have lived in the state for 
twelve(l2) months and in the county for which they 
applied for registration for three (3) months by the date of 
the next succeeding election shall be entitled to 
permanently register as voters under the provisions of this 
chapter provided, however, that registration or 
re-registration shall not be permitted within thirty (30) 
days of any primary or general election provided for by 
statute. If a registered voter in any county shall have 
changed his residence to another county, or to another 
ward, precinct, or district within the same county, or 
changed his name by marriage or otherwise, within 
ninety (90) days prior to the date of an election, he shall 
be entitled to vote in his former ward, precinct or district 
of registration. 
[2] On July 30, the District Court refused to grant a 
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preliminary injunction perm1ttmg Blumstein and 
members of the class he represented to vote in the August 
6 election; the court noted that to do so would be "so 
obviously disruptive as to constitute an example of 
judicial improvidence." The District Court also denied a 
motion that Blumstein be allowed to cast a sealed 
j)rovisional ballot for the election. 
Ai the time the opinion beiow was filed, the next election 
was to be held in November, 1970, at which time 
Blumstein would have met the three-month part of 
Tennessee's durational residency requirements. The 
District Court properly rejected the State's position that 
the alleged invalidity of the three-month requirement had 
been rendered moot, and the State does not pursue any 
mootness argument here. Although appellee now can 
vote, the problem to voters posed by the Tennessee 
residence requirements is ,. capable of repetition, yet 
evading review."' Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 
( 1969); Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 
498, 515 (1911 ). In this case, unlike Hall v. Beals, 396 
U.S. 45 (1969), the laws in question remain on the books, 
a:nd Blumstein has standing to challenge them as a 
member ofthe class of people affected by the presently 
written statute. 
[3] The important question in this case has divided the 
lower courts. Durational residence requirements ranging 
from three months to one year have been struck down in 
Burg v. Canniffe, 315 F.Supp. 380 (Mass.l970); Affeldt v. 
Whitcomb, 319 F.Supp. 69 (NO lnd.l970); Lester v. 
8oard of Elections for District of Columbia, 319 F.Supp. 
505 (DC 1970); Bufford v. Holton, 319 F.Supp. 843 (ED 
Va.1970); Hadnott v. Amos, 320 F.Supp. I 07 (MD 
Ala.l970); Kahn v. Davis, 320 F.Supp. 246 (Vt. I 070); 
Keppel v. Donovan, 326 F.Supp. 15 (Minn.1970); 
Andrews v. Cody, 327 F.Supp. 793 (MDNC 1971), as 
well as this case. Other district courts have upheld 
dura tiona! residence requirements of a similar variety. 
Howe v. Brown, 319 F.Supp. 862 (NO Ohio 1970); 
Ferguson v. Williams. 330 F.Supp. 1012 (NO 
Miss.l971 ); Cocanower v. Marston, 318 F.Supp. 402 
(Ariz.l970); Fitzpatrick v. Board of Election 
Commissioners (NO lll.l970); Piliavin v. Hoe/, 320 
F.Supp. 66 (WD Wis.l970); Epps v. Loan (No. 9137, 
WD Wash.l970); Fontham v. McKeithen, 336 F.Supp. 
153 (ED La.1971). In Sirak v. Brown (Civ. No. 70-164, 
SO Ohio 1970), the District Judge refused to convene a 
three-judge court and summarily dismissed the 
complaint. 
[4] Noting the lack of dispute on this point, the court 
below specifically found that Blumstein had no intention 
of leaving Nashville, and was a bona fide resident of 
Tennessee. 337 F.Supp. 323,324. 
]:5] While it would be difficult to determine precisely how 
many would-be voters throughout the country cannot 
vote because of durational residence requirements, but 
see Cocanower & Rich, Residency Requirements for 
Voting, 12 Ariz.L.Rev. 477, 478 and n. 8 (1970), it is 
worth noting that, during the period 1947-1970 an 
average ofapproximately 3.3% of the total national 
population moved interstate each year. (An additional 
3.2% of the population moved from one county to 
another intrastate each year.) U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 
Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, 
Population Characteristic, Series P-20, No. 210, Jan. 15, 
1971, Table 1, pp. 7-8. 
[6] Compare Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 
U.S. 621 (1969), andSkinnerv. Oklahoma,316 U.S. 535 
(1942), with Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 
(1955); compare McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 
(1964), Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 
663 (1966), and Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 
(1971 ), with Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), and 
Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 ( 1959). 
[7] Appellants also rely on Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 
621 (1904). Carefully read, that case simply holds that 
federal constitutional rights are not violated by a state 
provision requiring a person who enters the State to make 
a "declaration ofhis intention to become a citizen before 
he can have the right to be registered as a voter and to 
vote in the State." ld. at 634. In other words, the case 
simply stands for the proposition that a State may require 
voters to be bonafide residents. See infra at 343-344. To 
the extent that dicta in that opinion are inconsistent with 
the test we apply or the result we reach today, those dicta 
are rejected. 
[8] We note that, in the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as 
amended, Congress specifically found that a durational 
residence requirement "denies or abridges the inherent 
constitutional right of citizens to enjoy their free 
movement across State lines .... " 84 Stat. 316, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973aa-l(a)(2). 
[9] For example, m Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 
(1868), the tax imposed on persons leaving the State by 
commercial carrier was only $1, certainly a minimal 
deterrent to travel. But in declaring the tax 
unconstitutional, the Court reasoned that "if the State can 
tax a railroad passenger one dollar, it can tax him one 
thousand dollars," id. at 46. In Ward v. Maryland, 12 
Wall. 418 (1871), the tax on nonresident traders was 
more substantial, but the Court focused on its 
discriminatory aspects, without anywhere considering the 
law's effect, if any, on trade or tradesmen's choice of 
residence. Cf Chalker v. Birmingham N. W. R. Co., 249 
U.S. 522,527 (1919); but see Williamsv. Fears, 179 U.S. 
270 (1900). In Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 
U.S. 60, 79-80 (1920), the Court held that New York 
could not deny nonresidents certain small personal 
exemptions from the state income tax allowed residents. 
The amounts were certainly insufficient to influence any 
employee's choice of residence. Compare Toomer v. 
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948), with Mullaney v. Anderson, 
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342 U.S. 415 (1952). 
[10] Separately concurring, MR. JUSTICE STEWART 
concluded that, quite apart from any purpose to deter, 
a law that so clearly impinges upon the constitutional 
right of interstate travel must be shown to reflect a 
compelling governmental interest. 
!d. at 643-644 (first emphasis added). See also Graham v. 
R~chardson, 403 U.S. at 375. 
[II] In Harman, the Court held that a Virginia law which 
allowed federal voters to quality either by paying a poll 
tax or by filing a certificate of residence six months 
before the election "handicap[ped] exercise" of the right 
to participate in federal elections free of poll taxes, 
guaranteed by the Twenty-fourth Amendment. !d. at 541. 
[ 12] Where, for example, an interstate migrant loses his 
"driver's license because the new State has a higher age 
requirement, a different constitutional question is 
presented. For, in such a case, the new State's age 
requirement is not a penalty imposed solely because the 
newcomer is a new resident; instead, all residents, old 
and new, must be of a prescribed age to drive. See 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,638 n. 21 (1969). 
[13] As noted infra at343-344, States may show an 
overriding interest in imposing an appropriate bona fide 
residence requirement on would-be voters. One who 
travels out of a State may no longer be a bona fide 
resident, and may not be allowed to vote in the old State. 
Similarly, one who travels to a new State may, in some 
cases, not establish bona fide residence, and may be 
ineligible to vote in the new State. Nothing said today is 
meant to cast doubt on the validity of appropriately 
defined and uniformly applied bona fide residence 
requirements. 
[14] Seen. 7, supra. 
[15] See Fontham v. McKeithen, 336 F.Supp. at I67-168 
(Wisdom, J., dissenting); Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 
(1904); and n. 7, supra. 
[16] See, e.g., Cocanower & Rich, 12 Ariz.L.Rev. at 499; 
MacLeod & Wilberding, State Voting Residency 
Requirements and Civil Rights, 38 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 93, 
113 (1969). 
[ 17] Obviously, it could not be argued that the 
three-month waiting period is necessary to confirm 
residence in the county, and the one-year period 
necessary to confirm residence in the State. Quite apart 
from the total implausibility of any suggestion that one 
task should take four times as long as the other, it is 
sufficient to note that, if a person is found to be a bona 
fide resident of a county within the State, he is, by 
definition, a bonafide resident of the State as well. 
[18] See, e.g., Brown v. Hows, 163 Tenn. 178,42 S.W.2d 
210 (1930); Sparks v. Sparks, 114 Tenn. 666, 88 S.W. 
173 (1905). See generally Tennessee Law Revision 
Commission, Title 2 -- Election Laws, Tentative Draft of 
October 1971, § 222 and Comment. Seen. 22, infra. 
[ 19] In the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, 
Congress abolished durational residence requirements as 
a precondition to voting in presidential and 
vice-presidential elections, and prohibited the States from 
cutting off registration more than 30 days prior to those 
elections. These limits on the waiting period a State may 
impose prior to an election were made "with full 
cognizance ofthe possibility offraud and administrative 
difficulty." Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 238 
(separate opm1on of BRENNAN, WHITE, and 
MARSHALL, JJ.). With that awareness, Congress 
concluded that a waiting period requirement beyond 30 
days "does not bear a reasonable relationship to any 
compelling State interest in the conduct of presidential 
elections." 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-l(a)(6). And, in sustaining 
§ 202 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, we found 
no explanation why the 30-day period between the 
closing of new registrations and the date of election 
would not provide, in light of modern communications, 
adequate time to insure against ... frauds. 
Oregon v. Mitchell, supra, at 239 (separate opinion of 
BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ.). There is no 
reason to think that what Congress thought was 
unnecessary to prevent fraud in presidential elections 
should not also be unnecessary in the context of other 
elections. See infra at 354. 
[20] As a technical matter, it makes no sense to say that 
one who has been a resident for a fixed duration is 
presumed to be a resident. In order to meet the durational 
residence requirement, one must, by definition, first 
establish that he is a resident. A durational residence 
requirement is not simply a waiting period after arrival in 
the State; it is a waiting period after residence is 
established. Thus, it is conceptually impossible to say 
that a durational residence requirement is an 
administratively useful device to determine residence. 
The State's argument must be that residence would be 
presumed from simple presence in the State or county for 
the fixed waiting period. 
[21] It should e clear that this argument assumes that the 
State will reliably determine whether the sworn claims of 
duration in the jurisdiction are themselves accurate. We 
have already noted that this is unlikely. See supra at 346. 
Another recurrent problem for the State's position is the 
existence of differential durational residence 
requirements. If the State presumes residence in the 
county after three months in the county, there is no 
rational explanation for requiring a full 12 months' 
presence in the State to presume residence in the State. 
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[22] Tennessee's basic test for bona fide residence is (I) 
an intention to stay indefinitely in a place (in other words, 
"without a present intention of removing therefrom," 
Brown v. Haws, 163 Tenn. at 182, 42 S.W.2d at 211 ), 
joined with (2) some objective indication consistent with 
that intent, see n. 18, supra. This basic test has been 
applied in divorce cases, see, e.g., Sturdavant v. 
Sturdavant, 28 Tenn.App. 273, 189 S.W.2d 410 (1944); 
Brown v. Brown, 150 Tenn. 89, 261 S.W. 959 (1924); 
Sparks v. Sparks, 114 Tenn. 666,88 S.W. 173 (1905); in 
tax cases, see, e.g., Denny v. Sumner County, 134 Tenn. 
468, 184 S.W. 14 (1916); in estate cases, see, e.g., 
Caldwell v. Shelton, 32 Tenn.App. 45,221 S.W.2d 815 
(1948); Hascallv. Hafford, 107 Tenn. 355, 65 S.W. 423 
(1901); and in voting cases, see, e.g., Brown v. Haws, 
supra; Tennessee Law Revision Commission, Title 2 --
Election Laws, supra, n. 18. 
[23] Indeed, in Blumstein's case, the County Election 
Commission explicitly rejected his offer to treat the 
waiting period requirement as 
a waivable guide to commission action, but rebuttable 
upon a proper showing of competence to vote 
intelligently in the primary and general election. 
Complaint at App. 8. Cf Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 
at 544-545 (Stone, C.J., concurring). 
[24] See Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. at 543 (1965) 
(filing of residence certificate six months before election 
in lieu of poll tax unnecessary to insure that the election 
js limited to bona fide residents in light of"numerous 
devices to enforce valid residence requirements"); cf 
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939) (fear of 
fraudulent solicitations cannot justifY permit requests 
since "[ f]rauds may be denounced as offenses and 
punished by law"). 
[25] Tenn.Code Ann. § 2-1614 (Supp. 1970) makes it a 
felony for any person who "is not legally entitled to vote 
at the time and place where he votes or attempts to vote . 
to vote or offer to do so," or to aid and abet such 
illegality. Tenn.Code Ann. § 2-2207 (1955) makes it a 
misdemeanor 
for any person knowingly to vote in any political 
convention or any election held under the Constitution or 
laws of this state, not being legally qualified to vote ... , 
and Tenn.Code Ann. § 2-2208 (1955) makes it a 
misdemeanor to aid in such an offense. Tenn. Code Ann. 
§ 2-202 (Supp. 1970) makes it an offense to vote outside 
the ward or precinct where one resides and is registered. 
Finally, Tenn.Code Ann. § 2-2209 (1955) makes it 
unlawful to 
bring or aid in bringing any fraudulent voters into this 
·;tate for the purpose of practising a fraud upon or in any 
primary or final election .... 
See, e.g., State v. Weaver, 122 Tenn.l98, 112 S.W. 465 
(1909). 
[26] We note that in the period since the decision below, 
several elections have been held in Tennessee. We have 
been presented with no specific evidence of increased 
colonization or other fraud. 
[27] ii has been noted elsewhere, and with specific 
reference to Tennessee law, that 
[t]he historical purpose of [durational] residency 
requirements seems to have been to deny the vote to 
undesirables, immigrants and outsiders with different 
ideas. 
Cocanower & Rich, 12 Ariz.L.Rev. at 484 and nn. 44, 45, 
and 46. We do not rely on this alleged original purpose of 
durational residence requirements in striking them down 
today. 
[28] Tennessee may be revealing this impermissible 
purpose when it observes: 
The fact that the voting privilege has been extended to 
18-year-old persons ... increases, rather than diminishes, 
the need for durational residency requirements .... It is 
so generally known, as to be judicially accepted that there 
are many political subdivisions in this state, and other 
states, wherein there are colleges universities and military 
installations with sufficient student body or military 
personnel over eighteen years of age as would completely 
dominate elections in the district, county or municipality 
so located. This would offer the maximum of opportunity 
for fraud through colonization, and permit domination by 
those not knowledgeable or having a common interest in 
matters of goverrunent, as opposed to the interest and the 
knowledge of permanent members of the community. 
Upon completion of their schooling or service tour, they 
move on, leaving the community bound to a course of 
political expediency not of its choice, and, in fact, one 
over which its more permanent citizens, who will 
continue to be affected, had no control. 
Brief for Appellants 116. 
[29]ln the 1970 Voting Rights Act, which added § 201, 
42 U.S.C. § 1973aa, Congress provided that "no citizen 
shall be denied, because of his failure to comply with any 
test or device, the right to vote in any Federal, State, or 
local election .... " The term "test or device" was defined 
to include, in part, 
any requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting 
or registration for voting (I) demonstrate the ability to 
read, write, understand, or interpret any matter, (2) 
demonstrate any educational achievement or his 
knowledge of any particular subject. ... 
By prohibiting various "test[s]" and "device[s]" that 
would clearly assure knowledgeability on the part of 
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voters in local elections, Congress declared federal policy 
that people should be allowed to vote even if they were 
not well informed about the issues. We upheld § 201 in 
Oregon v. Mitchell, supra. 
[30] H. Alexander, Financing the 1968 Election 106-113 
(1971); Affeldt v. Whitcomb, 319 F.Supp. at 77; 
Cocanower & Rich, 12 Ariz.L.Rev. at 498. 
[31] The general provisions for absentee voting apply in 
part to 
[a ]ny registered voter otherwise qualified to vote in any 
election to be held in this state or any county, 
municipality, or other political subdivision thereof, who 
by reason of business, occupation, health, education, or 
travel, is required to be absent from the county of his 
fixed residence on the day of the election .... 
Tenn.Code Ann. § 2-1602 (Supp. 1970). See generally 
_Tenn.Code Ann. § 2-1601 et seq. (Supp. 1970). An 
alternative method of absentee voting for armed forces 
members and federal personnel is detailed in Tenn. Code 
Ann. § 2-1701 et seq. (Supp. 1970). Both those 
provisions allow persons who are still technically 
"residents" of the State or county to vote even though 
they are not physically present, and even though they are 
likely to be uninformed about the issues. In addition, 
Tennessee has an unusual provision that permits persons 
to vote in their prior residence for a period after residence 
has been changed. This section provides, in pertinent 
part: 
If a registered voter in any county shall have changed his 
residence to another county ... within ninety (90) days 
prior to the date of an election, he shall be entitled to vote 
iiT his former ward, precinct or district of registration. 
Tenn.Code Ann.§ 204 (Supp. 1970). See also Tenn.Code 
Ann. § 2-204 ( 1955). 
t
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Page 663 
383 ll.S. 663 ( 1966) 
86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 
Harper 
v. 
Virginia Board of Elections 
No. 48 
United States Supreme Court 
March 24, 1966 
Argued January 25-26, 1966 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 
Syllabus 
Appellants, Virginia residents, brought this action to 
have Virginia's poll tax declared unconstitutional. The 
three-judge District Court dismissed the complaint on the 
basis of Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277. 
Held: A State's conditioning of the right to vote on 
the payment of a fee or tax violates the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Breedlove v. 
·suttle, supra. pro tanto overruled. Pp. 665-670. 
(a) Once the franchise is granted to the electorate, 
lines which determine who may vote may not be drawn 
so as to cause invidious discrimination. Pp. 665-667. 
(b) Fee payments or wealth, like race, creed, or 
color. are unrelated to the citizen's ability to participate 
intelligently in the electoral process. Pp. 666-668. 
(c) The interest ofthe State, when it comes to voting 
registration, is limited to the fixing of standards related to 
the applicant's qualifications as a voter. P. 668. 
(d) Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, 
like those ofrace, are traditionally disfavored. P. 668. 
(e) Classifications which might impinge on 
fundamental rights and liberties -- such as the franchise --
must be closely scrutinized. P. 670. 
240 F.Supp. 270, reversed. 
Page 664 
DOUGLAS, J., lead opinion 
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of 
the Court. 
These are suits by Virginia residents to have 
declared unconstitutional Virginia's poll tax.[ I] The 
three-judge 
Page 665 
District Court, feeling bound by our decision in 
Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, dismissed the 
complaint. See 240 F.Supp. 270. The cases came here on 
appeal and we noted probable jurisdiction. 380 U.S. 930, 
382 U.S. 806. 
While the right to vote in federal elections is 
conferred by Art. I,§ 2, of the Constitution (United States 
v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 314-315), the right to vote in 
state elections is nowhere expressly mentioned. It is 
argued that the right to vote in state elections is implicit, 
particularly by reason of the First Amendment, and that it 
may not constitutionally be conditioned upon the 
payment of a tax or fee. Cf Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 
319 U.S. 105, 113.[2] We do not stop to canvass the 
relation 
[86 S.Ct. 1081[ between voting and political expression. 
For it is enough to say that, once the franchise is granted 
to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are 
inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. That is to say, the right of 
suffrage 
is subject to the imposition of state standards which are 
not discriminatory and which do not contravene any 
restriction that Congress, acting pursuant to its 
constitutional powers, has imposed. 
Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board, 360 U.S. 
45, 51. We were speaking there of a state literacy test 
which we sustained, warning that the result would be 
different if a literacy test, fair on its face, were used to 
discriminate 
Page 666 
against a class.[3]/d. at 53. But the Lassiter case does not 
govern the result here, because, unlike a poll tax, the 
"ability to read and write . . has some relation to 
standards designed to promote intelligent use of the 
ballot." /d. at 51. 
We conclude that a State violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment 
U.
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of any fee an electoral standard. Voter qualifications have 
·no relation to wealth nor to paying or not paying this or 
any other tax.[4] Our cases demonstrate that the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment restrains 
the States from fixing voter qualifications which 
invidiously discriminate. Thus, without questioning the 
power of a State to impose reasonable residence 
restrictions on the availability of the ballot (see Pope v. 
Williams, 193 U.S. 621), we 
Page 667 
held in Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, that a State may 
not deny the opportunity to vote to a bona fide resident 
merely because he is a member of the armed services. 
By forbidding a soldier ever to controvert the 
presumption of non-residence, the Texas Constitution 
imposes an invidious discrimination in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
!d. at 96. And see Louisiana v. United States, 380 
U.S. 145. Previously we had said that neither homesite 
nor occupation "affords a permissible basis for 
distinguishing between qualified voters within the State." 
Gray v. Sanders, 3 72 U.S. 368, 380. We think the same 
. must be true of requirements of wealth or affluence or 
payment of a fee. 
Long ago, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,370, 
the Court referred to "the political franchise of 
(86 S.Ct. 1082( voting" as a "fundamental political right, 
because preservative of all rights." Recently, in Reynolds 
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-562, we said, 
Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental 
matter in a free and democratic society. Especially since 
the right to exercise the franchise in a free and 
unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil 
and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right 
of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously 
s·crutinized. 
There we were considering charges that voters in 
one part of the State had greater representation per person 
in the State Legislature than voters in another part of the 
State. We concluded: 
A citizen, a qualified voter, is no more nor no less so 
because he lives in the city or on the farm. This is the 
_Slear and strong command of our Constitution's Equal 
Protection Clause. This is an essential part of the concept 
of a goverrunent oflaws, and not men. This is at the heart 
of Lincoln's vision of"govemment of the people, by the 
people, [and] for the people." The Equal Protection 
Clause 
Page 668 
demands no less than substantially equal state legislative 
representation for all citizens, of all places as well as of 
all races. 
!d. at 568. 
We say the same whether the citizen, otherwise 
qualified to vote, has $1.50 in his pocket or nothing at all, 
pays the fee or fails to pay it. The principle that denies 
the State the right to dilute a citizen's vote on account of 
his economic status or other such factors, by analogy, 
bars a system which excludes those unable to pay a fee to 
vote or who fail to pay. 
It is argued that a State may exact fees from citizens 
for many different kinds of licenses; that, if it can 
demand from all an equal fee for a driver's license,[S] it 
can demand from all an equal poll tax for voting. But we 
must remember that the interest of the State, when it 
comes to voting, is limited to the power to fix 
qualifications. Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not 
germane to one's ability to participate intelligently in the 
electoral process. Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or 
property, like those of race (Korematsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214, 216), are traditionally disfavored. See 
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184-185 (Jackson, 
J., concurring); Griffin v.lllinois, 351 U.S. 12; Douglas v . 
California, 372 U.S. 353. To introduce wealth or 
payment of a fee as a measure of a voter's qualifications 
is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor. The 
degree of the discrimination is irrelevant. In this context 
-- that is, as a condition of obtaining a ballot -- the 
requirement of fee paying causes an "invidious" 
discrimination (Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541) 
that runs afoul of the Equal Protection Clause. Levy "by 
the poll," as stated in 
Page 669 
Breedlove v. Suttles. supra, at 281, is an old familiar form 
of taxation, and we say nothing to impair its validity so 
long as it is not made a condition to the exercise of the 
franchise. Breedlove v. Suttles sanctioned its use as "a 
prerequisite of voting." !d. at 283. To that extent the 
Breedlove case is overruled. 
We agree, of course, with Mr. Justice Holmes that 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
"does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics" 
(Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75). Likewise, the 
Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political 
theory of a particular era. In determining what lines are 
unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have never been 
confined to historic notions of equality, any more than we 
have restricted due process to a fixed catalogue of what 
was at a given time deemed to be the limits of 
fundamental rights. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I, 
5-6. Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for 
purposes ofthe Equal Protection Clause do change. This 
Court, in 1896, held that laws providing for separate 
public facilities for white and Negro citizens did not 
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deprive the latter of the equal protection and treatment 
that the Fourteenth Amendment commands. Plessy v. 
Ferguson, I63 U.S. 537. Seven ofthe eight Justices then 
sitting subscribed to the Court's opinion, thus joining in 
expressions of what constituted unequal and 
discriminatory treatment that sound strange to a 
contemporary ear.[6] When, in I954 -- more than a 
half-century later we repudiated the 
"separate-but-equal" doctrine of Plessy 
Page 670 
as respects public education[?] we stated: 
Jn approaching this problem, we cannot tum the clock 
back to 1868, when the Amendment was adopted, or even 
to I 896, when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483,492. 
In a recent searching reexamination of the Equal 
Protection Clause, we held, as already noted, that "the 
opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the 
election of state legislators" is required.[&] Reynolds v. 
Sims, supra, at 566. We decline to qualifY that principle 
by sustaining this poll tax. Our conclusion, like that, in 
Reynolds v. Sims. is founded not on what we think 
governmental policy should be, but on what the Equal 
Protection Clause requires. 
We have long been mindful that, where fundamental 
rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal 
Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or 
restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully 
confined. See. e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 
541; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-562; 
Carrington v. Rash supra; Baxstrom v. Herold, ante p. 
I07; Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 580-581 (BLACK, 
J ., concurring). 
Those principles apply here. For, to repeat, wealth or 
fee paying has, in our view, no relation to voting 
qualifications; the right to vote is too precious, too 
fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned. 
Reversed 
BLACK, J., dissenting 
MR JUSTICE BLACK, dissenting. 
In Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, decided 
December 6, 193 7, a few weeks after I took my seat as a 
member 
P_age 671 
of this Court, we unanimously upheld the right of the 
State of Georgia 
(86 S.Ct. 1084( to make payment of its state poll tax a 
prerequisite to voting in state elections. We rejected at 
that time contentions that the state law violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because 
it put an unequal burden on different groups of people 
according to their age, sex, and ability to pay. In rejecting 
the contention that the law violated the Equal Protection 
Clause the Court noted at p. 28 I: 
While possible by statutory declaration to levy a poll tax 
upon every inhabitant of whatsoever sex, age or 
condition, collection from all would be impossible, for 
always there are many too poor to pay. 
Believing at that time that the Court had properly 
respected the limitation of its power under the Equal 
Protection Clause and was right in rejecting the equal 
protection argument, I joined the Court's judgment and 
opinion. Later, May 28, I95I, I joined the Court's 
judgment in Butler v. Thompson, 341 U.S. 937, 
upholding, over the dissent of MR. JUSTICE 
DOUGLAS, the Virginia state poll tax law challenged 
here against the same equal protection challenges. Since 
the Breedlove and Butler cases were decided, the Federal 
Constitution has not been amended in the only way it 
could constitutionally have been, that is, as provided in 
Article V[l] of the 
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Constitution. I would adhere to the holding of those 
cases. The Court, however, overrules Breedlove in part, 
but its opinion reveals that it does so not by using its 
limited power to interpret the original meaning of the 
Equal Protection Clause, but by giving that clause a new 
meaning which it believes represents a better 
governmental policy. From this action, I dissent. 
It should be pointed out at once that the Court's 
decision is to no extent based on a finding that the 
Virginia law as written or as applied is being used as a 
device or mechanism to deny Negro citizens of Virginia 
the right to vote on account of their color. Apparently the 
Court agrees with the District Court below and with my 
Brothers HARLAN and STEWART that this record 
would not support any finding that the Virginia poll tax 
law the Court invalidates has any such effect. If the 
record could support a finding that the law as written or 
applied has such an effect, the law would, of course, be 
unconstitutional as a violation of the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments and also 42 U.S.C. § l97l(a). 
This follows from our holding in Schnell v. Davis, 336 
U.S. 933, affirming 81 F.Supp. 872 (D.C.S.D.Ala.); 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339; United States v. 
Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128; Louisiana v. United States, 
380 U.S. 145. What the Court does hold is that the Equal 
Protection Clause necessarily bars all States from making 
payment of a state tax, any tax, a prerequisite to voting. 
(I) I think the interpretation that this Court gave the 
Equal Protection Clause in Breedlove was correct. The 
mere fact that a law results in treating some groups 
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differently from others does not, of course, automatically 
amount to 
l86 S.Ct. 1085) a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
Page 673 
To bar a State from drawing any distinctions in_ the 
application of its laws would practically paralyze the 
regulatory power oflegislative bodies. Consequently, 
The constitutional command for a state to afford "equal 
protection of the laws" sets a goal not attainable by the 
invention and application of a precise formula. 
Kotch v. River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 
556. Voting laws are no exception to this principle. All 
voting laws treat some persons differently from others in 
s.ome respects. Some bar a person from voting who is 
under 21 years of age; others bar those under 18. Some 
bar convicted felons or the insane, and some have 
attached a freehold or other property qualification for 
voting. The Breedlove case upheld a poll tax which was 
imposed on men but was not equally imposed on women 
and minors, and the Court today does not overrule that 
part of Breedlove which approved those discriminatory 
provisions. And in Lassiter v. Northampton Election 
Board, 360 U.S. 45, this Court held that state laws which 
disqualified the illiterate from voting did not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause. From these cases and all the 
others decided by this Court interpreting the Equal 
Protection Clause, it is clear that some discriminatory 
voting qualifications can be imposed without violating 
the Equal Protection Clause. 
A study of our cases shows that this Court has 
refused to use the general language of the Equal 
Protection Clause as though it provided a handy 
instrument to strike down state laws which the Court 
feels are based on bad governmental policy. The equal 
protection cases carefully analyzed boil down to the 
principle that distinctions drawn and even discriminations 
imposed by state laws do not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause so long as these distinctions and discriminations 
are not "irrational," "irrelevant," "unreasonable," 
"arbitrary," or "invidious. "[2] 
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These vague and indefinite terms do not, of course, 
provide a precise formula or an automatic mechanism for 
deciding cases arising under the Equal Protection Clause. 
The restrictive connotations of these terms, however 
(which in other contexts have been used to expand the 
Court's power inordinately, see, e.g., cases cited at pp. 
728-732 in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726), are a 
plain recognition of the fact that, under a proper 
interpretation ofthe Equal Protection Clause, States are 
to have the broadest kind ofleeway in areas where they 
have a general constitutional competence to act.[3] In 
view of the purpose of the terms to restrain the courts 
from a wholesale invalidation of state laws under the 
Equal Protection Clause, it would be difficult to say that 
the poll tax requirement is "irrational," or "arbitrary," or 
works "invidious discriminations." State poll tax 
legislation can "reasonably," "rationally" and without an 
"invidious" or evil purpose to injure anyone be found to 
rest on a number of state policies. including (I) the State's 
desire to collect its revenue, and (2) its belief that voters 
who pay a poll tax will be interested in furthering the 
State's welfare when they vote. Certainly it is rational to 
believe that people may be more likely to pay taxes if 
payment is a prerequisite 
(86 S.Ct. 1086) to voting. And ifhistory can be a factor 
in determining the "rationality" of discrimination in a 
state law (which we held it could in Kotch v. River Port 
Pilot Comm'rs, supra), then whatever may be our 
personal opinion, history is 
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on the side of"rationality" ofthe State's poll tax policy. 
Property qualifications existed in the Colonies and were 
continued by many States after the Constitution was 
adopted. Although I join the Court in disliking the policy 
of the poll tax, this is not, in my judgment, a justifiable 
reason for holding this poll tax law unconstitutional. Such 
a holding on my part would, in my judgment, be an 
exercise of power which the Constitution does not confer 
upon me.[4] 
(2) Another reason for my dissent from the Court's 
judgment and opinion is that it seems to be using the old 
"natural law due process formula"[5] to justifY striking 
down state laws as violations of the Equal Protection 
Clause. I have heretofore had many occasions to express 
my strong belief that there is no constitutional support 
whatever for this Court to use the Due Process Clause as 
though it provided a blank check to alter the meaning of 
the Constitution as written, so as to add to it substantive 
constitutional changes which a majority of 
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the Court at any given time believes are needed to meet 
present-day problems.[6] Nor is there, in my opinion, any 
more constitutional support for this Court to use the 
Equal Protection Clause, as it has today, to write into the 
Constitution its notions of what it thinks is good 
governmental policy. If basic changes as to the respective 
powers of the state and national governments are needed, 
I prefer to let those changes be made by amendment a 
Article V of the Constitution provides. For a majority of 
this Court to undertake that task, whether purporting to 
do so under the Due Process or the Equal Protection 
Clause amounts, in my judgment, to an exercise of power 
the Constitution makers with foresight and wisdom 
refused to give the Judicial Branch of the Government. I 
have in no way departed from the view I expressed in 
"186 /
.
'
 
 t
[ /  hi
 "rati  t
t
WOUld
 
 
SC 38417-2011 Page 2621 of 2676
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 90, decided June 23, 
194 7, that the "natural law due process formula" under 
which courts make the Constitution mean what they think 
it should at a given time 
has been used in the past, and can be used in the future, to 
license this Court, in considering regulatory legislation, 
to roam at large in the broad expanses of policy and 
morals and to trespass all too freely on the legislative 
domain of the States, as well as the Federal Government. 
The Court denies that it is using the "natural law due 
process formula." It says that its invalidation of the 
[86 S.Ct. 1087[ Virginia law "is founded not on what we 
think governmental policy should be, but on what the 
·Equal Protection Clause requires." I find no statement in 
the Court's opinion, however, which advances even a 
plausible argument as to why the alleged discriminations 
which might possibly be effected by Virginia's poll tax 
law are "irrational," "unreasonable," "arbitrary," or 
"invidious," 
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or have no relevance to a legitimate policy which the 
State wishes to adopt. The Court gives no reason at all to 
discredit the longstanding beliefs that asking the payment 
of a tax a prerequisite to voting is an effective way of 
collecting revenue, and that people who pay their taxes 
are likely to have a far greater interest in their 
g9vernment. The Court's failure to give any reasons to 
show that these purposes of the poll tax are "irrational," 
"unreasonable," "arbitrary," or "invidious" is a pretty 
clear indication to me that none exist. I can only conclude 
that the primary, controlling, predominant, if not the 
exclusive, reason for declaring the Virginia law 
unconstitutional is the Court's deep-seated hostility and 
antagonism, which I share, to making payment of a tax a 
prerequisite to voting. 
The Court's justification for consulting its own 
notions, rather than following the original meaning of the 
Constitution, as I would, apparently is based on the belief 
of the majority of the Court that for this Court to be 
bound by the original meaning of the Constitution is an 
intolerable and debilitating evil; that our Constitution 
should not be "shackled to the political theory of a 
particular era," and that, to save the country from the 
original Constitution, the Court must have constant power 
to renew it and keep it abreast of this Court's more 
enlightened theories of what is best for our society.[7] 
Page 678 
It seems to me that this is an attack not only on the great 
value of our Constitution itself, but also on the concept of 
~-written constitution which is to survive through the 
years as originally written unless changed through the 
amendment process which the Framers 
[86 S.Ct. 1088[ wisely provided. Moreover, when a 
"political theory" embodied in our Constitution becomes 
outdated, it seems to me that a majority of the nine 
members of this Court are not only without constitutional 
power, but are far less qualified, to choose a new 
constitutional political theory than the people of this 
country proceeding in the manner provided by Article V. 
The people have not found it impossible to amend 
their. Constitution to meet new conditions. The Equal 
Protection Clause itself is the product of the people's 
desire to use their constitutional power to amend the 
Constitution to meet new problems. Moreover, the 
people, in § 5 ofthe Fourteenth Amendment, designated 
the 
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governmental tribunal they wanted to provide additional 
rules to enforce the guarantees of that Amendment. The 
branch of Government they chose was not the Judicial 
Branch, but the Legislative. I have no doubt at all that 
Congress has the power under § 5 to pass legislation to 
abolish the poll tax in order to protect the citizens of this 
country if it believes that the poll tax is being used as a 
device to deny voters equal protection of the laws. See 
my concurring and dissenting opinion in South Carolina 
v. Katzenbach, ante, p. 355. But this legislative power 
which was granted to Congress by § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is limited to Congress.[&] This Court had 
occasion to discuss this very subject in Ex parte Virginia, 
100 U.S. 339, 345-346. There, this Court said, referring 
to the fifth section of the Amendment: 
All ofthe amendments derive much oftheir force from 
this latter provision. It is not said the judicial power of 
the general government shall extend to enforcing the 
prohibitions and to protecting the rights and immunities 
guaranteed. It is not said that branch of the government 
shall be authorized to declare void any action of a State in 
violation ofthe prohibitions. It is the power of Congress 
which has been enlarged. Congress is authorized to 
enforce the prohibitions by appropriate legislation. Some 
legislation is contemplated to make the amendments fully 
effective. Whatever legislation is appropriate, 
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that is, adapted to carry out the objects the amendments 
have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the 
prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the 
enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal 
protection ofthe laws against State denial or invasion, if 
not prohibited, is brought within the domain of 
congressional power. 
(Emphasis partially supplied.) Thus, § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, in accordance with our 
constitutional structure of government, authorizes the 
Congress to pass definitive legislation to protect 
Fourteenth Amendment rights, which it has done many 
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times, e.g.. 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a). For Congress to do this 
fits in precisely with the division of powers originally 
entrusted to the three branches of government --
Executive, Legislative, and Judicial. But for us to 
-~ndertake in the guise of constitutional interpretation to 
decide the constitutional policy question of this case 
amount, in my judgment, to a plain exercise of power 
which the Constitution has denied us, but has specifically 
granted to Congress. I cannot join in holding 
(86 S.Ct. 10891 that the Virginia state poll tax law 
violates the Equal Protection Clause. 
HARLAN, J., dissenting 
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, whom MR. JUSTICE 
STEW ART joins, dissenting. 
The final demise of state poll taxes, already totally 
pJoscribed by the Twenty-Fourth Amendment with 
respect to federal elections and abolished by the States 
themselves in all but four States with respect to state 
elections,[I] is perhaps, in itself, not of great moment. 
But the fact that the coup de grace has been administered 
by this Court. instead of being left to the affected States 
or to the federal political process,[2] should be a matter 
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-of continuing concern to all interested in maintaining the 
proper role of this tribunal under our scheme of 
government. 
I do not propose to retread ground covered in my 
dissents in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589, and 
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 97, and will proceed on 
the premise that the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment now reaches both state 
apportionment (Reynolds) and voter qualification 
(Carrington) cases. My disagreement with the present 
decision is that, in holding the Virginia poll tax violative 
of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has departed 
from long-established standards governing the 
application of that clause. 
The Equal Protection Clause prevents States from 
arbitrarily treating people differently under their laws. 
Whether any such differing treatment is to be deemed 
arbitrary depends on whether or not it reflects an 
appropriate differentiating classification among those 
affected; the clause has never been thought to require 
equal treatment of all persons despite differing 
circumstances. The test evolved by this Court for 
determining whether an asserted justifying classification 
·exists is whether such a classification can be deemed to 
be founded on some rational and otherwise 
constitutionally permissible state policy. See, e.g .. Powell 
v. Pennsylvania. 127 U.S. 678; Barrett v. Indiana, 229 
U.S. 26; Walters v. City of St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231; 
Baxstrom v. Herold. ante p. I 07. This standard reduces to 
a minimum the likelihood that the federal judiciary will 
judge state policies in terms of the individual notions and 
predilections of its 
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own members, and, until recently, it has been followed in 
all kinds of"equal protection" cases.[3] 
Reynolds v. Sims, supra, ~T&ong its other breaks ·with 
the past, also marked a departure from these traditional 
and wise principles. Unless its "one man, one vote" thesis 
of state legislative apportionment is to be attributed to the 
unsupportable proposition that "Equal Protection" simply 
means indiscriminate equality, it seems inescapable that 
what Reynolds really reflected was but this Court's own 
views of how modem American representative 
government should be run. For it can hardly be thought 
that no other method of apportionment may be considered 
rational. See the dissenting opinion of 
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STEWART, J., in Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General 
Assembly ofColorado, 377 U.S. 713, 744, and my own 
dissenting opinion in Reynolds v. Sims, supra, at pp. 
615-624. 
Following Reynolds the Court in Carrington v. 
Rash, 380 U.S. 89, applied the traditional equal 
protection standard in striking down a Texas statute 
disqualifying as voters in state elections certain members 
ofthe Armed Forces ofthe United States.[4] But today, 
in holding unconstitutional state poll taxes and property 
qualifications for voting and pro tanto overruling 
Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, and Butler v. 
Thompson, 341 U.S. 937, the Court reverts to the highly 
subjective judicial approach manifested by Reynolds. In 
substance the Court's analysis of the equal protection 
issue goes no further than to say that the electoral 
franchise is "precious" and "fundamental," ante p. 670, 
and to conclude that "[t]o introduce wealth or payment of 
a fee as a measure of a voter's qualifications is to 
introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor," ante p. 668. 
These are, of course, captivating phrases, but they are 
wholly inadequate to satisfy the standard governing 
adjudication of the equal protection issue: is there a 
rational basis for Virginia's poll tax as a voting 
qualification? I think the answer to that question is 
undoubtedly "yes. n [ 5] 
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(86 S.Ct. 10911 Property qualifications and poll taxes 
have been a traditional part of our political structure. In 
the Colonies the franchise was generally a restricted 
one. [ 6] Over the years, these and other restrictions were 
gradually lifted, primarily because popular theories of 
political representation had changed.(?] Often restrictions 
were lifted only after wide public debate. The issue of 
woman suffrage, for example, raised questions of family 
relationships, of participation in public affairs, of the very 
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nature ofthe type of society in which Americans wished 
to live; eventually a consensus was reached, which 
culminated in the Nineteenth Amendment no more than 
45 years ago. 
Similarly with property qualifications, it is only by 
fiat that it can be said, especially in the context of 
American history, that there can be no rational debate as 
to their advisability. Most of the early Colonies had them; 
many ofthe States have had them during much oftheir 
histories;[8] and, whether one agrees or not, arguments 
have been and still can be made in favor of them. For 
example, it is certainly a rational argument that payment 
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of some minimal poll tax promotes civic responsibility, 
weeding out those who do not care enough about public 
affairs to pay $I .50 or thereabouts year for the exercise of 
the franchise. It is also arguable, indeed it was probably 
accepted as sound political theory by a large percentage 
of Americans through most of our history, that people 
with some property have a deeper stake in community 
affairs, and are consequently more responsible, more 
educated, more knowledgeable, more worthy of 
confidence, than those without means, and that the 
community and Nation would be better managed if the 
franchise were restricted to such citizens.[9] 
Nondiscriminatory and fairly applied literacy tests, 
upheld by this Court in Lassiter v. Northampton Election 
Board, 360 U.S. 45, find justification on very similar 
grounds. 
These viewpoints, to be sure, ring hollow on most 
contemporary ears. Their lack of acceptance today is 
evidenced by the fact that nearly all ofthe States, left to 
their own devices. have eliminated property or poll tax 
qualifications; by the cognate fact that Congress and 
three-quarters of the States quickly ratified the 
Twenty-Fourth Amendment. and by the fact that rules 
such as 
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the "pauper exclusion" in Virginia law, Va.Const. § 23, 
Va.Code § 24-18, have never been enforced.(JO] 
Property and poll-tax qualifications, very simply, are 
not in accord with current egalitarian notions of how a 
modern democracy should be organized. It is, of course, 
entirely fitting that legislatures should modiJY the law to 
reflect such changes in popular attitudes. However, it is 
all wrong, in my view, for the Court to adopt the political 
doctrines popularly accepted at a particular moment of 
our history and to declare all others to be irrational and 
invidious, barring them from the range of choice by 
reasonably minded people acting through the political 
process. It was not too long ago that Mr. Justice Holmes 
felt impelled to remind the Court that the Due Process 
Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment does not enact the 
laissez-fa ire theory of society, Lochner v. New York, I 98 
U.S. 45, 75-76. The times have changed, and perhaps it is 
appropriate to observe that neither does the Equal 
Protection Clause of that Amendment rigidly impose 
upon America an ideology of unrestrained egalitarianism 
.[II] 
I would affirm the decision of the District Court. 
Notes: 
[*] Together with No. 655, Butts v. Harrison, Governor 
of Virginia, eta!., also on appeal from the same court. 
[I] Section I 73 of Virginia's Constitution directs the 
General Assembly to levy an annual poll ta,; not 
exceeding $1.50 on every resident of the State 21 years of 
age and over (with exceptions not relevant here). One 
dollar of the tax is to be used by state officials 
"exclusively in aid of the public free schools," and the 
remainder is to be returned to the counties for general 
purposes. Section I 8 of the Constitution includes 
payment of poll taxes as a precondition for voting. 
Section 20 provides that a person must "personally" pay 
all state poll taxes for the three years preceding the year 
in which he applies for registration. By § 2 I, the poll tax 
must be paid at least six months prior to the election in 
which the voter seeks to vote. Since the time for election 
of state officials varies (Va.Code §§ 2136, 2160 -- 2168; 
id. at § 222), the six months' deadline will vary, election 
from election. The poll tax is often assessed along with 
the personal property tax. Those who do not pay a 
personal property tax are not assessed for a poll tax, it 
being their responsibility to take the initiative and request 
to be assessed. Va.Code §58-I 163. Enforcement of poll 
taxes takes the form of disenfranchisement ofthose who 
do not pay, § 22 ofthe Virginia Constitution providing 
that collection of delinquent poll taxes for a particular 
year may not be enforced by legal proceedings until the 
tax for that year has become three years delinquent. 
(2] Judge Thornberry, speaking for the three-judge court 
which recently declared the Texas poll tax 
unconstitutional, said: 
If the State of Texas placed a tax on the right to speak at 
the rate of one dollar and seventy-five cents per year, no 
court would hesitate to strike it down as a blatant 
infringement of the freedom of speech. Yet the poll tax as 
enforced in Texas is a tax on the equally important right 
to vote. 
252 F.Supp. 234,254 (decided February 9, 1966). 
[3] We recently held in Louisiana v. United States, 380 
U.S. 145, that a literacy test which gave voting registrars 
"a virtually uncontrolled discretion as to who should vote 
and who should not" (id. at !50) had been used to deter 
Negroes from voting and accordingly we struck it down. 
While the "Virginia poll tax was born of a desire to 
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disenfranchise the Negro" (Harman v. Forssenius, 380 
U.S. 528, 543), we do not stop to determine whether on 
this record the Virginia tax in its modem setting serves 
the same end . 
. [4] Only a handful of States today condition the franchise 
on the payment of a poll tax. Alabama (Ala.Const., §§ 
178, 194, and Amendments 96 and 207; Ala.Code Tit. 17, 
§ i2) and Texas (Tex.Consi., Art. 6, § 2; Vernon's 
Ann.Stat., Election Code, Arts. 5.02, 5.09) each impose a 
poll tax of$1.50. Mississippi (Miss.Const., §§241, 243; 
Miss.Code §§ 3130, 3160, 3235) has a poll tax of $2. 
Vermont has recently eliminated the requirement that poll 
taxes be paid in order to vote. Act of Feb. 23, 1966, 
amending Vt.Stat.Ann. Tit. 24, § 701. 
As already noted, note 2, supra, the Texas poll tax was 
recently declared unconstitutional by a three-judge 
United States District Court. United States v. Texas, 252 
F.Supp. 234 (decided February 9, 1966). Likewise the 
A:labama tax. United States v. Alabama, 252 F.Supp. 95 
(decided March 3, 1966.) 
[5] Maine has a poll tax (Maine Rev.Stat.Ann. Tit. 36, § 
1381) which is not made a condition of voting; instead, 
its payment is a condition of obtaining a motor vehicle 
license (Maine Rev.Stat.Ann. Tit. 29, § 108) or a motor 
vehicle operator's license. !d. § 584. 
__(6] E.g.. 
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's 
argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced 
separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a 
badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of 
anything found in the act, but solely because the colored 
race chooses to put that construction upon it. 
163 U.S. at 551. 
[7] Segregated public transportation, approved in Plessy 
v. Ferguson, supra, was held unconstitutional in Gayle v. 
Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (per curiam). 
[8] Only MR. JUSTICE HARLAN dissented, while MR. 
J.YSTICE CLARK and MR. JUSTICE STEW ART each 
concurred on separate grounds. 
[I] Article V of the Constitution provides: 
The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall 
deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this 
Constitution, or, on the application ofthe Legislatures of 
two-thirds of the several States, shall call a convention 
for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be 
.valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this 
Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of 
three-fourths of the several States, or by conventions in 
three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of 
ratification may be proposed by the Congress; provided 
that no amendment which may be made prior to the year 
one thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any manner 
affect the first and fourth clauses in the Ninth Section of 
the First Article, and that no State, without its consent, 
shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate. 
[2] See, e.g., Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 
522; Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464; Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535; Minnesota v. Probate Court, 
309 U.S. 270; Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553; Watson v. 
Mmyland, 218 U.S. 173. 
[3] 
A statutory discrimination will not be set aside as the 
denial of equal protection of the laws if any state of facts 
reasonably may be conceived to justifY it. 
Metropolitan Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 584 (Stone, 
J.). 
[4] The opinion of the Court, in footnote two, quotes 
language from a federal district court's opinion which 
implies that, since a tax on speech would not be 
constitutionally allowed, a tax which is a prerequisite to 
voting likewise cannot be allowed. But a tax or any other 
regulation which burdens and actually abridges the right 
to speak would, in my judgment, be a flagrant violation 
of the First Amendment's prohibition against abridgments 
of the freedom of speech, which prohibition is made 
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Cf Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105. There is no 
comparable specific constitutional provision absolutely 
barring the States from abridging the right to vote. 
Consequently States have from the beginning, and do 
now, qualifY the right to vote because of age, prior felony 
convictions, illiteracy, and various other reasons. Of 
course, the First and Fourteenth Amendments forbid any 
State from abridging a person's right to speak because he 
is under 21 years of age, has been convicted of a felony, 
or is illiterate. 
[5] See my dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California, 
332 U.S. 46, 90. 
[6] See, for illustration, my dissenting opinion in 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507, and cases 
cited therein. 
[7] In Brown v. Board of Education, 34 7 U.S. 483, the 
Court today purports to find precedent for using the 
Equal Protection Clause to keep the Constitution up to 
date. I did not vote to hold segregation in public schools 
unconstitutional on any such theory. I thought when 
Brown was written, and I think now, that Mr. Justice 
Harlan was correct in 1896 when he dissented from 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, which held that it was 
not a discrimination prohibited by the Equal Protection 
Clause for state law to segregate white and colored 
people in public facilities, there, railroad cars. I did not 
join the opinion of the Court in Brown on any theory that 
segregation, where practiced in the public schools, denied 
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equal protection in 1954, but did not similarly deny it in 
1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. In 
my judgment, the holding in Brown against racial 
discrimination was compelled by the purpose of the 
Framers of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments completely to outlaw discrimination against 
people because of their race or color. See the 
Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 71-72; Nixon v. 
Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541. 
N.or does Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I, stand as 
precedent for the amendatory power which the Court 
exercises today. The Court in Malloy did not read into the 
Constitution its own notions ofwise criminal procedure, 
but instead followed the doctrine of Palko v. Connecticut, 
302 U.S. 319, and made the Fifth Amendment's 
unequivocal protection against self-incrimination 
applicable to the States. I joined the opinion of the Court 
in Malloy on the basis of my dissent in Adamson v. 
California, supra, in which I stated, at p. 89: 
If the choice must be between the selective process of the 
Palko decision applying some of the Bill of Rights to the 
States, or the Twining rule applying none of them, I 
would choose the Palko selective process. 
[8] But § I of the Fourteenth Amendment itself outlaws 
any state law which either as written or as applied 
discriminates against voters on account of race. Such a 
law can never be rational. 
States may do a good deal of classifying that it is difficult 
to believe rational, but there are limits, and it is too clear 
for extended argument that color cannot be made the 
basis of a statutory classification affecting the right [to 
v_9te] set up in this case. 
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (Holmes, J.). 
[I] Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia. 
[2] In the Senate hearings leading to the passage of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, some doubt was expressed 
whether state poll taxes could be validly abolished 
through the exercise of Congress' legislative power under 
.. § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Hearings on S. 
1564 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th 
Cong., Ist Sess., 194-197 (1965). I intimate no view on 
that question. 
[3] I think the somewhat different application of the 
Equal Protection Clause to racial discrimination cases 
finds justification in the fact that, insofar as that clause 
may embody a particular value in addition to rationality, 
the historical origins ofthe Civil War Amendments might 
attribute to racial equality this special status. See. e.g.. 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, I I 8 U.S. 356; Shelley v. Kraemer, 
334 U.S. I; Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 
410; Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483; Evans 
v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296; cf Korematsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214, 216. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal 
Protection of the Laws, 37 CalifL.Rev. 341 (1949); 
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional 
Law, 73 Harv.L.Rev. I, 33 (1959). 
A similar characterization of indigency as a "neutral 
fact," irrelevant or suspect for purposes oflegislative 
classification, has never been accepted by this Court. See 
Edwardsv. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184-185 (Jackson, 
J., concurring). Griffin v. liiinois, 35 i U.S. i2, requiring 
free trial transcripts for indigent appellants, and Douglas 
v. California, 372 U.S. 353, requiring the appointment of 
counsel for such appellants, cannot fairly be so 
interpreted, for, although reference was made 
indiscriminately to both equal protection and due process, 
the analysis was cast primarily in terms of the latter. 
More explicit attempts to infuse "Equal Protection" with 
specific values have been unavailing. See .. e.g.. Patsone v. 
Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (alienage); West Coast Hotel 
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (sex); Kotch v. Board of 
River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 564 (Rutledge, 
J., dissenting) (consanguinity). 
[ 4] So far as presently relevant, my dissent in that case 
rested not on disagreement with the equal protection 
standards employed by the Court but only on 
disagreement with their application in that instance. 380 
U.S. at 99-101. 
[5] I have no doubt that poll taxes that deny the right to 
vote on the basis of race or color violate the Fifteenth 
Amendment and can be struck down by this Court. That 
question is presented to us in Butts v. Harrison, No. 655, 
the companion case decided today. The Virginia poll tax 
is on its face applicable to all citizens, and there was no 
allegation that it was discriminatorily enforced. The 
District Court explicitly found "no racial discrimination . 
. . in its application as a condition to voting." 240 F.Supp. 
270, 27 I. Appellant in Butts, supra, argued first, that the 
Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1902, which 
framed the poll-tax provision, was guided by a desire to 
reduce Negro suffrage, and second, that, because of the 
generally lower economic standard of Negroes as 
contrasted with whites in Virginia the tax does, in fact, 
operate as a significant obstacle to voting by Negroes . 
The Court does not deal with this Fifteenth Amendment 
argument, and it suffices for me to say that, on the record 
here, I do not believe that the factors alluded to are 
sufficient to invalidate this $1.50 tax whether under the 
Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment. 
[6] See generally Ogden, The Poll Tax in the South 2 
(1958); I Thorpe, A Constitutional History of the 
American People, 1776-1850, at 92-98 (1898); 
Williamson, American Suffrage From Property to 
Democracy, 1760-1860, cc.l-4 (1960). 
[7] See Porter, A History of Suffrage in the United States 
77-111 (1918); Thorpe, op. cit. supra at 97, 401; 
Williamson, op. cit. supra at 13 8- I 8 I. 
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[8] See generally Ogden, op. cit. supra; Porter, op. cit. 
supra. 
[9] At the Constitutional Convention, for example, there 
was some sentiment to prescribe a freehold qualification 
for federal elections under Art. IV, § I. The proposed 
amendment was defeated, in part because it was thought 
·suffrage qualifications were best left to the States. See II 
Records of the Federal Convention 201-210 (FaiTfutd 
ed.l911 ). Madison's views were expressed as follows: 
Whether the Constitutional qualification ought to be a 
freehold, would with him depend much on the probable 
reception such a change would meet with in States where 
the right was now exercised by every description of 
people. In several of the States a freehold was now the 
qualification. Viewing the subject in its merits alone, the 
freeholders of the Country would be the safest 
depositories of Republican liberty. 
!d. at 203. See also Aristotle, Politics, Bks. III, IV; I 
Tocqueville, Democracy in America, c. xiii, at 199-202 
(Knopf ed.l948 ). 
[I OJ See Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 240 
F.Supp. 270,271. 
[II] Justice Holmes' admonition is particularly 
appropriate: 
Some of these laws embody convictions or prejudices 
which judges are likely to share. Some may not. But a 
-constitution is not intended to embody a particular 
economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic 
relation of the citizen to the State or of laissezfaire. It is 
made for people of fundamentally differing views, and 
the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and 
familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to 
conclude our judgment upon the question whether 
statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of 
the United States. 
198 U.S. at 75-76. 
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CARRINGTON 
v. 
RASH ET AL. 
No. 82. 
Supreme Court of United States. 
Aigued January 28, 1965. 
Decided March 1, 1965. 
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS. 
Wayne Windle argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was W C. Peticolas. 
Hawthorne Phillips, First Assistant Attorney General of Texas, and Mary K. Wall, Assistant 
Attorney General, argued the cause for respondents. With them on the brief was Waggoner 
Carr, Attomey General of Texas. 
MR JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court 
A provision of the Texas Constitution prohibits "[a]ny member of the Armed Forces of the 
United States" who moves his home to Texas during the course of his military duty from ever 
90 voting in any election in that State "so long as he or she is a member of the Armed Forces. •>ill 
'90 The question presented is whether this provision, as construed by the Supreme Court of 
Texas in the present case,IZl deprives the petitioner of a right secured by the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment The Supreme Court of Texas decided that it does not 
and refused to issue a writ of mandamus ordering petitioner's local election officials to permit 
him to vote, two Justices dissenting_ 378 S. W 2d 304. We granted certiorari, 379 U. S. 812. 
The petitioner, a sergeant in the United States Army, entered the service from Alabama in 
91 1946 at the age of 18. '91 The State concedes that he has been domiciled in Texas since 
1962, and that he intends to make his home there permanently. He has purchased a house in 
El Paso where he lives with his wife and two children. He is also the proprietor of a small 
business there. The petitioner's post of military duty is not in Texas, but at White Sands, New 
Mexico. He regularly commutes from his home in El Paso to his Army job at White Sands. He 
pays property taxes in Texas and has his automobile registered there. But for his uniform, the 
State concedes that the petitioner would be eligible to vote in El Paso County, Texas. 
Texas has unquestioned power to impose reasonable residence restrictions on the availability 
of the ballot Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S. 621. There can be no doubt either of the historic 
function of the States to establish, on a nondiscriminatory basis, and in accordance with the 
Constitution, other qualifications for the exercise of the franchise. Indeed, "[t]he States have 
long been held to have broad powers to determine the conditions under which the right of 
suffrage may be exercised." Lassiterv. Northampton Election Bd .. 360 U.S. 45. 50. Compare 
United States v_ Classic. 313 U. S. 299; Ex parte Yarbrough. 110 U. S. 651. "In other words, 
the privilege to vote in a State is within the jurisdiction of the State itself, to be exercised as 
the State may direct, and upon such terms as to it may seem proper, provided, of course, no 
discrimination is made between individuals in violation of the Federal Constitution." Pope v. 
Williams supra. at 632. 
This Texas constitutional provision, however, is unique_ ill Texas has said that no serviceman 
82 may ever "92 acquire a voting residence in the State so long as he remains in service. It is 
true that the State has treated all members of the military with an equal hand. And mere 
classification, as this Court has often said, does not of itself deprive a group of equal 
~13 protection. Williamson "93 v_ Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483. But the fact that a State is 
dealing with a distinct class and treats the members of that class equally does not end the 
judicial inquiry. "The courts must reach and determine the question whether the 
classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in light of its purpose. ___ " McLaughlin v. 
Florida 379 U.S. 184, 191. 
It is argued that this absolute denial of the vote to servicemen like the petitioner fulfills two 
purposes. First, the State says it has a legitimate interest in immunizing its elections from the 
concentrated balloting of military personnel, whose collective voice may overwhelm a small 
local civilian community. Secondly, the State says it has a valid interest in protecting the 
franchise from infiltration by transients, and it can reasonably assume that those servicemen 
who fall within the constitutional exclusion will be within the State for only a short period of 
time. 
The theory underlying the State's first contention is that the Texas constitutional provision is 
necessary to prevent the danger of a "takeover'' of the civilian community resulting from 
concentrated voting by large numbers of military personnel in bases placed near Texas towns 
and cities. A base commander, Texas suggests, who opposes local police administration or 
teaching policies in local schools, might influence his men to vote in conformity with his 
predilections. Local bond issues may fail, and property taxes stagnate at low levels because 
military personnel are unwilling to invest in the future of the area. We stress-and this a 
94 theme to be reiterated -that Texas has the right to require that all military '94 personnel 
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enrolled to vote be bona fide residents of the community. But if they are in fact residents, with 
the intention of making Texas their home indefinitely, they, as all other qualified residents, 
have a right to an equal opportunity for political representation. Cf. Grav v. Sanders. 372 U. 
S. 368. "Fencing ouf' from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they 
may vote is constitutionally impermissible. "[T]he exercise of rights so vital to the 
maintenance of democratic institutions," Schneiderv. State 308 U.S. 147 161. cannot 
constitutionally be obliterated because of a fear of the political views of a particular group of 
bona fide residents. Yet, that is what Texas claims to have done here. 
The State's second argument is that its voting ban is justified because of the transient nature 
of service in the Armed Forces.~ As the Supreme Court of Texas stated: "Persons in military 
service are subject at all times to reassignment, and hence to a change in their actual 
residence ... they do not elect to be where they are. Their reasons for being where they are 
. cannot be the same as [those of] the permanent residents." 378 S. W. 2d, at 306. The 
Texas Constitution provides that a United States citizen can become a qualified elector if he 
has "resided in this State one (1) year next preceding an election and the last six (6) months 
95 within the district or county ·95 in which such person offers to vote." Article VI, § 2, Texas 
Constitution. It is the integrity of this qualification of residence which Texas contends is 
protected by the voting ban on members of the Armed Forces. 
But only where military personnel are involved has Texas been unwilling to develop more 
precise tests to determine the bona fides of an individual claiming to have actually made his 
home in the State long enough to vote. The State's law reports disclose that there have been 
many cases where the local election officials have determined the issue of bona fide 
residence. These officials and the courts reviewing their actions have required a "freely 
exercised intention" of remaining within the State, Harrison v. Chesshir. 316 S. W. 2d 909 
915. The declarations of voters concerning their intent to reside in the State and in a 
particular county is often not conclusive; the election officials may look to the actual facts and 
circumstances. Stratton v. Hall, 90S. W. 2dB65, 866. By statute,l§l Texas deals with 
particular categodesofdtizenswfio, ilkesoidiers;piesent specialized problems in 
determining residence. Students at colleges and universities in Texas, patients in hospitals 
and other institutions within the State, and civilian employees of the United States 
Government may be as transient as military personnel. But all of them are given at least an 
opportunity to show the election officials that they are bona fide residents. 
Indeed, Texas has been able, in other areas, to winnow successfully from the ranks of the 
military those whose residence in the State is bona fide. In divorce cases, for example, the 
residence requirement for jurisdictional purposes, like the requirement for the vote, is one 
year in the State and six months in the forum county. The Texas courts have held that merely 
CJ6 being stationed within the ·s6 State may be insufficient to show residence, even though the 
statutory period is fulfilled. Even a declared intention to establish a residence may be not 
enough. "However, the fact that one is a soldier or sailor does not deprive him of the right to 
change his residence or domicile and acquire a new one." Robinson v. Robinson. 235 S. W. 
2d 228 230. 
We deal here with matters close to the core of our constitutional system. "The right ... to 
choose," United States v. Classic. 313 U.S. 299. 314, that this Court has been so zealous to 
protect, means, at the least, that States may not casually deprive a class of individuals of the 
vote because of some remote administrative benefit to the State. Oyama v. California. 332 U. 
S. 633. By forbidding a soldier ever to controvert the presumption of nonresidence, the Texas 
Constitution imposes an invidious discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
"[T]here is no indication in the Constitution that ... occupation affords a permissible basis for 
distinguishing between qualified voters within the State." Gravv. Sanders. 372 U.S. 368, 
380. 
We recognize that special problems may be involved in determining whether servicemen 
have actually acquired a new domicile in a State for franchise purposes. We emphasize that 
Texas is free to take reasonable and adequate steps, as have other States,!§] to see that all 
applicants for the vote actually fulfill the requirements of bona fide residence. But this 
constitutional provision goes beyond such rules. "[T]he presumption here created is ... 
definitely conclusive-incapable of being overcome by proof of the most positive character." 
Heinerv. Donnan. 285 U.S. 312 324. All servicemen not residents of Texas before induction 
97 come within the provision's sweep. Not one of them can ever vote in Texas, no matter how 
·m long Texas may have been his true home. "[T]he uniform of our country ... [must not] be 
the badge of disfranchisement for the man or woman who wears it. "!Zl 
Reversed. 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting. 
I. 
Anyone not familiar with the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, the history of that 
Amendment, and the decisions of the Court in this constitutional area, would gather from 
today's opinion that it is an established constitutional tenet that state laws governing the 
qualifications of voters are subject to the limitations of the Equal Protection Clause. Yet any 
dispassionate survey of the past will reveal that the present decision is the first to so hold. 
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In making this holding the Court totally ignores, as it did in last Term's reapportionment cases, 
Revnolds v. Sims. 377 U. S. 533 (and companion cases), all the history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the course of judicial decisions which together plainly show that the Equal 
Protection Clause was not intended to touch state electoral matters. See my dissenting 
opinion in Revnolds v. Sims, at 589. If that history does not prove what I think it does, we are 
at least entitled to be told why. While I cannot express surprise over today's decision after the 
reapportionment cases, which though bound to follow I continue to believe are constitutionally 
c;s indefensible, I can and do respectfully, but earnestly, record my protest ·ga against this 
further extension of federal judicial power into the political affairs of the States. The 
reapportionment cases do not require this extension. They were concerned with methods of 
constituting state legislatures; this case involves state voter qualifications. The Court is quite 
right in not even citing them.ill 
I deplore the added impetus which this decision gives to the current tendency of judging 
99 constitutional questions '99 on the basis of abstract "justice" unleashed from the limiting 
principles that go with our constitutional system. Constitutionally principled adjudication, high 
in the process of which is due recognition of the just demands of federalism, leaves ample 
room for the protection of individual rights. A constitutional democracy which in order to cope 
with seeming needs of the moment is willing to temporize with its basic distribution and 
limitation of governmental powers will sooner or later find itself in trouble. 
For reasons set forth at length in my dissent in Reynolds, I would dismiss the complaint in this 
case for failure to state a claim of federal right. 
II. 
I also think this decision wrong even on the Court's premise that it is free to extend the Equal 
Protection Clause so as to reach state-established voter qualifications. The question here is 
simply whether the differentiation in voting eligibility requirements which Texas has made is 
founded on a rational classification. In judging this question I think that the dictates of history, 
even though the Court has seen fit to disregard them for the purpose of determining whether 
it should get into the matter at all, should cause the Court to take a hard look before striking 
down a traditional state policy in this area as rationally indefensible. 
Essentially the Texas statute establishes a nule that servicemen from other States stationed 
at Texas bases are to be treated as transients for voting purposes. No one disputes that in 
the vast majority of cases Texas' view of things accords with fact. Although it is doubtless true 
that this rule may operate in some instances contrary to the actual facts, I do not think that 
the Federal Constitution prevents the State from ignoring that possibility in the overall picture. 
100 In my opinion Texas •;oo could rationally conclude that such instances would likely be too 
minimal to justify the administrative expenditure involved in coping with the "special 
problems" (ante, p. 96) entailed in winnowing out the bona fide permanent residents from 
among the transient servicemen living off base and sending their children to local schools. 
Beyond this, I think a legitimate distinction may be drawn between those who come 
voluntarily into Texas in connection with private occupations and those ordered into Texas by 
military authority. Residences established by the latter are subject to the doubt, not present to 
the same degree with the former, that when the military compulsion ends, so also may the 
desire to remain in Texas. 
And finally, I think that Texas, given the traditional American notion that control of the military 
should always be kept in civilian hands, emphasized in the case of Texas by its own special 
1 O: historical experience,l£1 could ·1 01 rationally decide to protect state and local politics against 
the influences of military voting strength by, in effect, postponing the privilege of voting 
otherwise attaching to a service-acquired domicile until the serviceman becomes a civilian 
and by limiting Texan servicemen to voting in the counties of their original domicile.Ql Such a 
policy on Texas' part may seem to many unduly provincial in light of modern conditions, but it 
cannot, in my view, be said to be unconstitutional. 
Thus, whether or not this Court has subject matter jurisdiction in this case, the judgment of 
the Supreme Court of Texas should not be disturbed. 
I1J Texas Constitution, Art. VI, § 2: 
"Any member of the Armed Forces of the United States or component branches thereof, or in the military service of the 
United States, may vote only in the county in which he or she resided at the time of entering such service so long as he or 
she is a member of the Armed Forces." 
The constitutional provision has been implemented by Article 5.02 of the Election Code of Texas which provides, in part: 
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, any member of the Armed Forces of the United States or component 
branches thereof who is on active duty in the military service of the United States may vote only in the county in which he or 
she resided at the time of entering such service so long as he or she is a member of the Anned Forces. This restriction 
applies only to members of the Armed Forces who are on active duty, and the phrase 'time of entering such service' means 
the time of commencing the current active duty. A re-enlistment after a temporary separation from service upon termination 
of a prior enlistment shall not be construed to be the commencement of a new period of service, and in such case the 
county in which the person resided at the time of commencing active service under the prior enlistment shall be construed 
to be the county of residence at the time of entering service." 
In Mabrvv. Davis 232 F. Supp. 930 <D. C. W. D. Texas 1964} a three-judge court recently declared this same provision 
unconstitutional as violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
.0 "The self-evident purpose of the amendment to the Constitution was to prevent a person entering military service as a 
resident citizen of a county in Texas from acquiring a different voting residence in Texas during the period of his military 
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service, and to prevent a person entering militaty service as a resident citizen of another state from acquiring a voting 
residence in Texas during the period of military service." 378 S. W. 2d 304, 305. (Emphasis supplied.) 
Ql V\lhife many States have rules which prescribe special tests for qualifying military personnel for the vote, none goes so 
far as completely to foreclose from the franchise all servicemen who were nonresidents before induction. 
One other State, Nevada, has a provision which on its face seems as prohibitory as Art. VI,§ 2, of the Texas Constitution. 
The Nevada Constitution provides that 
"The right of suffrage shall be enjoyed by all persons, otherwise entitled to the same, who may be in the military or naval 
service of the United States; provided. the votes so cast shall be made to apply to the county and township of which said 
voters were bona fide residents at the time of their entry into such service .. .. "Nev. Con st., Art. 2, § 3. (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
But the Attorney General of Nevada has recenUy interpreted this provision to mean that servicemen such as petitioner can 
estabiish a voting residence in the State if they snow tne1r 1ntent to rematn by "clear and unequivocal evidence." Op. Atty. 
Gen. Nev. 194, 197 (1961-1962). 
Under the Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955,69 Stat. 584, the Department of Defense collects and distributes to 
military personnel an analysis of state voter qualifications as applied to servicemen. The 1964 report states: 
"For voting purposes the legal residence of members of the Armed Forces is generally the State from which they entered 
military service. This home State remains as the only State in which a person in the Armed Forces has the legal right to 
vote unless certain conditions are met. Almost all States except Texas will permit persons in the Armed Forces to acquire a 
new voting residence within their jurisdiction. When this is accomplished, voting rights in the old State of residence are 
lost." Voting Information 1964, Department of Defense, p. x. 
Constitutional and statutory provisions of other States which treat the military specially, do not absolutely prohibit any 
opportunity to prove residence. The Georgia Constitution, for example, provides that no member of the Armed Forces "shall 
acquire the rights of an elector by reason of being stationed on duty in this State." Georgia Canst.,§ 2-702; see Indiana 
Canst., Art. 2, § 3; Oregon Canst., Art. II,§ 5; Alabama Code, Tit. 17, § 17. Other States distinguish between servicemen 
who live on the base, and those who have acquired homes in the community. Cf. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 21, 
Comment c. 
Iii The constitutional provision at issue in this case seems designed more as a rule prohibiting a serviceman from ever 
acquiring a voting residence than a disqualification from the franchise. Prior to 1954, Art. VI, § 1, of the Texas Constitution 
induded among the "classes of persons ... not ... allowed to vote in this State": "5. All soldiers, marines and seamen 
employed in the service of the Army or Navy of the United States." This clause was eliminated, according to the annotator's 
notes, to "confer the privilege to vote upon members of the regular establishment of the Armed Forces." 9 Vernon's Texas 
Civ. Stat. 19 (1964 Supp.). The 1954 constitutional amendment, involved in this case, was added to the section which 
establishes residence qualifications for voters. 
l2J. 9 Vernon's Tex. Civ. Stat. (Election Code) Art. 5.08. 
1§1 See note 3, supra. 
IZl Message of Governor Ellis Arnall to General Assembly of Georgia, p. 5 (January 3, 1944). 
ill None of the cases on which the Court does rely lends any support to its decision. 
In Pope v. Williams 193 U. S. 621 the Court upheld a Maryland statute which required voters to have been registered in 
the State tor at least a year. The Court said of the right to vote: 
"It is not a privilege springing from citizenship of the United States .... It may not be refused on account of race, color or 
previous condition of servitude, but it does not follow from mere citizenship of the United States. In other words, the 
privilege to vote in a State is within the jurisdiction of the State itself, to be exercised as the State may direct, and upon 
such terms as to it may seem proper, provided, of course, no discrimination is made between individuals in violation of the 
Federal Constitution [obviously refening to the Fifteenth and not the Fourteenth Amendment}. ... The question whether the 
conditions prescribed by the State might be regarded by others as reasonable or unreasonable is not a Federal one."~ 
U.S. at 632-633. 
Lassiterv. Northampton Election Bd. 360 U.S. 45 upheld the literacy test applied in North Carolina against an attack 
made on its face. The Court noted that: 
"Of course a literacy test, fair on its face, may be employed to perpetuate that discrimination which the Fifteenth 
Amendment was designed to uproot." 360 U.S. at 53. (Emphasis added.) 
Grayv. Sanders 372 U.S. 368. struck down Georgia's county~unit system for counting votes in a party primary election for 
the nomination of a United States Senator. It did not deal with voter qualifications. 
United States v. Classic. 313 U. S. 299 dealt with stuffing ballot boxes, and Ex parte Yarbrough. 110 U. S. 651 with 
intimidation of Negroes attempting to vote. Neither dealt with voter qualifications. 
None of the other federal cases cited by the Court was concerned in any way with voting. 
l6J. The 1837 election law of the Republic of Texas, § 9, provided ''That regular enlisted soldiers, and volunteers for during 
the war, shall not be eligible to vote for civil officers." 2 Laws of Republic of Texas, p. 8, in 1 Gammel, Laws of Texas, p. 
1350. "This provision was no doubt inspired by the mutinous conduct of the nonresident volunteers who had been recruited 
in the United States after the Battle of San Jacinto. They had defied the provisional government and on one occasion in 
July, 1836, had sent an officer to arrest President David G. Burnett and his cabinet to bring them to trial before the army. 
They had continued their rebellious conduct after Sam Houston became the first president under the Constitution of 1836. It 
was not until May, 1837, that Houston was able to dissolve the army and eliminate this threat to civil authority. This 
provision disfranchising soldiers in the regular army was placed in the 1845 Constitution of the State ofT exas and has 
remained in each succeeding constitution. It was modified in 1932 to exempt the National Guard and reserve and retired 
officers and men." McCall, History of Texas Election Laws, 9 Vernon's Ann. Tex. Civ. Stat., pp. XVII~ XVIII (1952). 
Other States which had similar provisions in their early constitutions induded Alabama, Canst. of 1819, Art. Ill, § 5; 
Arkansas, Canst. of 1836, Art. IV,§ 2; Indiana, Const. of 1816, Art. VI,§ 1: Louisiana, Canst. of 1845, Art. 12; Missouri, 
Canst. of 1820, Art. Ill,§ 10; South Carolina, Const. of 1790 (as amended in 1810}, Art. I,§ 4; Virginia, Canst. of 1830, Art. 
Ill,§ 14. 
The 1932 amendment to the Texas Constitution was replaced in 1954 by the present provision. 
Q.] Tex. Canst., Art. VI,§ 2, quoted in Court's opinion, ante, n. 1 
Page 4 of4 
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842 F.Supp. 607 (D. Puerto Rico 1994) 
Gregorio !GART(!A DE LA ROSA, et al., Plaintiffs, 
v. 
UNITED STATES of America, et al., Defendants. 
Civ. No. 91-2506(RLA). 
United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico. 
Jan.20, 1994 
Page 608 
Gregorio lgarta de Ia Rosa, Aguadilla, PR, for 
plaintiffs. 
Silvia Carreno Col, Asst. U.S. Atty., U.S. Attorney's 
.Office, Hato Rey, PR, Michael J. Haungs, U.S. Dept. of 
Justice, Washington, DC, for defendants. 
OPINION AND ORDER 
ACOSTA, District Judge. 
This is an action filed by residents of Puerto Rico 
who wish to vote for the President and the Vice President 
ofthe United States. Some ofthe plaintiffs have always 
resided in Puerto Rico and have never participated in 
presidential elections. Others had exercised their right to 
vote while residing in a state of the union but have 
become ineligible because of their change of residence to 
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The complaint 
alleges that the inability to vote in the presidential 
elections violates their constitutional rights and seeks 
declaratory and injunctive relief against the United States. 
The Court has before it defendants' Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings (docket No. 12) [I] alleging, 
in essence, that the complaint does not state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted, and also that the complaint 
impermissibly seeks an advisory opinion from this Court 
regarding the constitutionality oflegislation which has 
not been enacted. Plaintiffs have filed their Opposition 
.(docket No. 16), and a Supplementary Motion thereto 
(docket No. 24). 
Upon careful consideration of the arguments 
advanced by the parties, this Court finds that this action 
should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Article II of the Constitution of the United States 
provides that "[e]ach state shall appoint, in such Manner 
as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of 
Electors ... " U.S. Const. Art. II § I (our emphasis). The 
Electors appointed by the states, and not the voting 
public, are the ones who vote for, and elect, the President 
and Vice President of the United States. !d. The 
Constitution further provides that only states and, through 
the Twenty-Third Amendment, the District of Columbia, 
may cast electoral votes in presidential elections. U.S. 
Const. Art. II,§ I; amend. XXIII. 
In 1974, this District Court faced a similar 
constitutional challenge to that now presented by 
plaintiffs; the same was rejected as plainly without merit. 
Sanchez v. United States, 376 F.Supp. 239, 241 
(D.P.R.I974). This Court held: 
Although plaintiff is a U.S. citizen, under the 
Constitution of the United States the President is not 
chosen directly by the citizens, but by the electoral 
colleges in the States and the District of Columbia ... The 
whole thrust of this is that the Constitution does not by its 
terms, grant citizens the right to vote, but leaves the 
matter entirely to the States. 
!d. 
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A more recent challenge by residents of Guam was, 
likewise, rejected. "The right to vote in presidential 
elections under Article II inheres not in citizens but in 
states." Attorney General of the Territ01y of Guam v. 
United States, 738 F.2d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied. 469 U.S. 1209, 105 S.Ct. 1174, 84 L.Ed.2d 323 
(1985). The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Constitution 
"does not grant to American citizens the right to elect the 
President." Id "Since Guam concededly is not a state, it 
can have no electors, and plaintiffs cannot exercise 
individual votes in a presidential election. There is no 
constitutional violation." !d. 
Therefore, granting U.S. citizens residing in Puerto 
Rico the right to vote in presidential elections would 
require either that Puerto Rico become a state, or that a 
constitutional amendment, similar to the Twenty-Third 
Amendment, be adopted. Territ01y of Guam, 738 F.2d at 
1019; Sanchez v. United States, 376 F.Supp. at 242. As of 
this date, Puerto Rico has not become a state, neither has 
a constitutional amendment been adopted granting Puerto 
Rico the right to vote in presidential elections, as was 
specifically accorded to the District of Columbia. 
THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE 
In order to circumvent the constitutional provisions 
cited above, plaintiffs contend that "Puerto Rico['s] 
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present political status has evolved in such a way from a 
Territory in 1898 to that of a 'de facto' state," and that 
consequently, it should be considered a state entitled to 
electoral votes. See Opposition at 2. This argument, as 
defendant points out, presents a political question not 
suitable for judicial resolution. 
The political question doctrine, which is an aspect 
of the Court's i\rticle III jurisdiction, is premised upon 
the separation of powers among the three coordinate 
branches of goverrunent and the inherent limits of judicial 
power. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210, 82 S.Ct. 691, 
706, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962); Chicago & Southern Air 
Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 
111, 68 S.Ct. 431, 436, 92 L.Ed. 568 (1 948); United 
States ex rei. Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373, 1379 
(D.C.Cir. 1981), cert. denied. 455 U.S. 999, 102 S.Ct. 
1630, 71 L.Ed.2d 865 (1982). 
In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court identified six 
"formulations" that signal the presence of issues which 
are committed to the political branches: 
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a 
political question is found [I] a textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate 
political department; or [2] a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; 
or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial 
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion; or [ 4] the impossibility of a court's 
undertaking independent resolution without expressing 
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of 
goverrunent; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning 
adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the 
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one question. 
}69 U.S. at217, 82 S.Ct. at 710. 
"Implicating any one of these factors renders a 
question 'political' and thus nonjusticiable." United States 
v. Mandel. 914 F.2d 1215, 1222 (9th Cir. 1990). A 
non justiciable case must be dismissed as not presenting a 
"case" or "controversy" under Article Ill of the 
Constitution. See 369 U.S. at 198, 217, 82 S.Ct. at 710. 
Article Ill courts have a limited scope of jurisdiction, and 
will only decide upon matters that constitute a case or 
controversy. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 
2197,2204,45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). 
A complaint must set forth an actual case and 
controversy for judicial review. By seeking to obtain 
electoral votes for Puerto Rico as if it were a state, 
plaintiffs are requesting that this Court disregard the 
balance between the three coordinate branches of 
government, and the Article lii courts' inherent limits of 
judicial power. Bakerv. Carr, 369 U.S. at 210, 82 S.Ct. 
at 706. 
A determination on whether or not Puerto Rico's 
political status has evolved into "de 
Page 610 
facto" statehood for purposes of presidential elections 
would correspond to Congress. The text of the 
Constitution specifically commits the decision to create 
new states to Congress: "New States may be admitted by 
the Congress into this Union." U.S. Const. Art. !V, § 3 
(our emphasis). In seeking to have Puerto Rico 
recognized as a "de facto state," plaintiffs seek to thrust 
the Court into a decision the Constitution specifically 
entrusts to the legislative branch of government. 
Moreover, no standards exist by which a Court can 
or should decide what is or is not a "de facto" state. 
Whether Puerto Rico should be considered a "de facto" 
state for purposes of presidential elections is a question 
characterized by "a lack ofjudicially discoverable and 
manageable standards" for its resolution. Baker v. Carr, 
369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. at 710. 
Any attempt by this Court to determine whether 
Puerto Rico has sufficient attributes of statehood so as to 
be a state for purposes of Article II, § I would involve 
"an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for 
nonjudicial discretion." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at217, 
82 S.Ct. at 710. Since the question of the political status 
of Puerto Rico has been the subject of debate both on the 
Island and in Congress, it is up to the legislative branch to 
make the initial policy determination regarding this 
matter. 
Consequently, and pursuant to the political question 
doctrine, this Court will not enter into a matter that 
clearly pertains to Congress. Article Ill courts have 
historically avoided altering the balance between the 
three branches ofgoverrunent. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 
U.S. at 498, 95 S.Ct. at 2204. If plaintiffs wish to obtain a 
determination on whether or not Puerto Rico has become 
a "de facto" state for the purpose of presidential elections, 
they should address their views and concerns to the 
Congress of the United States, and not to this Court. 
ABSENTEE VOTING 
Plaintiffs' second argument for the proposition that 
residents of Puerto Rico should be afforded the right to 
vote in presidential elections pertains to absentee 
balloting. In the complaint, nine of the twelve plaintiffs 
allege that although they previously qualified to vote in 
presidential elections by virtue of their residence in 
various states, they have lost this right upon relocating to 
Puerto Rico. 
Plaintiffs also contend that "[f]ederal election 
qualification of absentee voters are clearly and 
unquestionably promulgated by Congress, not states," 
and that federal law alone determines who may vote by 
absentee ballot in federal elections. See Opposition at 14. 
Plaintiffs further argue that the Uniformed and Overseas 
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Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ff to 
ff-6 ("the Act") is unconstitutional, as it allows absentee 
voting by overseas citizens, but not by state residents 
who have relocated in Puerto Rico. 
While federal law places some limits on the ability 
of states to regulate federal elections, [2] it is primarily 
the states, not the federal government, that determine the 
manner in which presidential electors are chosen. 
Anderson v. Ce!ebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 794 n. 18, 103 
S.Ct 1564, 1573 n. 18, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983); Sanchez, 
376 F.Supp. at 241. 
The Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ff to ff-6, grants U.S. 
citizens living abroad the right to vote in federal 
elections, as though they were present in their last place 
of residence in the United States. The Act specifically 
applies to residents of the fifty states--and to residents of 
Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands and American 
Samoa--who live overseas. 42 U.S.C.§§ 1973ff-1, ff-6(6). 
The Act does not establish the sole criteria for 
absentee voting, but rather leaves states free to allow 
additional classes of people to vote by absentee ballot 
Similarly, the Act recognizes that states may impose 
additional requirements on absentee voters as long as 
these are not inconsistent with federal law. 
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The Act does not prevent persons who have become 
qualified to vote in a particular state from continuing to 
vote in that state by absentee ballot during a period of 
residence elsewhere in the United States. 
As defendant properly brings to our attention, 
plaintiffs have not cited any provision of federal law 
which prohibits them from voting by absentee ballot 
Furthermore, plaintiffs have apparently not contacted the 
states where they resided prior to relocating to Puerto 
Rico to inquire about the absentee ballot provisions at 
those states. Were they to be denied the right to vote, they 
could seek relief from those states. It would be up to the 
states in question to determine whether plaintiffs are 
'l!:lalified voters for the purpose of absentee balloting. 
Therefore, and contrary to plaintiffs' assertions, 
neither the Voting Rights Amendments nor the 
Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act 
impair the ability ofplaintiffs to continue voting for 
President and Vice President The issue of whether they 
are qualified voters would be one to be determined by the 
states where they previously resided. As this would not 
be a matter under federal law, plaintiffs' contention fails 
to state a claim against the United States upon which 
relief can be granted. 
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION 
CLAUSES 
As part of the absentee voting issue, plaintiffs also 
allege that the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens 
Absentee Voting Act is unconstitutional, since it violates 
the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection 
component of the Fifth Amendment Plaintiffs argue that 
the Act discriminates against U.S. citizens by denying 
those who previously voted in presidential elections the 
right to absentee voting. See Opposition at 25. 
This Court must only entertain unavoidable 
constitutional questions. Commonwealth v. Secretary of 
Health and Human Services, 899 F.2d 53, 55 (1st Cir. 
1990). If there are suitable alternative grounds, courts 
have the duty to avoid the constitutional issues. Benoni v. 
Boston and Maine Corp., 828 F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1987). 
Although we have found that the complaint fails to bring 
a proper case and controversy before the Court, we will, 
nonetheless, briefly address plaintiffs' constitutional 
challenge. 
Under the Due Process Clause, if a statute has a 
"reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and 
[is] neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements 
of due process are satisfied .... " Nebbiav. New York, 291 
U.S. 502, 537, 54 S.Ct 505, 516, 78 L.Ed. 940 (1934). 
Likewise, under the Equal Protection Clause, a statute not 
directed at a suspect or quasi-suspect class must be 
upheld if it has a rational basis. Clements v. Fashing, 457 
U.S. 957, 967, 102 S.Ct 2836, 2845, 73 L.Ed.2d 508 
(1982)(citing Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 
483,489, 75 S.Ct 461,465,99 L.Ed. 563 (1955)); United 
States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 
177, 179, 101 S.Ct 453, 460, 461, 66 L.Ed.2d 368 
(1980); Mathews v. DeCastro, 429 U.S. 181, 185, 97 
S.Ct. 431, 434, 50 L.Ed.2d 389 (1976). Since the 
distinction drawn in the Act, between U.S. citizens living 
abroad and U.S. citizens living within the United States, 
does not implicate any suspect or semi-suspect class of 
people, it is evaluated under the "rational basis" test for 
Equal Protection purposes. 
The Act has a legitimate governmental purpose, 
namely "to facilitate absentee voting by United States 
citizens, both military and civilian, who are overseas." 
H.R.Rep. No. 99-765, 1986 U.S.C.CAN. at 2009. It 
should be emphasized that the Act does not grant all 
overseas state residents the right to vote in presidential 
elections. Instead, it grants U.S. citizens living abroad the 
right to vote in federal elections--whether for president or 
other federal offices--as though they were present in their 
last place of residence in the United States. 
That the Act is limited to American citizens who are 
absent from the country, rather than Americans who 
move from place to place within the United States, is 
rational and nondiscriminatory. Americans who move 
within the United States lose their voting rights in their 
old residence while gaining voting rights in their new 
residence, whereas Americans who move overseas do 
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not acquire new voting rights in the country to which 
they move. The Act simply ensures that such overseas 
citizens can continue voting in federal elections from 
their last place of residence as though they were still 
there. 
\Vhcn a resident ofl'-Je"v York moves abroad, he or 
she will not gain voting rights at the new country. The 
Act would allow such a voter to retain his or her New 
York voting rights. If this same resident of New York 
relocated to Puerto Rico, he or she would no longer 
participate in New York federal elections, but would gain 
voting rights in Puerto Rico--and vote in federal elections 
for the Resident Commissioner. Although plaintiffs 
consider this change of voting rights as highly 
unfavorable, see Opposition at 12-13, this Court finds 
that such changes in voting rights are part of the benefits 
and burdens of moving to another jurisdiction. 
Therefore, the Act has a reasonable relation to a 
proper legislative purpose, is neither arbitrary nor 
discriminatory, and has a rational basis. The Act is not 
unconstitutional, and plaintiffs have failed to state a claim 
on which relief can be granted. 
In view of the above, and after careful consideration 
of the arguments advanced by the parties in their 
pleadings and motions, the Court hereby GRANTS 
Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, and 
consequently, hereby DISMISSES the instant action 
with prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which 
rei ief can be granted. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Notes: 
[I] See also, Reply Brief in Support ofDefendants' 
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, docket No. 31. 
[2] For instance, the Voting Rights Amendments of 1970, 
42 U.S.C.§ 1973aa-1 (1988), limits the ability of states to 
··impose durational residency requirements on individual 
voting in presidential elections, yet leaves other matters 
to the discretion of the states. SeeOregon v. Mitchell. 400 
U.S. 112,91 S.Ct. 260,27 L.Ed.2d 272 (1970). 
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439 u.s. 60 (1978) 
99 S.Ct. 383, 58 L.Ed.2d 292 
Holt Civic Club 
v. 
Qty of Tuscaloosa 
No. 77-515 
li nited States Supreme Court 
Nov. 28, 1978 
Argued October II, 1978 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 
Syllabus 
Appellants, a civic association and certain individual 
residents of Holt, Ala., a small unincorporated 
community outside the corporate limits of Tuscaloosa but 
within three miles thereof, brought this statewide class 
action challenging the constitutionality of "police 
jurisdiction" statutes that extend municipal police, 
sanitary, and business licensing powers over those 
residing within three miles of certain corporate 
boundaries without permitting such residents to vote in 
municipal elections. A three-judge District Court granted 
appellees' motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 
Held: 
I. The convening of a three-judge court under 
then-applicable28 U.S.C. §2281 (1970 ed.) was proper, 
since appellants challenged the constitutionality of 
··!99 S.Ct. 3851 state statutes that created a statewide 
system under which Alabama cities exercise 
extraterritorial powers. Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97, 
distinguished. Pp. 63-65. 
2. Alabama's police jurisdiction statutes do not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Pp. 66-75. 
(a) A government unit may legitimately restrict the 
right to participate in its political processes to those who 
reside within its borders. Various voting qualification 
decisions on which appellants rely in support of their 
contention that the denial of the franchise to them can 
stand only if justified by a compelling state interest are 
inapposite. In those cases, unlike the situation here, the 
challenged statutes disfranchised individuals who 
physically resided within the geographical boundaries of 
the governmental entity concerned. Pp. 66-70. 
(b) Alabama's police jurisdiction statutory scheme is 
a rational legislative response to the problems faced by 
the State's burgeoning cities, and the legislature has a 
legitimate interest in ensuring that residents of areas 
adjoining city borders be provided such basic municipal 
services as police, fire, and health protection. Nor is it 
unreasonable for the legislature to require police 
jurisdiction residents to contribute through license fees, 
as they do here on a reduced scale, to the expense of such 
services. Pp. 70-75. 
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3. The challenged statutes do not violate due 
process, since appellants have no constitutional right to 
vote in Tuscaloosa elections. P. 75. 
Affirmed. 
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, 
in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, BLACKMUN, 
POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., 
filed a concurring opinion, post. p. 75. BRENNAN, J., 
filed a dissenting opinion, in which WHITE and 
MARSHALL, JJ.,joined,post, p. 79. 
REHNQUIST, J., lead opinion 
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion 
of the Court. 
Holt is a small, largely rural, unincorporated 
community located on the northeastern outskirts of 
Tuscaloosa, the fifth largest city in Alabama. Because the 
community is within the three-mile police jurisdiction 
circumscribing Tuscaloosa's corporate limits, its residents 
are subject to the city's "police [and] sanitary 
regulations." Ala.Code § 11-40-10 (1975).[1] Holt 
residents are also subject to the criminal jurisdiction of 
the city's court, Ala.Code § 12-14-1 (1975)[2] and to the 
city's 
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power to license businesses, trades, and professions, 
Ala.Code § 11-51-91 (175).[3] Tuscaloosa, however, 
may collect from businesses in the police jurisdiction 
only one-half 
(99 S.Ct. 3861 of the license fee chargeable to similar 
U.S
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businesses conducted within the corporate limits. Ibid. 
In 1973, appellants, an unincorporated civic 
association and seven individual residents of Holt, 
brought this statewide class action in the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama[4] 
challenging the constitutionality of these Alabama 
statutes. They claimed that the city's extraterritorial 
exercise ofpolice powers over Holt residents, without a 
concomitant extension of the franchise on an equal 
footing with those residing within the corporate limits, 
denies residents 
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of the police jurisdiction rights secured by the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The District Court denied appellants' 
request to convene a three-judge court pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2281 (1970 ed.) and dismissed the complaint for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted. Characterizing the Alabama statutes as enabling 
Acts, the District Court held that the statutes lack the 
requisite statewide application necessary to convene a 
three-judge District Court. On appeal, the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ordered the convening of a 
three-judge court, finding that the police jurisdiction 
statute embodies "'a policy of statewide concern."' Holt 
Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 525 F.2d 653, 655 (1975), 
quoting Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89, 
94 (1935). 
A three-judge District Court was convened, but 
appellants' constitutional claims fared no better on the 
merits. Noting that appellants sought a declaration that 
extraterritorial regulation is unconstitutional per se, rather 
than ar extension of the franchise to police jurisdiction 
residents, the District Court held simply that "[ e ]qual 
protection has not been extended to cover such 
contention." App. to Juris.Statement 2a. The court 
rejected appellants' due process claim without comment. 
Accordingly, appellees' motion to dismiss was granted. 
Unsure whether appellants' constitutional attack on 
the Alabama statutes satisfied the requirements of 28 
U.S.C. § 2281 (1970 ed.) for convening a three-judge 
district court, we postponed consideration of the 
jurisdictional issue until the hearing of the case on the 
merits. 435 U.S. 914 (1978). We now conclude that the 
three-judge court was properly convened, and that 
appellants' constitutional claims were properly rejected. 
Before itsrepeal,[5] 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970 ed.) 
required that a three-judge district court be convened in 
any case in 
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which a preliminary or permanent injunction was sought 
to restrain 
the enforcement, operation or execution of any State 
statute by restraining the action of any officer of such 
State in the enforcement or execution of such statute .... 
Our decisions have interpreted § 228 I to require the 
convening of a three-judge district court 
where the challenged statute or regulation, albeit created 
or authorized by a state legislature, has statewide 
application or effectuates a statewide policy. 
Board of Regents v. New Left Education Project, 
404 U.S. 541, 542 (1972). Relying on Moody v. Flowers, 
387 U.S. 97 (1967), appellees contend, and the original 
single-judge District Court held, that Alabama's police 
jurisdiction statutes lack statewide impact. 
A 
(99 S.Ct. 3871 three-judge court was improperly 
convened in Moody because the challenged state statutes 
had "limited application, concerning only a particular 
county involved in the litigation. . .. " /d. at I 04. In 
contrast, appellants' constitutional attack focuses upon a 
state statute that creates the statewide system under which 
Alabama cities exercise extraterritorial powers. In 
mandatory terms, the statute provides that municipal 
police and sanitary ordinances 
shall have force and effect in the limits of the city or 
town and in the police jurisdiction thereof and on any 
property or rights-of-way belonging to the city or 
town.[6] 
Clearly, Alabama's police 
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jurisdiction statutes have statewide application. See, e.g., 
Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105, 107 (1967). 
That the named defendants are local officials is irrelevant 
where, as here, those officials are "functioning pursuant 
to a statewide policy and performing a state function." 
Moody v. Flowers, supra, at 102; Spielman Motor Sales 
Co. v. Dodge, supra, at 94-95. The convening of a 
three-judge District Court was proper. 
II 
Appellants' amended complaint requested the 
District Court to declare the Alabama statutes 
unconstitutional and to enjoin their enforcement insofar 
as they authorize the extraterritorial exercise of municipal 
powers. Seizing on the District Court's observation that 
"[appellants] do not seek extension of the franchise to 
themselves," appellants suggest that their complaint was 
dismissed because they sought the wrong remedy. 
The unconstitutional predicament in which 
appellants assertedly found themselves could be remedied 
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In only two ways: (I) the city's extraterritorial power 
could be negated by invalidating the State's authorizing 
statutes, or (2) the right to vote in municipal elections 
could be extended to residents of the police jurisdiction. 
We agree with appellants that a federal court should not 
dismiss a meritorious constitutional claim because the 
complaint seeks one remedy rather than another plainly 
appropriate one. Under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 
every final judgment shall grant the relief 
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to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is 
e!_ltitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in 
his pleadings. 
Rule 54( c). Thus, although the prayer for relief may 
be looked to for illumination when there is doubt as to the 
substantive theory under which a plaintiff is proceeding, 
its omissions are not, in and of themselves, a barrier to 
redress of a meritorious claim. See, e.g., 6 J. Moore, W. 
Taggart, & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice ~ 54.62, 
pp. 1261-1265 (2d ed.l976). But while a meritorious 
·claim will not be rejected for want of a prayer for 
appropriate relief, a claim lacking substantive merit 
obviously should be rejected. We think it is clear from 
the pleadings in this case that 
[99 S.Ct. 388[ appellants have alleged no claim 
cognizable under the United States Constitution. 
A 
Appellants focus their equal protection attack on § 
11-40-10, the statute fixing the limits of municipal police 
jurisdiction and giving extraterritorial effect to municipal 
police and sanitary ordinances. Citing Kramer v. Union 
Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969), and cases 
following in its wake, appellants argue that the section 
creates a classification infringing on their right to 
participate in municipal elections. The State's denial of 
the franchise to police jurisdiction residents, appellants 
urge, can stand only if justified by a compelling state 
interest. 
At issue in Kramer was a New York voter 
qualification statute that limited the vote in school district 
elections to otherwise qualified district residents who (I) 
.either owned or leased taxable real property located 
within the district, (2) were married to persons owning or 
leasing qualifYing property, or (3)were parents or 
guardians of children enrolled in a local district school 
for a specified time during the preceding year. Without 
deciding whether or not a State may in some 
circumstances limit the franchise to residents primarily 
interested in or primarily affected by the activities of a 
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given governmental unit, the Court held that the statute 
was not sufficiently tailored to meet that state interest, 
since its classifications excluded many bona fide 
residents of the school district who had distinct and direct 
interests in school board decisions, and included many 
residents whose interests in school affairs were, at best, 
remote and indirect. 
On the same day, in Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 
U.S. 701 (1969), the Court upheld an equal protection 
challenge to a Louisiana law providing that only 
"property taxpayers" could vote in elections called to 
approve the issuance of revenue bonds by a municipal 
utility system. Operation of the utility system affected 
virtually every resident of the city, not just property 
owners, and the bonds were in no way financed by 
property tax revenue. Thus, since the benefits and 
burdens of the bond issue fell indiscriminately on 
property owner and nonproperty owner alike, the 
challenged classification impermissibly excluded 
otherwise qualified residents who were substantially 
affected by and directly interested in the matter put to a 
referendum. The rationale of Cipriano was subsequently 
called upon to invalidate an Arizona law restricting the 
franchise to property taxpayers in elections to approve 
the issuance of general obligation municipal bonds. 
Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970). 
Appellants also place heavy reliance on Evans v. 
Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970). In Evans, the Permanent 
Board of Registry ofMontgomery County, Md. ruled that 
persons living on the grounds of the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH), a federal enclave located within the 
geographical boundaries of the State, did not meet the 
residency requirement of the Maryland Constitution. 
Accordingly, NIH residents were denied the right to vote 
in Maryland elections. This Court rejected the notion that 
persons living on NIH grounds were not residents of 
Maryland: 
Appellees clearly live within the geographical boundaries 
ofthe State of Maryland, and they are treated as state 
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residents in the census and in determining congressional 
apportionment. They are not residents ofMaryland only 
if the NIH grounds ceased to be a part of Maryland when 
the enclave was created. However, that "fiction of a state 
within a state" was specifically rejected by this Court in 
Howard v. Commissioners of Louisville, 344 U.S. 624, 
627 (1953), and it cannot be resurrected here to deny 
appellees the right to vote. 
Id at 421-422. Thus, because inhabitants ofthe NIH 
enclave were residents of Maryland and were 
[99 S.Ct. 389[ 
just as interested in and connected with electoral 
decisions as the were prior to I 953, when the area came 
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under federal jurisdiction, and as their neighbors who live 
off the enclave, 
id. at 426, the State could not deny them the equal 
right to vote in Maryland elections. 
From these and our other voting qualifications cases, 
a common characteristic emerges: the challenged statute 
in each case denied the fra.71chise to individuals \Vho \Vere 
physically resident within the geographic boundaries of 
the governmental entity concerned. See, e.g., Hill v. 
Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975) (invalidating provision of the 
Texas Constitution restricting franchise on general 
·obligation bond issue to residents who had "rendered" or 
listed real, mixed, or personal property for taxation in the 
election district); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 
383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating Virginia statute 
conditioning the right to vote of otherwise qualified 
residents on payment of a poll tax); cf Turner v. Fouche, 
396 U.S. 346 (1970) (invalidating Georgia statute 
restricting county school board membership to residents 
owning real property in the county). No decision of this 
Court has extended the "one man, one vote" principle to 
individuals residing beyond the geographic confines of 
the governmental entity concerned, be it the State or its 
political subdivisions. On the contrary, our cases have 
uniformly recognized that a government unit may 
legitimately restrict the right to participate in its political 
processes to those who reside within its 
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borders. See, e.g .. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 
343-344 ( 1972); Evans v. Cornman. supra at 422; 
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist.. 395 U.S. at 625: 
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965); Pope v. 
Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904). Bona fide residence 
alone, however, does not automatically confer the right to 
-~ote on all matters, for at least in the context of special 
interest elections the State may constitutionally 
disfranchise residents who lack the required special 
interest in the subject matter of the election. See Salyer 
Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 
U.S. 719 (1973); Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. To/tee 
Watershed Improvement Dist., 410 U.S. 743 (1973). 
Appellants' argument that extraterritorial extension 
of municipal powers requires concomitant extraterritorial 
extension of the franchise proves too much. The 
imaginary line defining a city's corporate limits cannot 
corral the influence of municipal actions. A city's 
decisions inescapably affect individuals living 
immediately outside its borders. The granting of building 
permits for high rise apartments, industrial plants, and the 
like on the city's fringe unavoidably contributes to 
problems of traffic congestion, school districting, and law 
enforcement immediately outside the city. A rate change 
in the city's sales or ad valorem tax could well have a 
significant impact on retailers and property values in 
areas bordering the city. The condemnation of real 
property on the city's edge for construction of a municipal 
garbage dump or waste treatment plant would have 
obvious implications for neighboring nonresidents. 
Indeed, the indirect extraterritorial effects of many purely 
internal municipal actions could conceivably have a 
heavier impact on surrounding environs than the direct 
regulation contemplated by Alabama's police jurisdiction 
statutes. Yet no one would suggest that nonresidents 
likely to be affected by this sort of municipal action have 
a constitutional right to participate in the political 
processes bringing it about. And unless one adopts the 
idea that the 
Page 70 
Austinian notion of sovereignty, which is presumably 
embodied to some extent in the authority of a city over a 
police jurisdiction, distinguishes the direct effects of 
limited municipal powers over police jurisdiction 
residents from the indirect though equally dramatic 
extraterritorial effects of 
(99 S.Ct. 390( purely internal municipal actions, it makes 
little sense to say that one requires extension of the 
franchise, while the other does not. 
Given this country's tradition of popular sovereignty, 
appellants' claimed right to vote in Tuscaloosa elections 
is not without some logical appeal. We are mindful, 
however, ofMr. Justice Holmes' observation in Hudson 
Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908): 
All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their 
logical extreme. Yet all, in fact, are limited by the 
neighborhood of principles of policy which are other than 
those on which the particular right is founded, and which 
become strong enough to hold their own when a certain 
point is reached. . . . The boundary at which the 
conflicting interests balance cannot be determined by any 
general formula in advance, but points in the line, or 
helping to establish it, are fixed by decisions that this or 
that concrete case falls on the nearer or farther side. 
The line heretofore marked by this Court's voting 
qualifications decisions coincides with the geographical 
boundary ofthe governmental unit at issue, and we hold 
that appellants' case, like their homes falls on the farther 
side. 
B 
Thus stripped of its voting rights attire, the equal 
protection issue presented by appellants becomes whether 
the Alabama statutes giving extraterritorial force to 
certain municipal ordinances and powers bear some 
rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. San 
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 
I (1973). 
The Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit legislation 
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merely because 
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it is special, or limited in its application to a particular 
geographical or political subdivision ofthe state. 
Fort Smith Light Co. v. Paving Dist., 274 U.S. 387, 
39! (! 927). Rather, the Equal Protection Clause is 
offended only if the statute's classification "rests on 
grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the 
State's objective." McGowan v. MGiyland, 366 U.S. 420, 
425 ( 1961 ); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 
330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947). 
Government, observed Mr. Justice Johnson, "is the 
science of experiment," Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 
22.6 ( 1821 ), and a State is afforded wide leeway when 
experimenting with the appropriate allocation of state 
legislative power. This Court has often recognized that 
political subdivisions such as cities and counties are 
created by the State "as convenient agencies for 
exercising such of the governmental powers of the State 
as may be entrusted to them." Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 
U.S. 161, 178 (1907). See also e.g.. Sailors v. Board of 
Education. 387 U.S. at 108; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 
533, 575 (1964). In Hunter v. Pittsburgh, the Court 
discussed at length the relationship between a State and 
its political subdivisions, remarking: 
The number. nature and duration of the powers conferred 
upon (municipal] corporations and the territory over 
which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute 
discretion of the State. 
207 U.S. at 178. While the broad statements as to 
state control over municipal corporations contained in 
Hunter have undoubtedly been qualified by the holdings 
oflater cases such as Kramer v. Union Free School Dist .. 
supra. we think that the case continues to have substantial 
constitutional significance in emphasizing the 
extraordinarily wide latitude that States have in creating 
various types of political subdivisions and conferring 
authority upon them. [7] 
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(99 S.Ct. 391( The extraterritorial exercise ofmunicipal 
powers is a governmental technique neither recent in 
origin nor unique to the State of Alabama. See R. 
Maddox, Extraterritorial Powers of Municipalities in the 
,United States (1955). In this country. 35 States authorize 
their municipal subdivisions to exercise governmental 
powers beyond their corporate limits. Comment, The 
Constitutionality of the Exercise of Extraterritorial 
Powers by Municipalities, 45 U.Chi.L.Rev. 151 (1977). 
Although the extraterritorial municipal powers granted by 
these States vary widely, several States grant their cities 
more extensive or intrusive powers over bordering areas 
than those granted under the Alabama statutes.[8] 
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In support of heir equal protection claim, appellants 
suggest a number of "constitutionally preferable" 
governmental alternatives to Alabama' system of 
municipal police jurisdictions. For example, exclusive 
management of the police jurisdiction by county officials, 
appellants maintain, would be more "practical." From a 
political science standpoint, appellants' suggestions may 
be sound, but this Court does 
[99 S.Ct. 392] not sit to determine whether Alabama has 
chosen the soundest or 
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most practical form of internal government possible. 
Authority to make those judgments resides in the state 
legislature, and Alabama citizens are free to urge their 
proposals to that body. See, e.g .. Hunter v. Pittsburgh. 
207 U.S. at 179. Our inquiry is limited to the question 
whether "any state of facts reasonably may be conceived 
to justifY" Alabama's system of police jurisdictions, 
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage 
Dist., 410 U.S. at 732, and, in this case, it takes but 
momentary reflection to arrive at an affirmative answer. 
The Alabama Legislature could have decided that 
municipal corporations should have some measure of 
control over activities carried on just beyond their "city 
limit" signs, particularly since today's police jurisdiction 
may be tomorrow's annexation to the city proper. Nor 
need the city's interests have been the only concern of the 
legislature when it enacted the police jurisdiction statutes. 
Urbanization of any area brings with it a number of 
individuals who long both for the quiet of suburban or 
country living and for the career opportunities offered by 
the city's working environment. Unincorporated 
communities like Holt dot the rim of most m<Uor 
population centers in Alabama and elsewhere, and state 
legislatures have a legitimate interest in seeing that this 
substantial segment of the population does not go without 
basic municipal services such as police, fire, and health 
protection. Established cities are experienced in the 
delivery of such services, and the incremental cost of 
extending the city's responsibility in these areas to 
surrounding environs may be substantially less than the 
expense of establishing wholly new service organizations 
in each community. 
Nor was it unreasonable for the Alabama Legislature 
to require police jurisdiction residents to contribute 
through license fees to the expense of services provided 
them by the city. The statutory limitation on license fees 
to half the amount exacted within the city assures that 
police jurisdiction residents will not be victimized by the 
city government. 
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Viable local governments may need many innovations, 
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numerous combination of old and new devices, great 
flexibility in municipal an·angements to meet changing 
urban conditions. 
Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. at 110-111. 
T-his observation in Sailors was doubtless as true at the 
turn of this century, when urban areas throughout the 
country were temporally closer to the effects of the 
industrial revolution. Alabama's police jurisdiction 
statute, enacted in 1907, was a rational legislative 
response to the problems faced by the State's burgeoning 
cities. Alabama is apparently content with the results of 
its experiment, and nothing in the Equal Protection 
Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment requires that it try 
.~omething new. 
c 
Appellants also argue that "governance without the 
franchise is a fundamental violation of the due process 
clause." Brief for Appellants 28. Support for this 
proposition is alleged to come from United States v. 
Texas, 252 F.Supp. 234 (WD Tex.) (three-judge District 
Court), summarilyaffd, 384 U.S. 155 (1966), which held 
that conditioning the franchise of otherwise qualified 
voters on payment of a poll tax denied due process to 
many Texas voters. Appellants' argument proceeds from 
the assumption, earlier shown to be erroneous, supra at 
66-70, that they have a right to vote in Tuscaloosa 
elections. Their conclusion falls with their premise. 
Ill 
In sum, we conclude that Alabama's police 
jurisdiction statutes violate neither the Equal Protection 
Clause nor the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Accordingly, the judgment of the District 
Court is 
Affirmed. 
STEVENS. J., concurring 
(99 S.Ct. 393( MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring. 
The Court today holds that the Alabama statutes 
providing for the extraterritorial exercise of certain 
limited powers by 
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municipalities are not unconstitutional. While I join the 
opinion of the Court, I write separately to emphasize that 
this holding does not make all exercises of extraterritorial 
authority by a municipality immune from attack under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Alabama Legislature, which is elected by all of 
the citizens of the State, including the individual 
appellants, has prescribed a statewide program pursuant 
to which residents of police jurisdictions are subject to 
limited regulation by, and receive certain services from, 
adjacent cities. In return, those residents who are engaged 
in business are charged [ icense fees equal to one-half 
those charged to city businesses. In my view, there is 
nothing necessarily unconstitutional about such a system. 
Certainly there is nothing in the Federal Constitution to 
prevent a suburb from contracting with a nearby city to 
provide municipal services for its residents, even though 
those residents have no voice in the election of the city's 
officials or in the formulation of the city's rules. That is 
essentially what Alabama has accomplished here, through 
the elected representatives of all its citizens in the state 
legislature. [I) 
Of course, in structuring a system, neither a 
contracting suburb nor an enacting legislature can 
consent to a waiver of the constitutional rights of its 
constituents in the election process. For 
when the State delegates lawmaking power to local 
government and provides for the election of local 
officials from districts specified by statute, ordinance, or 
local charter, it must insure that those qualified to vote 
have the right to an equally effective voice in the election 
process. 
Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 4 74, 480. 
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But the fact that these appellants are subject to 
certain regulations of the municipality does not, itself, 
establish that they are "qualified to vote." Unlike the 
residents of the National Institutes of Health enclave at 
issue in Evansv. Cornman,398 U.S. 419, appellants are 
not without any voice in the election of the officials who 
govern their affairs. They do vote for the county, state, 
and federal officials who exercise primary control over 
their day-to-day lives. And even as to their interaction 
with the government of the city, appellants are not 
completely without a voice: through their state 
representatives, they participate directly in the process 
which has created their governmental relationship with 
the city. The question then is whether, by virtue of that 
relationship created by state law, the residents of Holt and 
all other police jurisdictions in the State are entitled to a 
voice "equally effective" with the residents of the 
municipalities themselves in the election of the officials 
responsible for governing the municipalities. 
In my judgment, they are not. A State or city is free 
under the Constitution to require that "all applicants for 
the vote actually fulfill the requirements of bona fide 
residence." Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96. While it 
is not free to draw residency lines which deny the 
franchise to individuals who "are just as interested in and 
connected with electoral decisions . . . as are their 
neighbors" who are entitled to vote, Evans v. Cornman. 
supra at 426, the Alabama statutes, at least on their face, 
do not do so. The powers of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
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granted by the challenged statutes are limited. 
Tuscaloosa, for example, does not tax the residents of 
Holt, nor does it control the zoning of their property or 
.the operation of 
(99 S.Ct. 394( their schools. Indeed, many of the powers 
traditionally exercised by municipalities --the provision 
of parks, hospitals, schools, and libraries and the 
construction and repair of bridges and highways -- are 
entrusted here to the county government, which is fully 
representative of Holt. Nor is 
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there any claim that residency lines have generally been 
drawn invidiously, or that residents of the police 
jurisdictions have been charged unreasonable costs for 
the services they.receive. In sum, appellants have shown 
no more than that they and all residents of police 
jUrisdictions in Alabama are subject to some -- but by no 
means all -- of the regulations and services afforded by 
the cities to their residents, in return for which they pay 
license fees half as great as those paid by city residents. 
Such a showing is plainly insufficient to justify a holding 
that the Alabama statutes are unconstitutional and cannot 
be applied anywhere in the State. 
This is all that the Court decides today. For this suit 
~as brought under the then-applicable three-judge court 
jurisdiction as a challenge to the constitutionality of the 
Alabama statutes.[2] Appellants did not merely challenge 
the statutes as applied in the Tuscaloosa police 
jurisdiction. Rather, they sought to represent all Alabama 
residents living in contiguous zones, and to have the 
statutes at issue here declared unconstitutional in all their 
applications throughout the State. It was for this very 
reason that the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
concluded that three-judge court jurisdiction was proper 
in this case. See Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 525 F.2d 
653, 655 (I 75). And it is for this reason that our holding 
is necessarily a limited one. The statutory scheme created 
by the Alabama Legislature is not unconstitutional by its 
terms, but it may well be, as the opinion of the Court 
recognizes, ante at 72-73, n. 8, that that scheme or 
another much like it might sometimes operate to deny the 
franchise to individuals who share the interests of their 
voting neighbors. No such question, however, is 
presented by this appeal from the decision of the 
three-judge District Court. See Moody v. 
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Flowers, 387 U.S. 97; Rorick v. Board of Comm'rs, 307 
_U.S. 208. 
BRENNAN, J., dissenting 
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. 
JUSTICE WHITE and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL join, 
dissenting. 
Alabama creates by statute an area of "police 
jurisdiction" encompassing all adjoining territory within 
three miles of the corporate limits of cities with a 
population of 6,00 or more. Within this police jurisdiction 
Alabama law provides that 
[ o ]rdinances of a city ... enforcing police or sanitary 
regulations and prescribing fines and penalties for 
violations thereof shall have force and effect. ... 
Ala.Code § I 1-4010 (1975).[1] Alabama law 
provides in addition that a city 
may fix and collect licenses for any business, trade or 
profession done within the police jurisdiction of such 
city ... provided, that the amount of such licenses shall 
not be more than one half the amount charged and 
collected as a license for like business, trade or profession 
done within the corporate limits of such city .... 
Ala.Code § I 1-51-91 (1975).[2] At the time this 
lawsuit commenced on August 7, 1973, Alabama vested 
jurisdiction of the prosecution of breaches of municipal 
ordinances occurring within a police jurisdiction in a 
recorder's court,[3] the recorder being elected by a city's 
(99 S.Ct. 395( board of commissioners. Ala.Code, Tit. 
37, § 584 (1958).[4] 
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Appellants are the Holt Civic Club and seven 
residents of the unincorporated community of Holt, 
which lies within the police jurisdiction of the city of 
Tuscaloosa, Ala.[5] Although appellants are thus subject 
to Tuscaloosa's police and sanitary ordinances, to the 
jurisdiction of its municipal court,[6] and to the 
requirements of its licensing fees, appellants are not 
permitted to vote in Tuscaloosa's municipal elections, or 
to participate in or to initiate Tuscaloosa's referenda or 
recall elections. Appellants claim that this disparity 
"infringes on their constitutional right (under the due 
process and equal protection clauses) to a voice in their 
government." Complaint ~ I I . The three-judge District 
Court below dismissed appellants' equal protection and 
due process claims.[7] Without reaching the due process 
issue, I would reverse the judgment of the District Court 
and hold that appellants' equal protection claim should 
have been sustained. 
It is, of course, established that, once a 
franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be 
drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 
665 ( 1966). Because "statutes distributing the franchise 
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constitute the foundation of our representative society," 
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 
( 1969), we have subjected such statutes to "exacting 
judicial scrutiny." !d. at 628.[8] Indeed, 
if a challenged statute grants the right to vote to some 
citizens and denies the franchise to others, "the Court 
must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to 
promote a compelling state interest." [Kramer v. Union 
Free School Dist., 395 U.S.] at 627 (emphasis added). 
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972). The 
general rule is that, 
whenever a state or local government decides to select 
persons by popular election to perform governmental 
Junctions, the Equal Protection Clause ofthe Fourteenth 
Amendment requires that each qualified voter must be 
given an equal opportunity to participate in that election .. 
Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 56 
(1970). 
Our decisions before today have held that bona fide 
residency requirements are an acceptable means of 
distinguishing qualified from unqualified voters. Dunn v. 
Blumstein. supra at 343. The Court holds today, however, 
that the restriction of the franchise to those residing 
within the corporate limits of the 
199 S.Ct. 3961 city ofTuscaloosa is such a bona fide 
residency requirement. The Court rests this holding on 
the conclusion that "a government unit may legitimately 
restrict the right to participate in its political processes to 
those who reside within its borders." Ante at 68-69. The 
Court thus insulates the Alabama statutes challenged in 
this case from the strict judicial scrutiny ordinarily 
applied to state laws distributing the franchise. In so 
doing, the Court cedes to geography a talismanic 
significance contrary to the theory and meaning of our 
_past voting rights cases. 
We have previously held that, when statutes 
distributing the franchise depend upon residency 
requirements, state law 
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characterizations of residency are not controlling for 
purposes ofthe Fourteenth Amendment. See .. e.g., Evans 
v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970); Carrington v. Rash, 
380 U.S. 89 (1965). Indeed, Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, 
was careful to exempt from strict judicial scrutiny only 
bona fide residency requirements that were 
"appropriately defined and uniformly applied." 405 U.S. 
at 343. The touchstone for determining whether a 
residency requirement is "appropriately defined" derives 
from the purpose of such requirements, which, as stated 
in Dunn .. is "to preserve the basic conception of a political 
community." !d. at 344. At the heart of our basic 
conception of a "political community," however, is the 
notion of a reciprocal relationship between the process of 
government and those who subject themselves to that 
process by choosing to live within the area of its 
authoritative application.[9] Cf Avery v. Midland County, 
390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968). Statutes such as those 
challenged in this case, which fracture this relationship 
by severing the connection between the process of 
government and those who are governed in the places of 
their residency, thus undermine the very purposes which 
have led this Court in the past to approve the application 
of bona fide residency requirements. 
There is no question but that the residents of 
Tuscaloosa's police jurisdiction are governed by the 
city.[IO] Under Alabama 
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law, a municipality exercises "governing" and 
"lawmaking" power over its police jurisdiction. City of 
Homewood v. Wofford Oil Co., 232 Ala. 634, 637, 169 
So. 288,-290 ( 1936). Residents ofTuscaloosa's police 
jurisdiction are subject 
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to license fees exacted by the city, as well as to the city's 
police and sanitary regulations, which can be enforced 
through penal sanctions effective in the city's municipal 
court. See Birmingham v. Lake, 243 Ala. 367, 372, 10 
So.2d 24, 28 ( 1942). The Court seems to imply, however, 
that residents of the police jurisdiction are not governed 
enough to be included within the political community of 
Tuscaloosa, since they are not subject to Tuscaloosa's 
powers of eminent domain, zoning, 
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or ad valorem taxation. Ante at 73 n. 8. But this position 
is sharply contrary to our previous holdings. In Kramer v. 
Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969), for 
example, we held that residents of a school district who 
neither owned nor leased taxable real property located 
within the district, or were not married to someone who 
did, or were not parents or guardians of children enrolled 
in a local district school, nevertheless were sufficiently 
affected by the decisions of the local school board to 
make the denial of their franchise in local school board 
elections a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 
Similarly, we held in Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 
U.S. 701 (1969), that a Louisiana statute limiting the 
franchise in municipal utility system revenue bond 
referenda to those who were "property taxpayers" was 
unconstitutional because all residents ofthe municipality 
were affected by the operation of the utility system. See 
Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 ( 1970). 
The residents ofTuscaloosa's police jurisdiction are 
vastly more affected by Tuscaloosa's decisionmaking 
processes than were the plaintiffs in either Kramer or 
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Cipriano affected by the decisionmaking processes from 
which they had been unconstitutionally excluded. Indeed, 
under Alabama law, Tuscaloosa's authority to create and 
enforce police and sanitary regulations represents an 
-~xtensive reservoir of power "to prevent, an anticipation 
of danger to come, .. and, in so doing, to curb and 
restrain the individual tendency." Gilchrist Drug Co. v. 
Birmingham, 234 Ala. 204,208, 174 So. 609,612 (1937). 
See Cooper v. Town of Valley Head, 212 Ala. 125, 126, 
101 So. 874, 875 (1924). A municipality, for example, 
may use its police powers to regulate, or even to ban, 
common professions and businesses. 
In the exertion and application of the police power, there 
is to be observed the sound distinction as to useful and 
harmless trades, occupations and businesses and as to 
businesses, occupations and trades recognized as hurtful 
to public morals, public safety, 
~age 86 
productive of disorder or mJunous to public good. In 
applying it to the class last mentioned, it may be exerted 
to destroy. 
Chappell v. Birmingham, 236 Ala. 363, 365, 181 So. 
906,907 (1938). The Court today does not explain why 
being subjected to the authority to exercise such 
extensive power does not suffice to bring the residents of 
.Tuscaloosa's police jurisdiction within the political 
community of the city. Nor does the Court in fact provide 
any standards for determining when those subjected to 
extraterritorial municipal legislation will have been 
"governed enough" to trigger the protections of the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
The criterion of geographical residency relied upon 
by the Court is of no assistance in this analysis. Just as a 
State may not fracture the integrity of a political 
community by restricting the franchise to property 
taxpayers, so it may not use geographical restrictions on 
the franchise to accomplish the same end. This is the 
teaching of Evans v. Cornman.£ vans held, contrary to the 
conclusion of the Maryland Court of Appeals, that those 
who lived on the grounds of the National Institutes of 
H-ealth (NIH) enclave within Montgomery County were 
residents of Maryland for purposes of the franchise. Our 
decision rested on the grounds that inhabitants of the 
enclave were "treated as state residents in the census and 
in determining congressional apportionment," 398 U.S. at 
42 I, and that 
residents of the NIH grounds are just as interested in and 
connected with electoral decisions as they were prior to 
.-1953, when the area came under federal jurisdiction, and 
as are their neighbors who live off the enclave. 
!d. at 426. Residents of Tuscaloosa's police 
jurisdiction are assuredly as "interested in and connected 
with" the electoral decisions of the city as were the 
inhabitants of the NIH enclave in the electoral decisions 
of Maryland. True, inhabitants of the enclave lived 
"within the geographical boundaries of the State of 
Maryland," but appellants in this case similarly reside 
within the geographical boundaries ofTuscaloosa's 
Page 87 
police jurisdiction. They live within the perimeters of the 
city's "iegisiaiive powers." City of Leeds v. Town of 
Moody, 294 Ala. 496, 50 I, 319 So.2d 242, 246 ( 1975). 
The criterion of geographical residency is thus 
entirely arbitrary when applied to this case. It fails to 
explain why, consistently with the Equal Protection 
Clause, the "government unit" which may exclude from 
the franchise those who reside outside of its geographical 
boundaries should be composed of the city of Tuscaloosa, 
rather than of the city together with its police jurisdiction. 
It irrationally distinguishes between two classes of 
citizens, each with equal claim to residency (insofar as 
that can be determined by domicile or intention or other 
similar criteria), and each governed by the city of 
Tuscaloosa in the place of their residency. 
The Court argues, however, that, if the franchise 
were extended to residents of the city's police 
jurisdiction, the franchise must similarly be extended to 
all those indirectly affected by the city's actions. This is a 
simple non sequitur. There is a crystal-clear distinction 
between those who reside in Tuscaloosa's police 
jurisdiction, and who are therefore subject to that city's 
police and sanitary ordinances, licensing fees, and the 
jurisdiction ofits municipal court, and those who reside 
in neither the city nor its police jurisdiction, and who are 
thus merely affected by the indirect impact of the city's 
decisions. This distinction is recognized in Alabama law, 
cf Roberson v. City of Montgomery, 285 Ala. 421, 233 
So.2d 69 ( 1970), and is consistent with, if not mandated 
by, the very conception of a political community 
underlying constitutional recognition of bona fide 
residency requirements. 
Appellants' equal protection claim can be simply 
expressed: the State cannot extend the franchise to some 
citizens who are governed by municipal government in 
the places of their residency, and withhold the franchise 
from others similarly situated, unless this distinction is 
necessary to promote a compelling state interest. No such 
interest has been articulated 
Page 88 
in this case. Neither Tuscaloosa's interest in regulating 
"activities carried on just beyond [its] ·city limit' signs," 
ante at 74, nor Alabama's interest in providing municipal 
services to 
[99 S.Ct. 399[ the unincorporated communities 
surrounding its cities, ibid., are in any way inconsistent 
with the extension of the franchise to residents of 
Tuscaloosa's police jurisdiction. Although a great many 
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States may presently authorize the exercise of 
extraterritorial lawmaking powers by a municipality,[ll] 
and although the Alabama statutes involved in this case 
may be of venerable age, neither of these factors, as 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 ( 1964), made clear, can 
serve to justify practices otherwise impermissible under 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Therefore, since the statutes challenged by 
appellants distinguish among otherwise qualified voters 
without a compelling justification, I would reverse the 
judgment of the District Court and hold the challenged 
statutes to be in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 
.Notes: 
[I] The full text of§ 11-40-10 provides: 
The police jurisdiction in cities having 6,000 or more 
inhabitants shall cover all adjoining territory within three 
miles of the corporate limits, and in cities having less 
than 6,000 inhabitants and in towns, such police 
jurisdiction shall extend also to the adjoining territory 
within a mile and a half of the corporate limits of such 
city or town. 
Ordinances of a city or town enforcing police or sanitary 
regulations and prescribing fines and penalties for 
violations thereof shall have force and effect in the limits 
of the city or town and in the police jurisdiction thereof 
aiid on any property or rights-of-way belonging to the 
city or town. 
[2] 
The municipal court shall have jurisdiction of all 
prosecutions for the breach of the ordinances of the 
municipality within its police jurisdiction. 
Ala.Code § 12-14-l(b) (1975). 
[3]1n pertinent part§ 11-51-91 provides: 
Any city or town within the state of Alabama may fix and 
collect licenses for any business, trade or profession done 
within the police jurisdiction of such city or town but 
outside the corporate limits thereof; provided, that the 
amount ofsuch licenses shall not be more than one half 
the amount charged and collected as a license for like 
business, trade or profession done within the corporate 
limits of such city or town, fees and penalties excluded. 
Although not at issue here, Ala.Code § 11-52-8 (1975) 
imposes a duty on the municipal planning commission 
to make and adopt a master plan for the physical 
development of the municipality, including any areas 
outside of its boundaries which, in the commission's 
judgment, bear relation to the planning of such 
municipality. 
Under Ala.Code §§ 11-52-30 and 11-52-31 (1975), also 
not contested here, the municipal planning commission is 
required to adopt regulations governing the subdivision 
of land within its jurisdiction, which includes all land 
lying within five miles of the municipality's corporate 
iimits and not located within the corporate limits of any 
other municipality. 
[4] This suit was instituted prior to the 1975 
recompilation of the Alabama Code. Other than minor 
stylistic changes, § Ill 0 and § ll-51-91 are identical to 
their predecessors, Ala. Code, Tit. 37, §§ 9 and 733 
(1958), respectively. Section 12-14-1 abolished the 
recorder's courts created under is predecessor, Ala. Code, 
Tit. 37, § 585 (1958), and replaced them with municipal 
courts having similar extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
[5] Pub.L. 9381, § l, Aug. 12, 1976, 90 Stat. 1119. 
[6] Ala.Code § 11-40-10 (1975) (emphasis added). The 
Alabama Supreme Court has recognized the mandatory 
nature of § 11-40-l 0. In City of Leeds v. Town of Moody. 
294 Ala. 496, 319 So.2d 242 (I 975), the court rejected 
the contention that the city of Leeds had, by 
discontinuing police and fire protection in its police 
jurisdiction, "waived and relinquished its police 
jurisdiction over the area." !d. at 502, 3 I 9 So.2d at 246. 
Since a municipality cannot barter away a governmental 
power specifically delegated to it by the legislature, ... it 
follows that it also cannot waive or relinquish such 
power. 
lbid.See also Trailway Oil Co. v. Mobile, 271 Ala. 218, 
224, 122 So.2d 757, 762 (1960) ("[Section] 9 ofTitle 37 
[now § 11-40-1 0], describing the territorial extent of the 
municipal police jurisdiction and the incidents thereof, 
and§ 733 ofTitle 37 [now§ 11-51-91], as amended, 
authorizing and regulating the fixing and collecting of 
licenses within the police jurisdiction of cities and towns, 
are general laws, and, as such, they are considered part of 
every municipal charter"); Coursey v. City of Andalusia. 
24 Ala.App. 247, 247-248, 134 So. 671 (1931) ("Under 
the statute [§ 11-40-10] the police jurisdiction extends to 
all the adjoining territory within a mile and a half of the 
corporate limits of said city, and ... ordinances ofthe 
city enforcing police or sanitary regulations . . . have 
force and effect not only in the limits of the city, but also 
in the police jurisdiction thereof'). 
[7] In this case, residents of the police jurisdiction are 
excluded only from participation in municipal elections, 
since they reside outside of Tuscaloosa's corporate limits. 
This "denial of the franchise," as appellants put it, does 
not have anything like the far-reaching consequences of 
the denial of the franchise in Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 
419 ( 1970). There, the Court pointed out that, 
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[i]n nearly every election, federal, state, and local, for 
offices from the Presidency to the school board, and on 
the entire variety of other ballot propositions, appellees 
have a stake equal to that of other Maryland residents. 
·Jd. at 426. Treatment of the plaintiffs in Evans as 
nonresidents of Maryland had repercussions not merely 
with respect to their right to vote in city elections, but 
with respet:l lu iheir right iu vuie in naiionai, siaie, school 
board, and referendum elections. 
[8] Municipalities in some States have almost 
unrestricted governmental powers over surrounding 
unincorporated territories. For example, South Dakota 
cities 
have power to exercise jurisdiction for all authorized 
purposes over all territory within the corporate limits ... 
and in and over all places, except within the corporate 
limits of another municipality, within one mile of the 
c.Qrporate limits or of any public ground or park 
belonging to the municipality outside the corporate limits, 
for the purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals, 
and general welfare ofthe community, and of enforcing 
its ordinances and resolutions relating thereto. 
S.D.Comp.Laws Ann.§ 9-29-1 (1967). 
North Dakota's statutory grant of extraterritorial 
municipal powers is similarly broad: 
Except as otherwise provided by law, a governing body 
of a municipality shall have jurisdiction: 
* * * * 
2. In and over all places within one-half mile of the 
municipal limits for the purpose of enforcing health and 
quarantine ordinances and regulations and police 
regulations and ordinances adopted to promote the peace, 
order, safety, and general welfare of the municipality. 
N.D.Cent.Code § 4001(2) (1968). 
Cities in many States are statutorily authorized to zone 
extraterritorially, see. e.g.. Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 
9·240-B-2l(c) (1977); Mich.Comp.Laws § 125.36 
(1970); N.D.Cent.Code § 11-35-02 (1976), a power not 
afforded Alabama municipalities. See Roberson v. City of 
Montgome1y. 285 Ala. 421,233 So.2d 69 (1970). 
By setting forth these various state provisions respecting 
extraterritorial powers of cities, we do not mean to imply 
that every one of them would pass constitutional muster. 
We do not have before us, of course, a situation in which 
a city has annexed outlying territory in all but name, and 
"is exercising precisely the same governmental powers 
over residents of surrounding unincorporated territory as 
it does over those residing within its corporate limits. See 
Little Thunder v. South Dakota, 518 F.2d 1253 (CA8 
1975). Nor do we have here a case like Evans v. 
Cornman, supra, where NIH residents were subject to 
such "important aspects of state powers" as Maryland's 
authority "to levy and collect [its] income, gasoline, 
sales, and use taxes," and were "just as interested in and 
connected with electoral decisions as ... their neighbors 
who live[ d) off the enclave." 398 U.S. at 423,424, 426. 
Appellants have made neither an allegation nor a showing 
that the authority exercised by the city of Tuscaloosa 
within the police jurisdiction is no less than that exercised 
by the city within its corporate limits. The minute catalog 
of ordinances of the city of Tuscaloosa which have 
extraterritorial effect set forth by our dissenting Brethren, 
post at 82-84, n. I 0, is as notable for what it does not 
include as for what it does. While the burden was on 
appellants to establish a difference in treatment violative 
of the Equal Protection Clause, we are bound to observe 
that among the powers not included in the "addendum" to 
appellants' brief referred to by the dissent are the vital 
and traditional authorities of cities and towns to levy ad 
valorem taxes, invoke the power of eminent domain, and 
zone property for various types of uses. 
[I] I recognize that there is a difference between a 
suburb's decision to contract with a nearby city and a 
decision by the state legislature requiring all suburbs to 
do so. In some situations, that difference might justifY a 
holding that a particular extraterritorial delegation of 
power is unconstitutional. It does not, however, justifY 
the view that all such delegations are invalid. 
[2] 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970 ed.), repealed by Pub.L. 
9381, §I, Aug. 12, 1976,90 Stat. 1119. 
[I] At the time this lawsuit commenced, this statute was 
codified at Ala. Code, Tit. 37, § 9 (1958). 
[2] At the time appellants filed their complaint, this 
statute was found at Ala. Code, Tit. 37, § 733 (1958). 
Minor changes in wording were effected during 
recodification. 
[3] Alabama Code, Tit. 37, § 585 (1958) provided: 
It shall be the duty of the recorder to keep an office in the 
city, and hear and determine all cases for the breach of 
the ordinances and by-laws of the city that may be 
brought before him, and he shall make report, at least 
once a month, of all fines, penalties and forfeitures 
imposed by him, or by any councilman in his stead. Such 
recorder is especially vested with and may exercise in the 
city and within the police jurisdiction thereof, full 
jurisdiction in criminal and quasi criminal matters, and 
may impose the penalties prescribed by ordinance for the 
violation of ordinances and by-laws ofthe city, and shall 
have the power of an ex-officio justice of the peace, 
except in civil matters .... 
[4] On December 27, 1973, recorder's courts were 
abolished in Alabama and replaced by municipal courts 
having virtually identical jurisdiction. See Ala. Code § 
'1
l ped m t k t l
. 
D.Cent.
  
- 1
p
lY O.
.
] , 
1
.s c
 I ,
.
 t
SC 38417-2011 Page 2646 of 2676
12-14-1 (1975). Municipal judges "shall be appointed and 
vacancies filled by the governing body of the 
municipality .... " Ala.Const., Arndt. No. 328, § 6.065. 
[5] Tuscaloosa contains 65,773 residents, while the police 
jurisdiction surrounding the city contains between 16,000 
and 17,000residents.SeeApp.l7-19. 
[.6] See 11. 4, supra. 
[7] The court granted appellants leave 
to further amend within 45 days to specifY particular 
ordinances ofthe City ofTuscaloosa which are claimed 
to deprive plaintiffs ofliberty or property. 
[8] 
.[S]tatutes structuring local government units receive no 
less exacting an examination merely because the state 
legislature is fairly elected. See Avery v. Midland County, 
390 U.S. 474,481 n. 6 (1968). 
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. at 628 n. 
10. 
[9] The Court apparently accepts this proposition by 
strongly implying, ante at 73 n. 8, that 
a situation in which a city has annexed outlying territory 
in all but name, and is exercising precisely the same 
governmental powers over residents of surrounding 
unincorporated territory as it does over those residing 
within its corporate limits 
would not "pass constitutional muster." 
[10] Appellants have included in their brief an 
unchallenged addendum listing the ordinances of the city 
of Tuscaloosa, Code ofTuscaloosa ( 1962, Supplemented 
1975), that have application in its police jurisdiction: 
Licenses: 
-4-1 ambulance 
9-4, 9-18, 9-33 bottle dealers 
19-1 junk dealers 
20-5 general business license ordinance 
20-6 7 florists 
20-102 hotels, motels, etc. 
20-163 industry 
Buildings: 
19-1 inspection service enforces codes 
10-10 regulation of dams 
10-21 Southern Standard Building Code adopted 
10-25 building permits 
13-3 National Electrical Code adopted 
!4-23 Fire Prevention Code adopted 
14-65 regulation of incinerators 
14-81 discharge of cinders 
Chapter 21 A mobile home parks 
25-1 Southern Standard Plumbing Code adopted 
33-79 disposal of human wastes 
33-114, 118 regulation of wells 
Public Health: 
5-4 certain birds protected 
5-4C, 42, 55 dogs running at large and bitches in heat 
prohibited 
14-4 no smoking on buses 
14-15 no self-service gas stations 
15-2 regulation of sale of produce from trucks 
15-4 food establishments to use public water supply 
15-16 food, meat, milk inspectors 
15-37 thru 40 regulates boardinghouses 
15-52 milk code adopted 
17-5 mosquito control 
Traffic Regulations: 
22-2 stop & yield signs may be erected by chief of police 
22-3 mufflers required 
22-4 brakes required 
22-5 inspection of vehicle by police 
22-6 operation of vehicle 
22-9 hitchhiking in roadway prohibited 
22-9 .I permit to solicit funds on roadway 
22-11 impounding cars 
22- I 4 load limit on bridges 
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22-15 police damage stickers required after accident 
22-25 driving while intoxicated 
22-26 reckless driving 
_?,2-27 driving without consent of owner 
22-33 stop sign 
22-34 yield sign 
22-38 driving across median 
22-40 yield to emergency vehicle 
22-42 cutting across private property 
22-54 general speed limit 
22-72 thru 7 8 truck routes 
Criminal Ordinances: 
23-1 adopts all state misdemeanors 
23-7.1 no wrecked cars on premises 
23-15 nuisances 
23-17 obscene literature 
23-20 destruction of plants 
23-37 swimming in nude 
23-38 trespass to boats 
26-51 no shooting galleries in the police jurisdiction or 
outside 
fire limits (downtown area) 
28-31 thru 39 obscene films 
Miscellaneous: 
20-120 thru 122 cigarette tax 
2_:1-31 public parks and recreation 
26-18 admission tax 
Chapter 29 regulates public streets 
30-23 taxis must have meters. 
[11] See Comment, The Constitutionality of the Exercise 
of Extraterritorial Powers by Municipalities, 45 
y.Chi.L.Rev. 151 (1977). 
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193 u.s. 621 (1904) 
2j S.Ct. 573, 48 L.Ed. 817 
Pope 
v. 
Williams 
No. 603 
United States Supreme Court 
April4, 1904 
Argued March 8-9, 1904 
ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND 
Syllabus 
While the privilege to vote may not be abridged by a 
state on account of race, color and previous condition of 
servitude, the privilege is not given by the federal 
Constitution or by any of its amendments, nor is it a 
privilege springing from citizenship of the United States. 
.~1inor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162. 
While the right to vote for members of Congress is 
not derived exclusively from the law of the state in which 
they are chosen, but has its foundation in the Constitution 
and laws of the United States, the elector must be one 
entitled to vote under the state statute. 
An act ofthe legislature of a state providing that all 
persons who shall thereafter remove into the state from 
·;ny other state, district or territory shall make declaration 
of their intent to become citizens and residents of the 
state a year before they have the right to be registered as 
voters is not violative of the federal Constitution as 
against a citizen of another state moving into the enacting 
state after the passage of the act. 
This is a writ of error to the Court of Appeals of the 
State of Maryland to review its judgment affirming that 
of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, which 
affirmed the proceedings of the Board of Registry of 
Election District No. 7 of that county 
Page 622 
rGfusing to register petitioner as a legal voter on the 
ground of his noncompliance with the Maryland law 
making it necessary for a person coming into the state, 
with the intention of residing therein, to register his name 
with the clerk of the circuit court of the proper county, 
and thereby to indicate the intent of such person to 
become a citizen and resident ofthe state. 
The act in question was passed March 29, 1902, as 
chapter 133 of the laws of that 
[24 S.Ct. 5741 year, and as an amendment and 
supplement to the Public General Laws of the state, title 
Elections, subtitle Registration, as § 25B, and it is 
reproduced in the margin. * 
Plaintiff in error on September 29, 1903, presented 
his application 
Page 623 
to the Board of Registry of Election District No. 7, 
Montgomery County, Maryland, then sitting at a place 
within such district, to be registered and entered as a 
qualified voter on the registry of voters of that election 
district, which application the board refused and declined 
to comply with for the sole reason that he had not 
complied with this law of Maryland. Thereafter the 
plaintiff presented a sworn petition to the Circuit Court 
for Montgomery County, in the State of Maryland, 
praying that court to enter an order to revise the action of 
the board ofregistry, and to order and direct that the 
name of the petitioner should be entered as a qualified 
voter on the registry of voters of the election district 
already named. In that sworn petition, he alleged that he 
had, on June 7, 1902, with his wife and child, removed 
from the City of Washington, District of Columbia, into 
Montgomery County, in the State of Maryland, 
having then had, and ever since and now having, the 
intention ofmaking the State of Maryland the permanent 
domicil ofhimself and his family, and ofbecoming a 
citizen of said state, and ever since said June 7, 1902, 
petitioner has resided in the subdivision ofOtterboume, 
near Chevy Chase, in said Montgomery County, and in 
the seventh election district of said county. 
The petitioner further showed in his petition that he 
had made application to the proper board of registry in 
the election district mentioned, and the board had refused 
to enter his name as a qualified voter on the ground 
already stated, ofnoncompliance with the Maryland 
statute. 
The petitioner admitted 
that he did not, within a year prior to said application for 
registration as a qualified voter, or at any time during the 
year 1902, in any manner make or register, in the office 
of or before the Clerk ofMontgomery County, Maryland, 
or in a record book kept by said clerk, a declaration of 
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intention to become a citizen and resident of Maryland, 
such as is required by the aforesaid law to be made by 
persons who remove into the State ofMaryland after 
March 29, 1902, as a condition precedent to subsequent 
registration 
Page 624 
of such persons as qualified voters. Petitioner, ho\vever, 
claims and asserts that said section 258 of article 33 of 
the Code of Public General Laws of Maryland affords no 
justification for said refusal to register your petitioner as 
a qualified voter, because said alleged law contravenes 
and is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States 
and the Constitution of Maryland, and is therefore null 
and void. 
The petitioner then asserts and sets forth in his 
petition several grounds which, as he therein alleges, 
render the state law a violation of the Constitution of the 
Maryland, and he also specially sets up and claims that 
the law is a violation of the Constitution of the United 
States in the particulars named by him, and which are as 
follows: 
Said law is repugnant to that portion of section I of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States which declares that, "all persons born or 
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and 
of the state wherein they reside," because by said law it is 
in effect ordained that male citizens of the United States 
of the age of twenty-one years and upwards, removing 
into the State of Maryland after March 29, 1902, with the 
intention of making 
124 S-Ct. 5751 said state their permanent domicil, shall 
not be treated as citizens or residents of Maryland, or 
given the rights and privileges of citizens of Maryland, 
until they have been naturalized in the mode prescribed 
by said law. 
Said law is also repugnant to that portion of section I of 
said Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States which prohibits a state from denying any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws, because said law operates an unjust and 
unreasonable discrimination against citizens of the United 
States coming into the State of Maryland to permanently 
reside therein after March 29, 1902, who may desire to 
become qualified voters therein. 
Said law is also repugnant to the general spirit of the 
Constitution of the United States and the fundamental 
rights 
Page 625 
of citizens of the United States. which deny to a state the 
power to attach unreasonable or burdensome conditions 
to the free movement of citizens of the United States out 
of, into, and settlement within, the confines of any state, 
district, or territory within the United States. 
To this petition there was a general demurrer, which 
was sustained by the court, which thereupon entered 
judgment dismissing the petition, with costs to the 
defendants. 
PECKHAM, J., lead opinion 
MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after making the above 
statement of facts, delivered the opinion ofthe Court. 
This is not a case of a statute of the state having 
been passed subsequently to the time when the individual 
had removed from another state or from a territory or 
from the District of Columbia into the State of Maryland. 
There is therefore no alteration of any possible rights 
which the plaintiff in error might have already acquired 
and which he might claim were taken from him by the 
passage of such statute. On the contrary, this statute took 
effect on March 29, 1902, more than two months prior to 
the removal of the plaintiff in error from Washington in 
the District of Columbia to Montgomery County, within 
the State of Maryland. The objections of a federal nature 
which are made by the plaintiff in error to the validity of 
the statute are set out in his petition, and are 
Page 632 
also contained in the above statement of facts, and are 
substantially reproduced in his assignment of errors. 
We are of opinion that the statute does not violate 
any federal right of the plaintiff in error which he seeks to 
assert in this proceeding. The statute, so far as it concerns 
him and the right which he urges, is one making 
regulations and conditions for the registry of persons for 
the purpose of voting. It was only for the purpose of 
thereafter voting that the plaintiff in error sought to be 
registered, and it was the denial of that right only which 
he can now review. His application for registry as a voter 
was denied by the board of registry solely because of his 
failure to comply with the statute. Whatever other right 
he may have as a citizen of Maryland by reason of his 
removal there with an intent to become such citizen is not 
now in question. So far as appears no other right, if any 
he may have, has been infringed by the statute. The 
simple matter to be herein determined is whether, with 
reference to the exercise of the privilege of voting in 
Maryland, the legislature ofthat state had the legal right 
to provide that a person coming into the state to reside 
should make the declaration of intent a year before he 
should have the right to be registered as a voter of the 
state. 
The privilege to vote in any state is not given by the 
federal Constitution, or by any of its amendments. It is 
not a privilege springing from citizenship of the United 
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States. Minor v. Happersett. 21 Wall. 162. It may not be 
refused on account of race, color, or previous condition 
of servitude, but it does not follow from mere citizenship 
of the United States. In other words, the privilege to vote 
in a state is within the jurisdiction of the state itself, to be 
exercised as the state may direct, and upon such terms as 
to it may seem proper, provided, of course, no 
discrimination is made between individuals, in violation 
ofthe federal Constitution. The state might provide that 
~rsons of foreign birth could vote without being 
naturalized, and, as stated by Mr. Chief Justice Waite in 
Miner v. Happersett, supra, such persons were allowed to 
vote in several of the 
Page 633 
states upon having declared their intentions to become 
citizens ofthe United States. Some states permit women 
to vote; others refuse them that privilege. A state, so far 
·as the federal Constitution is concerned, might provide by 
its own constitution and laws that none but native-born 
citizens should be permitted to vote, as the federal 
Constitution does not confer the right of suffrage upon 
any one, and the conditions under which that right is to be 
exercised are matters for the states alone to prescribe, 
subject to the conditions of the federal Constitution 
already stated. although it may be observed that the right 
to vote for a member of Congress is not derived 
[24 S.Ct. 576[ exclusively from the state law. See Federal 
Constitution, Art. I, Section 2; Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 
58. But the elector must be one entitled to vote under the 
state statute. (!d.) See also Sll'ajford v. Templeton, 185 
U.S. 487. 491. In this case, no question arises as to the 
right to vote for electors of President and Vice President, 
and no decision is made thereon. The question whether 
the conditions prescribed by the state might be regarded 
by others as reasonable or unreasonable is not a federal 
one. We do not wish to be understood, however, as 
intimating that the condition in this statute is 
unreasonable or in any way improper. 
We are unable to see any violation of the federal 
Constitution in the provision of the state statute for the 
"declaration of the intent of a person coming into the state 
before he can claim the right to be registered as a voter. 
The statute, so far as it provides conditions precedent to 
the exercise of the elective franchise within the state, by 
persons coming therein to reside (and that is as far as it is 
necessary to consider it in this case), is neither an 
unlawful discrimination against any one in the situation 
of the plaintiff in error nor does it deny to him the equal 
protection of the laws, nor is it repugnant to any 
fundamental or inalienable rights of citizens of the United 
States, nor a violation of any implied guaranties of the 
federal Constitution. The right of a state to legislate upon 
the subject of the elective franchise as to it may seem 
good, subject 
Page 634 
to the conditions already stated, being, as we believe, 
unassailable, we think it plain that the statute in question 
violates no right protected by the federal Constitution. 
The reasons which may have impelled the state 
legislature to enact the statute in question were matters 
entirely for its consideration, and this Court has no 
concern with them. 
It is unnecessary in this case to assert that under no 
conceivable state of facts could a state statute in regard to 
voting be regarded as an infringement upon or a 
discrimination against, the individual rights of a citizen of 
the United States removing into the state, and excluded 
from voting therein by state legislation. The question 
might arise if an exclusion from the privilege of voting 
were founded upon the particular state from which the 
person carne, excluding from that privilege, for instance, 
a citizen of the United States coming from Georgia and 
allowing it to a citizen of the United States coming from 
New York or any other state. In such case, an argument 
might be urged that, under the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the federal Constitution, the citizen from Georgia was, by 
the state statute, deprived of the equal protection of the 
laws. Other extreme cases might be suggested. We 
neither assert nor deny that, in the case supposed. the 
claim would be well founded that a federal right of a 
citizen of the United States was violated by such 
legislation, for the question does not arise herein. We do, 
however, hold that there is nothing in the statute in 
question which violated the federal rights ofthe plaintiff 
in error by virtue of the provision for making a 
declaration ofhis intention to become a citizen before he 
can have the right to be registered as a voter and to vote 
in the state. 
The plaintiff in error has no ground for complaint in 
regard to the decision of the courts below, and the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland is 
therefore 
Affirmed. 
Notes: 
[*] 
SEC. 258. All persons who, after the passage of this act, 
shall remove into any county of this state or into the City 
of Baltimore from any other state, district, or territory, 
shall indicate their intent to become citizens and residents 
of this state by registering their names in a suitable record 
book, to be procured and kept for the purpose by the clerk 
of the circuit court for the several counties, and by the 
clerk of the Superior Court ofBaltimore City; such 
record to contain their names, residence, age, and 
occupation, and the intent of such persons to become 
t
 t
 t
'
I  w f
,
o
m
t
,
 
J
t
 Balti
SC 38417-2011 Page 2651 of 2676
citizens and residents of this state shall date from the day 
on which such registry shall be so entered in such record 
book by the clerk of the circuit court for the county, or of 
the superior court of Baltimore City, as the case may be, 
into which county or city such person shall so remove 
from any other state, district, or territory. And no person 
coming into this state from any other state, district, or 
.territory shall be entitled to registration as a legal voter of 
this state until one year after his intent to become such 
legal voter shall be thus evidenced by such entry in such 
record book, and such entry or a duly certified copy 
thereof shall be the only competent and admissible 
evidence of such intent. And the clerk of the Superior 
Court ofBaltimore City and ofthe several courts ofthe 
several counties shall immediately, upon the passage of 
this act, procure a suitable record book for the recording 
therein of such entries, arranged alphabetically under the 
names of such persons. For every person so registered 
under the provisions of this section they shall be entitled 
to demand and receive the sum of twenty-five cents, to be 
paid to said clerks by the Mayor and City Council of 
Baltimore and the county commissioners, respectively. A 
C?PY of such record, duly certified by said clerk, shall be 
evidence of the right of such person to registration as 
legal voters according to law, and each person so 
registered shall be entitled to such certified copy upon 
demand, without charge. 
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Time Speaker Note 
01:44:15 PM!Judge 
! Hosack 1 
··a2·:·0"9.:0"{fF>Ml.'JLiCiiie········--r-·ar;e;"i1s:···r;a·itre·s···p·;:e;59nC.sfart:··with .. M"ofra·r;···tor .. N.ew .. friaTfi"rst:" .............  
~Hosack ~ 
··a2:·0"~f:2·3···F>M·f·sta·;:r: .. ·············!··rili"atio·n···is .. set".torih .. i.n .. ihe .. hriar·rhere···a·;:e;··some···c:r:iticafihin9s ...........  
Kelso that jump out. Sec'y of State Tim Hurst testimony is clear, the 
changes to the database were four peopie. if you add that to 
the vote count, Hurst checked the changes and there were 
four. He also testified, page 23 of his transcript, the envelopes 
only show the ballts received, has nothing to do with valid 
ballots. He testified that the daily reports would equal the exh 5 
reports. To get 2041 it would have all the inputs. Judge Marano 
, did not testify he counted 2051 ballots. He counted 2027 valid 
! absentee ballots, not 2051.The error I'd like to address 
~ regarding the law is UOCAV A. State law is different than 
~federal, also municipal is different. We provided extensive 
~ research as to cases on point. US Supreme Court cases. There 
~ is no US Constitutional right to vote. States can set the 
~requirements. States have the power to require voters meet 
~requirements, clerk has to verify the residence, they have to 
~follow up and verify. The evidence shows beyond any doubt 
! that in excess of five illegal ballots were counted. They are not 
. I eligible voters - but for federal elections. 
··a2·:··f£3":""3T .. i=iMTFiete·;:··············O·fn .. tii·e;··Pcsriefifle·;:e;··was .. me.niion··c;rt>u·;:a·e·r;···arr;r:a·a-r··rdt:e .. tha······ 
! Erbland Noble case. Not necessary for DF to put on evidence after 
~ close of case. That is cited in our brief. We addressed the 
' standards for a new trial. The Memo Decision of the Court 
addresses the contentions presented by the PL. There was a 
call made by the Court, a decison made by the Court, on 
UOCAVA will have to be decided by ld Supreme Court on 
appeal. We have specific Idaho statutes, statutes that 
. incorporate UOCAV A, people made application under 
! UOCAVA. The decision this Court made, on UOCAVA, is 
~ something courts are called on to make. It doesn't 
~ disinfranchize a voter. I submit a new trial should not be 
~granted, ask the court to deny the motion. 
··a2:·2:~r2"3···i=iMlr\A"ichaai·······;·rhe .. me·m·a···s"l:ih·;:n·itie·c:rad"d"re.sses .. ihe .. dhis .. stanCiiil·9···an .. this:···iT········ 
~ Haman we presume what the PL is saying is true, is there evidence 
~ that would, not could, but would change the findings? This 
~ Court listened to Hurst testimony, he clearly went through the 
~ voter qualifications that the Court considered when entering its 
~ decision. There is no evidence submitted the findings of the 
I court would change. 
)·-1~/~ 
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02:26:55 PM Starr ·As the Court points out it was unable to locate case law on 
Kelso UOCAVA. There are 5-6 cases submitted that shows it does 
not apply. Also, the form the voters fill out, it is not a form for 
municipal elections, it is a form for state and county elections. 
Municipal elections are different. Hurst testified they don't even 
have jurisdiction over municipal elections. The absentee 
envelopes don't prove anything. It doesn't prove they were 
valid. Judge Marano testified 2027 valid absentee ballots 
. counted. Obligation in this case is not to the litigants, it is to the 
' citizens of CDA. UOCAVA is clear under US Supreme Court 
cases. I think with the clarified record of Hurst and Marano, this 
Court should bypass a new trial and order a new election. It 
serves no prupose to drag this to the ld Sup Court. 
12/7/2010 3 of 7 
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02:33:01 PM; Judge 
Charles 
Hosack 
12/7/2010 
; I appreciate the submissions. So the record is clear, I'm not 
reopening the record. If someone submits an Affd that could 
have been put in at trial - law doesn't work that way. This can 
be no surprise to parties. The database is interesting 
information, the Sec of State said it was by no means the 
record, and was only as good as the entries. It's not the record, 
and not intended to be the record. The changes in the 
database are irrelevant. You can argue Judge Marano's 
testimony any way you want. There are 2051 absentee ballots 
counted. There were 4 UOCAVA voters the court made a 
determination on, the Court said they were legal but no 
indication as to how they voted. I addressed the UOCAVA 
issue because I thought it was important. I did study that and 
made a ruling, I found it wasn't an irregularity. There isn't a 
case anybody cited to me that says UOCAVA cannot be 
extended to citizens in municipal elections. If the legislature 
wants to make an exception they can do that, then there would 
be a law. I'm not going to do that. At the trial level, there wasn't 
anything wrong how the County applied it. They're doing the 
best they can. UOCAVA wouldn't be relevant to the excess 
ballot issue. The issue raised on the new trial, is the burden of 
proof argument. There isn't any legal basis for this Court to shift 
the burden of proof to the defendant. I can't find a case that 
allows shifting the burden of proof. There is no legal basis for 
this Court to shift the burden of proof. I'm not going to order a 
new election because it's a close election. The legislature can 
order that, but that isn't the current law. 
There was never a hint, suggestion as to preparing a ballot out 
of thin air and putting them into a machine. A complete 
absence of proof as to excess ballots. There is one ballot that 
doens't have an absentee return envelope. That fact that there 
is one missing envelope is probably explained by that it got lost. 
There was not testimony, but using logic. One excess ballot is 
less than three. Then you're down to two. We don't know it 
voted. It wouldn't change the outcome of the election. You have 
no proof as to how they were voted. Out of over 6,000 votes, 
2051 absentee votes, you have ten votes you don't know 
anything about. There is a request to have a new election, that 
is absurd. 
On the burden of proof, the burden would always be on the PL. 
Would the excess ballots have made a difference? The burden 
never shifts. We only found one excess ballot. There isn't legal 
support for shifting burden of proof. It would change the result 
given the findings of the Court. Deny the Moiton for New Trial. 
We also have pending Motions on Costs/Atty fees. We can 
start with the city, however you want to present your argument. 
4 of? 
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02:56:13 PM! Michael ! The city was not in on this, just proper party. This court 
~reinstated the city and the city clerk in official capacity. The 
! claim on canvassing went forward, the city if the prevailing 
! party. So costs as a matter of right should be granted. The 
l dispute is on the atty fees incurred in defending and 
! discretionary costs. When this was first filed the suit included all 
~the city and county in official capacity. Then county and their 
~officials were dismissed. The suit continued on for Kennedy in 
~capacity of Seat 2, on the claims. Then this Court brought the 
~city back in- under the statute. The PL pressed forward. There 
~was nothing to support a claim against the city. Claims were 
~dismissed by the Court then five days of trial testimony. Claims 
' has no basis or merit against the city. The PI subpoened most 
of the city to be here for the whole trial, we asked to be let out, 
they had to stay here at public expense. The county was not a 
party, they conducted the election. We do believe this case was 
frivilous. I'm seeking fees under 54 E. My brief set forth 
elements for A-F. Atty fees and costs are proper and should be 
awarded. Then discretionary fees should be awarded . 
................................................ .;. ................................. ~ ................................................................................................................................................................................................................  
03:04:01 PM~ Peter i Mr Kennedy is the holder of seat 2 and had to defend this case, 
· Erbland CDA is a nominal defendant. The case was tried against the 
County. All the proof was against the County. Mr Kennedy was 
simply a target, Mr Brannon was challenging seat 2. I think the 
decision says 6-7 times there was probably reason to 
challenge. I cannot say the action was taken friviously. I can 
say it was tried against an empty chair. Mr Kennedy had no say 
in how the election was run. There were steps Mr Kennedy had 
to take to invesitgate and prove his case. We've asked for an 
award of discretionary costs incurred by Kennedy. It would not 
have been appropriate to not invesitgate the elections. There is 
a bond in this case of 5,000.00. Costs total5,700.00. We 
believe the Court should find they were necessary. 
12n1201o 5 of7 
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03:10:04 PM Starr 
Kelso 
I want to step back and say "Whose election was this?" It was a 
city election. The County supplied witnesses as to what 
happened in the city election. It was the city election. The city 
was in charge. Who canvasses the votes, the city does. Under 
Title 50 and 34 there is requirement of a city record. The record 
was not maintained according to state law. The city clerk could 
have maintained the record, the county could have maintained 
the record then there wouldn't be a dispute, they didn't. Mr 
Kennedy is required to be a defendant. There was no allegation 
he did anything wrong. Just as the city is required to be a 
defendant. That's just the law. Mr Kennedy didn't have anything 
to prove. It was never a burden for a public servant interested 
in a fair election. I don't recall him ever sitting at counsel table. 
We've objected to discretionary costs because contacting 
witnesses is what is done in litigation. Bill Moreland LLC and his 
company are not licensed in CDA. There is no foundation for 
that. 
The original bond was set at $40,000. The statute with regard 
. to bond requirements is $500.00 because that's what costs are. 
: : 
The 5,000 bond was wrong, the costs are what we agreed to. 
Regarding Mr Kennedy's claim for costs, there is a fee for 
serving Mr McCrory for a contempt proceeding, that has 
nothing to do with this case. 
As costs of right - they are clear. They didn't attend the 
deposition of two witnesses, they ordered a transcript, they're 
entitled to that. 
··O":f22·:·2-£fF>rvf!""rJfichaai""···-r::rfie .. city··w:a·s···ir;···atte.ild"iiil.ce···c;nt19··aepas:···$s60":·0"c>""was··wr:iite·n···in. 
l Haman l the 1890's. It's for the courts discretion. What's to prevent this 
1 1 from happening again and again. Especially when the loosing l l party chooses not to seek a recount. 
··63:·2·3·:ss···F>rvfl..F>efe·r··············f·::rfie .. cas·e···a9ai"i1.sfthe .. dty .. was .. trivHolis:···:r-he.dty .. ca.u"iCfconfract:······ 
12/7/2010 
Erbland 1 for elections. The statute requires that the holder of the seat 
1 has to be named. The statute requires this to be tried within 30 
1 days. There were a myraid of challenges. It was exceptional, i ask for the award of costs. 
6 of? 
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03:25:50 PM Judge 
Charles 
Hosack 
12n12010 
As the Court has said, this litigation has proved difficult. The 
way modern day litigation works - you're not going to get many 
cases to trial in 30 days. You have a problematic statute in area 
of fees/costs. The city was brought back in. The county was not 
an indispensable party, nobody brought them back in. This isn't 
spelled out in the law. In terms of determining frivilous against 
the city, I don't know I can make a finding against the city. The 
city could do nothing or defend, comments. There's any 
number of things that could be done, it's completly unclear. 
These claims are few and far between. The city was in only for 
a remedy. But you have a duty to the public to defend. The city 
did take an active roll here, that's a cost to the taxpayer. Very 
valid fees incurred. If the city had chosen to stand back - would 
that have been frivilous? What they did was reasonable. The 
case got tried on the merits, the case got resolved. I can't make 
the finding of frivilous. There are taxpayer costs in this type of 
llitigation - that's how things work. That's not to say the fees 
aren't reasonable, but I don't think appropriate to award those 
fees. As to costs, the cost of right is the service fee, service on 
McCrory - that was a seperate action and dismissed by the 
court. RE: transcript, it's not exceptional, don't find an issue 
with investigation. Claim of right, awarded. Discretionary costs, 
award. Prepare an Order, either together or separate. Counsel 
for defense prepare Order for denial. 
7 of? /
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~QUEST FOR.CAMERAS IN THE·COURTROO-M· · 
# • ' ,•' I 
To Judge /Jos14.ci 1r._ · , Fax# (.208) · '-ft-1&,· _...) ?'kf 
The undersigned requests permission to use c.ameras in your courtroom in : 
. · /)urvtthJf/1) v. . C/-1-,t 7 · &fJ A 
-~------County Case N"o. ( V -- 6 q -- ·i <.> () t 0 
Courtroom No. ·on Date: __ l_'L..J.j_· '+--_....c;j_v_o __ . at --ll·~d;_-,-_, f-. ~ ·~· 
Media to be ~sed: J still camera; -~· video cam~ra; --~audio equipment 
I certify th'at I have read tlze, I,daho Supreme Court Order that authorizes cameras in 
. the courtroom. I further certify that as a representative of tlt.e he/ow listed news 
-~gency, I-a~ authorized to bind my news agency and ali memhers of its news team. I 
and they agFee to comply in all respects with the Supreme Court's Order and rules, 
with any special i:onditio1ts stated hy the trial judge and with any pool coverage plan 
·approved by tlte tr:ialjudge ... _ 
Dated: ._I:Jj i /7) News Agency: 
. ' ----------~~----~~~-----
·.Printed Name:' Jerornr:.. Po /las. 
TeiephoneNo.: /;//1-JF!ft_erl JPD(8 
., 
. 
COURT AUTHORIZATION 
o DENIED. N GRANTED UNDER THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS: 
1. Comply with the Supreme Court Guidelines ; 
2. One still camera (re·quired to pool); . 
~. One TV camera (required to pool)_; · 
4. No· zoom lenses or·te1ephotos (no close-ups of any individuals); 
s. Photos taken only during calling of t~e case (which conc1u9es when the 
attorn~s have advised the Court that they are ready to proceed); 
6. No motor drives~ no flashes~ · 
7. Pool camerf:i authorized by "first come, first served 11 request. 
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Dec. 7. 2010 12:06PM Ma~r.rnber Law PLLC 
Arthur B. Macomber, State Bar No. 73 70 
Jonathan A. Burky, State Bar No. 8043 
Macomber Law, PLLC 
408 E. Sherman Avenue, Suite 215 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone: 208-664-4700 
Facsimile: 208-664-9933 
AtTorney for William L. McCrory 
No. 0651 P. 1/3 
STA!t Uf- lDAr10 } SS 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
FILED: ~\), t;_Dt 
ZOIO OFC -l PM 2: 40 
fmliiJWe~ 
Utl"U ,.~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JIMBRANNON; ) Case No: CV-09-10010 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. 
SUSAN K. WEATHERS, in her capacity 
as the City of Coeur d'Alene City Clerk; 
MIKE KENNEDY, in his capacity as the 
incumbent candidate for the City of 
Coeur d'Alene Council Seat #2; 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF 
ATTORNEY OF RECORD FOR NON-
PARTY WILLIAM L. MCCRORY 
TO: PLAINTIFF JIM BRANNON AND DEFENDANTS SUSAN K. WEATHERS 
AND MIKE KENNEDY THROUGH THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, 
AND TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
Macomber Law, PLLC, pursuant to I.R.C.P. ll(b)(2}, gives notice of Macomber 
Law, PLLC's and attorney Arthur B. Macomber's withdrawal as attorney of record for 
William L. McCrory ("McCrory"), a non-party in this action, who appeared in the matter 
specifically and solely to address the contempt proceeding initiated against him. 
Macomber Law, PLLC requests to be removed from the service list in this matter. 
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Dec. 7. 2010 12:07PM Macomber Law PLLC No. 0651 P. 2/3 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure ll(b)(2) provides in pertinent part that: 
[A]t the time judgment is entered in any action, or at any time thereafter, 
an attorney who desires to withdraw as attorney of record for a party may . 
. . file a notice of withdrawal at the time of entry of the judgment, or at any 
time thereafter, but such notice of withdrawal shall not become effective 
until the time for appeal from the final judgment has expired and there are 
no proceedings pending. The attorney shall provide the last known address 
of the client in any notice of withdrawal. 
On October21, 2010, the Court issued an Order of Dismissal (of Contempt 
. . 
Proceeding) wherein it ordered that the "contempt proceeding [against McCrory] is 
hereby dismissed... There are, therefore, no unresolved matters concerning non-party 
William L. McCrory currently penrung before the Court. Although there is no specific 
rule for withdrawing as attorney of record for a non-party, because no issues remain 
related to non-party McCrory, no further representation is required for McCrory in this 
matter. 
The last known address of non-party McCrory is as follows: 6065 N. Harcourt 
Drive, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, 83815. A copy of this notice is being mailed to McCrory at 
such address. 
. "'* Dated this ., day of December 2010. 
MACOMBER LAW, PLLC 
Arthur B. Macomber 
Attorney for William L. McCrory 
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De c. 7. 2010 12: 07PM Macornbe r Law PLLC No.0651 P. 3/3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the l1h. day of December 2010, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing: 
NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD 
FOR NON-PARTY WILLIAM L. MCCRORY 
Peter Erbland [ ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Paine, Hamblen, Coffin, Brooke & Miller, LLP [ ] Hand Delivered 
701 Front Ave., Ste. 101 [ ] Overnight Mail 
P.O. BoxE kf Facsimile: 664-6338 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-0328 
Main Phone: 664-8115 
FAX: 664-6338 
Attorney for Defendant Mike Kennedy 
Michael Haman [ ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
P.O. Box 2155 ( ] Hand Delivered 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 [ ] Overnight Mail 
FAX: 676-1683 M Facsimile: 676-1683 
Scott Reed [ ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
P.O. Box A [ ] Hand Delivered 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 [ ] Overnight Mail 
Main Phone: 664-2161 M Facsimile: 765-S 117 
FAX: 765-5117 
ATtorney for Defendant Mike Kennedy 
Starr Kelso [ ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
P.O. Box 1312 [ ] Hand Delivered 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 [ ] Overnight Mail 
FAX: 664-6261 ~ Facsimile: 664-6261 
Attorney for Plaintiff Jim Brannon 
William L. McCrory kt U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
6065 N. Harcourt Drive [ ] Hand Delivered 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 81 5 [ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile: 
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Coeur d'Alene 
Reporting 
\;~6t11~fo~~~8tJt~f.!kl5~3666 Fax 208-676-8903 
FlLEO: Toll Free 888-894-CDAR (2327) 
110 'Wallace }l:venue, Lower Leve( 
Court ana (])eposition CJ<?porters 2010 DEC -8 PH It: 38 Coeura}l1ene, Idaho 83814 
December 6, 2010 
District Court Clerk 
Kootenai County Courthouse 
324 West Garden Avenue 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
www.cdareporting.com 
CLERK SISTRICT COURT 
Re: Brannon vs. City of Coeur d'Alene, et at.- No. CV 09-10010 
9/15/2010 Testimony of Timothy Hurst 
Dear District Court Clerk: 
NOTICE OF PREPARATION OF ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPT 
Notice is hereby given that a transcript totaling 50 pages, entitled Testimony 
of Timothy Hurst in Brannon vs. City of Coeur d'Alene dated 9/15/2010, has 
been delivered to the District Court of the State of Idaho. 
A certified copy has been delivered to: 
Starr Kelso 
Law Office of Star Kelso 
P.O. Box 1312 
1621 N. Third Street, Suite 600 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1312 
If additional copies of the transcript are requested, please call Coeur d'Alene 
Reporting at 208-765-3666. 
cc: Original transcript 
Court Clerk 
All Counsel 
Personable ... Dependable ... Flexible 
Depositions - Court- Conference Room - E-Transcript- Video -Realtime Hookup 
11~fo ~8t ,Jk)5~
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Coeur d'Alene 
Reporting 
STATE OF IDAHO Ph.l~8-765-3666 Fax 208-676-8903 ~~Uf0~Y OF KOOTENAifTon Free 888-894-CDAR (2327) 
110 'Watlace)Ivenue, Lower £eve[ 
Court aruf CJJeposition CJ{.eporters 
December 6, 2010 
District Court Clerk 
Kootenai County Courthouse 
324 West Garden Avenue 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Coeura)Ifene, Itfafzo 83814 
www.cdareporting.com ZDlO OEC ""8 PH ft: 31 
Cl ERK DISTRiCT COURT 
Re: Brannon vs. City of Coeur d'Alene, et al.- No. CV 09-10010 
9/15/2010 Testimony of Eugene Marano 
Dear District Court Clerk: 
NOTICE OF PREPARATION OF ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPT 
Notice is hereby given that a transcript totaling 41- pages, entitled Testimony 
of Eugene Marano in Brannon vs. City of Coeur d'Alene dated 9/15/2010, has 
been delivered to the District Court of the State of Idaho. 
A certified copy has been delivered to: 
Starr Kelso 
Law Office of Star Kelso 
P.O. Box 1312 
1621 N. Third Street, Suite 600 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1312 
If additional copies of the transcript are requested, please call Coeur d'Alene 
Reporting at 208-765-3666. 
cc: Original transcript 
Court Clerk 
All Counsel 
Personable ... Dependable ... Flexible 
Depositions~ Court ~ Conference Room ~ E-Transcript ~ Video ~Realtime Hookup 
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Deo 29 2010 9:01AM PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 12086646338 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAl. DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 1N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JIM BRANNON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO, a 
municipal corporation; et al., 
Defendants. 
) Case No. CV 09-10010 ) 
~ ORDER ON APPLICATION FOR 
) COSTS AND FEES 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
The Motions for an award of fees and costs and objections thereto came before tho court 
fbr bearing on Dccombc;r 7, 2010. Plaintiff, lim Brannon, was l'epresented. by Attorney Starr 
Kelso. Defendant Susan K. Weathers and City of Coeur d'Alene were represented by Attorney 
Michael L. Haman. Defendant Mike Kennedy was represented by Attorney Peter C. Erbland. 
Whereupon, the court having considered the argument and submissions of the parties, and 
having considered the files and records in this case, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant City of Coeur d'Alene's Motion for An Award 
of Anomey Fees and Discretionary Costs is hereby dcnic:d. Defendant City of Coeur d'Alene is 
~warded total costs incurred as ama.tter ofrigh.t in the amount of$167.20. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Mike Kennedy's Motion for An Award of 
Discretionary Costs is denied. Defendant Mike Kennedy is awarded costs as a matter of right in 
the amount of$58.00. 
ORDER ON APPLICATION FOR COSTS AND FEES-I 
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Dee 29 2010 9:01AM PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 12086646338 
Starr Kelso 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 13l2 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
Michael L. Haman 
Haman Law Office 
P.O. Box 2155 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
Peter C. Erbland 
Pa.inc &mblon LLP 
P.O. BoxE 
Coeur d'Alene. ID 83816-2530 
H:\CDAD0CS\3'7101\0000l\PLEAD\C04Sl2S 
ORDER ON APPLICATION FOR COST5 AND FEES • J 
EMAIL to 
TELECOPY (FAX) to: 208 664-6261 
UNITED STATES MAIL 
EMAIL to mlhaman.law@gmail.com 
TELECOPY (FAX) to: 208 676-1683 
UNITED STATES MAIL 
EMAIL to peter.erbhmd@.pa]nehamblon.eom 
TBLBCOPV (FAX) to: 208 664-6338 
UNITED STATES MAn.. 
7o~ 
p.4 
1
 l
10
IL C
·
; c O ?lOI\ooool\PLEAO\C04S1
S·
® e
painehamblon,CDlD
Y
SC 38417-2011 Page 2668 of 2676
Deo 29 2010 9~01AM PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 12086646338 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JIM BRANNON, 
Plaintiff. 
) Case No. CV 09-10010 
vs. 
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO, a 
municipal corporation; et al., 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants. ) _____________________________ 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL OR TO ALTER OR AMEND 
JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs Motion for a 1\ew Trial, or in the alternatjve, to Alter or Amend the Judgment, 
came on for hearing on December 7, 2010. Plaintiff, Jim Brannon, was represented by Attorney 
Starr Kelso. Defendant Susan K. Weathers and City of Coeur d'Alene were represented by 
Attorney Michael L. Haman. Defendant Mike Kennedy was r~rQ5Qntc.d by Attorney Pctt;r C. 
Erbland. 
Whereupon., the court having considered the argument and submissions of the parties, and 
having considered the files and records in this case. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial or in the alternative~ 
Motion to AJter or Amend the Judgment be and hereby is denied. 
DATEDthis---f--dayof~~/- ,201_L 
J' 
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In the Supreme Court of the State oiiiftt-)NjrENAJ}ss 
JIM BRANNON, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO, a ) 
municipal corporation; SUSAN K. ) 
WEATHERS, in her capacity as the City of ) 
Coeur d'Alene City Clerk; and MIKE ) 
KENNEDY, in his capacity as the incumbent ) 
candidate for the City of Coeur d'Alene ) 
Counsel Seat #2, ) 
) 
Defendants-Respondents. ) 
2UIIJ!iN21 AHII: 28 
c 
ORDER SUSPENDING APPEAL 
Supreme Court Docket No. 38417-2011 
Kootenai County Docket No. 2009-10010 
The Notice of Appeal in the above captioned matter filed in this Court January 4, 
2011, requested that a Reporter's Transcript be prepared. However, the Notice of Appeal failed to 
comply with Idaho Appellate Rules 17( o )( 5)(b) and 25( a) in that it did not specifically list the 
date(s) and title(s) of the hearing(s) required to be transcribed for purposes of this Appeal: 
therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant shall file an AMENDED NOTICE OF 
APPEAL which complies with Idaho Appellate Rules 17(o)(5)(b) and 25(a), and shall specify the 
date(s) and title(s) title of the hearing(s) required to be transcribed for purposes of this Appeal. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDER that Appellant shall serve the Reporter(s) with a copy of 
the Amended Notice of Appeal and shall indicate in the Amended Notice of Appeal which 
reporter(s) was served. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED the Amended Notice of Appeal shall be filed with the 
District Court within fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order. In the event an Amended 
Notice of Appeal is not filed, this appeal may proceed on the Clerk's Record ONLY. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that this appeal is SUSPENDED until further notice. 
ORDER SUSPENDING APPEAL- Docket No. 38417-2011 
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STARR KELSO 
Attorney at Law #2445 
P.O. Box 1312 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 816 
Tel: 208-765-3260 
Fax: 208-664-6261 
Attorney for Appellant Brannon 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST mDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
JIM BRANNON, 
Appellant 
vs. 
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 
a municipal corporation, et.al. 
Respondents. 
Case No. CV-09-10010 
***AMENDED*** 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE; SUSAN K. 
WEATHERS in her capacity as the City of Coeur d'Alene City Clerk; AND MIKE KENNEDY 
in his capacity as the incumbent candidate for the City of Coeur d'Alene Council Seat# 2; and 
THE PARTIES RESPECTIVE ATTORNEYS MICHAEL HAMAN, SCOTT REED, AND 
PETER ERBLAND 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellant, Jim Brannon appeals against the above named respondents to 
the Idaho Supreme Court from the final Judgment entered on November 4, 2010 and the 
post judgment order denying Appellant's Motion for a New Trial or in the Alternative 
Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment, Senior District Court Judge Charles W. Hosack 
presiding and all interlocutory orders entered by the Court prior thereto, simultaneously 
therewith, and subsequent thereto. 
2. That the appellant has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment 
described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a) (1) 
I.A.R. and Idaho Code section 34-2025 (b). 
1 AMENDED--NOTICE OF APPEAL 
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3. Preliminary Issues on Appeal: 
1. Whether the district court erred in holding that the City and City Clerk were permitted 
in 2009 to enter into a contract with Kootenai County and the Clerk of the Court 
whereby all responsibility for the conduct of the City's election, and duties of the City 
Clerk, were delegated to the County and Clerk. 
2. Whether the district court erred in dismissing the complaint to set aside the entire 2009 
City of Coeur d'Alene General Election and only retaining the contest for Seat 2? 
3. Whether UOCA VA residency statutes are applicable to municipal elections? 
4. Whether the failure of the County and Clerk to maintain an I.C. 34-1011 and I.C. 50-
451 absentee ballot record constitutes misconduct. 
5. Whether the district court erred in holding that mere return envelopes, some of which 
or marked "void" and some of which have no date and time stamp recording their 
receipt, is compliance with the absentee ballot record required to be kept by the Clerk 
pursuant to I. C. 34-1011 and/or I.C. 50-451. 
6. Whether the district court erred by not adopting the November 6, 2009 absentee ballot 
record (Exhibit 5) as being prima facie proof that more absentee ballots were counted 
than were actually received by the Clerk by the close of the polls? 
7. Whether the district court erred in holding, without any evidence in the record, that the 
2050 return envelopes counted by Judge Marano each contained a legal and valid 
absentee ballot when the absentee ballot record printed on November 6, 2009 (Exhibit 
5) documents that only 2041 valid absentee ballots were received prior to the close of 
the polls. 
8. Whether the district court erred by only requiring that the board of canvassers accept a 
print-out of machine vote totals to meet their responsibility to "count votes" pursuant to 
I.e. 34-2001 (6)? 
9. Whether the district court erred by not entering its order requiring voters that cast 
absentee ballots, who were not able to located within the city or the county for service 
of process, to appear at the trial as permitted by I. C. 34-2013? 
2 AMENDED--NOTICE OF APPEAL 
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10. Whether the district court erred in not considering prior recorded statements of voters 
as substantive proof of who they cast their respective ballots for when they testified at 
trial that, at that time, they can not remember who they voted for in the election? 
11. Whether the district court erred in holding that Denise Dobslaff, a landed immigrant in 
Canada, was a resident for the purpose of voting in the City's municipal election? 
12. Whether the district court erred in hoiding that the Cierk does not have an obiigation 
under I. C. 50-445 to determine whether an applicant for an absentee ballot is registered 
and lawfully entitled to vote as requested by the applicant. (e.g. a resident of the city)? 
13. Whether the district court erred in holding that Kimberly Gagnon, who has never 
resided in the city, was a qualified voter simply because she is the spouse of a current 
member of the military? 
14. Whether the district court erred in holding that Alan Friend, who listed his residence as 
a commercial building and whose internet advertising claims he is a permanent resident 
of Canada, was a qualified voter? 
15. Whether the district court erred by not requiring, under I.C. 50-402 "residence", that a 
voter living outside of the city must have a "fixed" principal or primary home or place 
of abode within the city, to which he intends to return to as opposed to a general intent 
to possibly someday return to the City? 
16. Whether erred, when the evidence establishes that at least two voters were provided the 
wrong ballots at polling places, by holding that in a "combined" election where more 
than one ballot is to be voted and the poll books are to document which type of ballot a 
person receives, that the fifty three "in-person" voters, for whom there are no records 
documenting which ballot they were respectively given, that the each were provided 
the correct ballot to cast their vote on when they appeared at the polls. 
17. Whether there is substantial competent evidence that supports the district court's 
holding that Judge Marano counted 2051 absentee ballots as being received. 
18. Whether the district court erred by not shifting that the burden of proof to Defendants, 
once the Plaintiff established that the only reliable absentee ballot record database 
documented that only 2041 valid absentee ballots were received by the Clerk and the 
machine reflects 2051 absentee ballots were counted which difference in number is 
3 AMENDED--NOTICE OF APPEAL 
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five more than the difference in the vote totals attributed to Appellant Brannon and 
Defendant Kennedy? 
19. Whether the district court judge erred in not disqualifying himself given his pretrial 
statements in open court, on the record, that election challenges established is bias if 
election challenges were permitted would cause anarchy reign? 
20. Whether the district court erred in hoiding that the proposed, but previously denied, 
requested amended complaint failed to state a claim for malconduct under I. C. 34-
2001? 
21. Whether the district court erred in confirming the 2009 City of Coeur d'Alene General 
Election? 
22. Whether the district court erred in declaring Defendant Kennedy as duly elected to Seat 
2 in the 2009 City of Coeur d'Alene General Election? 
23. Whether the district court (Judge Simpson) erred in requiring Plaintiff to file a 
$5,000.00 bond. 
24. Whether the district erred in denying Appellant's motion for a new trial or in the 
alternative to alter or amend the judgment. 
4. An order has not been issued sealing all or a part of the record. 
5. (a) The entire reporter's standard transcript pursuant to IAR Rule 25, in hard copy, 
supplemented by the following: 
1. The following pre-trial hearings: 
a 1128/2010 Status Conference Hearing, Reporter JoAnn Schaller 
b. 3/02/10 Entire Hearing, Reporter JoAnn Schaller 
c. 5/14/2010 Entire Hearing, Reporter Ann McManus 
d. 6/14/2010 Entire Hearing, Reporter Byrl Cinnamon 
e. 8/31/2010 Entire Hearing, Reporter Valerie Nunemacher 
f. 9/13/10 pre-trial hearings on motions on Kennedy motion in Limine and 
Plaintiff Motion to Disqualify Judge Hosack, Reporter Valerie 
Nunemacher 
g. 9/13/10 Opening statements of counsel 
h. 9/18/10 Closing arguments of counsel, Reporter Allison Stovall 
4 AMENDED--NOTICE OF APPEAL 
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1. 12/07/10 Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial or in alternative 
Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment, Reporter Byrl Cinnamon 
6. The appellant selects the "scan" option under Idaho Appellate Rule 27 (b), effective as 
of July 1, 2010, and requests the clerk of the district court to "scan the entire 
district court fiie as the record in iieu of the appellant designating certain docwuents to 
be included in the record." 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a 
transcript has been requested: 
(b) The clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of 
the reporter's transcript. 
(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the Clerk's record has been paid. 
(d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20.-. 
Starr Kelso, Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: I certify that a copy of the foregoing was faxed on the 1st day of 
February, 2011 to: 
ATTORNEYS 
Michael L. Haman 
Haman Law Office 
P.O. Box 2155 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
FAX :208-676-1683 
5 AMENDED--NOTICE OF APPEAL 
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Peter C. Erbland, ISB#2456 
Paine, Hamblen, Coffin, Brooke & Miller, LLP 
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101 
Post Office Box E 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0328 
FAJ{:208-664-6338 
Scott W. Reed, ISB#818 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box A 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
F AJ{: 208-765-5117 
COURT REPORTERS 
Coeur d' Alene Reporting 
Valerie Nunemacher 
Keri Veare 
Allison Stoval 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
JIM BRANNON, 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, 
VS. 
CITY OF COEUR D' ALENE, IDAHO 
a municipal corporation, et a1 
DEFENDANTIRESPONDENT 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
SUPREME COURT 
CASE NO. 38417-2011 
I, Clifford T. Hayes, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for 
the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in the above entitled cause 
was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true, full and correct record of the pleadings and 
documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
I further certify that exhibits were offered in this case and have been included with the Clerk's Record. 
I certify that the Attorneys for the Appellant and Respondent were notified that the Clerk's Record was 
complete and ready to be picked up, or if the attorney is out of town, the copies were mailed by U.S. mail, 
postage prepaid on the 17TH day of May. 2011. 
I do further certify that the Clerk's Record will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. 
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at Kootenai County, 
Idaho this 17TH day May. 2011. 
CLIFFORD T. HAYES 
Clerk of the District Court 
